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ABSTRACT 
SEEING TWO WORLDS: THE ESCHATOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF  
THE JOINT DECLARATION ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
Jakob Karl Rinderknecht, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, signed in 1999 by the 
Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church, represents the high-water 
mark of the twentieth-century ecumenical movement. It declared that the sixteenth-
century condemnations related to the central question of the Reformation do not apply to 
the theology of the partner church today. This declaration rests on a differentiated 
consensus on justification that emerged over forty years of bilateral dialogue. Within this 
consensus, Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies of justification, while different and 
possibly even incompatible, need not be understood as contradictory. This claim has 
proven to be controversial regarding both the particular consensus on justification and the 
logical possibility of such a differentiated consensus. Members of both churches have 
insisted that the division cannot be overcome unless the questions of the sixteenth century 
are answered in their favor, making use of their cherished theological terminology.  
This dissertation reapproaches the question of differentiated consensus using the 
tools of contemporary cognitive linguistics. It investigates the embodied character of 
human knowing to demonstrate that conversation between communities of understanding 
requires attention to their particular structures of language and knowledge. In particular, 
attention to the “metaphoric blends” that structure meaning can reveal underlying 
agreement within seeming contradiction.  
The anthropological claims of the Joint Declaration, namely the Tridentine 
insistence that concupiscence in the baptized is not sin properly-speaking, and the 
Lutheran dictum simul iustus et peccator, meaning that the Christian is at the same time 
justified and a sinner, serve as test cases for the thesis. These seemingly contradictory 
assertions each seek to describe a double-vision of the Christian as already saved by 
God’s action, but not-yet fully remade. The Roman Catholic claim is shown to depend on 
the cognitive blend SIN IS JUST CAUSE FOR DISINHERITANCE, interpreted within the 
cognitive frame provided by THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM. The Lutheran position is a 
development of Luther’s contrasting blend SIN IS ANYTHING THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD 
WITH GOD’S LAW, understood within the framing provided by the distinctively Lutheran 
space THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ECCLESIAL DISUNION 
Theological Diversity and Ecclesial Division 
The second millennium of Christian history was termed “the era of Christian 
division” by Pope John Paul II.1 It is an apt description, as this era saw the formalization 
of many divisions between those who call themselves Christian. These divisions grew 
from acrimonious politics, mutual distrust, cultural chauvinism, and real disagreements in 
theology. As the contemporary participants in ecumenical dialogues attempt to sort out 
what differences are properly theological, and of those, which require division, they have 
often found much more commonality than they expected. But real differences remain.  
Which theological differences are worthy of the designation “church-dividing” is 
to a certain extent dependent on context. Churches that have inherited a broken 
communion seem to require a higher standard of theological unity to re-establish visible 
unity than would be required to maintain it. When the delegates to the Lutheran World 
Federation’s (LWF) 1963 Assembly in Helsinki were unable to agree on a statement 
about justification in the modern world, it was a source of frustration, but not a reason for 
disunion among the LWF churches.
2
 Among Catholics, the case of the Society of St. Pius 
X (SSPX) is illuminative. The leaders of this group were formally excommunicated 
because of extra-canonical ordinations, not doctrine. Nevertheless, it is continued 
theological dissent from official teaching that prevents its return to full participation in 
                                                 
1Pope John Paul II, encyclical letter, “Ut unum sint” (May 25, 1995), §1. 
2
 For a treatment of the 1963 Assembly, see Jens Holger Schjørring, Prasanna Kumari, and 
Norman A. Hjelm, eds., From Federation to Communion: The History of the Lutheran World Federation, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 375–381. 
  2 
the church’s common life.3 Holding positions at the border of orthodoxy, or even beyond 
it, need not drive a person or a group from participation in the broader church’s life. 
Remaining in communion may allow their positions to receive a more open hearing. On 
the other hand, once the border is closed, there is significantly less reason to believe that 
the dissenting group will be allowed to define its position as falling within the catholica. 
This is, perhaps, an unintended outcome of the Vincentian canon, which defines orthodox 
catholic belief as that which is believed by the church.
4
 Once a group is considered to not 
be fully within the church, many more of their teachings can be brought into question. 
The locations of ecclesial borders were very much at issue in the sixteenth-century 
debates. One need only consider the summation of the first part of the Augsburg 
Confession (AC) written in 1530, when there was still hope for unity:  
This is nearly a complete summary of the teaching among us. As can be seen, 
there is nothing here that departs from the scriptures or the catholic church, 
insofar as we can tell from its writers. Because this is so, those who claim that our 
people are to be regarded as heretics judge too harshly. The entire dissension 
concerns a few specific abuses, which have crept into the churches without any 
proper authority.
5
 
This is quite a different tone than that taken by the Formula of Concord, written in 1580, 
well after both schism and polemic had become normative. In describing the section of 
the Augsburg Confession quoted above, the irenic tone has been replaced by a combative 
voice:  
                                                 
3
 See Peter Hünermann, “Excommunication–Communication an Essay in Layered Analysis,” 
Horizons 36 no.2 (2009), 285–340. 
4
 That is, that true Christian doctrine is attested “semper, ubique, et ab omnibus” a principle that 
Vincent of Lérins’ augments with a second describing the growth of Christian doctrine in continuity with 
what preceded it. Both are found in Vincent’s Duo Commonitoria, (Migne PL 50.0640; 0667–68). 
5
 Augsburg Confession, Latin Text, Conclusion of Part I, 1–2. The Book of Concord, Robert Kolb 
and Timothy J. Wengert, eds., (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000). I will cite the Lutheran Confessional 
documents from this translation, unless otherwise noted. Hereafter, the Augsburg Confession will be cited 
as AC.  
  3 
[T]he opposition regarded this genuine Reformation as a new teaching, as if it 
were totally contrary to God’s word and established Christian practices. They 
attacked this Reformation vigorously but without foundation and brought charges 
against it filled with the wildest lies and accusations. This caused the Christian 
electors, princes, and estates, who had at that time accepted the pure teaching of 
the holy gospel and had reformed their churches in Christian fashion according to 
the Word of God, to arrange for the presentation of a Christian confession 
composed on the basis of God’s Word at the great imperial assembly in Augsburg 
in 1530. They submitted it to Emperor Charles V as their clear and unequivocal 
Christian confession of what is held and taught in the Christian, Evangelical 
churches, regarding the most important articles of the faith —particularly 
regarding those things that had become matters of controversy between them and 
the pope’s adherents. This elicited a churlish reaction from their opponents, but, 
praise God, this confession has endured to this day, without being refuted or 
overturned.
6
  
By 1580 the situation of the argument had shifted. There was no longer room to argue 
that both Lutherans and Catholics belonged to the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic 
church. Instead, the Lutherans could only argue that they were the church against the 
claim of the Romans. This shift is not unique to the Lutheran, although it is most clear in 
their writings, in part because the burden of proof remained with them in 1530. The 
papacy did not feel the need to prove its catholicity then or later. However, even the 
Confutation of the Augsburg Confession (CAC), a document which has little desire to 
make room for the reformers’ opinions, ends with an agreement that renewal is needed in 
the churches of the Holy Roman Empire, and a plea for unity in the one faith. While this 
document also threatens military action should the reformers not accept the Emperor’s 
response, it recognizes that “the Elector, princes, and estates agree on many of the articles 
with the catholic and Roman Church. Further, these same authorities also condemn and 
reject the godless teachings that have been spread by pamphlet among the German 
                                                 
6
 Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, 2–3, from the Kolb–Wengert translation. Hereafter, FC. 
  4 
people.”7 They are admonished, therefore, to “come to agreement in these things” which 
the Confutation rejects in the CA, so as to “prove obedient to the Christian faith and the 
catholic and Roman Church.”8 These are requests addressed to the fringes of the church, 
not to those outside it. They are a final plea for unity before a division point is reached.  
Justification and the Reformation  
Justification can, without overstatement, be called a nexus of the Reformation-era 
debates. Certainly other issues, particularly liturgical, sacramental, and ecclesiological 
questions, were strenuously debated and occasioned disagreement contributing to the 
schism, but these questions were understood, especially from the Lutheran perspective,
9
 
to be outcomes of the inability to unify the different descriptions of the divine 
justification of the sinner.
10
 
                                                 
7
 Confutation of the Augsburg Confession, Epilogue. Sources and Contexts of The Book of 
Concord, Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen, eds., (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 139. Hereafter, 
CAC. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Before the break became final, the Reformers repeatedly stipulated that many differences of 
practice, including the papacy, the mass, and monastic vows could be accepted if only agreement on 
justification could be reached. See, among others, Melanchthon’s appendix to the Smalcald Articles, in 
which he professes that “if [the pope] would allow the gospel,” Lutherans would even accept his superiority 
over the other bishops, albeit “by human right.” Smalcald Articles, Subscriptions. In Kolb and Wengert, 
326. By 1537, when the Smalcald Articles were written, Luther himself believed that the papacy was 
beyond reformation. Earlier in the decade, however, he had expressed a similar opinion in a letter to 
Melanchthon dated June 29, 1530: “Just as I have always written, I am prepared to concede all things to 
them, if only the gospel is allowed its freedom among us. But, I am not able to concede on anything that 
fights against the gospel.” “Ego sicuti semper scripsi, Omnia eis concedere paratus, tantum solo euangelio 
nobis libere permisso. Quod autem cum euangelio pugnat, concedere non possum.” WA B 5.407. 
10
 Many “fundamental differences” [Grunddifferenzen] have been proposed as lying at the root of 
Catholic-Lutheran division. This question is not central to the present project and must be laid aside. 
Instead, the particular differences related to describing the state of the baptized Christian will be engaged, 
as they are described in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. Readers interested in 
pursuing the question of Grunddifferenzen should see Harding Meyer, “Fundamental Difference—
Fundamental Consensus.” Mid-Stream 25, no. 3 (July 1, 1986), for a clear overview of the topic and the 
first chapter of Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, and Difference: To the Heart of the Lutheran-Roman 
Catholic Differentiated Consensus on Justification, (New York: T&T Clark, 2012), for a clear-headed 
engagement with the problem that such proposals pose to an ecumenical theology.  
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The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (1999) 
The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, signed by the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation in Augsburg, Germany on October 
31, 1999, is therefore an unparalleled ecumenical event. It is the only signed bilateral 
agreement between the Roman Catholic Church and a communion issuing from the 
Reformation, and it addresses a central issue of the sixteenth-century debate. Its 
contribution to the cause of church unity cannot be overlooked. It draws on several 
decades of ecumenical dialogues to agree that the seemingly insuperable condemnations 
of the sixteenth century can be overcome ecumenically without rejecting the validity of 
those concerns.  
Nevertheless, the Joint Declaration’s proclamation of the non-applicability of the 
sixteenth-century condemnations to the contemporary positions of the dialogue partner 
rests on a particular differentiated consensus regarding justification, and this has proven 
to be somewhat controversial. Both Lutherans and Roman Catholics have questioned 
whether this consensus is adequate to their own traditions of teaching, both have asked 
whether the partner’s positions are fairly represented, and both have asked whether the 
resulting consensus between them is a true consensus.  
Outline of the Project 
In this project, I will begin to answer these questions, starting with a chapter on 
the history of the Joint Declaration and its critics. It will become clear in this chapter that 
the critiques fall into two different types: those related to the content of the faith as it is 
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presented in the JDDJ, and those related to the possibility of a differentiated consensus at 
all. Before answering any questions of content, it will be necessary to ask whether such a 
thing as a differentiated consensus is possible, and if so, what it would look like. 
The second chapter, then, represents a kind of “zooming out,” to the bigger 
question of consensus in ecumenical dialogue. In this chapter, I will attend not only to 
ecumenical considerations of what constitutes a consensus, but to the particular questions 
related to differentiated consensus —that is, a consensus in which the parties arrive at 
common statements that are then differentially applied within the habitual language of 
each. While the Joint Declaration does not use the language of “differentiated 
consensus,” its very structure demonstrates that such a consensus is present in it, for each 
subsection begins with a common paragraph that is then followed by a Lutheran and a 
Roman Catholic explanation.
11
 
In this chapter, it will become clear that while differentiated consensuses have 
been recognized by many of those who have participated in the dialogues, there is still no 
adequate explanation as to why they might be possible. George Lindbeck’s famous The 
Nature of Doctrine, for example, begins to show that theological language works in this 
way, without providing an explanation as to why. The third chapter therefore represents 
another level of “zooming out,” this time to the question of human language and 
cognition. It considers the insights of contemporary cognitive linguists regarding 
language structure, especially the role metaphors play in making linguistic meaning 
                                                 
11
 Harding Meyer defines differentiated consensus in much this manner. Such a consensus will 
contain “a statement, which states in fundamental and essential content the agreement attained on a 
doctrine that until now was disputed, and a statement which says, how and why the remaining doctrinal 
differences can be evaluated as admissible and do not call into question the agreement in its fundamental 
and essential aspects.” Harding Meyer, “Die Struktur ökumenischer Konsense,” 60–74 in Versöhnte 
Verscheidenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie I, (Frankfurt/M: Lembeck, 1998), 74. 
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possible for humans. The reason that a differentiated consensus might be possible, and in 
fact, necessary to mediate between different traditions of discourse, will become clear. I 
am especially indebted to the work of Robert Masson in relating these insights to 
theology. Here I develop his work by applying it explicitly to understanding what 
happens when two Christian traditions of theological discourse seek to agree on questions 
of historical division.  
The last two chapters are the application of the theory developed in the first three. 
I have chosen to investigate one theological locus in the JDDJ by means of this method, 
that is, the anthropology of the baptized Christian. It makes a felicitous test case for 
several reasons. First, it represents an area of the Joint Declaration’s text that has received 
considerable examination and challenge. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
(CDF) and the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity (PCPCU) pointed 
to this question as the first area requiring more investigation in their initial public 
engagement with the JDDJ.
12
 Specifically, they wondered how Catholics might be able to 
understand the Lutheran description of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator [at the 
same time just and a sinner] given their own theological commitments. On the other side, 
Lutherans have objected to the approval that the JDDJ gives to the Council of Trent’s 
canon stating that concupiscence in the baptized is not properly-speaking sin.
13
 This 
points to another useful characteristic of the choice of test-case: there are important 
                                                 
12
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of 
Christian Unity, “Response of the Catholic Church to the Joint Declaration of the Catholic Church and the 
Lutheran World Federation on the Doctrine of Justification,” Information Service 98 (1998), 93–95. In 
German: Friedrich Hauschild, Udo Hahn, and Andreas Siemens, eds., Die Gemeinsame Erkärung zur 
Rechtfertigungslehre: Dokumentation des Entstehungs und Rezeptionsprozesses, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2009), C.55. 
13
 See Wilfried Härle, “Lutherische Formeln – tridentinisch interpretiert,” epd-Dokumentation no. 
43/99(1999):5. Available at http://goo.gl/a1xlEX. Accessed September 19, 2014. 
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sixteenth-century loci on both sides of the debate. This means not only that there is the 
data of the contemporary dialogues, and of the process of evolution of the JDDJ and its 
contemporary dissenters, but there is sufficient data available in the documents of the 
Reformation era. This breadth of consideration allows us to consider how the JDDJ’s 
proposed solution solves the problem both as it is understood now and as it was examined 
then.  
Chapter four approaches the question from Roman Catholic theology, specifically 
from a consideration of concupiscence in the baptized. I will argue that Trent’s insistence 
that this reality is not sin stems from a particular understanding of sin and from a desire 
to protect the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism. Trent recognizes that concupiscence 
remains, and is no indifferent reality, even if it is not sin, “properly-speaking.” This sets 
up a double-vision of the Christian as someone who is saved by incorporation into Christ 
by the Holy Spirit, but has not yet reached the fullness of that incorporation and still 
struggles with the tinder of sin. He thus already participates in what he is to become, but 
is not yet fully made into the form of his final justice by God’s action.  
This chapter will examine the theological development from the bull Exsurge 
Domine (June 15, 1520) to the Tridentine declaration on original sin (June 17, 1546) and 
will describe the Roman Catholic understanding of concupiscence in the baptized in 
terms of the Roman Catholic definition of “sin” and its framing by the sacrament of 
baptism. It will then show how this vision, as present in the JDDJ, demonstrates a real 
consensus with the Lutheran position and yet is able to accept the habitual language of 
both groups.  
  9 
Chapter five will then turn to the Lutherans and follow much the same procedure. 
Here the question is posed by the Lutheran aphorism simul iustus et peccator. This first 
arises in Luther’s Lectures on Romans (1515/16), is developed in his Against Latomus 
(1521), and receives its classical framing in terms of law and gospel in the Lectures on 
Galatians (1531). The concept receives some attention in the Confessions of the Lutheran 
Churches, and quite a bit in twentieth-century Lutheran theology. Two developing 
traditions of interpretation will be examined, that of twentieth-century German theology, 
and that of the recent Finnish Luther School.  
As in the Catholic chapter, I will examine how the concept of sin is 
metaphorically structured in Luther’s writing and contemporary Lutheran thought. It will 
then relate that to Luther’s distinctive framing in terms of law and gospel, and show how 
a unique eschatological vision of the Christian develops. After doing this, I will be able to 
demonstrate how these traditions are made present in the JDDJ and demonstrate real 
consensus with the Roman Catholic positions.  
In the contemporary world, Christians have had little choice but to come to terms 
with one another. Thrown together by history, by new patterns of migration, and by the 
effects of technology, we have come to see that those from whom we are separated not 
only proclaim Christ’s gospel in different, although recognizable ways, but that they 
share many of the same liturgical inheritances from our common ancestors. The 
recognition that any division in the church is not only scandalous, but also sinful, gives 
further impetus to the project of church unity. But Christian unity will always be a unity 
in the truth. A new challenge stands before the churches: to learn to see Christ in the 
separated brethren and to understand their proclamation well enough to affirm what is 
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true, to challenge what needs correction, and to accept what differences we are able to. 
This requires an account of difference and consensus in ecumenical dialogue that can 
account for both our common witness to the gospel and our continued diversity of 
theological language. 
 
 
  
 
     
CHAPTER ONE:  
JUSTIFICATION AND ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE JDDJ 
Chapter Introduction 
Lutherans and Catholics likely constitute the pair of separated churches best 
suited to the project of reconciliation through dialogue. They are historically separated by 
clearly defined theological disputes. These disputes have been extensively explored by 
many theologians spread across both centuries and cultures. Both churches have official 
structures that can speak authoritatively for the tradition. They have inhabited many of 
the same geographical spaces and therefore experience ongoing pressure for institutional 
reconciliation because of intermarriage, ecumenical friendship, and other kinds of 
personal relationships. All of this has contributed to a fruitful Lutheran–Catholic dialogue 
in the years since the Second Vatican Council on both the international level and in 
several national dialogues. The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ) 
represents the high-point of these dialogues’ work. It harvests the fruits of many years of 
engagement into the first, and thus far only, bilateral statement to be officially received 
and signed by representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and a community issuing 
from the Reformation.
1
  
Despite this success, the Joint Declaration has not been received without 
controversy. Each version, including the final form, received its share of critique from 
both churches and their theologians. Within these critiques, one can discern two types of 
response, the first having to do with method, the second with particular aspects of its 
                                                 
1
 Lutheran World Federation and Roman Catholic Church, Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). 
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content. The central claim of the Declaration is that the dialogue of the last forty years 
has shown Lutheran and Roman Catholic descriptions of justification to be open to each 
other in such a way that each church can affirm that the condemnations of the sixteenth 
century do not apply to the other church’s teaching. This claim depends on a particular 
methodology growing out of the experience of dialogue since the Second Vatican 
Council. Called “differentiated” or “differentiating consensus,” it attempts to convey the 
insight of recognizing in the other church’s position a different, but nonetheless 
recognizably Christian confession.
2
 If unity in difference is not accepted as a possibility, 
no dialogue’s proposed consensus can be received. Theologians will continue to merely 
repeat the same confessional party lines that have characterized polemical theology since 
the sixteenth century. On the other hand, should the possibility be entertained that two 
different confessions might share the one gospel of Jesus Christ, expressed in different 
systems of thought, using different terminology, making different assumptions, and 
emphasizing different commitments, the ecumenical goal of reconciliation is possible.  
This chapter will provide an introduction to the JDDJ, including its sources in the 
twentieth century Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, its process of coming into being, 
and the major theological critiques that it has received. I will then describe one disputed 
aspect of agreement in the Joint Declaration, which will later serve as a test case for the 
claim that the JDDJ describes a real consensus. That test case is the anthropology of the 
baptized Christian, which has occasioned much disagreement in Christian history. There 
are several reasons for attending to this question. First, both Lutherans and Catholics 
make traditional theological claims about justification that impinge on anthropology, 
                                                 
2
 There has been some dispute in recent theological work on the topic about whether this 
methodology is more properly termed “differentiated consensus” or “differentiating consensus.” Because 
the former is used more prevalently in the sources leading up to the JDDJ, I will use it exclusively.  
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each of which has traditionally been rejected by the other. These claims are the Lutheran 
axiom simul iustus et peccator and the Tridentine insistence that post-baptismal 
concupiscence cannot properly be called sin. Second, these claims have both remained 
controversial throughout the process of writing and receiving the JDDJ. Third, the two 
claims are related to each other. I will argue that both of these traditional theological 
commitments are managing the same eschatological tension in Christian life: while 
justification is proclaimed to be already present and real, the Christian nevertheless 
experiences herself as still being tempted to sin and all-too-often succumbing to that 
temptation. This double reality is the effect of the eschatological structure of Christian 
life; we are baptized into the already-completed victory of Christ, but not yet living 
entirely in the final victory of the kingdom. The well-documented difference and 
theological parallelism that exists between Lutheran and Catholic descriptions of this 
central Christian tension provides a clear case for evaluating the JDDJ’s claim to describe 
a real unity in difference regarding justification. 
The Joint Declaration and its Reception 
A Brief History of the Joint Declaration 
The Predecessor Documents to the JDDJ 
While the JDDJ itself is a short document, and the official signed statement is yet 
shorter, they both build upon several decades of official ecumenical dialogue and 
independent research. The Lutheran–Catholic dialogue was formed shortly after the 
closing of the Second Vatican Council. It issued its first report in 1972, entitled “The 
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Gospel and the Church,” (GC) often referred to as “the Malta Report” because of the 
location of its final editing.
3
 Like the statements of most ecumenical dialogues, this 
document is “offered to the churches with a recommendation for thorough study” and 
“has no binding character for the churches.”4  
The Malta Report treats the question of justification within a consideration of 
“The Gospel and Tradition.” Its context is the historical dispute between Catholics and 
Lutherans about “the center of the Gospel.” It is able to say that while in disputes over 
justification “the traditional polemical disagreements were especially sharply defined.… 
a far-reaching consensus is developing in the interpretation of” this doctrine.5 It credits 
contemporary agreement to a renewed scriptural interpretation among both Lutherans and 
Catholics, and asks several questions: 
although a far-reaching agreement in the understanding of the doctrine of 
justification appears possible, other questions arise here. What is the theological 
importance of this doctrine? Do both sides similarly evaluate its implications for 
the life and teaching of the church?
6
  
This is a very interesting statement. Already in 1972, after one round of dialogue talks, 
Lutheran and Catholic representatives were suggesting that agreement on justification 
was possible (although not yet achieved) and looking ahead to the theological and 
ecclesiological implications of a potential agreement.  
                                                 
3
 Joint Lutheran–Roman Catholic Study Commission, “Report on ‘The Gospel and the Church’ 
(Malta Report), 1972,” in Growth in Agreement I: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical 
Conversations on a World Level, ed. Harding Meyer and Lukas Vischer, (Geneva: World Conference of 
Churches, 1984), 167–89. Hereafter, GC. There is a second document of the ecumenical dialogue also 
called “the Malta Report.” This earlier document is a product of the Anglican-Roman Catholic Preparatory 
Commission, and was published in 1966. I will not be treating the Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue, so 
any references to the “Malta Report” are to GC. 
4
 GC, Preface, 168.  
5
 GC §26. 
6
 GC §28 
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The issue of justification does not arise in the next document of the Joint 
Commission, “The Eucharist,” (1978)7 but is once again discussed in the following 
document “All Under One Christ” (1980) (UC), which reexamines the Augsburg 
Confession.
8
 Drawing on a recent joint study by Lutheran and Catholic theologians,
9
 this 
document is able to describe the Augustana as “in a large measure” fulfilling its goal of 
bearing “witness to the faith of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church,” and it can 
therefore “be regarded as an expression of the common faith.”10 Referring to AC IV, the 
document was able to say that “a broad consensus emerges in the doctrine of 
justification,” about which both Roman Catholics and Lutherans can say, “it is solely by 
grace and by faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit in us that we are 
accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit who renews our hearts and equips us for and 
calls us to good works.”11  
In 1981, the international dialogue published a document on the ordained 
ministry, “The Ministry in the Church” (MC), which once again quoted the Malta Report 
as to both the historical division regarding justification and the contemporary 
                                                 
7
 Lutheran-Roman Catholic Joint Commission, “The Eucharist, 1978,” in Growth in Agreement I, 
190–213. Justification is mentioned only once, in the context of Christ’s salvific work and its effects in the 
reception of the eucharist. 
8
 Lutheran-Roman Catholic Joint Commission, “All Under One Christ,” In Growth in Agreement 
I, 241–247. Hereafter, UC. The commission also published a document on community at the same time as 
UC, which does not deal with the question of justification in a substantive manner.  
9
 Harding Meyer and Heinz Schütte eds., with Edwin Iserloh, Walter Kasper, Georg Kretschmar, 
Wenzel Lohff, G. W. Forell, and James. McCue, Confessio Augustana—Bekenntnis des einen Glaubens. 
(Paderborn: Bonifacius Druckerei, 1980).  
10
 UC §§10–11. At this time there was some discussion of an official Roman Catholic acceptance 
of the CA. While it did not come to fruition, several important theologians of both confessions argued that 
it was a possibility. For a history of this movement see Richard Penaskovic, “Roman Catholic Recognition 
of the Augsburg Confession,” Theological Studies 41, no. 2 (1980): 303-321. 
11
 UC §14. 
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convergence.
12
 The church is described as the recipient of salvation and the channel for 
that salvation to reach the world.
13
 The ministry is held up as a necessity for the church, 
and therefore for the church’s work of salvation.14 The international dialogue’s 
preoccupation with the question of ministry reflects both the early Lutheran double 
criterion for unity in AC VII,
15
 and a developing interpretation of the Second Vatican 
Council’s Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio (UR). The Decree uses the 
language of the “churches and ecclesial communities of the west” to describe the 
communities of the Reformation. After the council, a growing body of interpretation 
arose reading the two terms as mutually exclusive ecclesiological categories requiring a 
clear principle of differentiation.
16
 The division was usually made by inquiring as to the 
presence or absence of a valid eucharist and a valid sacrament of order. This 
interpretation later received substantial weight with the promulgation of two documents 
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), Communionis notio (1992) and 
Dominus Iesus (2000).
17
  
                                                 
12
 Roman Catholic-Lutheran Joint Commission, “The Ministry in the Church,” In Growth in 
Agreement I, 248–275, §9. 
13
 MC §12. 
14
 Ibid. §29. 
15
 CA 7, Latin text: “Et ad veram unitatem ecclesiae satis est consentire de doctrina evangelii et 
administratione sacramentorum.” German text: “Denn dieses ist genug zu wahrer Einigkeit der christlichen 
Kirche, dass da eintraechtiglich nach reinem Verstand das Evangelium gepredigt und die Sakramente dem 
goettlichen Wort gemaess gereicht werden.” 
16
 Second Vatican Council, “Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio” (November 21, 1964), 
§22, in Norman P. Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
1990), II:919. Hereafter, UR. 
17
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Some Aspects of the Church Understood 
as Communion, Communionis notio” (May 28, 1992), §17–18 in AAS 85 (1983): 848–49; and “Declaration 
on the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, Dominus Iesus” (August 6, 2000), 
§17, in AAS 92 (2000): 758–59. For a dissenting interpretation of the Council’s intent, see Otto Hermann 
Pesch, The Ecumenical Potential of the Second Vatican Council, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
2006), 44–47. Also helpful in interpreting this history is Catherine E. Clifford, “Elementa Ecclesia: A Basis 
for Vatican II's Recognition of the Ecclesial Character of Non-Catholic Christian Communities,” in La 
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Two regional projects were also in preparation at this point that would prove 
important in the history of the JDDJ. The US dialogue was preparing its document 
Justification by Faith (JF), published in 1983,
18
 and the German Ecumenical Working 
Group (ÖAK) was working towards its seminal 1985 document, Lehrverurteilungen — 
kirchentrennend? (LK).
19
 These two documents form the theological foundation of the 
JDDJ: JF provides a common theological statement regarding justification overall; LK 
examines whether one can say in good faith that the confessional statements and 
anathemas directed against the other’s position in the sixteenth century do not apply to 
the contemporary dialogue partner’s positions. While JF was quietly received,20 LK 
inspired a widespread and quite varied reaction.
21
 Lengthy written responses were 
                                                                                                                                                 
théologie catholique entre intransigeance et renouveau: La réception des mouvements préconciliaires à 
Vatican II, ed. Gilles Routhier, Philippe J. Roy and Karin Schelkens, (Leuven: Revue d’Histoire 
ecclesiastique, 2011), 249–69. 
18
 H. George Anderson, T. Austin Murphy, and Joseph A. Burgess, eds., Justification by Faith: 
Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII. (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985).  
19
 Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, eds., Lehrverurteilungen — kirchentrennend? 4 vols., 
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1986).  
20
 JF was received officially by the ELCA Council in 1991 (John A. Radano, Lutheran and 
Catholic Reconciliation on Justification: A Chronology of the Holy See’s Contributions, 1961–1999, to a 
New Relationship between Lutherans and Catholics and to Steps Leading to the Joint Declaration on the 
Doctrine of Justification, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 130). While there does not seem to be a parallel 
Roman Catholic reception of the document, it was listed as a resource for the JDDJ commission by the 
PCPCU Secretary in the letter of invitation to the Roman Catholic drafters (Radano, 138, n. 18). 
21
 A structural aspect of the German churches and their relationship to the LWF complicates any 
description of the development of the JDDJ. LK was produced by the Common Ecumenical Working 
Group, and its findings received by the Protestant Church of Germany [EKD], which includes Lutheran, 
United Protestant, and Reformed Protestant Churches. The EKD is formally sub-divided between two 
confessions, the United Lutheran Church in Germany [VELKD] and the Union of Evangelical Churches 
[UEK], which serves both United and Reformed Churches. Because the LWF is the Protestant party to the 
JDDJ, it broadens the LK’s findings of non-condemnation to a wider geographical and demographic base. 
Within Germany, however, it excludes the 40% of EKD membership which are not members of the LWF. 
This division adds another layer of complexity to the responses to JDDJ from German protestant professors 
of theology in 1998–1999. These differences will resurface in the critiques of the JDDJ, particularly in the 
critiques of German Landeskirchen with both Lutheran and Calvinist influences. So, for example, the 
“Beschluss der Landessynode Lippische Landeskirche,” which, in critiquing the JDDJ for not giving 
enough centrality to the doctrine of justification, cites the third book of Calvin’s Institutes for support. C.43 
in Die Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre:Dokumentation des Entstehungs und 
Rezeptionsprozesses, ed. Friedrich Hauschild, Udo Hahn, and Andreas Siemens (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2009), §4.  
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produced by the PCPCU,
22
 the Evangelical Faculty of the University of Göttingen,
23
 the 
Protestant Church of Germany,
24
 and the German Conference of Catholic Bishops.
25
 
Regarding justification, these public statements are favorable, with the notable exception 
of that of the Faculty of Göttingen. Several of these responses, however, including that of 
the PCPCU, suggest that LK falls short in its other areas of engagement.
26
  
In 1993, the international dialogue published a document entitled Church and 
Justification (CJ), which continued to develop their trajectory of engagements with the 
question of justification in tandem with questions of ecclesiology.
27
 Starting from the 
claim that justification is “articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae” (the article by which 
the church stands or falls), CJ points out that church and justification are necessarily 
related, because it is the church that stands or falls.
28
 It draws out the double emphasis of 
                                                                                                                                                 
This book collects a nearly complete documentary history of the JDDJ from June of 1993 to July 
of 2006. Although many of these documents are publically available in other forms, I will be citing many 
texts from this volume. I will also note their original publication data when it is available. Documents in 
this book will hereafter be referenced by their document number, thus, GER-DER, C.43,§4. 
22
 PCPCU, “Evaluation for the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity of the Study 
Lehrverurteilungen — kirchentrennend?,” (Study Document, Centro Pro Unione Library, 1992).  
23
 Dietz Lange, Überholte Verurteilungen?: die Gegensätze in der Lehre von Rechtfertigung, 
Abendmahl und Amt zwischen dem Konzil von Trient und der Reformation, damals und heute, (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991).Of the responses, this is by far the most negative. It’s particular critiques 
regarding justification will be revisited later.  
24
 Arnoldshainer Konferenz, Vereinigte Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Deutschlands, and 
Lutheran World Federation, Lehrverurteilungen im Gespräch: die ersten offiziellen Stellungnahmen aus 
den evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993). 
25
 Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Stellungsnahme der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz zur Studie 
“Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend?,” (Bonn: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 1994). 
Also available on the German Bishops’ Conference website, http://www.dbk-shop.de/media/files_public/ 
qwltcierep/DBK_1152.pdf. accessed January 26, 2014.  
26
 Pierre Duprey, “The Condemnations of the 16th Century on Justification – Do they Still Apply 
Today,” in The Condemnations of the 16th Century on Justification – Do They Still Apply Today: 
Occasional Papers Contributing to 1997 Decisions, (Chicago, Department of Ecumenical Affairs, ELCA, 
1995), §5. 
27
 GC §28; UC §§15–16;  
28
 Joint Evangelical Lutheran–Roman Catholic Commission, “Church and Justification, 1993” 
485-565 in Growth in Agreement II: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a 
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church and justification as recurring themes in both the dialogue itself, and in the joint 
memorandum that gave it its task.
29
 Justification and the church, moreover, are 
“indissolubly linked with the triune God and founded in him alone.”30 This emphasis on 
the absolute priority of God’s work in justification remains a central theme throughout 
the dialogues. Justification necessarily results in the church because God’s “universal 
saving will” produces the church, which, founded in Jesus Christ, must be one, holy, and 
forever receive its life from the work of the Trinity.
31
 
In the later sections of the document that deal with areas of difference, the 
relationship of church to justification is once more explicitly engaged. The central 
question is  
summarized as follows: Catholics ask whether the Lutheran understanding of 
justification does not diminish the reality of the church; Lutherans ask whether the 
Catholic understanding of church does not obscure the gospel as the doctrine of 
justification explicates it.
32
 
CJ follows through four major topics to respond to these questions. These are institutional 
continuity, the institution of an ordained ministry, the teaching office, and ministerial 
jurisdiction.
33
 While these particular questions are not germane to the topic at hand, the 
document’s task is. It asks whether the understanding of justification and of the church 
shown by each side is sufficient to the gospel in each question. Moreover, the document 
displays the developing use of an explicit differentiated consensus, starting each section 
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with a common statement, followed by explanations of the Lutheran and Catholic 
positions that show their compatibility with the common statement despite the historic 
division. 
Writing the Joint Declaration 
Meanwhile, there was a growing push to consolidate the findings of the various 
dialogues into one document that could be officially received by the churches. The newly 
founded and ecumenically-minded Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) 
gave further momentum to this project when, after officially affirming Justification by 
Faith in 1991, it began looking for a way to officially receive the findings of LK.
34
  
In 1993, an American Lutheran–Roman Catholic Coordinating Committee was 
appointed to work towards a common declaration of the inapplicability of condemnations 
regarding justification. The committee was chaired by the Most Rev. Rembert Weakland, 
OSB, archbishop of Milwaukee and chairman of the bishops’ committee on ecumenism, 
and the Rev. Herbert Chilstrom, Presiding Bishop of the ELCA. At their first meeting the 
committee “called for the establishment of a process that would lead to a declaration that 
some of the Reformation-era condemnations are not applicable today.”35 1997 was 
proposed as a felicitous target date, as it would be both the year of an LWF convention 
and the 450
th
 anniversary of the fifth session of the Council of Trent, which had 
pronounced the Catholic anathemas regarding justification. 
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The US process was superseded by an action of the LWF council in June of 1993, 
which made the proposed statement a matter of the entire body.
36
 The LWF approached 
the PCPCU, which proved agreeable. A task force was appointed consisting of members 
of both churches who had worked on the major dialogues concerning justification.
37
 The 
task force drafted the first version of the JDDJ in early March of 1994 and a second draft 
in September of that year, responding to feedback received from various experts.
38
 Both 
the LWF and the PCPCU sought feedback on this second draft during 1995.
39
  
Here the structural differences between the churches become important: the 
Lutheran study process consisted of sending the document to the 142 member churches 
for review, while the Catholic process “involved study of the draft in Rome, by a joint 
subcommission of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Pontifical 
Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity,” and consultation with episcopal 
conferences.
40
 An expanded joint committee produced a third version of the text in June 
of 1996, and a fourth in January of 1997. This fourth version was submitted to both 
churches as a final version for study and potential approval.
41
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The release of the Joint Declaration began a lively debate, particularly in 
Germany, where a group of 141 Protestant professors of theology published an opinion in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung against the proposed text.
42
 The professors claimed 
that the JDDJ does not reach consensus because the text fails to do justice to the 
Protestant position, particularly the “decisive insight that belief is assurance of salvation,” 
along with the question of sin in the justified, the meaning of works after justification, the 
relationship of law and gospel, and the status of the doctrine of justification among 
church teachings.
43
 Other complaints include the lack of Old Testament texts in the 
JDDJ, and the lack of any immediate ecumenical impact, such as the recognition by the 
Catholic Church of the Lutheran churches as churches properly-speaking. On the other 
hand, the professors worried that the JDDJ was a step towards the subsumption of all 
evangelical office holders into the Roman hierarchy. With the exception of this final 
concern, this document sets the trajectory for Lutheran critiques of the JDDJ from this 
point forward. 
Official responses from the churches were more positive, but not entirely 
affirming. The LWF council, on June 16, 1998, adopted a recommendation that described 
the process of approval in the churches and affirmed the text of the JDDJ “on the basis of 
the positive responses of the said majority.”44 This majority breaks down as follows: of 
the then 124 member churches, 89 (representing 95% of world membership) had 
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responded. Of these, 80 had responded “yes;” 5, “no,” with four answers remaining 
difficult to categorize.
45
 The LWF emphasized that its affirmation of the Joint 
Declaration was a common action of the member churches (through their responses) and 
of the LWF itself (on the basis of the consensus that the Council judged to be present).
46
  
The Roman Catholic response was presented by Cardinal Cassidy slightly more 
than a week later. It took the form of a Note, issued jointly by the PCPCU and the CDF, 
and was less laudatory than the Lutheran response, although it affirmed that there is a 
“consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification” demonstrating “a high degree 
of agreement.”47 In a section entitled, “Clarifications,” the document enumerates four 
areas requiring further discussion: first, the idea of the Justified as Sinner (§4.4 of the 
JDDJ), is held up as difficult to accept within a Catholic framework. Second, the 
document notes the differences in the relative importance of the doctrine among 
traditional Roman and Lutheran theologies. Third, it asks for a clarification on how 
humans cooperate in their own salvation and what this entails. Fourth, it suggests that the 
sacrament of penance requires further treatment. It closes on a procedural note, reflecting 
on the different structures of the Roman Catholic Church and the LWF. Specifically, it 
sees a remaining “question of the real authority of such a synodal consensus, today and 
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also tomorrow, in the life and doctrine of the Lutheran community.”48 The note closes 
with hopes that these issues might be worked out and that the process will continue to 
fruition.  
This Note was met with some surprise and disappointment from Lutheran 
officials. It began a new phase of discussions, in both public and private forums about 
ways forward.
49
 While Catholic officials consistently emphasized that the positive 
“Declaration” section of the Note bore the greater weight in the document, the presence 
of the “Clarifications” made it clear that further work was needed to demonstrate that 
Lutherans and Catholics were affirming the same document in the same way.
50
 In 
November of 1998, the beginnings of the statement that would become the “Annex” was 
drafted by Bishop Johannes Hanselmann, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Joachim Track, and 
Heinz Schutte.
51
 At this time, another public statement authored by Protestant university 
professors was published in German, this time with 243 signatories; this statement names 
the Joint Declaration a failure.
52
  
The Annex text was, however, finalized, and Cardinal Cassidy and Dr. Noko 
announced on June 11, 1999 that the JDDJ would be signed by both churches the 
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following October, in light of the clarifications reached in the Annex.
53
 The churches 
would sign an “Official Common Statement” that “confirm[s] the Joint Declaration on 
the Doctrine of Justification in its entirety.”54 The Common Statement also points to the 
“Annex” as a clarification that “substantiates the consensus reached” in the JDDJ.55 
Cardinal Cassidy made clear in his public statement that the Official Common Statement 
and the Annex had “been approved by the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian 
Unity and by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith” and that Pope John Paul II 
had “given his blessing for the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification, together with the Official Common Statement with its attached Annex.”56 
Major Doctrinal Critiques 
While the JDDJ was hailed as an ecumenical breakthrough in many quarters, it 
has also received significant, ongoing critique from both Lutheran and Catholic authors. 
In particular, the project of declaring the sixteenth-century condemnations to not apply to 
the contemporary dialogue partner had received criticism from its beginnings. While the 
developing Declaration sought to respond to the criticisms levied against the predecessor 
documents, the official responses to the final JDDJ text themselves demonstrate some 
uneasiness on the part of church officials with the solutions it proposed. The Annex 
allowed the relevant officials of both churches to affirm both that the JDDJ provided a 
                                                 
53
 “Signing of ‘Joint Declaration’ Significant for Ecumenical Movement,” LWI (June 14, 1999).  
54
 “Official Common Statement” in JDDJ, 41–42, GER-DER, D.1. Also available in Hünermann, 
Peter, Helmut Hoping, Robert L. Fastiggi, Anne Englund Nash, and Heinrich Denzinger. Compendium of 
Creeds, Definitions, and Declarations on Matters of Faith and Morals, 43rd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2012), 5081. Hereafter DH. 
55
 Ibid., §2. 
56
 “Statement of Edward Idris Cardinal Cassidy at Press Conference, Geneva, June 11, 1999” 
PCPCU Information Service 103 (2000): 3–4, §7; In German: GER-DER, D.3. 
  26 
solution to the perceived problems and also that the churches both understood the 
document in the same way.
57
 Nevertheless, the official acceptance of the Annex and the 
JDDJ in the Official Common Statement by the responsible parties of both churches [i.e. 
the LWF Member Churches and Council on the one hand and the PCPCU, CDF, and 
Pope on the other] did not satisfy the concerns of all interested parties. This section will 
provide an overview of the major critiques of the JDDJ made during its writing and after 
its acceptance. 
These critiques fall into two major categories, with most authors leveling both 
kinds of criticism. The first type touches upon the document’s methodological 
assumptions, rejecting the cogency or application of the differentiated consensus model. 
The second disputes that a consensus has in fact been reached. Making the critiques clear 
and the differences stark at this point will allow chapters four and five to grapple with the 
fullest and most responsible versions of the difficulties, and to show that the JDDJ’s 
solutions meet these challenges.  
The major critiques that are still levied against the JDDJ began to emerge during 
the process of its development. Many groups weighed in on the growing consensus on 
justification through solicited and unsolicited channels. Although they are directed at one 
of the predecessor documents and not the JDDJ itself, the concerns regarding 
Lehrverurteilungen—Kirchentrennend? published by the Protestant Faculty of Göttingen 
in 1990 continue to form theological opinions directed against the JDDJ. Similarly, the 
two public dissents from the JDDJ by Protestant Professors of Theology made in 1998 
and 1999 remain the basis for many others’ critiques, as does that published by six Luther 
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Seminary faculty members. I will follow these streams of critique through the “No” votes 
from LWF churches and the public dissents and responses published by non-LWF 
Lutheran churches. There are fewer Catholics who have taken a position against the 
JDDJ, and so I will confine myself to a few comments of Avery Cardinal Dulles and the 
work of Christopher Malloy before summarizing the major critiques of the JDDJ’s 
proposal.  
 There are many more detailed position papers regarding the Declaration than can 
be fully engaged in this dissertation, particularly in an introductory section intended only 
to set the stage for a more specific theological project. In engaging the more specific 
concerns regarding the anthropology of the redeemed sinner in the JDDJ, I will, of 
course, engage the published critiques more deeply, but only in relationship to the 
question of the anthropology of the justified Christian. Readers who are interested in 
considering the breadth of contemporary critiques of the JDDJ in light of major trends in 
Lutheran thought particularly, are encouraged to consult the excellent Doctrine, 
Dynamic, and Difference, recently published by Pieter de Witte.
58
  
Überholte Verurteilungen (1990) 
This response to Lehrverurteilungen—Kirchentrennend? (LK), which was 
published by the Protestant Faculty of Theology at the University of Göttingen has a 
much wider scope than justification, as does the document to which it responds. It is 
divided into an introduction and three sections, each responding to a section of LK: 
Justification, The Eucharist [Das Heilige Abendmahl], and Ecclesial Office [Das 
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kirchliche Amt]. The introduction makes its own important argument against the 
assumption in LK that “sixteenth-century condemnations” is a useful category in both 
Lutheran and Catholic theology. Like many of the later questions that would be raised 
about the JDDJ, this concern is fundamentally one about parallelism. In this case, the 
concern is that while the Council of Trent makes clear condemnations using the classical 
formula anathema sit, this is rarely true of the Lutheran Confessions. Thus, a question of 
genre may remain unaddressed by the attempt to declare the non-applicability of 
Reformation-era condemnations. Examining the text of LK and the condemnations that it 
addresses, the Göttingen faculty find three difficulties: first, a quantitative difference 
between a much greater number of Tridentine anathemas and many fewer Lutheran 
Confessional condemnations; second, a qualitative difference between what the groups 
intended by their condemnations that is rooted in ecclesiology. This produces the third 
difficulty suggested by the Göttingen faculty, that there is a historical difference in the 
self-understanding of canonically-excluded Lutherans and canonically-excluding 
Catholics. In their view, when taken together, these difficulties create reason to say that 
LK is 
built on shaky ground. Because of this, beginning the project of approaching the 
church-dividing contradiction through overcoming the sixteenth-century 
condemnations one-sidedly rests on Roman Catholic assumptions and introduces 
these into the Lutheran Confessions. If one wanted to do the confessions justice, 
one would have to hold their positive and argumentative statements in tension 
with their partly implicit, partly explicit [self-]differentiation from the Tridentine 
condemnations.
59
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This critique is not without merit. The documents of the Lutheran Confessions are of 
several genres, none of which are formal conciliar canons. The document argues that 
while Roman Catholics consider the church to be juridically structured, and therefore in 
need of solving the danger to church unity posed by Trent, Lutherans do not, and so have 
no need to overcome sixteenth-century condemnations.
60
As an ecclesiological point, this 
distinction seems overdrawn. While sixteenth-century Lutherans were, in fact, arguing 
for their non-exclusion from the Church Catholic, and the Council of Trent did produce 
anathemas unlike the contents of the Lutheran Confessions, the Confessions have been 
interpreted since the sixteenth century as documents marking the boundaries of a true 
Christian identity against false doctrines. The Göttingen document, like many of the 
responses to the JDDJ, seems to want to argue two conflicting points simultaneously: 
First, that the Roman Catholic position is excluded because of Lutheran commitments to 
the gospel found in the Book of Concord. Second, that the lack of the formula anathema 
sit prevents this exclusion from being the kind of formal condemnation that LK and the 
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JDDJ seek to overcome. Because the Göttingen faculty argues that justification plays a 
unique ordering role within Lutheran theology, an agreement on justification must change 
the relationship between the churches. This change is remarkably similar to the change 
wrought by declaring the Tridentine anathemas to not apply.  
Regarding justification specifically, the Göttingen faculty begins with a 
description of the historic Lutheran insistence that justification must be the central 
confession of the Christian church, relating to all other doctrines.
61
 The JDDJ will later 
also be criticized for minimizing the importance of the doctrine. While LK insists that a 
genuine consensus on justification is necessary, the Göttingen faculty critiques its reasons 
for saying this, which they find to be merely historical, rather than theological.
62
 They 
worry that an agreement based on the kind of analysis that LK provides means that “there 
is no need to prove ‘that we are at one in the structure of our thinking’ and ‘in our mode 
of expression.’”63 This worry will also continue throughout critiques of the documents 
leading to the JDDJ, expressed in worries about equivocation or in statements that 
agreements cannot be real unless they are expressed and are understood in exactly the 
same way by all participants. The Göttingen faculty suggest that the difference between 
LK’s procedure and their own is a difference between supposing “that the only thing that 
counts is that all these elements —grace, faith, Christ, will, works, and so forth— are 
represented everywhere, no matter in what shape or relationship,” and a theology in 
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which “the correct relationship of the elements itself is the concern.”64 If their critique 
were substantive, it would be of real concern, for merely using the same words cannot 
mean agreement, otherwise “man bites dog” and “dog bites man” would be equivalent 
statements.  
They ask for clarity on several specific areas in which they do not think LK 
reaches true agreement, several of which will continue to be contested areas in the JDDJ, 
especially the question of concupiscence as sin, human passivity, the place of good 
works, the assurance of salvation, and merit. Each of these loci receives consideration 
from the view of the theological crises of the sixteenth century and are summed up by the 
Göttingen faculty as follows: 
To put it concretely: the common statements cited above can be considered 
unequivocal only if they are understood in the fashion in which, according to the 
Reformation view, they must be understood, by observing the following narrower 
definitions which prevent the relativism of making them particular ‘concerns,’ 
and about whose ‘urgency’ and ‘scope’ no ‘different opinion’ is permitted.65 
Their concerns, specifically that agreement is being reached by selling the treasured 
possessions held since the Reformation, will appear again and again as we look at the 
critiques of the process that would result in the JDDJ. At the heart of each is a discomfort 
with differentiated consensus based on the assumption that any real differences must 
destroy meaningful consensus.  
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Response of Six Luther Seminary Faculty (1997) 
Once the final form of the JDDJ was published, a group of six professors of 
Luther Seminary, an ELCA seminary located in St. Paul, Minnesota, published a 
response in May of 1997. This position paper builds on the critiques of LK by the 
Göttingen faculty while contributing several novel critiques about process.
66
 Their first 
plea is for more time for an intra-ELCA discussion of the document, arguing that the 
ELCA’s April 1997 decision to set a vote for that August’s Churchwide Assembly did 
not allow enough time for debate, despite the fact that the document had been under 
public discussion for six years and was built on dialogues reaching back decades.
67
  
Like the Göttingen faculty, the Luther Seminary professors call attention to the 
non-parallel character of the condemnations of the Council of Trent and the fewer and 
more internally-directed condemnations of the Lutheran Confessions. They reiterate that 
“[a]t no point is the Roman Catholic Church or its membership specifically 
anathematized —excommunicated from Christian fellowship— nor are Roman Catholics 
excluded by Lutherans from Lutheran fellowship, including Holy Communion, even to 
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this day.”68 What they do find important about the division between Lutherans and 
Catholics are not the questions of canon law raised by anathemas and excommunication. 
Nor are they convinced by the argument that Lutherans and Catholics must agree on the 
priority of God’s grace. Instead, they say the disagreement is about the understanding of 
“grace” itself. They articulate Trent’s understanding of justification “as the progressive 
transformation of the soul through the causal power of grace.” They argue that this leads 
to pastoral problems, namely,  
the haunting questions that ensue. Am I transformed enough yet? Do I have 
enough grace yet? What if it doesn’t work? Practically speaking, the Christian is 
left with only two options: either desperately to redouble one’s own efforts to be 
good enough or to conclude that God has not given me this transforming grace, 
and so has inexplicably predestined me to be excluded from salvation.
69
  
Against this, they posit a Lutheranism that roots salvation in God’s trustworthiness and 
the believer’s acceptance of the divine promise. Sacraments are not events that infuse 
grace, but “divinely given signs” and “new communicative acts on God’s part.”70 
 On the question of method, the six Luther Seminary faculty do not say much 
directly, although they bemoan the “[e]quivocal language in the Joint Declaration.”71 
They see such language in many places, allowing the joint statements to be “read in either 
Tridentine terms or in Lutheran terms.”72 The underlying assumption of their critique 
seems to be that the document’s task is to either settle the sixteenth-century dispute in 
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favor of one of the parties, or to demonstrate that either Trent or the Lutheran 
Confessions was mistaken and is repudiated by its own descendants.
73
  
Differentiated consensus, on the other hand, seeks to describe the theological 
insight that the supposedly contradictory statements may not, in fact, be contradictory. As 
such, it rests on relationship and dialogue. Distilling years of mutual understanding into a 
shortened statement like the JDDJ is difficult. The reader bears much of the weight of 
seeking to understand how the other’s language might be received, rather than merely 
recasting the same script filled with dismissive understandings of the other’s language 
and treasured insights. As will become clear through what follows, many readers find the 
JDDJ to be guilty of equivocation. Attention to method will have to be central to any 
attempt to explain the JDDJ’s content if it is to be received widely in the churches. 
Votum der Hochschullehrer zur GE (1998) 
As mentioned above, the final draft of the JDDJ received a public response from 
141 German Protestant professors of theology.
74
 This 1998 statement asserts that there is 
no possible agreement between Lutherans and Catholics on a variety of fronts: the 
centrality of the teaching on justification; the sinful character of the justified person, the 
law and gospel, assurance of salvation, and good works in the justified person.
75
 It also 
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worries that the JDDJ is being set up as a new confessional statement, which could call 
into question the communion between the LWF and non-LWF Evangelical Churches in 
Germany, and that of the Leuenberg Church Fellowship (now the Community of 
Protestant Churches in Europe).
76
 Finally, it worries that the asymmetry between 
Lutheran and Catholic ecclesiologies means that JDDJ is a step towards bringing 
Lutheran clergy under the authority of the pope, something this document argues is a 
Roman Catholic requirement for any eventual intercommunion.
77
  
This statement is quite compact, and as such, makes few arguments for its claims. 
However, the claims of difference rest on the hermeneutical assumption that the 
sixteenth-century disputes require adjudication, a path that the JDDJ refuses in its pursuit 
of a differentiated consensus rooted in an ongoing relationship of mutual understanding 
and dialogue. The ecumenical worries about the impact that signing the JDDJ will have 
on the inter-Protestant agreements in Europe are worth discussing, although more than a 
decade after JDDJ, they seem to have been without basis. 
 “No” Votes from LWF Churches 
As part of the official process of reception by the LWF, the LWF council asked 
each member church to respond to the final text of the document, specifically to consider 
this question: 
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Does your church accept the conclusions reached in §40 and §41 of the Joint 
Declaration and thus join in affirming that, because of the agreement on the 
fundamental meaning and truth of our justification in Christ to which the Joint 
Declaration testifies, the condemnations regarding justification in the Lutheran 
Confessions do not apply to the teaching on justification of the Roman Catholic 
Church presented in the Joint Declaration?
78
 
The LWF categorized official responses as follows: 
By the time of the Council vote on the Joint Declaration, 89 of the 124 LWF 
member churches had weighed in with their opinions on the document. Of those 
churches responding, 80 (91 percent) said "yes" to the document. The churches 
that said "yes" have 54.7 million members, or 95 percent of the Lutherans in LWF 
member churches. Five churches said "no," with four difficult to categorize.
79
 
The concerns of these the negative responses can be summarized as follows:
80
 all of the 
negative responses begin by stipulating that the JDDJ represents a significant step 
forward, although not reaching the benchmark that Dr. Noko’s letter stipulates, i.e., that 
the condemnations do not apply to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church as 
presented in the JDDJ. Several of the negative responses seem to be requiring an even 
more stringent standard; the Danes, for example, explicitly state that there are no 
condemnations in their confessional documents that touch the Roman Catholic teaching 
but return a “No” vote because there is not sufficient clarity in the document to accept it 
as a “new symbol of the Christian Church.”81 In addition, several churches —after 
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pointing out that the Lutheran Church does not condemn the Catholic Church— point to 
the current one-sided invitation to communion,
82
 or recognition of ecclesiality,
83
 as 
demonstrating a need for a Catholic growth in openness without a parallel need on the 
part of Lutherans. 
Several of these documents argue that the JDDJ is too general to be a real 
agreement, either because of topics it does not cover,
84
 or because the agreement it does 
reach is too facile.
85
 Throughout the negative responses, questions of process are 
common. The possability of differentiated consensus is itself at issue, although it is not 
always named as such. The Kinki Evangelical Lutheran Church’s response is particularly 
illuminating in this regard, as it suggests that the JDDJ both affirms and rejects the 
Council of Trent, particularly canon 12 from session six, on justification. It lauds the 
document for showing Roman Catholic progress towards “a more biblical and Lutheran 
view of justification,” but looks for ongoing dialogue that will sort out “which of the 
16th-century traditions represents the truth.”86 The response assumes that the agreement 
of the churches necessitates a single form of speech and behavior. Even a common 
language is not enough: 
The view of JD[DJ] is that in spite of slight differences in wording, etc., the 
Roman-Catholic and Lutheran Churches now basically agree concerning the 
doctrine of justification. In our view, however, JD[DJ] rather documents the 
opposite: the two churches are able to express their doctrines in similar, even 
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identical terms. What they mean by these terms, are, however, still basically 
different.
87
 
Agreement must mean not only finding a common language, but complete unanimity, for 
“[e]ven if the different doctrinal traditions of the 16th-century did not necessarily 
condemn each other, as JD[DJ] wants us to believe, they are still different and cannot all 
be true.”88 These two hermeneutic assumptions, that Christian teaching must be universal 
in all particulars and that the sixteenth-century disputes must be adjudicated within the 
historical terms of the debate, declaring a winner and a loser, would be very damaging to 
ecumenical prospects if they were true. They will therefore receive more extensive 
engagement in chapter two.  
A similar, although more softly-worded, hermeneutic is found in the opinion of 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Baden, Germany. This stipulates that it reads the 
document’s assertion “the Lutheran and the Catholic explications of justification are in 
their difference open to one another” in §40 to mean that these constitute “a domain for 
future further efforts towards a greater agreement.”89 This stipulated understanding, 
unless it is taken to mean that there can always be the possibility of more understanding, 
eviscerates the agreement of the JDDJ and ignores the second half of the sentence to 
which it refers; this stipulates that the remaining differences do not destroy consensus. 
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Other common concerns in the negative responses are that the Roman position is 
either setting the terms of the dialogue,
90
 or is not truthfully represented by the JDDJ.
91
 
Specific Lutheran theological modes of speech are often held up as requiring more 
attention or not having been central enough in the agreement. Among these, §18 and its 
language about justification being “an indispensable criterion” is almost universally 
described by dissenting votes as being insufficient to Lutheran teaching.
92
 Other such 
concerns include the question of a believer’s assurance of salvation,93 concupiscence as 
sin,
94
 law and gospel,
95
 and the role of divine grace in justification.
96
 
Of the negative responses, perhaps that of the Malagasy Lutheran Church is the 
most unusual. While it also is concerned that the document is too facile in its equation of 
Lutheran and Catholic views, especially in 4.1 and 4.2 [“Human Powerlessness and Sin 
in Relation to Justification” and “Justification as Forgiveness of Sins and Making 
Righteous”], the bulk of the response refers to questions of church practice that are not 
mentioned in the JDDJ, especially the 1990 beatification of Victoire Rasoamanarivo by 
Pope John Paul II. It levies several kinds of critique against this move, including post-
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colonial concerns that the “gesture does not come from a regional or even a local 
authority,” 97 and relating it specifically to the doctrine of justification: 
As we have emphasized, moreover, in accordance with the spirit of paragraph 18 
of the Draft Declaration, the doctrine of justification cannot be taken 
independently of the other truths of faith on the one hand, and the practices of 
ecclesiastical life on the other. We do not see how the doctrine of justification by 
faith alone in Jesus Christ would be consistent with this practice of beatification, 
which, as we have noted in our local context, i.e. Madagascar, is tied to the 
temptation of ancestor-worship, a temptation towards a syncretism that we always 
try to fight.
98
  
In a similar attention to church practice, the Malagasy Lutheran Church suggests that 
agreement on justification would require the Roman Catholic Church to reject “the 
doctrine of the mediation of Mary” and “the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass.”99  
 The negative ecclesial responses to adopting the Joint Declaration, taken as a 
whole, laud it for the progress it makes while suggesting that this progress is not 
sufficient to its goals. While some of these opinions seem to confuse what the goals of 
the document are, others interpret these goals as intended but reject that a differentiated 
consensus of the kind proposed is sufficient to achieving them.  
Public Critiques by non-LWF Lutheran Churches 
Official positions on the JDDJ were made public by two non-LWF churches, the 
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod (LC–MS) and the Selbständige Evangelisch-
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Lutherische Kirche (SELK) of Germany. Both churches are members of the International 
Lutheran Council, an international association of “confessional Lutheran church 
bodies.”100  
The LC–MS issued two official reactions to the JDDJ in quite different formats. 
The first, appearing December 9, 1999, as an advertisement in 15 US newspapers, was a 
short, popular statement entitled “Toward True Reconciliation.”101 The Office of the 
President encouraged all LC–MS congregations to reprint the statement in parish 
bulletins or to distribute it to their members by other means.
102
 It asserts that the JDDJ 
“does not actually reconcile the difference between us concerning the most important 
truth of Christianity.” The particular difference needing reconciliation is that  
the Roman Catholic Church teaches that something more than trust in Christ is 
necessary for us to be saved. It teaches that we are able to merit, through our 
works, eternal life for ourselves and others. We believe this teaching obscures the 
work of Jesus Christ and clouds the central message of the Bible.
103
  
The second, and much more substantive response from the LC–MS is a report from the 
church’s Commission on Theology and Church Relations in response to President 
Barry’s request for a study of the JDDJ. Entitled, “The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine 
of Justification in Confessional Lutheran Perspective,” it consists of an evaluation written 
                                                 
100
 Self-description from ILC website, Accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.ilc-online.org/. It is 
interesting to note that while the group functions in some ways like the LWF, it is both more diffuse (being 
an association, not a communion), and more unified in its theological presuppositions (all bodies accept the 
entire Book of Concord as binding, while the documents accepted by LWF churches vary from just the 
Augsburg Confession to the entire Book of Concord).  
101
 Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, “Toward True Reconciliation: A Comment on Lutheran-
Roman Catholic Relations,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, December 9, 1999, 6A. Available on Google 
News, http://goo.gl/CMdagQ, accessed January 28, 2014. 
102
The statement was issued as a press release by the Office of the President of the LC-MS and 
printed as a paid advertisement in “Chicago (two newspapers), Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, 
Des Moines, Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Saint Louis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis and 
Toledo.” LCMS News, December 8, 1999.  
103
 “Towards True Reconciliation.” ¶5. 
  42 
by each of the LC–MS’s two seminary faculties, a summary of these evaluations, the text 
of the JDDJ, and study questions for parish discussion.
104
 Like many critiques of the 
JDDJ, this document begins by critiquing the method of the document, asking “[h]ow can 
there be a genuine consensus on basic truths if the language, the elaborations, and the 
emphases differ?”105 It takes differentiated consensus to imply a contradiction that is 
merely overlooked, and interprets the document in light of this assumption. All 
differences are understood as implying disagreement, and the idea that two different 
theologies may be “open to each other,” to be evidence that  
there is a new and dangerous dialogical methodology at work here. It seems to be 
possible to affirm both that a theological statement is true and that what 
contradicts it is true as well. According to these laws of dialog (or is it 
lawlessness?), there appear to be no differences that matter, none that can be said 
to destroy ‘consensus.’106 
A more subtle critique is levied by the faculty of Fort Wayne Seminary, although it 
reaches the same conclusion. 
The Joint Declaration follows a similar pattern in distinguishing between the basic 
“concerns” or “intentions” and the actual doctrinal positions and formulations of 
Trent and the Book of Concord. First, terms like grace, faith, and justification are 
identified, but precise meanings give way to equivocations. Then the Declaration 
takes these ambiguities as proof of a “consensus on basic truths concerning the 
doctrine of justification,” of which the differing theologies of the two churches 
are merely complementary and not contradictory expressions.
107
  
These methodological concerns also mean that the terms of the debate in the sixteenth 
century are insurmountable. This can be seen in the document’s engagement with the 
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JDDJ’s description of the condemnations as “salutary warnings.”108 Neither seminary 
faculty’s response nor the summary imbue this term with the seriousness that the JDDJ 
itself says that it implies.
109
 Instead of being a description of why the condemnations still 
matter, the LC–MS evaluation understands the language of “salutary warnings” to 
witness to the weakening of a necessary theological clarity that the sixteenth century 
debate was protecting. 
The specific theological critiques that are brought to the document will not be 
surprising to the reader at this point. They begin with an unresolved difference between a 
juridical and a transformational account of righteousness.
110
 They then describe a 
difference regarding grace understood as an infused power or as God’s favor,111 
producing disagreement on what salvation “by faith” means.112 The question of 
concupiscence as sin is therefore described as “unresolved.”113 Finally, the evaluations 
deem the JDDJ deficient in its understanding of the centrality of justification, which they 
argue leads to further problems: “When the other articles of faith are not related to 
justification, those articles will be misunderstood or misconstrued. Ultimately, Christ will 
be robbed of his honor as the Savior of sinners.”114  
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This concern, that losing the absolute centrality of justification leads to a variety 
of theological difficulties, is also expressed in the evaluation by the Selbständige 
Evangelische-Lutherische Kirche. This document specifically suggests two problematic 
outcomes of the JDDJ’s softening of articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae to “an 
indispensable criterion that constantly serves to orient all the teaching and practice of our 
churches to Christ.”115 The first of these is that the JDDJ connects with a simple “and” 
expressions that “under the dialectic of Law and Gospel cannot be merely described as 
coequal.”116 It is referring, in particular, to such things as “Justification as Forgiveness of 
Sins and Making Righteous” (4.2, title) or “justifies, and truly renews the person” in §28.  
The SELK response also argues that a second misunderstanding results from 
sidelining the law/gospel dialectic. This regards the subject of the renewal of the 
Christian. They worry that Christ’s priority as the only actor in Christian salvation is 
reduced by the Christian’s own engagement in his salvation. They see this as leading to a 
situation in which “the remaining language in the Lutheran description (§32) regarding 
the usus elenchthicus of the law remains in the rest of the JDDJ as a foreign body.”117 
The SELK also finds deficits in the JDDJ’s method, along the lines of those 
described by the LC–MS evaluation and other critics of the JDDJ. In addition, it 
questions whether the churches can really be considered partners, or whether they must 
always be understood as two sides in a zero-sum game disputing the truth. Ecclesial 
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differences are located not only in how the scriptures are interpreted (and what role the 
bible has within theological thinking), but in the place of the sacrament of reconciliation 
and the possibility of the salvation of non-believers.
118
  
Critiques by Lutheran Theologians After Signing 
After the final form of the JDDJ became public, and continuing after its signing, 
individual Lutheran theologians published dissenting or dismissive treatments, often in 
connection to one of the public statements of the German professors of theology. Most of 
these mirror the positions taken by the joint faculty statements from Germany and the 
United States or the LC–MS statement.119 These documents are not unimportant, but they 
do not contribute substantially different critiques from those that have already been 
described in this section, and so they will not receive more specific consideration here.  
Critiques by Catholic Theologians After Signing 
After being signed, the JDDJ has received little critique from Catholic authors. 
This is likely due in part to structural differences between Roman Catholic and Lutheran 
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engagement with the JDDJ. The LWF sent the document out to its then 124 member 
churches, asking them for theological evaluation and to take a position on accepting it as 
a whole. This encouraged widespread discussion among Lutheran theologians. The 
Roman Catholic reception process was characteristically more Roman: it was evaluated 
by the PCPCU and the CDF and eventually given approbation by Pope John Paul II. 
Having been signed officially and on behalf of the whole church, there is less theological 
room to argue that the document is wholly inadequate, as some Lutherans have done.  
Nevertheless, there has been some theological pushback. One can point in 
particular to some minor hesitancy from Avery Cardinal Dulles and to a more full-
throated critique from Christopher Malloy.
120
 Dulles wished to affirm the JDDJ, while 
defining the agreement it reaches as small. Commenting on the document’s use of 
“acceptable” to describe the remaining differences, he writes: 
I personally regard the term “acceptable” as poorly chosen. I would prefer to say 
“tolerable.” By this I mean that I would not want to expel from the Catholic 
Church anyone who held the Lutheran positions on justification as described in 
the JD[DJ]. But if I were in a position to do so, I would prohibit these Lutheran 
positions from being preached in Catholic pulpits or taught in Catholic seminaries 
and catechisms. And conversely, I suppose that many Lutherans who subscribe to 
the JD[DJ] consider the Catholic positions described in that document misleading 
and even false.
121
 
Dulles here paints a rather dour picture of the agreement in the JDDJ, one that is arguably 
more pessimistic than warranted. Even if there is more than sufficient reason to say that 
the document is not a final or complete agreement, to allow for one of the partners in this 
dialogue to both subscribe to the agreement and call the positions of the other as 
                                                 
120Avery Cardinal Dulles, “Justification and the Unity of the Church,” in Gospel and Justification 
in Christ, ed. Wayne C. Stumme (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 125–40; Christopher J. Malloy, 
Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration, (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).  
121
Dulles, “Justification and Unity,” 127. 
  47 
described within it “false” would negate any and all concord that is present in it. On the 
other hand, one should note that Cardinal Dulles is referring to the use of Lutheran 
language by Catholics (and an implied use of Catholic language by Lutherans) as the 
context of this judgment. In this case, he could merely be saying that Lutheran language 
cannot be interpolated into a Catholic mode of discourse without rendering it false, 
although the force of the paragraph seems to imply more than this. 
Instead, the agreement of the JDDJ is best read as a mutual recognition that the 
language of the other, while unfamiliar and potentially dangerous if imported into one’s 
own context (Dulles’ first point), is not false in the manner employed within the 
theological system of the partner. In this way, then, it serves as both a mutually agreed 
center to the churches’ teaching and as agreement on the boundaries of legitimate 
difference. This is why the condemnations of the sixteenth century are not abrogated, but 
remain “‘salutary warnings’ to which [the churches] must attend in [their] teaching and 
practice.”122  
Malloy, on the other hand, after arguing in a first chapter that the JDDJ is not 
canonically binding on Catholics, thereafter maintains that the Declaration 
misunderstands the nature of the disagreement between Trent and the Lutherans.
123
 This 
he locates in the Council of Trent’s definition of the formal cause of justification.124 He 
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argues that because this disagreement remains unresolved, the document is not only 
juridically non-binding, but ineffective in its argument. Like the dissenting Lutherans 
engaged above, Malloy is neglecting the method of the Joint Declaration and suggesting 
that unless the theological modalities of the Council of Trent be wholly adopted by the 
Lutherans, no agreement is possible.    
Summary of Critical Evaluations 
As we have seen, these criticisms generally have two prongs. At a more 
fundamental level, they explicitly or implicitly challenge the basis on which the Joint 
Declaration claims that it has reached an agreement: the idea of a differentiated 
consensus. While the JDDJ does not use the language of differentiated consensus 
explicitly, it does describe its findings as follows: 
The understanding of the doctrine of justification set forth in this Declaration 
shows that a consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification exists 
between Lutherans and Catholics. In light of this consensus the remaining 
differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the 
understanding of justification described in paras. 18 to 39 are acceptable. 
Therefore the Lutheran and the Catholic explications of justification are in their 
difference open to one another and do not destroy the consensus regarding the 
basic truths.
125
 
The idea that the differentiated consensus described in the JDDJ is impossible or illusory 
is wide-spread among its critics. Generally, a rejection of its method leads to a second 
kind of critique that is putatively of content. These critiques hold up treasured language 
or insights of their own tradition, state that the Declaration does not universally recognize 
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them as the only way to properly speak of justification, and therefore declare no 
consensus to exist. Alternately, they may hold up language present in the document 
which had been rejected by earlier theologians of their church, asking how consensus can 
exist unless the other rejects their own traditional language.  
Scope and Argument of the Project 
All of the critiques that have been summarized require consideration because 
without extensive and deep reception in the churches, resulting in changed perceptions 
and behavior, official ecumenical agreement remains mere talk. On the other hand, it 
would be impossible to respond to all of these critiques well in one dissertation. I will, 
therefore, focus on one particular tension that is latent in the JDDJ’s description of the 
baptized Christian and has long been a source of theological disagreement: how to 
describe justification adequately as both accomplished state and ongoing process. This 
tension is dealt with in different, and seemingly incompatible, manners by historic 
Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies.  
As discussed above, method and content are necessarily linked in the JDDJ. I will, 
therefore, balance two different kinds of argument: first, that the method of differentiated 
consensus, used by the Joint Declaration and much of contemporary ecumenical 
dialogue, is a viable method for describing a real agreement in doctrine once understood 
to be church-dividing; second, that each tradition’s doctrinal commitments and historical 
anathemas can be reconciled with the agreement on Christian anthropology represented 
in the JDDJ. 
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The Question of Method – Differentiated Consensus 
From reading the negative responses to the Joint Declaration, it becomes clear 
that method is an important leitmotif, whether it is recognized as such by the respondents 
or not. This is not surprising, for ecumenical reconciliation begins in building 
relationships between people. While these relationships provide the ground for consensus 
to emerge, they are difficult to replicate in the dialogues’ official reports to the larger 
church bodies. Without a foundation in relationship, ecumenical harmony can easily give 
way to assertions that the treasured thought patterns and expressions of one’s own 
tradition have been given short shrift in the dialogue’s final product. Nevertheless, the 
dialogues are put in place not for the personal edification of their members, but to 
contribute to the full, visible unity of the churches. Explanations of the theological paths 
by which they came to recognize an underlying unity must be described for those they 
represent.  
To contribute to the task of making the JDDJ’s differentiated consensus on 
justification clearer and more widely accepted, I will first give sustained attention to the 
question of differentiated consensus itself, which will require engaging issues of 
hermeneutics, language, and the theological task in general. I will be aided in this project 
by Robert Masson’s application of the findings of recent cognitive linguistics to theology. 
He provides an explanation for how meaning is carried in human cultural-linguistic 
systems. Analyzing the metaphoric blends by which the divergent Roman Catholic and 
Lutheran systems are constructed alongside that of the differentiated consensus will 
demonstrate how the JDDJ’s consensus can represent a real “doctrinal reconciliation 
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without capitulation.”126 Demonstrating that this particular differentiated consensus is 
both coherent in itself and faithful to the logic of each system is itself an important task. 
However, attention to theological content will also lend support to the larger 
methodological claim; proving that the JDDJ accomplishes its goals in at least one area 
gives a practical credence to the viability of its method beyond the theoretical support 
mentioned above.  
A Remaining Need for Anthropological Clarity 
Even assuming that we can show differentiated consensus to be rational outcome 
from bilateral dialogues, the particular consensus of the JDDJ requires elaboration and 
development if it is to prove convincing to those members of both churches who have 
found it wanting in the past. Deeper engagements with the agreement of the JDDJ can 
also help push the official dialogues farther, specifically by attending to the differing 
assumptions out of which the different emphases and languages of salvation arise.
127
 
Understanding these assumptions in terms of the agreement already achieved can both 
foster reception within the churches and give clarity to the theological implications of the 
existing agreement.  
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As mentioned above, one area of the JDDJ’s agreement in which more explicit 
consideration would be fruitful is the description of a Christian anthropology. In other 
words, to examine the agreement that the JDDJ claims to reach regarding how God saves 
humans, we can attend to the remaining differences of emphasis and language, to ask 
what humans would have to be such that God saves them in this way. We can also ask 
what this means for the Christian life. The JDDJ’s differentiated consensus implies both 
that there is a substantial agreement on central issues regarding justification and that the 
remaining differences do not —of themselves— require division. We should be able to 
deliminate both the breadth of agreement and set boundaries on acceptable differences 
within a Christian anthropology on the basis of the JDDJ. Two disputed questions, 
whether and in what sense the Christian may be called simul iustus et peccator, and 
whether concupiscence in the baptized is to be called sin as such, provide the beginnings 
of such an anthropology. While historically these issues are important questions in their 
own right, they are now capable of shedding light on the broader outlines of 
justification’s implications for Christian life in this world. 
The JDDJ and its predecessor documents interpret the remaining differences as a 
matter of emphasis: Lutherans intend to emphasize the priority of faith in clinging to 
Christ’s promise, while Catholics emphasize the real effect of God’s work in the 
believer.
128
 These two theological ways of speaking begin from different starting points, 
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use different criteria to judge their fittingness to the gospel, and make use of different 
points of reference; they therefore entail different anthropological accounts of the 
Christian in her eschatological and fleshly aspects, but both are attempting to reconcile 
these two experienced realities.  
Catholics emphasize that the baptized are already united with Christ, and so by his 
grace a purified life is possible, if rare. Lutherans, on the other hand, emphasize the 
contingent nature of all human life (even that of the baptized) before the fullness of 
Christ’s kingdom is come. This difference has many implications for theological speech 
and practice, although, as the JDDJ argues, these differences need not be church dividing. 
Lutherans uphold the present reality of Christ’s grace for believers; Catholics do 
acknowledge that humans are still tempted to sin and are therefore not exempted from all 
creation’s posture of awaiting the fullness of redemption.129 Each theology must account 
for both the new life in Christ and the continued struggle against sin. I will argue that 
understanding the two theologies as differently-conceived descriptions of the same 
Christian experience allows each to be understood on its own terms without thereby 
requiring the repudiation of the other. This experience is of being named truly justified in 
Christ and still being aware of the distance that lies between myself and the final form of 
that justice. The resulting double-vision is eschatological, holding together the already 
and the not yet in a pattern familiar from many aspects of Christian life.  
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Seeing an Eschatological Reality 
Throughout what follows, I will be describing the implications of the doctrine of 
justification for Christian life in terms of an eschatological view of that life. Eschatology 
has enjoyed a renewed centrality in Christian theology beginning in the early twentieth 
century, stemming from a growing sense that the preaching of the kingdom of God is 
central to Jesus’ message.130 The succeeding century saw a number of proposals for 
describing the relationship between the kingdom of God as preached by Jesus and the 
reality of Christians living in the “time between the times.” Karl Barth proposed 
eschatology to be the center of Christian life that leaves no remainder, a decision for 
God’s reality; Bultmann took it to mean an existential living-in-relationship with 
Christ.
131
  
A different kind of eschatology was proposed by C. H. Dodd, which will form the 
basis of how I will use the term. For Dodd, the “realized eschatology” of Jesus’ preaching 
was the breaking into history of God’s action in such a way as to unite past, present, and 
future.
132
 Eschatology must therefore account for both the data of human experience and 
the hope of a future fulfillment in God. An inaugurated eschatology sees the acts of 
Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection as having inaugurated the inbreaking of the kingdom 
into the human world. This kingdom is known in the church’s preaching, sacraments, and 
                                                 
130
 So, for example, Johannes Weiss, Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of God. trans. Richard 
H. Hiers and David L. Holland. (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985). 
131
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, Edwyn Clement Hoskyns, trans (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1933); Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, (Edinburgh: University Press, 1957). 
132
 C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, (London: Nisbet, 1936.) 
  55 
common life, but is hidden by the continued sin and rebellion of humanity. In describing 
such a complex reality, Monica Hellwig therefore argues,  
it is clear that on the one hand ultimate salvation is continuous with all aspects of 
human development in history, including the political, economic, and social 
structures in which people affirm or deny the existence and rights of others, while 
on the other hand ultimate salvation transcends what we can grasp with the 
imagination or predict by calculation or extrapolate speculatively. …This is 
another way of expressing the “eschatological tension” to be found in the New 
Testament between the “already” of the resurrection of Jesus and the consequent 
empowerment of the followers of Jesus on the one hand and the “not yet” of the 
second and glorious coming of the Lord on the other hand.
133
 
Describing the lives of Christians therefore requires simultaneous attention to two 
different realities. It must take ultimately seriously the proclamation of the kingdom of 
God and its present effect on believers. But it cannot neglect the as-yet-unredeemed 
aspects of their lives that Paul describes as “the flesh.”134 These fight against the coming 
kingdom and in that sense we can truthfully call them “sin.” 
Another reason that attending to the difference is important is because providing 
descriptions of the eschatological double-vision of Christian life has proven to be 
difficult. One has to avoid the double pitfalls of antinomian paeans to Christian freedom 
and Pelagian insistence on the sufficiency of the law for salvation. Both have been 
continual temptations to Christians in describing the Christian life; each has proved its 
enduring capacity for ensnaring those attempting to avoid the other. Insisting both that 
the baptized Christian is saved by God’s work and that she needs to be attentive to the 
ongoing struggle against sin in her life requires holding in tension two descriptions about 
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her very being that do not easily cohere. An eschatological anthropology, therefore, is a 
critical aspect of any orthodox description of justification.  
Moreover, in describing these realities, Christians are holding together two things 
that remain in tension. Both Catholics and Lutherans have stretched language to describe 
what are overlapping but opposed realities. These cannot be made to be only partial 
descriptors, for in some sense, each exists in its entirety or not at all; they are mutually 
exclusive conditions.
135
 The eschatological viewpoint is therefore a kind of double vision. 
Theologians describe two realities that logically cannot occupy the same space, but 
nevertheless do for now, by God’s grace. As Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger argued, “here is 
the task of a contemporary eschatology: to marry perspectives, so that person and 
community, present and future, are seen in their entirety.”136  
The “already/not yet” of a Christian eschatological anthropology requires 
description, but this description cannot be simple. It requires the intentional and 
productive warping of usual language, concepts, and expression.
137
 As chapter three will 
make clear, Robert Masson’s proposal about tectonic language seeks to describe how 
such tension-ridden commitments provide the necessary condition for saying something 
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new in human language. The JDDJ’s agreement articulates an understanding that 
Lutherans and Catholics manage this tension through different normative cognitive-
linguistic “blends” or cultural-linguistic complexes in which terms come to produce 
meaning. In a sense, the critique that the JDDJ it is merely using language in an equivocal 
manner is not entirely incorrect, for several important words in the agreement, such as 
“sin” are used differently by the different sides of the discussion. Merely pointing this 
out, however, does not mean that there is no agreement. If in the process of ecumenical 
dialogue, theologians come to recognize in the distinctive blends of the other a theology 
that can be said to be truly Christian, that is, a true description of the gospel of Jesus 
Christ, then the churches can be said to be describing the same Christian reality in ways 
that are truly open to each other. In this case, a differentiated consensus neither makes the 
two ways of speech the same nor makes their difference unimportant. Instead, we must 
come to understand the systems of thought in which each tradition is sensible and only 
after understanding each in its own terms, judge if it is compatible with the gospel as the 
other expresses it.  
By limiting the field of discussion to the eschatological understanding of the 
justified sinner, it will be possible to describe the blends by which each church holds in 
tension its theological commitments to describe the divine gift of justification and the 
human experience of (ongoing) sinfulness. This should allow a clearer explanation of the 
real agreement on the topic than the concision of official documents can allow, and may 
therefore make more widely acceptable the ecumenical insight that “the Lutheran and the 
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Catholic explications of justification are in their difference open to one another and do 
not destroy the consensus regarding the basic truths.”138 
Proclaimed Justification and the Experience of Sinfulness 
Anthropology has not always seemed to be central in the justification dispute, 
except in the sense of the traditional question of whether justification is imputed or 
imparted to the individual.
139
 Yet, in Lutheran and Catholic discussions of justification, 
each side has repeatedly critiqued a claim made by the other relating to the anthropology 
of the baptized Christian. Lutherans have critiqued Catholic insistence that concupiscence 
in the baptized cannot be called sin in the proper sense, while Catholics have suggested 
that the Lutheran aphorism simul iustus et peccator is nonsensical because a person 
cannot simultaneously inhabit two contradictory states of being. Rarely have theologians 
held these together as mirror accounts of the Christian experience, but each of these 
controversial modes of speech does seek to balance the effect of God’s justification and 
the experience of ongoing human sin. 
 In this chapter I can only provide a brief introduction to the traditional 
theological language of each side and the equally traditional critique lobbied by the other. 
After providing a methodological introduction, each will receive fuller attention in a 
chapter of its own. These chapters will provide fuller history and development of the 
claim, situate it within the theological thought-world of its respective church, and show 
its importance for managing the eschatological tension present in the life of a Christian. 
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These chapters will also explain why each theology is difficult to accept for those 
habituated to the thought-world of the other. For now, however, I will provide a brief 
history of each term and introduce the major voices in the dispute, for the purpose of 
introducing the reader to the ecumenical situation of difference in which the JDDJ 
purports to find an agreement.  
Concupiscence in the Baptized 
The Joint Declaration itself, especially in its earlier versions, seems to downplay 
the question of whether concupiscence in the baptized is, properly-speaking, sin. The 
term occurs only once in the early text (that is, JDDJ I), in a paragraph briefly 
summarizing the teaching of Trent.
140
 In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the 
question becomes a major theme in Lutheran responses to the document. By the final 
version, an entire sub-section is dedicated to the question.
141
  
Part of the dispute is terminological; concupiscence has proven to be a slippery 
concept since its introduction as a technical theological term. The problem is 
compounded by the varying ways in which “sin” is conceived by Lutherans and 
Catholics; in addition each tradition frames its account of sin differently. Concupiscence 
has been used to mean several different things since at least the third century: it refers in 
general to desires (both ordinate and inordinate), to the unruled and sinful desires 
experienced by the unbaptized, and it describes a remaining tendency in the baptized that 
is called the “tinder” (fomes) of personal sin. Its translations range from “wish,” through 
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“desire” (often with sexual overtones), to “covetousness.”142 Its use as a technical term 
for something related to original sin and persisting in the Christian can be traced back to 
the theological father of Lutherans and Catholics, St. Augustine of Hippo.  
While Augustine uses the term to refer to a variety of kinds of desire, he always 
ties it to original sin. His engagement with the subject began with an attempt to explain 
the mechanism by which original sin was produced in the offspring of Christians, who 
had themselves been purified of this sin in baptism. In doing so, he links concupiscence 
to original sin, but argues that while baptism removes original sin’s hold on the Christian, 
it leaves behind a lesser residue (i.e. concupiscence) as punishment but not guilt. This 
carnal concupiscence is sufficient for the progeny of a Christian marriage to “contract 
original sin.”143 As evidence of the protean nature of the word, there is even a shift within 
Augustine’s own use of it from his earlier writings to his later anti-Pelagian works. While 
in his earlier thought it is depicted as “a powerful force binding mainly on those who 
have not yet received the grace of God,” when combating Pelagius, concupiscence 
becomes “a useful sparring partner,” a reason for “daily repentance of the relatively 
harmless and temporary lapses in consenting to the ‘law of sin’” and a temptation that is 
not in itself sinful.
144
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Peter Lombard rejected out of hand Augustine’s tentative traducianism,145 but 
suggested that because the flesh of the child was “conceived in vicious concupiscence, 
[it] is polluted and contaminated.”146 This pollution is spread to the formerly pure soul of 
the child such that it becomes impure, “contracting” original sin. Thus, parental 
concupiscence active in conception can be said to be the cause of original sin in the 
unbaptized child (or more properly, in his soul), and to remain as punishment in the body 
of the baptized Christian.
147
  
Another option for describing the transmission of original sin (and therefore the 
role of concupiscence) was the product of St. Thomas, who drew from St. Anselm but 
modified his position by retrieving aspects of the thought of St. Augustine. Because 
Anselm insists on the necessity of personal will for real sin, he rejects the argument that 
original sin as concupiscence is present in the body of a child before it has a will. Instead, 
original sin is understood to be the privation of original justice in the soul that is taken on 
as part of receiving fallen human nature.
148
 Aquinas concurs, and points out that this 
explains why original sin is a constant despite the variable quantity of lust active in 
human generation.
149
 Because Adam forfeited original justice, this loss is transmitted to 
all who share in his nature.
150
 For Aquinas, then, the “concupiscence of original sin” 
(differentiated from other natural concupiscences such as the desire to eat, sleep, or see to 
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other bodily needs) is the product of original sin, which is the privation of original 
justice. It is the remaining effect of that privation, but not the cause of its transmission.
151
  
Trent does not settle between the various accounts of the inheritance of original 
sin or its precise relationship to concupiscence. It decrees only that original sin is from 
Adam, present in all humans from birth (except Jesus and Mary), and is taken away by 
baptism, leaving behind an inclination to sin that is called concupiscence: 
But this holy council perceives and confesses (fatetur et sentit) that in the one 
baptized there remains concupiscence or an inclination to sin, which, since it is left 
for us to wrestle with, cannot injure those who do not acquiesce but resist manfully 
by the grace of Jesus Christ.…This concupiscence, which the apostle sometimes 
calls sin, the holy council declares the Catholic Church has never understood to be 
called sin in the sense that it is truly and properly sin in those born again, but in the 
sense that it is of sin and inclines to sin.
152
 
Here, the term is not employed, as in the early Augustine, as a metaphysical mechanism 
for the transmission of original sin to the offspring of Christians. Instead, it is a 
description of the remaining, albeit weakened, effect of sin that the council experiences 
(sentit) to be present within believers and therefore acknowledges (fatetur) as a reality 
within themselves. This inclination to sin is not itself sinful, but is “of sin” and “inclines 
to sin.” 
 Engaging the sacramental system is also important for understanding the 
Tridentine insistence that concupiscence not be called sin. For the council, baptism 
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frames the question of whether concupiscence can properly be called sin. This 
understanding also presupposes a particular understanding of sin, that is, as personal guilt 
that deserves division from God, which requires the action of the will. If concupiscence 
were to be called sin, it would both render baptism ineffective and God unjust, for the 
newly baptized Christian would remain in a state of separation from God through a guilt 
that they had received without the cooperation of their will.  
 Lutherans have been skeptical of this distinction from the beginning of their 
engagement with the Council of Trent. Martin Chemnitz describes his disagreement with 
the conciliar decree in terms of a distinction between the common usage of the word 
“sin” and the pronouncements of the divine law. He agrees that according to the common 
usage, concupiscence cannot be sin if it is resisted, because it does not impute guilt 
according to secular means of judging. This description he connects to Augustine’s 
definition. Against this, he describes what he calls Paul’s description of the 
“pronouncement of the divine law” regarding Rom 7:7 (almost as a gloss on Matt 5:27–
28), by which the internal temptation, although resisted, is already itself sinful. While all 
would certainly agree that this tendency will be purified out of the saints in heaven, its 
continued presence in the baptized requires description. Chemnitz insists that this 
concupiscence is sin (in the sense that it is something that remains to be purified). He 
does not argue that it overcomes Christ’s justification. What Catholics call mortal sin, 
that is, sin that overcomes Christ’s justification, Chemnitz argues is still a reality in the 
world to be distinguished from concupiscence in the Christian.
153
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 Martin Chemnitz, An Examination of the Council of Trent, translated by Fred Kramer, (St. 
Louis: Concordia, 1971), 345–49. 
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Another major influence on Chemnitz’s argument that concupiscence must be 
called sin is his reverence for the biblical text. The Vulgate has for Romans 7:7: “Quid 
ergo dicemus? lex peccatum est? Absit. Sed peccatum non cognovi, nisi per legem: nam 
concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces.” This is also the 
translation in Exodus 20:17, and Deuteronomy 5:21.
154
 Chemnitz takes Paul’s quotation 
of the law saying non concupisces as a straightforward proof that concupiscence must be 
called sin, for it is forbidden by the law.
155
 He does not consider that post-baptismal 
concupiscence and covetousness might be theologically distinguishable, or that Paul, in 
Romans 7, might not be seeking to answer the same question as the conciliar decree. 
Chemnitz’s commentary on the Council of Trent sets the Lutheran party line and is still 
recognizable in several responses to the Joint Declaration.  
Simul Iustus et Peccator 
Like concupiscence in the baptized, the question of simul iustus et peccator 
impinges on the definition of sin and its theological framing. It also has a somewhat 
complicated history. Almost all biblical sources divide Christians’lives between sin and 
justice temporally, as “having been ‘once’ sinners and are ‘now’ righteous, after they 
have come to Jesus Christ through the preaching of the Gospel and received the 
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 Exodus: “Non concupisces domum proximi tui, nec desiderabis uxorem ejus, non servum, non 
ancillam, non bovem, non asinum, nec omnia quæ illius sunt.” 
Deuteronomy: “Non concupisces uxorem proximi tui: non domum, non agrum, non servum, non 
ancillam, non bovem, non asinum, et universa quæ illius sunt.” It is interesting that at least in Exodus, 
concupiscere is applied to the neighbor’s house, while desiderere is applied to his wife, suggesting a 
decoupling of the concept from sexual desire.  
155
 Chemnitz, 323. 
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forgiveness of sins through baptism in the name of Jesus.”156 The First Epistle of John 
provides the single counter example, according to Ulrich Wilckens.
157
 There are typically 
Lutheran exegeses of Romans 7 and Galatians 5 that can allow the simul, but these are far 
from universal readings. Even Paul, on whom Lutheran accounts of justification are 
particularly dependent, does not provide reason for grounding the simul in his writings, 
unless Romans 7 is interpreted against much of contemporary scholarship.
158
  
The maxim finds its beginning in Luther’s writings, but becomes an important 
Lutheran theme only in the twentieth century, perhaps because it meshes so well with the 
idea of dialectic.
159
 Otto Hermann Pesch argues that in Luther, the formula, which finds 
its earliest expression in the Lectures on Romans (1515-1516), but draws on ideas present 
already in the early Lectures on the Psalms (1513–1521), is primarily a pastoral method 
of speaking of the alien character of righteousness in the framework of an eschatological 
hope. This method purports 
to break any pride in a personal justice and to describe the situation of the not-
finally-determined struggle in which Christian life takes place: bridged by God’s 
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 Ulrich Wilckens, “ ‘Simul iustus et peccator’ in Joh 1:5–2:2” in Gerecht und Sünder zugleich: 
Ökumenische Klärungen, 82–91 inTheodor Schneider and Guntehr Wenz, eds. (Freiburg im Breisgau: 
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 Ibid.  
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 Thomas Söding, “Die Rechtfertigung der Sünder und die Sündern der Gerechtfertigten” in 
Schneider and Wenz, 80–81. Interestingly, precisely Romans 7 is cited in the JDDJ section on the simul: 
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through Word and Sacrament and grants the righteousness of Christ, which they appropriate in faith. In 
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they remain also totally sinners. Sin lives in them (1 Jn 1:8; Rom 7:17, 20), for they repeatedly turn to false 
Gods and do not love God with that undivided love which God requires as their Creator (Deut 6:5; Mt 
22:26-40 par.)” JDDJ §29. 
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 Otto Hermann Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator” in Schneider and Wenz, 147–48. 
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total application of a non-reckoning [of sin] and built on the hope of the final 
overcoming of sin by the eschatological gift of justice.
160
 
The usual theological problem with the formula is a logical one: since Aristotle, it has 
been widely accepted that “two contradictories cannot coexist in the same place from the 
same point of view.”161 This leaves three possibilities of interpretation: first, that the 
simul is contradictory, and therefore wrong. Second, that it should be understood as a 
kind of progression in which sinfulness drains away over time, being forced out by 
justice. Finally, one can argue that the Christian is sinner and saint from different points 
of view, i.e. in terms of God’s judgment and in terms of his own merits. The first of these 
would most clearly line up with the typical Catholic reaction, while Lutheran theology 
has argued about the proper interpretation of the maxim in making a distinction between 
a partim-partim interpretation (the second) and a totus-totus interpretation (the third).
162
 
This distinction of positions and the disagreement between them is an important point, to 
which we will return at length in chapter five. It also has important interactions with the 
Catholic position, particularly regarding to what extent the Lutheran position is able to 
use language of a growth in justice by God’s gift before the final, eschatological 
perfection of the person. 
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 Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator,” 153. “Der Sinn der Formel, zusammengefasst, ist also hier : 
den Stolz auf jede eigene Gerechtigkeit zu brechen und die unabgeschlossene Kampfsituation des 
Christseins herauszustellen: überbrückt durch Gottes total geltende Nicht-Anrechnung und ausgerichtet auf 
das Hoffnungsgut der endgültigen Überwindung der Sünde durch die eschatologische Gabe der 
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 The maxim is from Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, 1007β – 15. Thomas Aquinas affirms it in 
his Commentary on Metaphysics Book IV, §611. Bonaventure also affirms the maxim, but George Tavard 
argues that his theology is nevertheless consistent with the intent of the simul. Tavard, From Bonaventure 
to the Reformers, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005), 63–84. These ideas will return in chapter 
5.  
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 This third can also be described as an eschatological reality, or as a tectonic blend. These ideas 
will be taken up in chapters 5 and 3, respectively.  
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The typical Catholic discomfort with the aphorism is demonstrated quite clearly 
in the official “Response of the Catholic Church to the Joint Declaration of the Catholic 
Church and the Lutheran World Federation on the Doctrine of Justification.”163 Here, 
after affirming that “a high degree of agreement has been reached,” the PCPCU and the 
CDF write:  
The major difficulties preventing an affirmation of total consensus between the 
parties on the theme of Justification arise in paragraph 4.4 The Justified as 
Sinner (nn. 28-30). Even taking into account the differences, legitimate in 
themselves, that come from different theological approaches to the content of 
faith, from a Catholic point of view the title is already a cause of perplexity. 
According, indeed, to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, in baptism everything 
that is really sin is taken away, and so, in those who are born anew there is 
nothing that is hateful to God (DS 1515). It follows that the concupiscence that 
remains in the baptized is not, properly speaking, sin. For Catholics, therefore, the 
formula “at the same time righteous and sinner”, as it is explained at the 
beginning of n. 29 (“Believers are totally righteous, in that God forgives their 
sins through Word and Sacrament ... Looking at themselves ... however, they 
recognize that they remain also totally sinners. Sin still lives in them...”), is not 
acceptable. 
This statement does not, in fact, seem compatible with the renewal and 
sanctification of the interior man of which the Council of Trent speaks (DS 1528, 
1561). The expression “Opposition to God” (Gottwidrigkeit) that is used in nn. 
28-30 is understood differently by Lutherans and by Catholics, and so becomes, in 
fact, equivocal. In this same sense, there can be ambiguity for a Catholic in the 
sentence of n. 22, “…God no longer imputes to them their sin and through the 
Holy Spirit effects in them an active love,” because man's interior transformation 
is not clearly seen. So, for all these reasons, it remains difficult to see how, in the 
current state of the presentation, given in the Joint Declaration, we can say that 
this doctrine on “simul iustus et peccator” is not touched by the anathemas of the 
Tridentine decree on original sin and justification.
164
 
 Protestants have also seen the formula as providing a dividing line among the 
confessions: “the expressed paradox is supposedly a particularly telling explanation of 
the difference between Protestant [evangelische] and Catholic teaching on justification 
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 CDF and PCPCU, “Response to the JDDJ,” Clarifications, §1. 
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 Ibid., §1. English from source in n. 102. 
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and, for that reason, the simul may be inacceptable to Roman Catholicism.”165 Clearly, 
the motto requires theological clarity, for, like the question of the character of post-
baptismal concupiscence, both sides see it as a potential, real theological divide that gets 
to the heart of the division. 
 One clarification is in order at this point. As previously noted, several recent 
theological engagements with the simul have argued that its importance in Lutheran 
theology is fairly recent, specifically representing a reappropriation of Luther’s work that 
fits particularly well with the concerns of twentieth-century dialectical theologies.
166
 
Such arguments are not uncommon in contemporary Lutheranism. Some scholars have 
sought to discover an authentically sixteenth-century Luther differentiated from the “neo-
Kantian” Luther that they see in the writings of the Luther Renaissance. This research has 
led to a richer, more complex view of the reformer, and to a very interesting question 
about the role of tradition and development within Lutheranism. One can neither entirely 
neglect the importance of Lutheranism’s formative century, documents, and thinkers, 
because of the confessional belief that the Gospel was given particularly clear expression 
in these places. Nor can one discount theological development entirely, seeking a 
repristinated, sixteenth-century Lutheranism in the contemporary world, because the 
theological questions have shifted in response to a different ecclesial and secular 
landscape. The contemporary ecumenical dialogues are dialogues between contemporary 
churches that have developed since the sixteenth century. Sometimes these developments 
                                                 
165
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have brought them closer together, sometimes driven them further apart. Further 
complicating matters is that particular theological streams have diverged within the 
communions; theologically, some Lutherans have more in common with some Catholics 
than with other members of their own churches. This makes describing an authentic 
Lutheranism or an authentic Catholicism a somewhat difficult task, especially for an 
outsider. 
 I am not a Lutheran theologian, although I am familiar with both its roots and its 
theological movements in the present. It would, therefore, be inappropriate for me to 
argue in this work that a particular Lutheranism is the most authentic theological heir to 
the tradition or the only real Lutheran theology. I will seek to elucidate the Lutheran 
theology expressed in the JDDJ. Because this theology has not been without controversy, 
I will show how it sees itself as an expression of Lutheran commitments and as speaking 
for the Lutheran tradition. This may, at times, require arguing on its behalf, which I will 
attempt to do in concord with the document itself, in light of the rich conversation that 
LWF Lutherans had leading up to and following its signing. In this, I will be following 
the Joint Declaration itself, which does not claim to withdraw the condemnations of the 
sixteenth century from all contemporary Lutherans and Roman Catholics; instead the 
churches proclaim through it that the sixteenth-century condemnations do not impinge on 
the doctrine of the other church as represented in the agreement of the JDDJ itself. This 
is a responsible theological move, as it is limited enough to be realized, does not impinge 
on the theological freedom of any particular Lutheran or Roman Catholic, but leaves the 
sixteenth century condemnations standing as “salutary warnings,” signposts at the 
borders of orthodoxy to warn those who would trespass that boundary. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a brief introduction to the development of the 
Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification within the ongoing Lutheran–Roman 
Catholic dialogues as well as two types of critique that the JDDJ has received. The next 
chapter will provide a more extensive introduction to the question of ecumenical 
hermeneutics in order to frame the question of the viability of differentiated consensus. 
Differentiated consensus has proved to be an ecumenically viable method. It represents 
the widespread experience that commonality can be recognized in difference once a 
relationship of mutual listening has been established. Nevertheless, the method has also 
proven unconvincing to many who have not themselves been part of the conversation and 
mutual conversion that dialogue entails. Chapter three will therefore bring the 
engagement with cognitive linguistics, as recently proposed by Robert Masson for 
understanding theological difference, to bear on the questions raised by chapter two. This 
engagement with how theological meaning is made in human language and history can 
provide a much-needed theoretical underpinning for the ecumenical experience described 
by George Lindbeck in which dialogue members 
say they have been compelled by the evidence, sometimes against their earlier 
inclinations, to conclude that positions that were once really opposed are now 
readily reconcilable, even though these positions remain in a significant sense 
identical to what they were before. … [T]he problem is not with the reality but 
with the comprehensibility of this strange combination of constancy and change, 
unity and diversity. The proper response in that case is not to deny the reality on 
the grounds that it seems impossible, but rather to seek to explain its 
possibility.
167
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This form of analysis will also provide a method of clarifying the key insights of the 
dialogues to those who have not yet entered into the conversation in which they become 
intelligible. Having brought these tools forward, they can then be applied to the question 
of post-baptismal anthropology. Chapters four and five will engage the question of an 
eschatological anthropology directly as both a contribution to the project of mutual 
understanding and as a test case to show the intelligibility of differentiated consensus in 
the JDDJ.  
 
  
     
CHAPTER TWO:  
TRUTH, CONSENSUS, AND THE ECUMENICAL WAY 
Chapter Introduction 
The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification is a unique document. 
Arising out of the bilateral dialogue between the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches, 
it has been officially affirmed in a way that the results of no other western bilateral 
dialogue have been. This leads to some difficulties of interpretation that we have already 
encountered in the previous chapter. Some of these difficulties arise from the differences 
of genre and reception between the bilateral dialogues and the Joint Declaration. 
Dialogue documents are the products of the appointed commissions, proposed to “the 
appropriate church authorities as the outcome of the commission’s work … for thorough 
study.”1 The Joint Declaration, while arising from these dialogues, and itself having been 
produced through similar structures of joint panels of theologians proposing texts to the 
church, had a very different reception process. It is an official declaration of the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation, properly speaking.
2
 The difference 
between bilateral dialogue statements and the JDDJ can be noted in the ways in which 
they are made public. The dialogue documents, while officially published (on the Roman 
                                                 
1
 Malta Report, Preface. In Growth in Agreement I, 168. Similarly, Church and Justification 
proposes its work to the churches as furthering the work of earlier dialogues and with them constituting a 
question to the churches: “whether, taken together, these documents constitute the sufficient consensus 
which would enable our churches to embark upon concrete steps towards visible unity which have become 
more and more urgent.” JC, Foreword, in Growth in Agreement II, 486–87. 
2
 This point was also made by Robert W. Jenson in the lead-up to the signing of the JDDJ, albeit 
before the JDDJ had been signed, and expressing frustration to format of the Official Vatican Response. 
That the document was later signed by precisely the Roman dicasteries with whom he is expressing 
frustration, on behalf of the entire Catholic Church, only strengthens the point. “On the Vatican’s ‘Official 
Response’ to the Joint Declaration on Justification,” Pro Ecclesia 7 no. 4 (1999):401–404. 
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Catholic side) in the PCPCU’s Information Service, are not received in a strong sense.3 
They are always accompanied by a theological evaluation by another theologian who 
may respond negatively to their content or raise questions about their claims. At times, 
Vatican dicasteries have determined that particular dialogue papers were too far-reaching 
in their description of having reached a consensus or agreement.
4
 Lutheran bodies have 
officially received dialogue documents, but no document has been confirmed “in its 
entirety” or by the entire Lutheran World Federation.5 
The JDDJ, in contrast, is properly a declaration of the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Lutheran World Federation. It is not merely proposed to the churches; it has been 
received by them at their highest levels for the purpose of making a common, binding 
decision.
6
 Properly speaking, the decision made in the JDDJ is this: 
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 The reception they receive through this publication is akin to that which official reports of sub-
committees receive when they are “received” in the minutes, that is, officially acknowledged without 
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Roman Catholic Church, including the roles of the PCPCU and the CDF, is described in Joint Working 
Group, Roman Catholic Church and World Council of Churches, Reception: A Key to Ecumenical 
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dialogue received from the CDF. This exchange is available in Jeffrey Gros, E., Rozanne Elder, and Ellen 
K. Wondra, eds., Common Witness to the Gospel: Documents on Anglican-Roman Catholic Relations 
1983–1995, (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1997).  
5
 So, for example, the US national dialogue’s study document, JF, was officially affirmed by the 
ELCA Council in 1991. Radano, Reconciliation on Justification, 132. 
6
 JDDJ §4. As Catherine Clifford notes, “to take these binding decisions, the full authority of each 
ecclesial polity was engaged in a process of discernment and critical judgment. Historical expressions of 
faith were reassessed in the face of contemporary agreement.” “The Joint Declaration, Method, and the 
Hermeneutics of Ecumenical Consensus,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38, no. 1 (2001): 81. Not all 
observers agree, the chief example being the introduction of Christopher M. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: 
A Critique of the Joint Declaration, (New York: P. Lang, 2005), 1–15.  
Malloy’s argument hinges on the Catholic signatory being the PCPCU, and therefore commanding 
no assent from the faithful. Therefore, “because the JD[DJ] does not have doctrinal authority, Catholic 
theologians can freely consider it their responsibility to examine the viability of the claims made therein.” 
(Ibid., 5). This seems to be an argument with insufficient subtlety regarding the kinds of claims which can 
be made by the church regarding belief. Teaching does not neatly divide into “infallible claims” and “open 
questions.” Malloy fails to account for the actual history of the JDDJ in which the CDF at its highest levels 
was involved in the production of the text and its signing was done with papal approval, and referred to by 
Pope John Paul II as an action of the Catholic Church. (See Radano, 180–82, 192–95.) 
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‘The understanding of the doctrine of justification set forth in this Declaration 
shows that a consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justifications exists 
between Lutherans and Catholics’ (JD[DJ] no. 40). On the basis of this consensus 
the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church declare together: ‘The 
teaching of the Lutheran Churches presented in this Declaration does not fall 
under the condemnations of the Council of Trent. The condemnations in the 
Lutheran Confessions do not apply to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church 
presented in this Declaration’ (JD[DJ] no. 41).7 
Notice that the Official Common Statement, that affirms the text of the JDDJ “in its 
entirety,”8 is making an ecclesial judgment based on the theological findings of a 
“consensus in basic truths” expressed in the JDDJ. As the previous chapter illustrates, 
much of the negative response that the JDDJ received was directed at this consensus in 
basic truths. In part, this is because there is a real ecumenical question about what 
“consensus” means, to whom it applies, and what it means for the churches going 
forward. The work of this chapter is to begin to address this question. As the ecumenical 
discussion is seeking not merely agreement, but agreement in the truth of the gospel, I 
will begin with a brief introduction to the questions of how consensus and truth 
interrelate.  
A three-fold distinction within the term “consensus,” (or, properly, Konsens) has 
become important within the ongoing discussion of ecumenical consensus. This 
distinction, between Zustimmung, Übereinstimmung, and Übereinkunft, was first 
suggested by Wolfgang Beinert. I will begin by describing these three categories; 
                                                                                                                                                 
This does not make the document infallible or irrefutable, but should prompt the Catholic 
theologian to approach it in a way that seeks to understand it on its own terms, and to make as much room 
as possible for its conclusions. It is not proposed to Catholic theologians as a topic for further study, or in 
Malloy’s words as a proposal to be examined to see if it is viable. Rather, it was accepted on behalf of the 
Catholic Church precisely because those responsible have found it to be viable. In other words, it might 
deserve a kind obsequium religiosum, that would not prevent Malloy or others from pointing out areas in 
which the document needs improvement. While not unimpeachable, the document understands itself to 
have much more weight than Malloy suggests. See p. 233. 
7
 Official Common Statement, §1. 
8
 Ibid., after §3. 
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Übereinkunft is what most authors understand to be at stake in the quest for church unity. 
There is, however, quite a breadth of opinion regarding how much agreement is 
necessary for union, or even is possible between confessions. I will therefore next 
describe three positions regarding how Übereinkunft relates to the project of ecumenical 
reconciliation. These will be represented by engagements with the JDDJ published by 
Daphne Hampson, Ulrich H.J. Körtner, and Ingolf U. Dalferth.  
A somewhat different understanding of consensus has arisen out of the experience 
of the dialogues, termed “differentiated consensus” by Harding Meyer and further 
developed by Minna Hietamäki. This term names a consensus in the truth that is possible 
between two communities who make use of different logics or metaphorical systems. It is 
a differentiated consensus that is said to exist in the JDDJ, although the term itself is not 
employed in the document. A reader will need to understand how such a consensus 
operates in order to be able to engage its truth claims profitably. As shown in the first 
chapter, many readers of the JDDJ seem to interpret the document’s claims only after 
having decided that a differentiated consensus is no true consensus. They therefore 
believe it to be merely equivocating between two different and irreconcilable positions.  
Admittedly, the declaration of a differentiated consensus attempts to describe the 
experience of recognizing unity in apparently contradictory statements. The difficulty in 
recognizing such an agreement should prompt us to ask if it is truly possible and how it 
could be explained. This question has not yet received an adequate answer, although 
George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic proposal sought to do so. That proposal will, 
therefore, provide a starting point for our further considerations. This chapter will engage 
his proposal and describe some areas in which further development will be helpful.  
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Taken together, these various investigations into ecumenical consensus will 
highlight the importance that theological culture and ecclesial language play in 
understanding the JDDJ, any unity in Christian truth, and the quest for the final unity of 
the churches. This chapter will serve to highlight the questions that the ecumenical 
project raises in light of the critiques of the JDDJ introduced in chapter one. It will show 
that explanations of “consensus with difference” need a clearer understanding of how 
culture and language produce meaning in order to be compelling to those who have not 
directly experienced the insight with which Lindbeck begins his book.
9
 Decades of 
ecumenical dialogue have repeatedly produced situations in which participants find 
compatibility between particular historic differences that were thought to contradict each 
other. The reception of these insights in the broader church will require a subtler 
consideration of consensus and truth; it is to making this question clearer that we now 
turn. 
Truth and Consensus 
The church’s unity is a unity in the gospel; this implies a unity in the truth. 
Among religions, Christianity is perhaps uniquely focused on agreement in the truth as a 
necessity for unity. The difficulty of providing a satisfactory answer to the questions, 
“who is Jesus?” and “how does he save?” has, since the patristic era, defined the 
boundaries of Christianity more in terms of particular articulations of the truth than in 
terms of particular sociological, cultic, or even ethical patterns. In addition, the intrinsic 
theological connection between the church and the Body of Christ requires an 
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explanation for ecclesial division. The church must be one in Christ; a divided celebration 
of the eucharist is not theologically tenable. Historically, the problem was solved by 
treating any division as complete. Reformation-era theologians and their successors were 
generally willing to see those across the borders of church-dividing questions as merely 
“not-church,” that is, as heretics and schismatics. Such a ruling has the benefit of 
consistency and of being relatively easy to wield as an ecclesiological principle, but 
several important shifts in the contemporary world have made it less tenable than it was 
even a century ago.  
Of these, the largest shift is perhaps the ecumenical moment of recognizing in the 
other something that can be truthfully called “church.”10 Several cultural currents 
contributed to this realization. Among them, the growth of an historical awareness is 
central. As in the nineteenth century the history of the scriptural texts came to be studied 
and theologians sought to understand them in their own proper settings, so in the 
twentieth this historical awareness was applied to the church and its confessions. The 
church’s creedal statements, the Reformation disputes, and the doctrinal positions that 
had hardened into anathemas and confessions each bears a history that affects its proper 
interpretation. The contemporary conversion to an ecumenical outlook did not occur in a 
vacuum; it is situated within a broader discussion regarding the nature of truth, 
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 One can point, for example, to the Second Vatican Council’s major shift of perspective 
regarding the Protestants, seeing in them not merely individual schismatics who may belong to the true 
church individually and imperfectly because of their baptisms, (as under CIC 1917, can. 12), but “separated 
brethren” whose communities are, even if not all are fully “churches,” are actually “ecclesial” (UR §19). 
Furthermore, their “liturgical actions” are not merely empty ceremonies (as a reading of, for example, 
Apostolicae curae might suggest) but actual loci of God’s grace, “capable of giving access to the 
community of salvation” (UR §3).  
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particularly regarding in what sense it can be known by humans. Engagement with this 
question has been developing through both the modern and postmodern eras.
11
  
As Christian unity is unity in the truth and the Western divisions of the church are 
the result of traumatic disagreements over doctrine, it is clear why “consensus” has been 
an incredibly important word in recent ecumenical theology. Consensus in the truth is the 
antidote to division, even if healing long-standing breaks in communion will also require 
cultural, interpersonal, and ecclesial re-membering.
12
 The limits of theological diversity 
are neither easily defined nor unimportant in navigating the contemporary situation of 
disunity. Several kinds of questions arise. From most concrete to most abstract, one can 
ask, “what theological topics require consensus?” “how much agreement on these topics 
is necessary for consensus?” “how is this agreement demonstrated or known?” and “what 
is the relationship between doctrine and truth?” 
In light of these questions, several lines of inquiry have developed. First, the 
language about consensus itself has become differentiated. The literature speaks of a 
basic consensus, or a developing consensus, and in more recent documents, a 
“differentiated consensus” in which a central agreement is explained in terms of 
seemingly differing positions taken by each side, with at least the intention that these do 
not violate the central agreement.
13
 Second, a developing field of ecumenical 
hermeneutics has grown up, often drawing from concerns about truth and plurality that 
                                                 
11
 This section can merely gesture towards where potential problems lie. These questions will be 
dealt with in more depth as they impinge on the more focused questions of the dissertation. For broader 
engagements with this question, see bibliography at n. 21 of this chapter. 
12
 I am in debt to Richard J. Barry IV, for this very apt phrase.  
13
 Harding Meyer, “Ökumenischer Konsens als ‘differenzierter Konsens’: Die Prägung einer 
Formel. Ursprung und Intention,” in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit III, (Frankfurt/M: Otto Lembeck, 2009), 
41–62. 
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arose in the postmodern critique. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle the one from the 
other; the more concrete questions already assume the more abstract. One cannot really 
answer which doctrines are necessary for unity without attempting to answer how one 
would relate those doctrines to divine truth in the contemporary situation of difference 
and division in the church. 
In particular, the notion of differentiated consensus must be located within a 
larger conversation about the definition and possibility of consensus, even in relation to 
Pilate’s question, “what is truth?”14 Consensus has been engaged mostly by way of 
considerations of hermeneutics, which is understandable, but this approach tends to 
emphasize the cognitive, textual aspects of church life and teaching, since hermeneutics 
arises as a discipline from questions of textual interpretation. An emphasis on 
hermeneutics can downplay the interpersonal aspects of dialogue. The recognition of the 
church in the other forms the center of the modern ecumenical project. I will therefore 
return to this important question after a brief engagement of the hermeneutical responses 
to consensus. Just as the Gospel of John criticizes Pilate for not recognizing truth in the 
person who sits before him, ecumenical dialogue is not capable of reaching its goals 
without learning to discern the Body of Christ in the separated brethren.  
First, however, it is helpful to be specific about what we mean when we speak of 
consensus. The German-language literature on ecumenical consensus, in particular, 
makes use of a tripartite division in understanding Konsens (consensus or consent). This 
distinction derives from a 1989 article by Wolfgang Beinert.
15
 In a section entitled “Was 
                                                 
14
 Jn 18:38, NAB. 
15
 Wolfgang Beinert, “Möglichkeit und Umfang ökumenischer Konsense. Eine historisch – 
theologische Studie zur ‘Grundkonsens’-Problematik,” Catholica 1989, no 4 (1989): 268–94. It was also 
reprinted under the same title, 56–77 in Andre Birmelé and H. Meyer, eds. Grundkonsens-Grunddifferenz. 
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ist Konsens?” Beinert differentiates between consensus understood as Übereinstimmung, 
Zustimmung, and Übereinkunft. These are difficult terms to disentangle for the English 
reader. There is an inexact overlap between the English “consensus” and the German 
“Konsens.” Zustimmung, for example, would usually be translated as “consent” instead of 
“consensus.” On the other hand, all three terms can be translated as “agreement,” 
“accord,” or “consensus” depending on context. As there is both overlap and difference 
between the languages, translating these terms into English does not clarify the question. 
Moreover, other differentiations regarding consensus will arise later in the chapter. 
Therefore, to prevent further confusion, I will use the German terms when referring 
specifically to Beinert’s distinction or the understandings of consensus that arise from it. I 
will also provide an etymological description of each term at the beginning of my 
engagement with it, in order to help the reader keep them separate. 
Consensus as Übereinstimmung, Zustimmung, and Übereinkunft 
Übereinstimmung 
The German word Übereinstimmung carries the sense of overall agreement, that 
is, of all voices (Stimmen) being in concord. Building on Plato and Aristotle, Beinert 
describes Übereinstimmung as common human agreement; at its most basic this can be 
merely the commonly held assumptions of the many. Such agreement is not itself a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Studie des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung, Ergebnisse und Dokumente, (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Lembeck, 1992). 
Ingolf Dalferth credits E. Arens for the distinction, in a 1999 talk entitled “Müssen wir uns 
überhaupt verständigen? Relevanz und Reichweite kirchlichen, ökumenischen und interreligiösen 
Konsens,” (Zurich: September 11, 1999,). This talk was published as “Müssen wir uns überhaupt 
verständigen? Relevanz und Reichweite gesellschaftlichen und kirchlichen Konsenses,” Orientierung 64 
(2000): 88-93. Arens credits Beinert for the insight.  
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reason for belief, but may provide the starting point for rhetoric as a common ground on 
which to engage an audience.
16
  
At a higher level, it can mean the agreement “of all (reasonable) people in the 
truth, on the basis of a [shared] human nature.”17 It is sometimes therefore extended to 
denote the transcendental basis of Christian belief: 
The consensus in faith is a sign that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of unity and love, 
is present, and that the church stands therefore in unity with the will of God, and 
recognizes this reality with praise (vertical dimension). This, however manifests 
itself in the historical homophony of the congregation (horizontal dimension), 
which stands in agreement [Übereinstimmung] with the universal church 
(synchronic dimension) and with prior generations (diachronic dimension). The 
church values both discerning [feststellen] and defining [festlegen] this consensus. 
This discernment happens through investigating the unity of faith with the 
Christian people (consensus fidelium), of qualified witnesses of the past 
(consensus patrum), and of experts (consensus theologorum). Fixing the 
definition [Die Festlegung] happens through fixing the consensus in specific 
formulas (statements of faith, dogmas, confessions, etc.), – and through defined 
uses of language.
18
  
Here the consensus at stake contains both the official, received actions of the churches 
(e.g. conciliar definitions), and the communal recognition that is the basis of the 
                                                 
16
 Of course, this is a much more complicated topic than can adequately be engaged here. In 
briefest of outlines, regarding moral conduct, Aristotle is held up as arguing that “that which everyone 
thinks really is so,” (Nicomachean Ethics, X.2.1173a. David Ross, trans.) and therefore as seeing consensus 
as a just reason for belief, while Plato is often described as holding consensus, even that of the gods, to be 
merely contingent historical fact and not a reason to believe something to be true. See Jyl Gentzler, “The 
Attractions and Delights of Goodness,” Philosophical Quarterly, 54 no. 216 (2004): 353–67. 
17
 Beinert, “Möglichkeit und Umfang,” 273.  
18
 Ibid., 274. “Der Konsens im Glauben ist Zeichen dafür, daß der Heilige Geist als Geist der 
Einheit und der Liebe gegenwärtig ist und daß die Kirche darum in Einheit mit dem Willen Gottes steht 
und dessen Wahrheit preisend anerkennt (vertikale Dimension). Das aber manifestiert sich in der 
geschwisterlichen Homophonie der Gemeinde (horizontale Dimension), die in ihrem Glauben allerorten 
(synchrone Dimension) zugleich in Übereinstimmung mit dem Glauben der vergangenen Generationen 
(diachrone Dimension) steht. Die Kirche legt Wert darauf, diesen Konsens festzustellen und festzulegen. 
Die Feststellung geschieht durch die Eruierung der Glaubenseinheit mit dem christlichen Volk (consensus 
fidelium), den qualifizierten Zeugen der Vergangenheit (consensus patrum) und den Experten (consensus 
theologorum). Die Festlegung geschieht durch die Fixierung des Konsenses in bestimmten Formeln 
Glaubenssätzen, Dogmen, Bekenntnisschriften usw.) – also durch eine Sprachregelung.” 
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Vincentian canon.
19
 This higher meaning has much in common with the sensus communis 
described by Hans-Georg Gadamer, that is, the common aesthetic sense of a people or 
nation, or even of all humanity, which is the ground of a kind of truth.
20
 In this sense, 
then, theological consensus of the first kind, Übereinstimmung, is a different kind of 
reasoning than is present in the sciences, but one that is nevertheless rooted in a real 
engagement with the world. It is no surprise, perhaps, that Gadamer’s primary examples 
of post-enlightenment thinkers for whom the sensus communis is an important category 
are pietist theologians.  
Here, the sensus communis, or indeed Übereinstimmung, is a kind of return to 
metaphysics by which the community is able to judge the fittingness of particular truth 
statements, or in its lesser manifestations, to rule out unfitting statements from among 
propositions arrived at by other methods of judgment.
21
 In the ecumenical conversation, 
                                                 
19
 That is, true Christian doctrine is attested “semper, ubique, et ab omnibus” a principle that 
Vincent of Lérins’ augments with a second describing the growth of Christian doctrine in continuity with 
what preceded it. Both are found in Vincent’s Duo Commonitoria, (Migne PL 50.0640; 0667–68). Robert 
B. Eno has located Vincent’s concern for the past within a complex of authorities, related also to the See of 
Rome, in “Consensus and Doctrine: Three Ancient Views,” Eglise et theologie, 9 no. 3 (1978): 473–83. 
Gerald O’Collins also describes its relationship with magisterial and communal norms, “Criteria for 
Discerning Christian Traditions,” Science et Esprit 30 no. 3 (1978): 295–302. For a thoughtful recent 
engagement with the question of development, consensus fidelium, and the Vincentian canon, see Thomas 
G. Guarino, “Tradition and Doctrinal Development: Can Vincent of Lérins Still Teach the Church?,” 
Theological Studies 67(2006): 34–72.  
20
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (New York: Seabury, 1975): 19–29. The idea of the 
sensus communis comes from Kant’s third critique. Imanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952). 
21
 Gadamer, 29. The idea of a return to metaphysics has received widespread application among 
theologians, and indeed from John Paul II in his encyclical Fides et ratio (September 14, 1998). Important 
recent engagements with the question include Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and 
the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology,(Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2004); Thomas G. Guarino, Foundations 
of Systematic Theology, (New York: T&T Clark, 2005); Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of 
Israel, (Ada, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007); D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language and 
Truth, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009); and Thomas Joseph White, Wisdom in the Face of Modernity: A 
Study in Thomistic Natural Theology, (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2009). This is an interesting question 
well worth the attention it is receiving. A complete constructive ecumenical hermeneutics would want to 
give it extended attention; however, it remains of secondary importance to the present discussion. While 
some observers of the JDDJ find its project to be self-contradictory, those engaged in dialogue have found 
sufficient commonality to declare that consensus exists. The project of this dissertation is making that 
  84 
Übereinstimmung has a role to play as a common inheritance to which the divided parties 
might refer either as a reason for unity, or as a witness in a dispute. The JDDJ, like all 
Christian theology, employs this form of consensus, particularly when engaging Christian 
tradition in common,
 22
 but these are not usually the sections that come under dispute and 
so will not figure prominently in the present discussion.
23
 
Zustimmung 
Playing on the etymological sense of Zustimmung, that is, giving one’s voice to 
something in agreement, this type of consensus has to do with the members of a 
community individually giving their affirmation to either an action or a belief. Of the 
three of Beinert’s terms, this has the most differentiated English translation: consent. 
Thus, Beinert points to the canonical consent given in the sacrament of marriage, or the 
voting at a council (each bishop rendering his placet or non placet), or of the church’s 
consent given at the election of a bishop.
24
 “This consent is always localized [endemisch], 
but is a true engagement between the community and its members: the latter must in 
                                                                                                                                                 
consensus clearer to others, not building up a theory of ecumenical engagement from scratch. It would 
constitute a major expansion of the project to engage the question of metaphysics as thoroughly, and so it 
must be acknowledged as a worthy question and passed over. For its application to the JDDJ in particular, 
see de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 29. 
22
 So, for example, in §§8–12, the churches listen together to the scripture regarding justification. 
The history of canonical formation is itself an example of Übereinstimmung, as are the many creedal 
references which are found throughout the document. As another example, in §15, the JDDJ describes a 
Trinitarian economy of salvation, without perceiving a need to ground its assumption of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in anything other than the shared faith of the church.  
23
 For a classic engagement with how Konsens/us as consensus fidelium relates to truth in a real, 
although not identical manner, especially in the context of ecumeical dialogue, see Jean-Louis Leuba, 
“Wahrheit und Konsensus: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Klärung des theologischen Gebrauchs der kopulatven 
Konjunktion ‘Und’,” in Jean-Louis Leuba and Heinrich Stirnimann, eds., Freiheit in der Begegnung: 
Zwischenbilanz des ökumenischen Dialogs, (Frankfurt/M.: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1969), 165–189. 
24
 Beinert, “Möglichkeit und Umfang,” 274. 
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every way have freedom to give consent or to withhold it.”25 It is in this category that 
Beinert locates the idea of reception. Doing so requires reading reception as a kind of 
individually-enacted consent to a proposed idea, law, or doctrine. In doing so, he makes 
reception into an individual, cognitive act, rather than the communal, lived out 
acceptance it would be if he had included it in his first category. In truth, both are at work 
in instances of ecumenical reception.  
The reception of the JDDJ provides a good example. The text itself received the 
kind of positive cognitive consent necessary for its signature from both the officials of the 
LWF and the Catholic Church; this represents an instance of Zustimmung, just as the 
letters of dissent from professors of theology and non-LWF churches represent its refusal. 
The actions of the LWF churches who voted “no” would also be examples of withholding 
Zustimmung, but like the minority votes at Vatican I,
26
 they did not prevent the church’s 
adoption of the question at hand.
27
 This adoption is itself Übereinstimmung.
28
 The 
ongoing reception of the document in the churches will demonstrate a different kind of 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. “Konsens ist hier zwar immer noch endemisch, aber er sitzt ein echtes Gegenüber con 
Gemeinschaft und Gliedern voraus: letztere müssen in irgendeiner Weise die Freiheit haben, den Konsens 
zu leisten und auch zu verweigern.” 
26
 There is a body of texts that engage the Vincentian canon precisely in the context of the 
argument at Vatican I about papal infallibility. These help sharpen the distinction between Zustimmung and 
Übereinkunft. See Jakob Speigl, “Das Traditionsprinzip des Vinzenz von Lerinum (Common 2): Ein 
unglückliches Argument gegen die Definition der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes,” in Hundert Jahre nach dem 
Ersten Vatikanum, Georg Schwaiger, ed., (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1970), 131–50; Robert B. 
Eno, “Some Elements in the Pre-History of Papal Infallibility” in Teaching Authority & Infallibility in the 
Church, Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VI, Paul C. Empie, T. Austin Murphy, and Joseph A. 
Burgess, eds., (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1978), 238–58; Klaus Schatz, “Päpstliche Unfehlbarkeit und 
Geschchte in den Diskussionen des Ersten Vatikanums,” in Werner Löser, Karl Lehmann, and Matthias 
Lutz-Bachman, eds., Dogmengeschichte und katholische Theologie, (Würzburg: Echter, 1985), 187–250.  
27
 There is an important difference between these two examples. At Vatican I, the dissenting 
minority was required to accept the decision of the council, whereas the LWF member churches that 
rejected the JDDJ are not required by the LWF action to accept it.  
28
 The relationship of Übereinstimmung, to Zustimmung as the church seeks out truth is fraught, 
especially when one considers the sometimes conflicting roles of individual conscience, magisterial 
authority, and communal discernment. This is unfortunately a bigger question than can be adequately dealt 
with here.  
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consensus, not directly described by Beinert, but which could be understood as a 
deepening of Übereinstimmung.
29
 
Übereinkunft 
This final division in Beinert’s schema has the etymological sense of a gathering, 
or of various persons or groups drawing nearer to one another. It is this that he singles out 
as the end of ecumenical dialogue: “the taking up again of a broken communication as a 
result of a discourse. According to the radicality of the break, one can speak of a basic, a 
partial, or a total consensus [Übereinkunft].”30 The project of reconciliation through 
Übereinkunft is pursued by divided Christian groups seeking to recognize each other 
through a theological dialogue focused on particular questions of dispute. It is important 
to note that Beinert sees the process of dialogue as being fundamentally about the proper 
reception of an act of communication. If a particular communication is received with 
doubt, and is an important matter, communication can only continue once doubt has been 
removed.
31
 He describes this as a process of argumentation and acceptance. One side 
proposes an argument, the other either receives it or not. Übereinkunft must, he argues, 
                                                 
29
 For a more thorough study of the understanding of “reception” in ecumenical conversation and 
historical ecclesial use, see Fredric M. Bliss, Understanding Reception: A Backdrop to its Ecumenical Use, 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993). For an understanding rooted in literary theory, see Linda 
L. Gaither, To Receive a Text: Literary Reception Theory as a Key to Ecumenical Reception, (American 
University Studies, Series VII, Theology and Religion; vol. 192; New York: Peter Lang, 1997). A 
document on the subject has also been published by the Joint Working Group of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the World Council of Churches, Reception: A Key to Ecumenical Progress. Geneva: WCC, 
2014. 
30
 “Konsens ist hier die Wiederaufnahme einer abgebrochenen Kommunikation auf Grund eines 
Diskurses. Je nach der Radikalität des Bruches kann man von einer grundlegenden, einer partiellen oder ein 
totalen Übereinkunft sprechen.” Ibid., 275. 
31
 Ibid.  
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rest on a previously-existing basic consensus. Otherwise it would result in an infinite 
regression and mutual dialogue would not finally be possible.
32
  
Übereinkunft and Ecumenism: Three Positions 
Übereinkunft is the sense of consensus towards which the ecumenical goal is 
directed. It has received the most debate regarding whether it is truly possible or even 
desirable in the contemporary, postmodern world. It is here that the engagement with 
hermeneutics is necessitated, because what is at stake is a common interpretation of both 
texts and history and therefore a debate over to what extent such a common 
understanding is necessary, desirable, or even possible.  
As we turn to the question of what kind of consensus is required for restoring 
communion between separated churches, we should keep in mind the reality of wide-
ranging theological diversity within communions. This is a topic which usually goes 
unexamined in considerations of ecumenical consensus, but it is not uncommon in the 
ecumenical world to have the members of a dialogue agree with each other more than 
some of them do with members of their own communion.
33
 This should lead us to be 
                                                 
32
 This is one of the senses referred to above at n. 21 above, in which several authors argue that 
theology requires a metaphysics in order to ground it, otherwise there will be no possibility of dialogue 
with either the separated brethren or the ancestors in the faith.  
33
 William G. Rusch makes precisely this point in his article, “The International Lutheran–Roman 
Catholic Dialogue — An Example of Ecclesial Learning and Ecumenical Reception.” 147–59 in Paul D. 
Murray, ed., Receptive Ecumenism and the Call to Catholic Learning, , (New York: Oxford, 2008), 154: 
“Still, it should not be overlooked that within churches this type of consensus has existed for centuries, 
whether or not it has been described as ‘differentiated.’ Members of a particular tradition are rarely in total 
agreement with all the other members of that tradition. What is new here is recognizing this kind of 
consensus across church lines, declaring that it is sufficient to resolve any issues of a church-dividing 
character on a certain doctrine, and employing the expression ‘differentiated consensus.’”  
 Admittedly, navigating such differences may provide a stronger challenge for churches without 
authoritative structures for determining which questions are church-dividing. But even for an entity like the 
Roman Catholic Church, it is clear that unity has been able to tolerate more difference among those who 
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wary of basing descriptions of unity simply on agreement. As Sarah Hinlicky Wilson 
comments, “what divides the church is the church.” While agreement about ways of life 
and doctrine may be necessary for union, the location of the line between church-dividing 
doctrine and acceptable theologoumena is determined by the churches themselves as they 
interpret the gospel.
34
 Whether any particular placement of this line is a necessary 
implication of the gospel or an explanation of an inherited divide is a question not to be 
ignored.  
In order to show the variety of positions currently operative regarding the 
ecumenical necessity or possibility of Übereinkunft, I will examine three contemporary 
thinkers’ engagements with the JDDJ. Each reaches a quite-different determination 
regarding the efficacy of the JDDJ’s agreement, to a large part determined by their 
understanding of what ecumenical consensus itself means. 
As an extreme example of what Übereinkunft would mean if interpreted as 
complete agreement in all things, we can point to the work of Daphne Hampson 
regarding Lutheran and Catholic engagement. On the other hand, several other authors 
have moved in the opposite direction from Hampson, suggesting that because complete 
Übereinkunft is an unreasonable goal, we should be pursuing an ecumenism of plurality, 
rather than of consensus. Among these, we can specifically mention the arguments made 
by Ulrich H. J. Körtner.
35
 A moderated position is held by Ingolf U. Dalferth, who posits 
                                                                                                                                                 
have not officially broken communion than is allowed in the case of overcoming a break. Ecclesial 
engagements with the Society of St. Pius X or with the Feeneyites demonstrate this.  
For another Lutheran voice on this question, see also Sarah Hinlicky Wilson’s excellent and 
challenging reflection on her engagement in the ecumenical movement, particularly under point 10 in 
“From the Editor: Reflections Five Years into Ecumenism,” Lutheran Forum 47, no. 3 (2013), 2–8.  
34
 Ibid., 4. 
35
 Another useful example would be Edmund Arens, “Müssen wir uns überhaupt verständigen?,” 
Orientierung 64, no. 8(2000): 88–93.  
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that consensus regarding texts is possible, but that they must be differentially received by 
each tradition.  
Daphne Hampson: Übereinkunft as Uniformity 
Daphne Hampson approaches the question of ecumenical consensus with the 
assumption that difference and consensus are mutually contradictory.
36
 Her engagement 
with the JDDJ could be classified broadly within the tradition of seeking fundamental 
differences (Grunddifferenzen) behind the symptomatic particularities discussed in 
bilateral dialogues. Most often, these differences are posited as existing between 
Catholics and Protestants in general, or between Catholics and Lutherans in particular.
37
 
Hampson describes the divide between the churches as resulting from two incompatible 
structures of theological thought. Lutheranism, “is built around a dialectic,” between the 
divine “yes” and “no” that is often described in terms of justification by faith.38 
Catholicism, however, has a different structure, putatively one that is interested in human 
progress and the “self-perfection” rejected by Luther.39  
                                                 
36
 Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
37
 A brief but excellent introduction to the phenomenon is provided by Harding Meyer, 
“Fundamental Difference – Fundamental Consensus,” Mid-Stream 25 no. 3 (1986): 247–59. See also, 
André Birmelé and Harding Meyer, Grundkonsens — Grunddifferenz: Studie des Straßburger Instituts für 
Ökumenische Forschung, (Frankfurt/M: Lembeck, 1992); S. Mark Heim, “Modes and Levels of 
Confession: a Protestant Perspective on ‘Basic Differences,’” Mid-Stream 25 no.3 (1986): 287–98; William 
G. Rusch, “Basic Difference – a Continuing Debate,” 1–8 in H. George Anderson and James R. Crumley, 
Jr., eds. Promoting Unity: Themes in Lutheran-Catholic Dialogue, (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988). 
38
 Hampson, 177. Her description of Lutheranism is heavily influenced by Gerhardt Forde. 
39
 Ibid., 176. In the chapter she does at times admit that Roman Catholic theology has perhaps 
developed in an Augustinian direction since Trent, but not in such a way as to overcome the difference 
between Lutheran and Roman Catholic disagreements. Additionally, all ecumenical change is always 
described as occurring on the Roman Catholic side of the debate. 
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While her particular concerns with the JDDJ will receive attention in chapter five, 
for now only her understanding of what constitutes consensus requires careful attention. 
Her book’s engagements with the Joint Declaration all follow the same logic: 
Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism have different logics by which they work. Some 
thinkers may see in this an opportunity for reconciliation. For Hampson, however, the 
different statements are expressions of “different and incompatible structures,” so 
consensus is impossible unless one side were to abandon its own particular logic.
40
  
As an example, regarding the disagreement about the Lutheran aphorism simul 
iustus et peccator at both the Regensburg Colloquy of 1541 and the JDDJ, she writes, “it 
is not a straightforward contradiction. But behind the two statements lie a different 
philosophy or ontology and indeed a different structure.”41 Here it is clear that she is 
making use of an understanding of consensus that would require not only unity but 
uniformity of thought and expression; any difference is itself evidence of disagreement. 
The Übereinkunft necessary for unity is impossible unless one side is converted to the 
other’s way of thought.  
Finally, such Grunddifferenz understandings of ecumenical division as that 
proposed by Hampson are either ahistorical or arbitrary. Pieter de Witte points out that 
                                                 
40
 Hampson’s engagement with dialectic is somewhat confusing. On the one hand, the flexibility 
which she finds in Lutheran dialectic could be a tool for recognizing the valid proclamation of the Gospel 
among Catholics. At times she seems to leave this a possibility, only to then assert that the Roman Catholic 
insistence on the importance of Trent, or some other particularly Roman pattern of thought, means that the 
Roman position is insufficient to the Lutheran understanding of the Gospel. 
 In a sense, this is a contemporary version of the reasoning by which the early 20c. 
Lutherrenaissance operated in engaging Luther’s work – that which is not-Catholic is authentic to the 
Reformation, while any agreement between the Reformer and the medieval church could only be 
understood as remnants yet to be weeded out. See, Risto Saarinen, Gottes Wirken auf uns: die 
transzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung, (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 
1989). It should also be noted that one of the important predecessor documents to the JDDJ explicitly 
rejects the position that the ecumenical goal is to “prove that we are one in the structure of our thinking, 
and our trains of thought, let alone our modes of expression.” LK Rechtfertigung.II.2. 
41
 Ibid., 209.  
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church dividing condemnations have always related to particular theological statements, 
never to “meta-theological” Grunddifferenzen, such as the one Hampson names.42 Nor 
does naming a particular concrete difference as the Grunddifferenz solve the problem. 
Whatever it is, it will have a systematic implications in other areas of theology, which 
could equally well be defined as the starting point of the difference. This leads to either a 
circular logic or an arbitrary insistence on one starting point.  
Ulrich H. J. Körtner: Plurality without Übereinkunft 
Ulrich H. J. Körtner also argues that the concept of “consensus” can only be 
sensible as a complete cognitive agreement. Thus, the products of contemporary 
dialogue, what Minna Hietamäki calls “a consensus with difference,” are nonsensical.43 
He derives a different lesson from the point than Hampson does, however. For Körtner, 
the Joint Declaration succeeds, not because of its method, but in spite of it:  
Clearly, the so-called “consensus ecumenism” finds itself in a dead end street. For 
example, the compromise formulas, which in the end did make possible the 
signing of the Joint Declaration by the LWF and the Roman Catholic Church, do 
not hide the theological dubiousness and limited capacity of the document. That 
such an enigmatic text as the JDDJ and the Official Common Statement can be 
held up as sound ecumenical work and a further convergence of the churches, 
demonstrates, in my opinion, no actual theological advance; instead it is an 
indicator “that doctrines such as those on Justification, Eucharist, and Office have 
lost their church-dividing effect because they —despite all solemn assurances to 
the contrary— have actually lost the significance they would receive from the 
very nature of Christianity.”44 
                                                 
42
 Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 12. The idea that Grunddifferenzen have “a 
meta-dogmatic” character is borrowed from Andre Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale: progrès 
œcuméniques et enjeux méthodologiques, (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2000), 138. 
43
 Minna Hietamäki, Agreeable Agreement: An Examination of the Quest for Consensus in 
Ecumenical Dialogue, (New York: T&T Clark, 2010). 
44
 Ulrich H. J. Körtner, Wohin steuert die Ökumene?: vom Konsens- zum Differenzmodel, 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2005), 14–15. “Offenkundig befindet sich die sogenannte 
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Consensus with difference here is merely the acknowledgement of a prior defeat. By 
suggesting that there is no reason for division because of a differentiated consensus 
regarding justification, the churches merely admit that the doctrines over which they 
divided in the sixteenth century have lost their divisive power. This is because they have 
lost all of their power in the churches’ contemporary lives, so the continuing difference is 
no longer a reason for division. Körtner, however, seems to believe this to be a good 
thing because it allows the church to accept the reality of difference with which it is 
confronted. He argues that what ecumenism needs is to give up the hope of consensus 
and instead accept the diversity of the Christian churches.  
 This is not a small point and deserves further consideration. It would seem that 
for Körtner, the two most common descriptions of the contemporary ecumenical project, 
i.e. consensus and reconciled diversity [versöhnte Verschiedenheit], are mutually 
contradictory. On the one hand, one could, with Körtner, agree that consensus is a word 
like “unique,” that is absolute in its meaning and cannot be moderated with words like 
“somewhat” or “differentiated.” If this is true, then a reconciled diversity may be 
desirable, but calling something a “differentiated consensus” is as contradictory as saying 
that someone is “a little bit pregnant.” On the other hand such understandings of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Konsensökumene in einer Sackgasse. Beispielsweise können die Kompromißformeln, die zu guter Letzt 
doch noch die Unterzeichnung einer gemeinsamen Erklärung von Lutherischem Weltbund und römisch-
katholischer Kirche ermöglicht haben, über die theologischen Fragwürdigkeiten und die begrenzte 
Tragfähigkeit des Dokumentes nicht hinwegtäuschen. Daß derart schillernde Texte wie die Gemeinsame 
Erklärung (GER) und die “Gemeinsame offizielle Feststellung” (GOF) allen Ernstes für eine tragfähige 
Basis künftiger ökumenischer Arbeit und einer weiteren Annäherung der Kirchen gehalten werden kann, 
zeugt m. E. nicht von echten theologischen Fortschritten, sondern ist eher ein Indiz dafür, ‘daß Lehren wie 
die zur Rechtfertigung, Eucharistie und Amt schon deswegen ihre kirchentrennenden Wirkung verloren 
haben, weil sie -allen feierlichen Beteuerungen zum Trotz- doch faktisch die Bedeutung verloren haben, die 
ihnen vom Wesen des Christlichen her zukäme. ’” The final citation is from Richard Schenk, “Eine 
Ökumene des Einspruchs: systematische Überlegungen zum heutigen ökumenischen Prozess aus einer 
römisch-katholischen Sicht,” 225-250, in Reunionsgespräche im Niedersachsen des 17. Jahrhunderts, 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 233. 
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consensus may overestimate both the distance between the confessions’ positions and the 
similarity of the cultural matrices in which these positions are articulated.
45
  
Proposals that reject the possibility of consensus seem unable to give a credible 
description of the borders of an authentically Christian diversity.
46
 For an agreement to be 
“ecumenical” that is, pertaining to the household of the faith, there will need to be some 
agreement, some consensus, about where such borders lie. Households are constituted not 
                                                 
45
 In this, the analogy to pregnancy is perhaps felicitous. If we consider pregnancy as a binary 
state, it is true that a woman is either pregnant or not. There are many situations in which this is a useful 
distinction, for example, in determining whether a physicist can continue to work with an X-ray generator, 
or whether to offer someone a glass of wine. On the other hand, it can be meaningful to modify the 
adjective as a descriptor of someone’s experience. In this way, we could speak of someone as being “more 
pregnant” than someone else in order to indicate that they have progressed farther toward childbirth — the 
expression is intuitively understandable. Bringing the analogy back to the ecumenical movement, it may be 
true that until full communion is established there is not a consensus between two groups. Nevertheless, the 
dialogues have furthered the consensus which does exist between the separated churches through their 
work over the last several decades, and the adjectival modifications of “consensus” describe this process in 
an immediately intuitive manner. 
Michael Root has proposed helpful categories for sorting out such ideas. He begins with “scalar” 
and “non-scalar” as top-level categories. These correspond with what we have been calling “analog” and 
“digital” categories. He then complexifies the non-scalar category in a helpful manner: “Non-scalar 
concepts can relate to scales of more or less, while remaining non-scalar. Take, for example, graduating 
from college. In one sense, that is a non-scalar category; one has either graduated or not graduated. But 
there can be progress toward graduation; one can almost have graduated. … ‘Graduated’ is in that sense a 
certain kind of non-scalar concept, which I would call a threshold concept; one approaches the threshold of 
graduation, which then applies when one has crossed the threshold. In addition, a non-scalar reality can 
become more intense or rich or full … [a marriage] may over time become more or less intense, more or 
less rich, even while the non-scalar judgment ‘John and Jane are married’ applies uniformly and 
consistently. I would call such a concept a fullness concept.” Michael Root, “The Theology of Unitatis 
redintegratio,” (panel paper, Catholic Theological Society of America, San Diego, CA, June 6, 2014).  
46
 One author who seems attentive to the problem, but believes it to be surmountable is Annemarie 
C. Mayer, “Toward the Difficult Whole: ‘Unity’ in Woman’s Perspective,” The Ecumenical Review 64 no. 
3 (2012): 314–327. In this article she suggests that there are resources within postmodern thought for 
“coping with the horror unitatis” that could generate “a hermeneutics of unity understood as an ‘obligation 
toward the difficult whole.’” (314) She argues that the divergent positions of the churches could “inflect … 
toward a common point of reference.” (326) This could allow, she thinks, the possibility of evaluating 
churches’ positions relative to the Gospel without having to do so through the (admittedly very complex) 
process of bilateral interconfessional dialogue. Interestingly, she sees “the difficult whole” operating in an 
eschatological manner very much like that described in the first chapter of the present work. On the whole 
her proposal is intriguing, however, it is unclear how the individual confessions are to be judged as to their 
fidelity to the Gospel and the Kingdom without the difficult process of bilateral dialogue. The reception of 
the Faith and Order papers has shown that while such efforts may be useful in increasing the sense of the 
other as separated Christians (and in her sense, therefore putting us in relationship to each other in terms of 
the messy whole-church), such documents have not been successful in calling churches to repentance 
regarding their behavior or in recognizing those across historical divides of practices as more fully church. I 
would argue that the missing element in the puzzle is relationship, and it is here that the bilateral dialogues 
are necessary to the ecumenical project.  
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only by what is inside them, but by their walls. Körtner does not seem unaware of the 
problem:  
From the division between church and synagogue on, one of the irremovable 
ambivalences of the church is that every effort towards visible unity, no matter 
what form it takes, leads to new polarizations and divisions, as it bumps up 
against its painful borders.
47
  
He is similarly quite aware of the necessity of holding together “identity and difference,” 
[Identität und Differenz], but prefers the language of “reconciled diversity” [versöhnte 
Verschiedenheit] for doing this.
48
 In part, this seems to be because of his ecclesiology, 
which insists on a strict division between the visible and invisible aspects of the church. It 
seems that this might betray a kind of futurist eschatology, in which the churches are 
merely a preparation for a future Kingdom of God. “Church” here is a synonym for 
“confession,” or “church body” and therefore also for the visible, human, sinful aspects 
of ecclesial structures. 
The formula of reconciled diversity, which names the problem of the unity of 
identity and difference in Christianity, is only theologically defensible when it is 
understood not statically, but dynamically. This, however, happens only when the 
ecclesiological consequences are considered in terms of what the New Testament 
calls discipleship [nachfolge]. Just as every Christian, so also the churches stand 
under the Word of Christ, whose admonition and promise is this: “Whoever 
wishes to come after me must deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For 
whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake 
and that of the gospel will save it. (Mark 8, 34–35, NAB).  
Just as the goal of reconciliation is not the dissolution of any kind of confessional 
identity, it is also not the absolute preservation of emergent structures and modes 
of faith. The proper hope, towards which all ecumenical work is directed, is not 
                                                 
47
 Körtner, Wohin,37. “Es gehört zu den unaufhebbaren Ambivalenzen der Kirche, daß jedes 
Bemühen um sichtbare Einheit, gleichgültig welche Form sie annimmt, zu neuen Polarisierungen und 
Trennungen führt und an der Trennung zwischen Kirche und Synagoge an seine schmerzlichen Grenzen 
stößt.” 
48
 Ibid., 42. 
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the visible unity of the earthly church, but is the Kingdom of God in which 
creation will find its fulfillment.
49
 
Such an ecclesiology leads him to see in official Roman Catholic ecumenism merely a 
kind of ecclesiastical imperialism in which the reunification of the churches can only be a 
“reintegration of the non-Catholics into the Roman Church.”50  
In this, his ecumenical hermeneutics and his ecclesiology are mirror images of 
each other. Because both are rooted merely in culture, language, and history, without a 
sense that these are sacraments of a deeper, already-existing presence of the kingdom, the 
church is left with only its human reality. If this is true, then one can see why every 
Roman Catholic or ecumenical appeal to the necessary unity in the truth or in the Body of 
Christ seems to be a power play to convert the other to one’s own way of thought or way 
of being. Yet, even in doing so, he points to the dominical call to follow in the way of the 
cross, so there must be some shared unity. The problem comes in that this understanding 
evacuates the church of any present unity, leaving it only able to refer back to the distant 
past and to hope in the future. It is blind to the presence of the unity that, while wounded, 
already exists between the churches.
51
  
                                                 
49
 Ibid., 4243. “Die Formel von der versöhnte Verschiedenheit, welche das Problem der Einheit 
von Identität und Differenz in der Christenheit benennt, ist nur dann theologisch vertretbar, wenn sie nicht 
statisch, sodern dynamisch verstanden wirt. Das aber geschieht nur, wenn die ekklesiologischen 
Konsequenzen dessen bedacht werden, was im Neuen Testament Nachfolge heißt. Wie jeder einzelne 
Christ und jede Christin, so stehen auch die Kirchen under dem Wort Christi, das Mahnung und 
Verheißung sugleich ist: ‚Wer mir nachfolgen will, der verleugne sich selbst und nehme sein Kreuz auf sich 
und folge mir nach. Denn wer sein Leben retten will, wird es verliegen; wer aber sein Leben verliert um 
meinetwillen und um des Evangeliums willen, der wird es retten’ (Mk 8, 34f) 
Sowenig die Auflösung jeglicher konfessioneller Identitäten das Ziel von Versöhnung ist, sowenig 
ist es das unbedingte Festhalten an gewachsenen Strukturen und Glaubensweisen. Die eigentliche 
Hoffnung, von der alle ökumenische Arbeit getragen wird, ist aber nicht die sichtbare Einheit der irdischen 
Kirche, sondern das Reich Gottes, in welchem die Schöpfung ihre Vollendung finden soll.” 
50
 Ibid., 42. “Re-Integration der nicht-katholischen in die römische Kirche.” He cites UR 
generically to support the claim.’ 
51
 Gregor Maria Hoff underlies the importance of this eschatological unity and argues from it for 
models of church unity that neither minimize difference (and thereby setting up tensions that will later 
cause division) nor relativize the central place of Christian claims about Christ (and thereby achieving unity 
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Ingolf U. Dalferth: Übereinkunft by Differentiated Reception 
 Ingolf U. Dalferth rejects the premise of Körtner’s position, but believes that the 
JDDJ’s attempt at differentiated consensus fails on the merits of the case.52 A truly 
ecumenical document, he argues, must be coherently receivable by both sides within their 
own understandings. 
From this it follows directly that ecclesial reception can only ever refer to the 
common text, but not on a common textual understanding [textverständnis], not 
because a text can be received without an understanding, but because every side 
receives the text within its own understanding — and nothing else is either 
required or possible. The decisive question for reception is not, “does the other 
side understand the text exactly as we do?” but instead “does this text present our 
theological concerns clearly so as to be defensible for us and understandable to 
the other?” When both sides can say yes to this within reason, such a text is 
receivable. Both sides can only agree, however, if each can judge within its own 
criteria and coherently connect to the text within their own horizon and modes of 
understanding [Verständnisreihen].
53
 
Dalferth’s understanding is fundamentally correct regarding the necessary location of 
reception; it can happen only within the existing understandings of the churches who are 
party to the dialogue. He does, however, seem to underplay an important aspect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
at the cost of witness or an inattention to the sinful exercise of power). This requires an ongoing 
engagement with dialogue and a “difference-theological ecumenical hermeneutic.” Idem. Ökumenische 
Passagen — zwischen Identität und Differenz: Fundamentaltheologische Überlegungen zum Stand des 
Gesprächs zwischen römisch-katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischer Kirche, (Salzburger Theologische 
Studien, vol. 25, Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 2005).  
52
 He diagnoses an incoherence in the document which makes it unacceptable from a Lutheran 
position. He argues that the JDDJ does away with Lutheran confessional commitments in order to replace 
them with Tridentine commitments. Ingolf U. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg der Ökumene: Die Gemeinschaft 
evangelischer und anglikanischer Kirchen nach dem Meissner Erklärung, (Leipzig: Evangelische 
Verlagsanstalt, 2002), 255.  
53
 Ibid., 256. Italics original.. “Daraus folgt unmittelbar, daß sich kirchliche Rezeption immer nur 
auf den gemeinsamen Text, aber nicht auf ein gemeinsames Textverständnis beziehen kann, nicht weil ein 
Text ohne Verständnis rezipiert – und anderes weder nötig noch möglich ist. Die für die Rezeption 
entscheidende Frage ist nicht; Versteht die andere Seite den Text genau so wie wir?, sondern: Bringt dieser 
Text unsere theologischen Anliegen für uns vertretbar und für den anderen verständlich zum Ausdruck und 
zur Darstellung. Wenn beide Seiten das mit Gründen bejahen können, wird ein solcher Text rezipierbar. 
Beide Seiten können es aber nur bejahen, wenn sie nach je ihren Kriterien urteilen und den Text in je ihrem 
Horizont an ihre jeweiligen Verständnisreihen kohärent anschließen können.” 
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dialogue, that is, the possibility of achieving an actual understanding of the other side’s 
position. Ecumenical dialogue requires more than recognizing the other’s theology as 
merely coherent; many coherent systems are also anti-gospel. It requires seeing in the 
other a possible Christian position, that is, as something that participates in the shared 
truth of the gospel.  
 This is important, for the churches do not approach ecumenical dialogue as mere 
strangers, or even in the same way that different religions might: sharing little but a 
common humanity on which a dialogue can be built. Consensus between Christians 
across confessional divides is grounded in a common Christian witness to the person of 
Jesus Christ as mediated by the ancestors of the faith and the Christian community. 
Because the confessions are not only separated but inhabit different cultural, linguistic, 
and historically-formed spaces, the dialogues will always be dealing with questions of 
interpretation. Absolute consensus of the kind assumed by Hampson cannot exist because 
the churches do not inhabit the same cultural-linguistic space. Translation will always be 
necessary. As Gregor Maria Hoff, argues, “Consensus never means absolute agreement; 
it excludes the totalizing identity of positions. Ecumenical consensus can only be the 
outcome of an encounter with the difference of the confessional other, which cannot be 
taken up into one’s own terms and concepts without doing it harm.”54 Hoff goes on to 
remark that the question of how this is possible constitutes, “the basic hermeneutical 
problem.”55 The importance of hermeneutics, especially to the Lutheran-Catholic 
                                                 
54
 “Konsens meint niemals absolute Zustimmung; er sperrt die totalisierende Identität von 
Positionen. Der ökumenische Konsens kann nur das Ergebnis einer Auseinandersetzung mit einer Alterität 
des konfessionell Anderen sein, die nicht in den eigenen Begriffen und Konzepten ungebrochen aufgeht.” 
Hoff, Ökumenische Passagen, 21.  
55
 Ibid. “Wie dies [see n. 21 above] möglich sein soll, ist das hermeneutische Grundproblem.” 
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dialogue, proves to be a recurring theme. How one can hold together a real consensus in 
the truth with the inescapable experience of difference and diversity within the church is 
no new problem, but it is a difficulty made particularly clear by the dialogues. Several 
other engagements with consensus and difference have been proposed, and to these we 
now turn. 
Consensus with Difference and Differentiated Consensus 
The language of “differentiated consensus” developed out of the experience of 
recognizing both unity and difference within the dialogues.
56
 Harding Meyer has been the 
most prolific theological writer on the topic of differentiated consensus. His very 
convincing account will provide the central beam on which the engagement with this 
topic will be constructed. A secondary distinction will be found in the work of Minna 
Hietamäki. She makes a careful distinction between this differentiated consensus and a 
“consensus with difference,” to which I will return.57 Each of these authors is working 
inductively, beginning with the data of the dialogues themselves. Attempting to hold 
together the various distinctions and descriptions that they provide may allow us a fuller 
vision of the phenomenon. In what follows, I will begin with Meyer’s consideration of 
differentiated consensus and then turn to Hietamäki’s work.  
                                                 
56
 At least one of its promoters now prefers “differentiating consensus.” See Theo Dieter, “Luther 
Research and Ecumenism,” Dialog 47, no. 2 (2008): 157–166. Dieter’s expression emphasizes that the 
consensus reached is not merely a differentiated understanding of the same thing, but is an agreement 
which itself differentiates between the two acceptable positions. This is a helpful point, and should be 
noted. However, as most of the literature, especially in English, continues to use “differentiated consensus,” 
I will follow this convention. 
57
 Hietamäki, Agreeable Agreement, 54. 
  99 
Harding Meyer 
Harding Meyer has done much to promote the idea of differentiated or 
differentiating consensus. Clearly he does not see this as an alternate option to reconciled 
diversity, as Körtner does, for his essay on the formula “differentiated consensus” is 
published in a collection of his work titled Versöhnte Verschiedenheit.
58
 Indeed, Meyer 
argues that differentiated consensus is not primarily a theory of consensus like those 
discussed above or a method for achieving unity in the truth. Instead, he argues, it is 
something that arises out of dialogue: “It is much more true that thoughts and formulas of 
‘differentiated consensus’ crystallize over time in the process of working for consensus in 
the bilateral interconfessional dialogues. They follow from the actual formation of a 
consensus as its self-reflection.”59  
                                                 
58
 Harding Meyer, “Ökumenischer Konsens als ‘differenzierter Konsens’ Die Prägung einer 
Formel. Ursprung und Intention” 41–62 in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen 
Theologie III, (Frankfurt/M.: Lembeck, 2009). He makes the point explicitly in an article in another volume 
of this collection, thus: “It is of great importance that the churches, in receiving the outcomes of the 
dialogues, also are aware of the particular nature of the consensus reached [that is, a differentiated one] and 
know that exactly such a consensus corresponds to the dialogues’ goal of church unity, not a unity of some 
sort of created uniformity, rather a community of different confessional churches, one which is – to use our 
catchword – “a unity in reconciled diversity.” “Es ist von grosser Wichtigkeit, dass auch die Kirchen bei 
der Rezeption der Dialogergebnisse sich der besonderen Gestalt der erreichten Konsens bewusst sind und 
erkennen, dass gerade solch ein Konsens der in den Dialogen gesuchten Einheit der Kirche entspricht, 
nicht einer wie auch immer gearteten Vereinheitlichung, sondern einer Gemeinschaft 
bekenntnisverschiedender Kirchen, einer – um das Stichwort zu gebrauchen – “Einheit in versöhnter 
Verschiedenheit.” Idem. “Die Struktur ökumenischer Konsense,” 60–74 in Versöhnte Verscheidenheit: 
Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie I, (Frankfurt/M: Lembeck, 1998), 73. 
59Hardng Meyer “Ökumenischer Konsens,” 41. “Vielmehr ist es so, dass Gedanke und Formel 
vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’ sich im Vollzug des Konsens bemühens der bilateralen interkonfessionellen 
Dialoge nach und nach herauskristallisierten. Sie folgten also der faktischen Konsensbildung nach als deren 
Selbstreflexion.” Emphasis original. 
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Differentiated Consensus as “Method” 
Because Meyer, quite rightly, insists that differentiated consensus does not 
constitute a method, a clarification regarding the use of the word may be helpful at this 
point.
60
 Throughout chapter one, I made a distinction between critiques of the JDDJ’s 
substance and critiques of its method. If Meyer is correct that differentiated consensus is 
not an ecumenical method but a product of the method of bilateral interconfessional 
dialogue, one could ask if my distinction in the prior chapter is valid.  
First, I accept his argument. Over time, through these dialogues and as mutual 
understanding grew, what resulted was a differentiated consensus. It is, therefore more 
the product of dialogue than a method to be followed in achieving it. Nevertheless, there 
is a necessity in the present project to describe the critiques levied at the JDDJ that are 
about more than particular questions of content. These critiques are directed at the 
document’s method. This seeming disjunction raises the question of what is meant by 
“method” in these various contexts and if differentiated consensus can be considered to 
be a method in the JDDJ.  
The JDDJ, as a document, has a method that it puts at the service of describing the 
consensus that arose out of the dialogues. Its explanation of the differentiated consensus 
is what authors critique in two distinct ways, viz. by critiquing particular doctrinal 
statements and by questioning whether differentiated consensus actually constitutes a 
                                                 
60
 “Method” is a particularly difficult word to use well because it is used differently by different 
writers and bears a variety of implications. As an example, we can look at two thinkers whose major works 
each include it in the title, Gadamer and Lonergan. Gadamer suggests that method is a kind of automation 
by which repeatable results are achieved by following a process. On the other hand, for Bernard Lonergan, 
a method is something which a person utilizes, and as such will provide new outcomes depending on their 
location in time, space, and personal development.  
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meaningful consensus. In considering the document we can speak rightly of a “method of 
differentiated consensus” as shorthand for “a method of describing a differentiated 
consensus that arose out of extended bilateral dialogue.” Specifically the JDDJ’s pattern 
of enunciating common statements followed by explanations of how those statements can 
be situated within Lutheran and Catholic commitments is a method of describing a 
differentiated consensus.
61
 Authors who argue that the JDDJ is merely equivocal are 
arguing that the consensus to which it bears witness cannot exist, and are therefore saying 
something more than “these particular doctrinal statements are unconvincing.” For this 
reason, we can properly speak of methodological critiques of the document, although 
perhaps “programmatic critiques” might be more precise.  
Considering the dialogues themselves, however, Meyer’s reminder is necessary: 
differentiated consensus is not really a method, but an outcome. The method of 
contemporary ecumenism is bilateral interconfessional dialogue, and it is this that 
produced the differentiated consensus described in the JDDJ. As Meyer demonstrates, 
this method took time to develop and entailed a major shift in conception regarding 
ecumenism, its goals, and the obstacles in its path. Specifically, the multilateral 
approaches to ecumenism before the nineteen-sixties assumed that “confession” and 
“ecumenism” were opposed terms. Of course, if this is true, then ecumenism is only 
achievable by a kind of “transconfessionalism” in which every confession has to give up 
all its distinctive characteristics for the sake of unity. The process of bilateral dialogue 
instead assumes that the confessions can come to a meaningful Christian unity without 
                                                 
61
 Meyer implicitly makes this point in his description of differentiated consensus statements cited 
below at n. 64. 
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uniformity, that is, they come to this unity as recognizable confessions.
62
 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Meyer understands “differentiated consensus” and “reconciled 
diversity” to be compatible. Seeking a reconciled diversity through bilateral dialogue 
often results in differentiated consensuses that “crystallize” over time as mutual 
understanding is achieved. 
Differentiated Consensus 
As Meyer points out, the word “consensus” rarely appears in bilateral documents 
without modifiers. Consensuses are “far-reaching” or “growing” or “in basics,” or 
“fundamental.”63 His choice of the image of crystallization is important; it emphasizes 
not only the glacial pace by which real understanding grows, but also the sense that the 
growing consensus is not merely the acceptance by one party of the other’s arguments (as 
in Beinert); the consensus is an emergent aspect of the conversation itself. Understanding 
the logic of the other party’s confessional commitments requires a re-reading of both 
those commitments and one’s own, especially regarding points where direct oppositions 
were historically understood to exist. The consensus has its own proper horizon. It is that 
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 Meyer “Ökumenischer Konsens,” 43. “Dieser Auffassung von einem prinzipiellen 
Antagonismuz zwischen ‘Konfession und Ökumene” und der daraus resultierenden transkonfessionellen 
Schau kirchlicher einheit konnten die konfessionsbewussteren unter den Kirchen und die meisten der 
Konfessionellen Weltbünde – trotz ihrer grundsätzlichen Befürwortung und Unterstützung der 
ökumenischen Bewegung – sie nie wirklich anschliessen. Statt dessen wählten diese Kirchen und 
Weltbünde gegen Ende der 1960er Jahre eine ihrem Selbstverständnis entsprecherendere Form 
ökumenischen Engagements: die “bilateralen interkonfesisonellen Dialoge.” Es war eine innovative Form 
ökumenischen Bemühens, die – im Unterscheid zu den bislang vorherrschenden und vom ÖRK 
favorisierten ‘multilateralen’ Gesprächen – die verschiedenen Konfessionalitäten nicht auszublenden und 
zurückzulassen verschuchte, sondern sie gezielt und in ihrer positiven Bedeutung in Rechnung setzte. In 
den bilateralen interkonfessionellen Dialogen sprach sich also von Anfang an ein Verständnis von 
kirchlicher Einheit aus, das nicht mehr vom Gedanken eines prinzipiellen Widerspruchs zwischen 
‘Konfession und Ökumene’ beherrscht war.” A similar point is made by Hoff. Ökumenische Passagen, 
267. 
63
 Ibid., 47.  
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of the bilateral dialogue itself. This is not properly speaking the habitual horizon of either 
party. Therefore, it must be differentiated, so as to relate the common consensus to the 
horizons of both parties. Indeed, Meyer occasionally speaks of a “consensus that is 
differentiated in itself,” [in sich differenzierten Konsens] to underline that each 
description of such a consensus bears two consensus statements within it:  
- a statement, which states in fundamental and essential content the agreement 
attained on a doctrine that until now was disputed, and 
- a statement which says, how and why the remaining doctrinal differences can 
be evaluated as admissible and do not call into question the agreement in its 
fundamental and essential aspects.
64
 
Meyer points out that while the Joint Declaration does not itself use the language of 
“differentiated consensus,” instead speaking of a “consensus in basic truths of the 
doctrine of justification,”65 it is elucidating precisely the kind of consensus that he is 
describing.
66
 The three-part structure of the JDDJ’s central sections emphasizes that there 
are three terms in its consensus to which the reader must attend: the consensus itself and 
the re-interpretations necessary to make the consensus sensible within each of the party’s 
habitual theological horizons.
67
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 Meyer, “Struktur,” 73. “- eine Konsensaussage im Blick auf das, was in dieser Lehrfrage 
gemeinsam als das Grundlegende und Wesentliche erachtet und vertreten wird, und 
- eine Konsensaussage darüber, dass und warum die bliebenden Verschiedenheiten der Lehraussagen als 
zulässig und legitim gelten können und die Übereinstimmung im Grundlegenden und Wesentlichen nicht in 
Frage stellen.” The translation is from Idem, “Consensus in the Doctrine of Justification,” William G. 
Rusch, trans., Ecumenical Trends 26, no.11 (1997): 5/165–8/168. 
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 JDDJ, §40, also §5. §13 describes both “a common understanding of justification” and “a 
consensus on basic truths.” §14 lauds both “a shared understanding of justification” and “a consensus in 
basic truths” paired with “differing [confessional] explications [which] … are compatible with it.”  
66
 Meyer, “Die Struktur ökumenischer Konsense,” 60–74 in Versöhnte Verscheidenheit: Aufsätze 
zur ökumenischen Theologie I, (Frankfurt/M: Lembeck, 1998), 62. 
67
 This is quite similar to the proposal made by Ingolf U. Dalferth above, with the exception that 
the JDDJ is insistent that the document be understood and received by both traditions in the same way. See 
above, page 94. This history does not necessarily rule out Dalferth’s point, although it does hold higher 
hopes for the possibility of mutual understanding than he seems to. 
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Minna Hietamäki 
Minna Hietamäki proposes a terminological distinction to help define 
differentiated consensus. Specifically, she suggests that what is present in the JDDJ can 
properly be called “differentiated consensus,” but is leery of extending this terminology 
either retroactively within the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue or to other ecumenical 
agreements. She sees in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue a “methodology that is 
explicitly more hermeneutical than many other dialogues,” which she believes to be 
central to the agreement in the JDDJ.
68
 Therefore, she suggests that the broader category 
of ecumenical agreement not requiring uniformity might be called “consensus with 
difference” within which differentiated consensus would be one particular type.69 Like 
Meyer, she is wary of considering differentiated consensus to be a kind of ecumenical 
method. The fact that the JDDJ declares a consensus to have been reached is a different 
thing than the method by which that consensus was reached; differentiated consensus, 
therefore, is the product, not the method of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue.  
This is a helpful distinction, and helps to structure the argument that is developing 
in this chapter. The theologians who figured in the first section were primarily concerned 
with the question of consensus with difference and whether it was possible in the 
abstract. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue’s particular fruits in the JDDJ point to a 
specific kind of consensus with difference, that is, Hietamäki’s narrow use of 
“differentiated consensus.” This seems to be the same use that the term receives in 
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 Hietamäki, 54. 
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 Among her concerns, chief seems to be this question of the hermeneutical character she sees in 
the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, but not in others. Specifically, she argues that not all dialogues 
“subscribe to the hermeneutical understandings that make the form of consensus possible in the first place.” 
Hietamäki, 54. 
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Meyer’s work, although he is more willing to describe such consensuses as having been 
achieved more broadly across ecumenical dialogues.
70
 
In engaging this consensus with difference, Hietamäki expands on a point made 
by Meyer that the Lutheran–Catholic dialogue underwent a shift regarding the meaning 
of “basic” in “basic consensus.”71 Indeed, she finds that the JDDJ “exemplifies a gradual 
shift in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue from partial (basic) agreement to an 
agreement on the basics.”72 This shift does not mean that all interpreters are equally 
convinced of the document’s success in its goals, as she ably demonstrates. She describes 
the consensus with difference of the JDDJ as inspiring both “joy and serious concern,” 
among theologians, a description that is entirely accurate, as demonstrated in the first 
chapter.
73
 Accepting that such a differentiated consensus is theoretically possible seems 
to be a major hurdle to accepting that such a consensus is present in the JDDJ.  
George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine: Consensus Despite Difference 
Hietamäki also recognizes that answering the challenges posed by contemporary 
ecumenical dialogue requires “an approach that incorporates the cognitive or truth aspect 
of consensus [and] must be expanded beyond the idea of a decontextualized cognition.”74 
While not claiming that he answers all questions, she suggests that an attention to George 
Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic understanding of doctrine could allow for the coexistence 
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72
 Ibid., 61.  
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of consensus and difference.”75 Lindbeck’s well-known volume, The Nature of 
Doctrine,
76
 provides a description of the phenomenon of recognizing such unity despite 
difference and suggests a way of making sense of it, but does little to suggest why it 
should be the case that theology works in this way. Perhaps because of this, the book has 
received a wide range of responses. After provoking an initial flurry of discussion, its 
“postliberal” proposal has not been primarily developed in relation to the ecumenical 
concerns that gave it rise.
77
  
Lindbeck’s Counter-Proposals 
Lindbeck proposes a relationship between truth and doctrine requiring a 
conception of consensus and communion that is quite different from most of the models 
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 Ibid., 206. David M. Chapman echoes Hietamäki’s point about the necessary interrelationship 
between “cognitive-intellectual” and “socio-communal” consensus. One of the difficulties with his 
proposal is that in distinguishing these two aspects of consensus, he suggests that they can in fact be 
separated. One of the strengths of both Lindbeck’s proposal and the analysis of theological meaning offered 
by Masson is the insistence that all cognitive-intellectual meaning is socio-communally located, that is, as 
will be argued in Lindbeck’s terms, cultural-linguistic coherence is a necessary condition for ontological 
truth. “Consensus and Difference: The Elusive Nature of Ecumenical Agreement,” Ecclesiology 8(2012): 
54–70.  
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 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1984).  
77
 Paul J. DeHart suggests that the Postliberal proposal has fragmented into “five loose strands of 
influence,” The first is associated with Stanley Hauerwas and focuses on “a counter-cultural social ethic, on 
the critique of ‘modernity’ and its offspring, the Western liberal societies.” The second “focuses on 
ecclesial practices and the communal formation of individuals.” A third searches for “a post-critical 
hermeneutic of scripture” perhaps because the scripture is emphasized as authoritative over the church. The 
fourth may emphasize the authority of the church [understood historically] more than that of scripture. 
This, he associates with the journal Pro Ecclesia. Finally, some emphasize the Scriptural role of judging the 
contemporary community, particularly among contemporary Barthians. This fragmentation, he suggests 
results from an instability baked into Lindbeck’s book, specifically regarding an account of the interaction 
of the contemporary community, the church in history, and scripture. To say that the Nature of Doctrine or 
the Postliberal argument has declined as an important theological trajectory, however, would be an 
overstatement. It may not form a cohesive movement, or provide a compelling argument as to why the 
ecumenical recognition of agreement without capitulation is possible, but the recognition that it is remains 
compelling, as can be seen in the continued publication of books and articles engaging the question. The 
Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology, (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2006). 
See particularly 46–48 and 240–44. 
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we have discussed so far. Lindbeck positions his proposal as an alternative to what he 
sees as the two dominant poles of contemporary theological engagement with truth. 
These he calls the “cognitive-propositionalist” and “experiential-expressivist” models. 
Understanding what he means by these terms will help locate his own proposed 
alternative. He allows that there is a third possibility extant among contemporary Roman 
Catholics, but he believes it to be a hybrid position, meshing aspects of the other two.
78
 
Each of these positions regarding the relationship between doctrines and truth will be 
described in Lindbeck’s terms briefly before describing his own position and considering 
its implications.  
Cognitive Propositionalism 
Of the models Lindbeck uses, this is the simplest to describe. Doctrines are true 
because they express true propositions. This position “emphasizes the cognitive aspects 
of religion and stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative 
propositions or truth claims about objective realities.”79 Lindbeck connects this approach 
to “traditional orthodoxies” as well as the commitments of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy and even scientific knowledge. Theological utterances are expressions of 
truth like any other. Of the models, this is that with which Lindbeck engages least, 
perhaps because he believes it to be the least likely to convince those in his primary 
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 16. Lindbeck’s Catholic option is neither convincing in its 
coherence as a position, nor in its resemblance to the figures to whom he ties it, Bernard Lonergan, SJ and 
Karl Rahner, SJ. Showing its insufficiency to the thought of these two important, but quite different, 
thinkers, will have to remain outside the scope of this chapter.  
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audience, i.e. those involved with ecumenical dialogue.
80
 He also seems to believe that 
contemporary culture produces people who are particularly unsuited to propositionalist 
understandings of doctrine; because they are generally less  
deeply embedded in particular religious traditions or thoroughly involved in 
particular religious communities. This makes it hard for them to perceive or 
experience religion in cognitivist fashion as the acceptance of sets of objectively 
and immutable true propositions.
81
  
Perhaps because of this lack of engagement, The Nature of Doctrine has often been 
attacked from the direction of cognitive propositionalism, with opponents suggesting that 
Lindbeck’s postliberal proposal is incapable of describing doctrines that are sufficiently 
true to be meaningful. Lindbeck’s category must also be differentiated from much of 
classical engagement with doctrine, lest it overstate the claims of many important 
theologians regarding the comprehension of divine truth. In particular, Lindbeck’s lack of 
engagement with the idea of analogy leaves him open to this charge, but as this chapter is 
not an evaluation of Lindbeck’s work as a whole, this must be passed over.82 His 
description of the cognitive-propositionalist pole of religious belief is fitting, even if few 
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 In the preface to the 1994 German edition, Lindbeck expresses his surprise at which theologians 
had expressed interest in a book which he understood to be directed only at an ecumenical audience. “By 
1984, ecumenical interests had shifted from overcoming the doctrinal barriers which block Christian unity 
to co-operating in common struggles for, to use the World Council of Churches’ formula, Justice, Peace 
and the Integrity of Creation (commonly known by the acronym, JPIC). Ecumenists of this new type are 
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sociologists of religion, and even, though to a lesser extent, scriptural scholars who have been the most 
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The Nature of Doctrine,” xxix–xxxii in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
age, 25th Anniversary Edition; Originally published as George A. Lindbeck, Christliche Lehre als 
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 21. 
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 This is also a critique of Lindbeck’s work made by Alistair McGrath, although I believe that 
McGrath goes too far in his critique, confusing Lindbeck’s diagnosis of a problematic modern position with 
a wholesale indictment of the tradition. I will engage McGrath’s critique at greater length below. The 
Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 
1990): 15–20.  
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classical thinkers of note would fit within it. Certainly there are religious people who 
treat doctrines as simply and universally true in an unproblematic fashion, and who are 
therefore aptly described by Lindbeck’s category. 
Experiential Expressivism 
Lindbeck’s second category intends to describe the descendants of 
Schleiermacher and their allies. These view doctrine as cultural and temporal expressions 
of a universal human transcendent experience.
83
 Lindbeck describes such thinkers as 
interpreting “doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientations.”84 This he locates as an effect of the turn to the 
subject.
85
 Lindbeck credits this stream of theology with producing much of Western 
culture of the last century and a half. He sees it as more likely to retain cultural 
dominance regarding religion than the cognitive-propositionalist approach, even while 
experiential-expressivist thought is losing ground in the nontheological sphere.
86
 
The disjunction may be explained within Lindbeck’s thought because he sees the 
conviction that religion is a private matter to be itself a product of the experiential-
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 They “all locate ultimately significant contact with whatever is finally important to religion in 
the prereflective experiential depths of the self and regard the public or outer features of religion as 
expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of internal experience.” Lindbeck, 
Nature of Doctrine., 21. 
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 Ibid., 16.  
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 Ibid., 24. 
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 Ibid., 25: “Yet, whatever the countervailing tendencies, the most significant development in 
theories of religion is the growing gap between theological and nontheological approaches. Experiential-
expressivism has lost ground everywhere except in most theological schools and departments of religious 
studies where, if anything, the trend is the reverse.”  
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expressivist trajectory.
87
 Thus, a single person can display an experiential-expressivist 
engagement with religion when thinking theologically and use quite different forms of 
discourse in nontheological modalities. Lindbeck initially leaves the question open 
whether this model needs to be transcended, although it is clear that doing so would be 
his preference.
88
  
Catholic “Two-Dimensional” Model 
Lindbeck’s categories are not as easily applied to many twentieth-century 
Catholic thinkers, a fact he seems to grasp when he says that there is “a third approach, 
…[that] attempts to combine these two emphases [experiential–expressivism and 
cognitive–propositionalism].”89 He includes both Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan in 
this category, but believes that Lonergan at least leans toward the experiential–
expressivist pole, giving him the very unflattering name of a “two-dimensional 
experiential–expressivist.”90 In part, this description is a product of Lindbeck’s 
engagement with Method in Theology, which leads him to classify five of what he calls 
“Lonergan’s six theses of the Theory of Religion” as “characteristic of experiential 
expressivism in general.”91  
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 He does also recognize the resistance which various neo-conservative/neo-Barthian schools are 
giving to the broader cultural trend, but at least in Nature of Doctrine, Lindbeck seems convinced that the 
cultural day has been won by experiential-expressivists. 
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 In saying this, Lindbeck is intending to say that Lonergan is more than one-dimensional, not that 
he is lacking depth. Ibid., 31. Confusingly, Lindbeck also chooses Lonergan as his prime example of 
experiential-expressivism throughout chapter two, perhaps in part because as a “two-dimensional” thinker, 
Lindbeck sees Lonergan’s proposal as among the most worthy of the experiential-expressivist positions. 
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 Ibid., 31. It is unclear to me what Lindbeck is doing here. Chapter 4 of Lonergan’s Method does 
not seem to have “six theses of the Theory of Religion.” Lindbeck seems therefore to be offering a 
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In describing these “two-dimensional” attempts, Lindbeck is generally 
appreciative, not least because of their ecumenical usefulness. Because he understands 
them as drawing alternately from both of his major typologies, however, he believes that 
such thinkers require a means of deciding when one must treat a particular doctrine 
propositionally and when it is to be read experientially. It is here that Lindbeck thinks the 
hybrid types run into trouble. 
Even at their best, as in Rahner and Lonergan, [the hybrid types] resort to 
complicated intellectual gymnastics and to that extent are unpersuasive. They are 
also weak in criteria for determining when a given doctrinal development is 
consistent with the sources of faith, and they are therefore unable to avoid a rather 
greater reliance on the magisterium, the official teaching authority of the church, 
for decisions in such matters than all Reformation Protestants and many Catholics 
consider desirable. In short, although two-dimensional views are superior for 
ecumenical purposes in that they do not a priori exclude doctrinal reconciliation 
without capitulation as do simple propositionalism and simple symbolism, yet 
their explanations of how this is possible tend to be too awkward and complex to 
be easily intelligible or convincing.
92
 
This is a location of major difficulty in Lindbeck’s engagement with Fr. Lonergan. It is 
likely that he is making a category error here that haunts much of the book. In describing 
doctrines, we are necessarily dealing with the internal language of a religion, and his 
ecumenical project is seeking to describe the conversation between two subsets of 
Christian speakers. To insist that Lonergan’s account of how Catholic Christians make 
determinations about what is changeable and unchangeable within a Catholic theology be 
acceptable to Protestants flies in the face of Lindbeck’s stated goals.93 Here, an attention 
                                                                                                                                                 
composite or compound reading of Lonergan’s chapter 4. It seems that his six theses range from reasonable 
reads of Lonergan through minor confusions to major misunderstandings. See Bernard J.F. Lonergan, 
Method in Theology, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972): 101–124. 
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 31. 
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 Nevertheless, his engagement with Rahner and Lonergan reflects a common experience of 
Protestants reading contemporary Roman Catholic theology. The decisions contained in such works 
regarding how prior ecclesial teachings are to be reinterpreted in the present often do seem capricious. This 
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to the difference between himself and Lonergan would not only make him a better reader 
of Lonergan’s project, but would strengthen his account of intra-Christian difference and 
the possibility of recognizing in it a situation of reconciled diversity. It seems that he at 
times treats his own categories of engagement with truth as if they were disembodied 
from particular ways of being religious in the world.  
Lindbeck’s Postliberal Model 
Against all of these models, Lindbeck proposes his own, that he calls “cultural-
linguistic” or “postliberal.” He argues that it properly constitutes a third model and is not 
merely a recombination of the two major categories. In this, it is fundamentally different 
than his interpretation of Rahner and Lonergan. Lindbeck proposes that doctrines 
function as grammatical rules by which true things can be said within a particular 
cultural-linguistic context. To say “Jesus is homoousious with the Father,” therefore, is a 
rule which, when followed, allows Christians to speak and act in ways appropriate to the 
gospel. Doctrines are therefore properly-speaking rules that allow the truth to be 
expressed, not the truth themselves.  
Lindbeck believes that this proposal can explain how Christian faith makes 
objective truth claims, while allowing for both historical development and the 
reconciliation of apparent contradictions (P and ~P) in some cases without doctrinal 
capitulation by one side. He examines, for example, how papal infallibility works within 
the cultural-linguistic situation of contemporary Roman Catholicism and argues that its 
affirmation there is not incompatible with the Lutheran refusal of such an infallible 
                                                                                                                                                 
is more often the product of the reader’s beginner’s grasp of the grammar of the Catholic dialect than a 
fundamental flaw in the Catholic thinker’s engagement with the past. 
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teaching office within the Lutheran cultural-linguistic system. Similar arguments are 
made regarding the necessity of Nicaea and Chalcedon and the Marian dogmas 
promulgated in the last century and a half.
94
  
There are several aspects of this proposal that can be difficult to grasp. To start, as 
John Allan Knight points out, Lindbeck uses three distinct senses of the word “truth.”95 
These are “ontological,” regarding correspondence to reality; “intrasystematic,” regarding 
the coherence of claims within a system; and “categorical,” which asks if the categories 
of a system are adequate to describing perceived reality.
96
 What Lindbeck means by 
speaking of the truth of an utterance in any given context is complex and requires 
attention to the inter-working of several of these categories.  
Articulating the distinction between ontological and intrasystematic truth provides 
the occasion of his famous example of the crusader’s cry, which will serve to elucidate 
the interaction of these categories. Considering the utterance, “Christus est Dominus” 
Lindbeck suggests that while it is generally a true statement within the Christian system, 
it loses its intrasystematic truth if used to support the cleaving of infidel heads. Because 
                                                 
94
 A more in depth engagement with Lindbeck’s examples and their applicability to ecumenical 
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intrasystematic truth is “a necessary but not sufficient condition for ontological truth,” 
Lindbeck would have to say that in such a situation, the utterance loses not only its 
intrasystematic truth, but also its ontological veracity.
97
 This is because the 
correspondence that Lindbeck is judging between an utterance and reality is mediated by 
a way of life and cannot be separated from it. As there are no immediate utterances, no 
utterance can be true except as it is embedded in a system of thought, action, and 
commitment.  
Perhaps Lindbeck’s point would be better expressed in terms of a distinction 
between cultural-linguistic coherence and ontological truth. If religious systems are 
considered as cultural-linguistic complexes, then cultural-linguistic coherence 
(Lindbeck’s intrasystematic truth) is the necessary condition of saying something 
meaningful about what is (Lindbeck’s ontological truth). A certain fluency in a language 
is necessary for expressing true statements in it, but does not guarantee that what one says 
is true. The crusader in Lindbeck’s example above proves by his inappropriate use of 
Christian language (“Christus est dominus” as supporting skull-cleaving) that he is not 
speaking the Christian language, thereby robbing his utterance of any context in which it 
can be interpreted as a meaningful statement about what is. He has become a speaker of a 
heretical dialect sharing a faux amis with the Christian language, but to disastrous 
outcome: the Prince of Peace is made into a violent idol. 
Lindbeck sees a correspondence between his understanding of truth and the 
doctrine of analogy in Thomas Aquinas, which bears more careful consideration.
98
 The 
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 65. 
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 This correspondence may also go a long way towards mitigating the concerns voiced by 
McGrath (see p. 122, below) insofar as it provides a means to explain how Lindbeck understand religious 
statements to really bear true meaning about the world, albeit in a different mode. 
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doctrine of analogy is difficult to define well, except perhaps through the practical 
process of the via affirmativa, via negativa, via emminentiae, described by Pseudo-
Dionysius and taken up by Thomas.
99
 Of course, this process itself constitutes a kind of 
analogy, as will all descriptions of analogous forms of knowledge. Lindbeck’s 
description of Thomistic analogy, however, seems to evacuate truth claims about God of 
any real meaning. He compares “God is good” in the angelic doctor to a non-physicist’s 
pronunciation of “Space-time is a four-dimensional continuum” and argues that this has 
no positive effect because the speaker does not know (or is incapable of knowing) the 
“sense in which this statement is true or even meaningful.”100 Statements about God, for 
Lindbeck, are therefore relegated to being rules against false statements.
101
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Thomas refers to Dionysius repeatedly through the questions on knowing God. He does try to 
describe analogous knowledge in other terms, for example, in ST I.Q13.A5.Resp, and this is helpful, but 
requires significant care in interpretation. “Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra 
dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad 
Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus 
communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his 
quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed 
nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de 
urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem 
sanitatis.” Here, Thomas suggests that “this mode of commonality [i.e. analogy] is a median between pure 
equivocation and simple univocity. For neither is the idea being said analogously one and the same, as in 
univocity; nor totally different, as in equivocity; but the thing is said as a multiplicity, signifying different 
proportion to one thing …” It is tempting in this to read him as describing analogy as a watered-down 
univocity. But this must be rejected because Thomas argues that the names we are considering (such as 
Good) are applied more properly to God than to creatures (in the next article, ST I.Q13.A6.Resp.), even 
though they are known in the opposite direction. Therefore, the analogous knowledge of God cannot be 
merely the knowing something which was already contained in the description of the creature, but must be 
the more eminent thing called divine goodness in which creaturely goodness participates in an analogous 
manner, and which therefore can incite a particular kind of analogous knowledge of God which is neither 
univocal nor equivocal, but of an entirely different kind.  
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 66. 
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 He goes so far as to describe them as having an “informational vacuity.” Ibid., 67. This may be 
true insofar as we are picturing analogies as “containing” a morsel of truth within them (the husk/kernel 
analogy), for analogy is not watered-down equivocity, but one cannot push it so far as to mean that such 
statements are meaningless. They may operate minimally, as Lindbeck suggests, by eliminating false 
formulations (“God is good” = “God is not evil”) but I will argue that they can also constructively prompt 
for tectonic shifts in meaning. This will be more properly engaged in the next chapter.  
One of the ways in which the present proposal distinguishes itself from Lindbeck’s is precisely its 
insistence on a certain kind of objectivity in a complex relationship with human subjectivity rooted in the 
structures of human knowing which have several inputs, including the world outside the person. It is thus 
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This understanding of analogy in Aquinas is insufficient; Thomas clearly 
understands analogy to bear positive meaning.
102
 Nevertheless, it provides an important 
reminder that theological analogies are neither watered-down truth nor kernels of non-
analogous meaning concealed inside a linguistic husk. Keeping this in mind, it is 
important to insist that, for Thomas and for Catholic theology in general, analogies do 
convey positive analogous meaning, which is capable of prompting its hearer into a 
better conception of the Christian understanding of God. How this may be better 
described will be engaged at length in chapter three, but for now, an analogy might be 
helpful: just as one cannot say that a human “contains” a soul, one should not say that an 
analogy “contains” truth. Rather, for Thomas, the soul is instantiated in the body. By 
looking for the soul inside a human, one would destroy the human and lose the soul also. 
In the same way, real truth is instantiated in an analogy, but not in a way that it could be 
extracted or made present without being so instantiated.  
Meaning, Language, & Dialect: Lindbeck & Ecumenical Consensus 
Bringing Lindbeck more explicitly back to his own stated arena, we can now ask 
how all of this relates to the ecumenical project. One of the weaknesses of Nature of 
Doctrine is its inability to keep the ecumenical question in focus, often being drawn off-
                                                                                                                                                 
somewhat differentiated from both options of what Richard Lints has called the Postpositivist choice: 
“Notice the fashion in which the postliberal ‘leans’ in the direction of the postpositivist critique of the 
verifiability criterion and Tracy and moderate postmodems "lean" in the direction of the postpositivist 
critique of the objectivity of knowledge. The one is concerned more narrowly with the structures of human 
knowledge and the other is concerned with the relative objectivity of that knowledge” “The Postpostitivist 
Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck,” JAAR 61 no.4 (1993): 670. 
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 For a careful engagement with why analogies in Thomas have to be understood as having 
positive content and not merely ruling out negative positions, see Robert Masson, Without Metaphor, No 
Saving God, (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 129–46. This will be engaged more specifically in chapter three. 
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track by a failure to adequately distinguish the interreligious from the ecumenical on the 
one hand and to attend to the real differences between Christian dialects on the other.
103
 
This is not to say that Lindbeck’s proposal does not give an account of the question he 
begins by asking. It is merely to suggest that he passes up opportunities for developing 
these distinctions in a way that would strengthen his answer.  
In describing the conditions for the possibility of truth, Lindbeck is working 
simultaneously on two levels, but in order to adequately describe ecumenical dialogue, 
the reader needs to consciously add a third. His levels of discourse are the sociological 
(outsider language about religion) and theological (insider language of a religion); this 
provides a useful framework for describing what it means to say that a religion is true. 
The pattern, however, is slightly mismatched to his stated goal of explaining the 
experience of “reconciliation without capitulation” in the ecumenical dialogues.104 These 
dialogues take place within the theological sphere, but between two distinct, and 
officially opposed, “dialects” of Christian theological language. The goal of 
reconciliation would be not only improper but meaningless in the wider “sociological” 
frame that he uses to make his proposal clear. Interreligious conversations do not share 
the ecumenical goal of reconciliation and unity. Mutual understanding is a difficult 
enough task at the interreligious level; ecumenical reconciliation (especially without 
                                                 
103
 This may help explain the fact of the book’s reception having occurred primarily by 
theologians interested in questions other than ecumenism, referred to above at note 80 of this chapter. 
Lindbeck does not seem unaware of the problem, returning to it in a chapter published by Lindbeck as 
“Relations interreligieuses et œcuménisme: Le chapitre 3 de La nature des doctrines revisité,” 183–96 in 
Postlibéralisme?: La théologie de George Lindbeck et sa réception, Marc Boss, Gilles Emery and Pierre 
Gisel, eds., (Montreal: Éditions Fides, 2004). The original English text was subsequently published as 
“Interreligious Relations and Christian Ecumenism: Revisiting Chapter 3 of The Nature of Doctrine,”125–
40 in The Nature of Doctrine: 25th Anniversary Edition, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009). 
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 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 16–17. 
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capitulation) is a much more difficult goal and requires a substantially more subtle 
engagement with the question of truth and difference.  
Stated another way, Christianity’s internal logic requires unity for coherence. 
There cannot be multiple, separate Christianities because there is only one Christ. The 
earliest Christian writers recognized this and warned the churches against internal and 
trans-local schism.
105
 Responding to the incompatibility of separated Churches with 
Christian thought, the ecumenical project of dialogue aimed at unity seeks to correct this 
incoherence and allow the churches to speak the Gospel more intelligibly for the sake of 
the world.
106
 In the process, those involved in the dialogues have come to points at which 
what seemed at first to be church-dividing difference was found to be a unity in the 
shared Christian heritage without any substantive change having taken place. Regarding 
doctrine, Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model is capable of explaining this situation, but 
doing so requires sustained attention to both the ways that differing Christianities are A) 
sharers in a common language and B) distinct (and potentially contradictory) dialects of 
that same language.  
As an example of why this is difficult, we might consider in more depth 
Lindbeck’s engagement with Bernard Lonergan, whom he takes to be a good example of 
experiential-expressivism. There are some historical accidents that may have contributed 
to Lindbeck’s choice of interlocutor, specifically his repeated invitations to give named 
lectures the year after Lonergan in the mid-1970s. In 1974, Lindbeck gave the St. 
Michael’s Lectures at Gonzaga University. These required him to engage directly with 
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 This is an overarching theme throughout the NT, famously throughout the Johannine Corpus 
and the Acts of the Apostles, but also throughout the Epistles. See particularly Rom 14; Gal 1–2; Eph 4; 1 
Cor 1–3.  
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 Cf. Jn. 17:21. 
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Lonergan’s thought on related matters.107 The following year, Lindbeck gave the Père 
Marquette Lecture at Marquette University and referenced Fr. Lonergan’s Père Marquette 
lecture of the previous year. The St. Michael’s lectures are especially important in this 
history, as Lindbeck writes that they were the seed of The Nature of Doctrine.
108
  
The problematic aspect of Lindbeck’s engagement with Lonergan relates to the 
ecclesial location of the two thinkers. Lindbeck first treats Lonergan as a “two-
dimensional” experiential expressivist in the first chapter, while acknowledging that his 
position is particularly Roman Catholic.
109
 He then chooses Lonergan as his example of 
an undifferentiated “experiential-expressivism” in chapter two, treating the difference 
between Lindbeck’s own Lutheranism and Lonergan’s Roman Catholicism as an 
unimportant detail in the discussion. This is understandable, as Lindbeck is attempting to 
describe a common (Christian) horizon in which the ecumenical experience is sensible, 
but by assuming a common Christian language early on, he weakens the chapter in which 
he applies his theory developed in terms of differing religions to particularly intra-
Christian, ecumenical conversation.  
Using Lonergan’s Catholic theory as his example of a generically experiential-
expressivist position leads Lindbeck into two difficulties. First, he insufficiently attends 
to the distinctively Catholic elements of Lonergan’s thought. Second, this weakens his 
case for applying his insight to ecumenical conversation. Beginning with the central 
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insight of the book —itself situated in the ecumenical difference between Lutherans and 
Catholics— would have allowed him to expand his insight to the inter-religious sphere 
with fewer problematic gaps in the argument. 
Nevertheless, Christian division is never total. Separated churches demonstrate 
varying levels of common language, culture, and commitments. Sometimes seemingly 
large differences are not counted as church dividing; at other points, smaller differences 
are.
110
 At stake is not merely a way of accounting for human difference, but for doing so 
within the theological conviction that the church is one. 
Lindbeck’s thesis can also allow for an account of Christian unity in terms of the 
shared patterns of not only doctrine, but of prayer. One can look to the classical Christian 
theological understanding of the relationship between doctrine and doxology for a 
grounding of both Lindbeck’s insight about the necessity of categorical truth for 
ontological truth, and the ecclesial effect of shared patterns of worship among the 
separated churches. The liturgy is classically called theologia prima, implying that what 
we usually term “theology” is really theologia secunda;111 Prosper of Aquitaine’s motto, 
legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi, often shortened to the pithy lex orandi, lex 
credendi, reinforces the point.
112
 Because Lindbeck argues that truth is located in 
                                                 
110
 One could consider Pope John Paul II’s recognition of the validity of the Anaphora of Addai 
and Mari in the Assyrian Church of the East on the one hand, and the many divisions over particular 
aspects of biblical interpretation among some American Protestant communities on the other. Why one or 
the other is church dividing or not can only be interpreted from within the communities. An outsider who 
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Christian discourse,” Nature of Doctrine, 94. He makes the connection to the liturgy explicit here in the 
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 Prosper of Aquitaine, Praeteritorum sedis apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates, de gratia dei 
et libero voluntatis arbitrio, ch. 8. PL 51, col. 0209c. While it is a bit of an excursus, it is worth noting that 
Prosper’s motto is making a somewhat more complex point. Specifically, the apostolic origin and universal 
nature of the liturgy makes it, for Prosper, to be an unimpeachable guide for theological reflection. This is, 
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particular cultures, languages, and ways of acting (for example, his famous crusader), 
liturgical action is part of the cultural-linguistic framework in which makes it possible to 
express Christian truth.
113
 Moreover, attending to the ways in which common Christian 
liturgical action shapes the grammar of faith in the various communities provides another 
venue for articulating a different kind of differentiated consensus.
114
 
Indeed, such questions have been receiving more direct attention in the 
contemporary dialogues, even in several of the harsher critiques of the JDDJ.
115
 While it 
is heartening that the liturgical life of the church is being treated as a theological locus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of course, quite different from both the usual assumptions made in employing either Prosper’s motto or the 
shorter lex orandi, lex credendi. Nevertheless, the motto and its later use are worth considering in this 
context.  
Prosper’s full sentence is, “Alongside of the inviolate law of the most blessed and apostolic see, 
by which our most pious fathers, rejecting the arrogance of pestilential novelty, have taught [us] to attribute 
to Christ’s grace both in its beginnings in good will, and in the commendable progress of zeal, and even in 
being preserved in these efforts to the end, let us consider as well the rites of the priestly sacraments/rites, 
which having been received from the apostles, are celebrated in the same way in the entire world and 
throughout the whole catholic church, such that the law of prayer establishes the law of belief.” “Praeter 
beatissimae et apostolicae sedis inviolabiles sanctiones, quibus nos piissimi patres, pestiferae novitatis 
elatione dejecta, et bonae voluntatis exordia, et incrementa probabilium studiorum, et in eis usque in finem 
perseverantiam ad Christi gratiam referre docuerunt, obsecrationum quoque sacerdotalium sacramenta 
respiciamus, quae ab apostolis tradita, in toto mundo atque in omni catholica Ecclesia uniformiter 
celebrantur, ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi.”  
113
 Lindbeck has a category for describing Christians who are not theologically trained but are 
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their religion that they are reliable judges, not directly of the doctrinal formulations (for these may be too 
technical for them to understand), but of the acceptability or unacceptability of the consequences of these 
formulations in ordinary religious life and language.” Nature of Doctrine, 100. 
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 See particularly the response of the General Synod of the Malagasy Lutheran Church, GER–
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theological importance of the Roman Church having declared Victoire Rasoamanarivo to be a Blessed in 
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interpreting the liturgical life of the separated brethren will require as much or more 
charity and care as interpreting their doctrine.  
Responses to and Developments of Lindbeck’s Model 
While Lindbeck’s proposal was clearly intended to describe the ecumenical 
experience and serve as an explanation for the possibility of “doctrinal reconciliation 
without capitulation,” the reception of the book has taken place mostly outside of 
specifically ecumenical circles.
116
 As discussed above, it has been much more influential 
in general investigations of hermeneutics and doctrine.
117
 It is, however, important to 
keep Lindbeck’s insight tethered to the experience of ecumenical dialogue, even when it 
is being used in other ways. Doing so provides a framework that keeps his engagements 
with truth, consensus and doctrine in proper relationship. 
An example of why this framing is important is found in the critique of Lindbeck 
offered by Alister McGrath. Its most central point is that there is “a fractional degree of 
phenomenological isomorphism between ‘doctrine’ as it is encountered as an historical 
phenomenon on the one hand, and as it is defined by such historically- and socially-
abstracted theories (such as Lindbeck) on the other.”118 McGrath offers four theses 
regarding what major dimensions “doctrine has been understood to possess” within 
Christian history, primarily focused ad intra.
119
 They are:  
1. Doctrine functions as a social demarcator.  
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2. Doctrine is generated by, and subsequently interprets the Christian 
narrative.  
3. Doctrine interprets experience.  
4. Doctrine makes truth claims.120  
These are helpful. Although they are themselves abstractions, they are of a different kind 
than Lindbeck’s, for they function as descriptors of the roles played by doctrine within 
any particular dialect of Christian life, not at their borders. What’s more, it is likely that 
Lindbeck would accept all four of these descriptors, albeit within his own understanding 
of what it means to say that something in a cultural-linguistic system is true. As shown 
above, for an utterance to bear ontological truth for Lindbeck, it must first be 
intrasystematically true within a categorically true system. McGrath’s attention to 
historical factors in the development of doctrine is important, perhaps more important in 
his thought than for Lindbeck.
121
 An attention to the development of doctrine in Christian 
history, however, will show that the role any particular doctrine plays in a later era, even 
our own historically aware era, is not necessarily determined by the factors of its 
formulation.
122
 
Like many readers, McGrath misunderstands the purpose and venue of 
Lindbeck’s abstraction. Lindbeck’s proposal is at the service of a discussion between 
speakers of Christian dialects, or even between Christian and non-Christian languages. It 
is not primarily intended as a description of doctrine as it functions within a particular 
church. To extend the grammatical metaphor, Lindbeck’s is a descriptivist position, and 
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is therefore not terribly helpful to any particular speaker within his own vernacular. Only 
when trying to learn another dialect or language do the abstracted rules of grammar 
become absolutely necessary.
123
  
Having engaged several proposals of how to understand ecumenical consensus in 
difference, we can now turn back to the Joint Declaration to show how these questions 
require an answer if we are to properly read its claims. The remainder of this chapter will 
seek to make the questions raised by the authors engaged in this chapter as clear as 
possible. The following chapter will locate those questions within a different framework, 
within which the final two chapters can demonstrate that the JDDJ is naming a real 
ecumenical consensus on the eschatological nature of the baptized.  
 
The JDDJ and Consensus: The Need for an Explanation 
An understanding of inter-Christian engagement as “doctrinal reconciliation 
without capitulation,” is central to the aims of the JDDJ and indeed to bilateral 
interconfessional dialogue in general. Interpreters of these documents must be able to 
provide a framework for explaining why the ecumenical program of differentiated 
consensus is not merely equivocation,
124
 juxtaposition of the incompatible,
125
 or evidence 
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 It could be argued from a more pedagogical direction that such rules are helpful to those 
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that the doctrines themselves have lost their importance.
126
 But in order to be convincing 
to those who have not experienced the central moment of insight described by 
Lindbeck,
127
 this will require some further explanation of how it is rooted in human 
cultural-linguistic engagement with the world. The following chapter will bring to bear 
insights from cognitive linguistics to explain how language and culture create the 
“blends” which bear meaning in human language and that allow for the same words or 
actions to bear different, and even possibly contradictory, meaning in different socio-
cultural locations, even as dialects of the same language (English) or the same religious 
tradition (Christianity). 
As Catherine Clifford argues, the rocky initial reception that the JDDJ received 
from both the German professors of theology and the CDF may merely show that these 
receptors were “ill-equipped to evaluate the rapport between the proposed common 
confession of faith and the different articulations of the partner in dialogue.”128 This 
interpretation becomes especially likely given that the document was shortly thereafter 
publically and officially affirmed by both the LWF and the Catholic Church. Considering 
what the JDDJ’s differentiated consensus requires on the part of the receiving churches, 
Clifford argues that it calls for an act of judgment in light of several decades of ongoing 
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 Catherine Clifford, “The Joint Declaration, Method, and the Hermeneutics of Ecumenical 
Consensus,” 80–81. 
  126 
dialogue.
129
 They were asked to make a binding decision precisely about a differentiated 
consensus in the truth regarding justification. Their task was to consider whether the 
confessional positions that were “developed over and against the other” could be now 
rethought in ways that could allow the other’s position and recognize it as an appropriate 
Christian elaboration of the Gospel.
130
  
She reads the nervous reception of the JDDJ as demonstrating habits of thought 
that are insufficiently attentive to the church’s need to not merely restate past positions 
but to interpret them in light of new situations. Specifically, the “future reception of 
ecumenical consensus will depend largely upon our ability to clarify the hermeneutics 
both of contemporary agreed statements and of the historical articulations of faith that 
have so defined the culture of the churches.”131 Clifford’s project in this article is to 
provide such a hermeneutic for interpreting the JDDJ, and indeed the products of all 
ecumenical dialogues, using the categories of Bernard Lonergan. It will help to clarify the 
necessity for an explanation of differentiated consensus, and so will receive a more 
detailed description here. 
Lonergan divides theological engagement into eight “functional specializations,” 
tied to his four conscious intentional operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, 
and deciding. Each operation has a mediating phase (listening) and a mediated phase 
(proclamation).
132
 While the JDDJ benefits from renewed research into scripture, history, 
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and the mutual engagement of Lutherans and Catholics,
133
 Clifford attends primarily to 
the transition from Dialectic to Foundations, which she relates to conversion, “the way 
beyond contradictory positions and understandings.”134 For Lonergan, foundations are 
tied closely to conversion, and represent “the horizon within which the meaning of 
doctrines can be apprehended.”135 As such, the JDDJ represents a new such horizon, 
within which the functional specialties of Doctrines, Systematics and Communications 
will be carried out by both Lutherans and Catholics. As she notes, the JDDJ itself seems 
to have a similar future in mind, as it suggests that future dialogue between the churches 
and the internal teaching of the churches, will be done in light of the consensus expressed 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Mediating Phase Mediated Phase 
Deciding Dialectic →  ↓ Foundations  
Judging History ↑  ↓ Doctrines 
Understanding Interpretation ↑  ↓ Systematics 
Experiencing Research ↑  Communications 
Robert M. Doran has argued that Lonergan’s specialization “Foundations” is better split in two, “Horizons” 
and “Categories.” The distinction clarifies how one transitions from the mediating phase to the mediated, 
because in Horizons what is mediated is “the mediating subject.” This relates to the present discussion 
because it recognizes that theology is not merely mediating historical positions to the present, but is a 
“mutual self-mediation of the historically constituted community of faith and its contemporary cultural 
contexts. The mutual self-mediation in question here results from an encounter and dialogue of persons 
with different horizons.” Doran, What is Systematic Theology, (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 
2005), 198.  
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in the Declaration.
136
 For Lonergan (and Clifford), the contemporary world recognizes 
that culture cannot be expressed in terms of unchanging universal achievements (this 
Lonergan calls the “classicist worldview”) but in light of change, history, and 
development (what Lonergan calls the “empirical notion of culture”).137 Clifford sees the 
classicist worldview at work in those who call the JDDJ a betrayal of earlier 
commitments, a judgment that bears a close resemblance to what Lindbeck might call a 
cognitive-propositionalist understanding of doctrine. 
Her description of a Lonerganian hermeneutic for interpreting the JDDJ 
emphasizes the need for an explanation of why it is not mere equivocation when 
dialogues in general, and the JDDJ in particular, suggest that a consensus exists despite 
widely diverging forms of thought, easily visible in different “language, theological 
elaboration, and emphasis.”138 Lindbeck’s proposal for a post-liberal theology similarly 
names how theologies work within different cultural linguistic systems and asks his 
reader to agree that their difference need not be church dividing in every case. However, 
it provides little in the way of an explanatory theory as to why cultural-linguistic systems 
might be capable of sharing a single gospel in what appear to be divergent or even 
apparently contradictory forms. Lindbeck points to several examples of difference and 
argues that these are examples of precisely such a non-divisive difference. Without some 
underlying theory, however, his examples are easily dismissed as either equivocation or 
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falsely-irenic ecumenism, a charge also made against both Lehrverurteilungen — 
Kirchentrennend? and the JDDJ.
139
  
Chapter Conclusions 
Christian consensus will always mean consensus in the gospel; it will therefore 
require an engagement with the interpretation of the witness of scripture and of Christian 
tradition. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue is uniquely positioned to postulate 
such a consensus because the questions at stake are historically well-defined and have 
received extensive attention both before and after the tragic rupturing of communion in 
the sixteenth century. A half-century of ecumenical engagement between these churches 
has produced a conviction among members of the dialogue that significant consensus 
exists on the issue of justification. The consensus that the dialogue came to recognize 
must be “differentiated in itself” if it is to be receivable by the adherents of both 
theological traditions. This is what the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification 
sought to do with its tripartite structure of a common statement followed by Lutheran and 
Roman Catholic explanations of their particular modes of discourse. Both the narration of 
the reception process of the JDDJ in the first chapter and this chapter’s more specific 
engagement with the consensus in ecumenical dialogue have shown that the JDDJ’s 
presentation of the differentiated consensus that had crystallized in the previous decades 
of dialogue is not convincing to many theological observers. I have argued that this is in 
part due to a lacking explanatory underpinning which grapples head-on with the 
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difficulties of theological language and culture to explain how apparently contradictory 
statements might in some cases be recognized to be complementary. 
A simple understanding of Übereinkunft is demonstrated (to very different effect), 
in Körtner and Hampson’s judgments about the JDDJ and its place in ecumenical 
theology. Dalferth allowed for a more culturally-conditioned engagement with 
Übereinkunft, arguing that a common document must be received differently in the 
contexts of different churches. This understanding has much to recommend it, but it may 
remain open to the charges of equivocation which are often levied against the JDDJ. 
Descriptions of differentiated consensus seek to overcome these troubles by describing a 
consensus that has arisen in the context of bilateral dialogue over time. These 
consensuses are differentiated insofar as they describe real commonality between 
positions which demonstrates a new horizon, different from the habitual horizon of either 
party, in which a new recognition of agreement is discovered.  
Having recognized precisely such achievements in their ecumenical work, various 
theologians have sought to explain why it might be possible. Of these, I dealt most 
extensively with George Lindbeck’s treatment, showing not only its potential riches, but 
that it would be greatly strengthened in its defense of ecumenical (differentiated) 
consensus if it were provided with a structure that could explain what about human 
language would allow the experience to be possible and thus to explain how the JDDJ 
and other ecumenical documents are sensible in their description of “reconciliation 
without capitulation.”  
The next chapter will therefore go somewhat further afield from theology in 
search of an explanatory model that can articulate how Lutherans and Catholics can 
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speak of the same things in such characteristically different ways, and yet over time 
discern that despite the apparent contradiction, they are preaching one gospel. Cognitive 
linguistic theory of analogy, metaphor, and meaning, particularly as appropriated by 
Robert Masson, will provide a set of tools for analyzing the “blends” by which cultural-
linguistic meaning is constructed. These insights into the human construction of meaning 
will then allow a return to the JDDJ in chapters four and five to reconsider the 
anthropological description of the justified human being in the terms of Roman Catholics 
(chapter four) and Lutherans (chapter five).  
  
     
CHAPTER THREE:  
DIFFERENTIATED CONSENSUS & COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 
 
Chapter Introduction 
The previous chapter described contemporary theologians’ engagement with the 
questions of meaning posed by the inherited wounds to the church’s koinonia and 
contemporary attempts at ecclesial reconciliation through dialogue. The chief difficulty in 
accounting for such consensus was found to be giving an account of Christian 
commitment to truth in the experience of diversity that neither permitted every extant 
Christian expression nor required uniformity for the sake of unity. Several authors 
pointed to George A. Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic proposal as a possible means of 
holding on to both truth claims and difference, even in a situation of perceived 
contradiction. Lindbeck’s insight, however, requires an explanatory underpinning capable 
of convincing skeptical readers that his “reconciliation without capitulation,” or the 
JDDJ’s “differentiated consensus” is more than mere equivocation.  
One potential candidate to provide such a theoretical foundation can be found in 
the recent work of cognitive linguists.
1
 This chapter will provide a brief introduction to 
                                                 
1
 Other, parallel, theories of metaphoric knowing were developed during this same time. The most 
familiar to many theologians may be that of Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell. Their theory of “metaphoric 
process” developed from different concerns from that of the cognitive linguists, and as such has different 
language and emphasizes different concerns. I would argue that these theories are compatible, if distinct, 
however, that argument must be passed over due to the limitations of space. For an overview of Gerhart 
and Russell’s work and its relationship to the cognitive linguistic proposal, see Masson, Without Metaphor, 
22–24, 59–94. Gerhart and Russell’s important works include Metaphoric Process: The Creation of 
Scientific and Religious Understanding, (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1984); Idem, New 
Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion, (New York: Continuum, 2001). A symposium 
containing articles authored by them, Betty Birner, and Robert Masson is also quite helpful, “Symposium: 
Metaphor as a Space for Religion/Science Engagement,” Zygon 39 no. 1 (2004): 5–75.  
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the developments in that relatively new field over the last several decades. It will also 
describe Robert Masson’s application of these findings to theological language, and 
extend his project in a direction toward which he gestures but which he does not 
extensively develop. This direction is the ecumenical dialogues between divided 
Christians. Finally, this chapter will describe the important “blends”2 that contribute to 
Lutheran and Catholic difference regarding the anthropology of the justified Christian. 
The following two chapters will apply the theory developed in this chapter to the 
traditional anthropological claims of Roman Catholics (chapter four) and Lutherans 
(chapter five), to demonstrate that the JDDJ describes a real consensus, crystallized over 
decades of bilateral dialogue.  
It is important to notice to what kind of project I am applying the insights of this 
cognitive linguistic analysis. I am not proposing a method by which dialogue should be 
conducted, nor am I proposing an overarching frame into which both Lutheran and 
Catholic theologies become relativized or sublated. Instead, I am proposing a model by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Of course, there are also tantalizing similarities between the insights of the cognitive linguists and 
aspects of the thought of Paul Ricoeur, especially The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the 
Creation of Meaning in Language, Robert Czerny, trans., (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
Other important engagements with metaphoric thought and religious language include Herwi Rikhof, The 
Concept of Church: A Methodological Inquiry into the Use of Metaphors in Ecclesiology, (Sheperdstown, 
WV: Patmos Press, 1981); Janet Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); 
and Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). The limits of this 
chapter do not allow a thorough engagement with these various understandings of metaphor, although 
Anderson’s work, which draws on the thought of Lakoff and Johnson, does provide some intriguing 
parallels to understanding the habitual Catholic and Lutheran blends for “sin.” See below at p. 215.  
2
 That is, the complex which is the product of metaphorical thought in which “structure from two 
[or more] input spaces is projected to a new space, the blend.” Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 
47. In the technical language of the field, “In an integration network, the mental space which results from 
conceptual integration, giving rise to emergent structure.” Vyvyan Evans, A Glossary of Cognitive 
Linguistics, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 11. Also available at www.vyvevans.net/ 
GLOSSARY.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2014). 
Through repeated use, it can come to bind the particular basic components more closely together 
in habits of thought such that it acquires its own stable existence that shapes meaning. Blends not only 
receive content from their “inputs,” but have their own emergent content. This means that the blend can 
allow new meanings to develop.  
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which the differentiated consensus that crystallized in the context of ongoing bilateral 
dialogue regarding justification, and which is described in the JDDJ, can be made more 
appropriable to ecumenical non-specialists in the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches. 
I will return to this point in what follows. 
From Conventional Literality to Embodied Metaphor 
As a discipline, cognitive linguistics is relatively young and reasonably cohesive 
in its vision. It seeks to explain how language functions to make meaning possible. It 
does this by examining the structure of various human languages and the biological 
structures which allow our perception and necessarily mediate it. Its practitioners design 
experiments to test aspects of human cognition and the production of meaning. Its 
insights are often counter-intuitive, but offer a means of abstracting from the 
particularities of individual languages to gain a look at human cognition itself. For a 
theologian, perhaps the most interesting aspect of their findings is how they describe 
language that theologians call “literal,” “metaphorical,” and “analogical.”3  
In considering matters of meaning and of metaphor, we often assume the 
“idealized conventional view” aptly summarized by Masson, in which:  
reason and concepts are abstract and disembodied. Literal meaning is the default 
position. Reasoning is primarily about propositions that can be objectively either 
true or false. The imaginative aspects of cognition —metonymy, metaphor, and 
mental images— are peripheral and deviations from literal meanings.4 
                                                 
3
 These terms are used differently by different thinkers, often to opposite effect. If I am using the 
terms in a different manner than they are usually employed in classical theological texts, I will be very clear 
as to what I mean and why the term is being used in that manner.  
4
 Masson, Without Metaphor, 31. The point about literality not being the default of human 
language with metaphor as a kind of “ornamental aspect of language, but a fundamental scheme by which 
people conceptualize the world and their own activities” is absolutely central to the argument of cognitive 
linguistics. This will be dealt with in what comes, but should be underlined at this point. Raymond W. 
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George Lakoff and his colleagues, on the basis of linguistic analysis and experimental 
data, reject the folk-theory, central to much of Western epistemology, that reality is taken 
in by humanity in a pre-structured form. This form supposedly includes pre-existing, 
defined concepts and categories that humans learn to distil from what is. Because the 
categories themselves exist outside of the human mind, reason itself can be said to be not 
only exterior to the mind (disembodied), but abstract in its being. Therefore, 
mathematical models are assumed to provide the central example of what reason is – a 
manipulation of symbols that fairly adequately describe the exterior, pre-existent 
structure of reality.
5
  
In its place, a new embodied theory of knowing is posited that attends to not only 
cultural and linguistic structures, but to human neurological development. It represents an 
attempt to give a better answer to the relationship of subjective and objective aspects of 
human knowing. The data from which these theories have arisen is of two sorts. First, 
investigations of basic aspects of human experience across languages and cultures form a 
particularly important beginning. Second, an attention to the findings of cognitive science 
provides methods of investigating the biological and neurological structures which shape 
how humans perceive and understand the world. One surprising and incredibly important 
discovery is that categories previously described as universals (especially, time, space, 
and color) demonstrate fundamental variations across cultures. Nevertheless, these 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gibbs, Jr. “Metaphor and Thought: The State of the Art” 3–13 in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor 
and Thought, Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3. See also, 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, “A Deflationary Account of Metaphor,” 84–105 and Rachel Giora, “Is 
Metaphor Unique?”143–160 in the same volume.  
5
 For a clear, extended description of the roles of theories of the mind and its relationship to the 
outside world among the cognitive linguists, see Zoltán Kövecses, Language, Mind, and Culture: A 
Practical Introduction, (New York: Oxford, 2006), 3–37. 
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variations occur in patterns that are themselves explained by neurological and biological 
structures.
6
  
While considerations of each of these supposedly universal categories contribute 
to understanding the embodied character of human understanding, color has become the 
primary example for explaining the complex mediation through which we engage the 
world. It is a felicitous example because, while relatively simple and part of everyday 
experience, it is capable of quickly demonstrating the interaction of exterior, anatomical, 
and cultural inputs. The perception of color is culturally determined, but also relates to 
underlying structures of the human body and to the structure of the world itself. It is thus 
truly connected to phenomena existing outside of us, but in a fundamentally mediated 
way.  
The basic research on which this theory is based was conducted by Brent Berlin 
and Paul Kay in the 1960s.
 7
 They first defined “basic” and “non-basic” color terms in a 
                                                 
6
 The basic theory of linguistic relativity was proposed by Benjamin Lee Whorf in the middle of 
the 20c. His research, based on differences between Indo-European languages and Hopi pointed to 
differences regarding color and time, but suggested that space might be a universal human experience, or 
“given substantially the same form by experience.” Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality: 
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, John B. Carrol, ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), 158–59. 
Later research by John B. Haviland and Stephen Levinson describes linguistic families with 
substantially different experiences of space, related not to the human person (i.e. front, behind, left, right 
etc.), but reckoned with great specificity to the absolute orientation, (i.e. as equivalents of North, South, 
North-by-North-East, etc.). John B. Haviland, “Guugu Yimithirr” 27–180 in Handbook of Australian 
Languages, R.M. Dixon and B. Blake, eds., (Canberra: ANU Press, 1979); Stephen C. Levinson, Language 
and Cognition: The Cognitive Consequences of Spatial Description in Guugu Yimithirr, (Nijmegen: 
Cognitive Anthropology Research Group, 1992).  
On this basis, Levinson argues, that “it can also be demonstrated experimentally that [Guugu 
Yimithirr speakers] remember spatial arrays not in terms of ego-centric co-ordinates … but in terms of the 
cardinal directions in which objects lie. Thus Guugu Yimithirr speakers appear to think about space in a 
fundamentally different way than we do.” Idem, Relativity in Spatial Conception and Description, in 
Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, J. Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 180.  
7
 It is summarized in all of the major authors. I will be citing the description of their findings 
found in Kövecses, Language, Mind, and Culture, 31–33.  
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variety of languages.
8
 They sought to define where the boundaries lay between these 
basic colors. They also asked subjects to identify the “best examples” of each basic term. 
Eleven “focal colors” emerged consistently across languages, although not all languages 
had all of the focal colors. No languages were found with more than eleven focal colors. 
Most importantly, they found an evolutionary hierarchy among the focal colors:  
Black, White 
Red 
Yellow, Blue, Green 
Brown 
Purple, Pink, Orange, Gray.
9
 
In a language with two basic colors, they will be black and white. The third will always 
be red. The fourth, fifth, and sixth will be yellow, blue, and green, emerging in different 
orders in different languages. As languages add more colors, they continue to expand in 
this manner according to the chart above.  
The universal structure by which this pattern emerges in human language relates 
to several distinct inputs. First, there is the outside world, without which, there would be 
no sense perception. Second, our visual experience of the world is mediated by the 
particular structure of human eyes, which contain a variety of photoreceptor cells:  
1) Cells that sense darkness and light (rods),  
2) Long cone cells, most sensitive to long-wavelength light, i.e. yellow-red (peak 
response is to light with a wavelength c. 570 nm),  
3) Medium cone cells, most sensitive to green light (peak response to wavelengths 
of c. 535 nm), and  
4) Short cone cells, most sensitive to blue-violet light (peak response to 
wavelengths of c. 445 nm).
10
  
                                                 
8
 Basic color terms tend to be monolexemic (i.e. “red” vs. “bur-gun-dy”), not contained in a more 
basic category (burgundy is a kind of red), not generally restricted to a single object (burgundy to wine), 
and generally known, i.e. operative in most people’s working vocabularies. Their definition of “basic 
colors” are found in Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), cited by Kövecses, Language, Mind, and Culture, 31.  
9
 Ibid., 32.  
10
 Martha J. Farah, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), 4–8.  
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Perception of all light is therefore received as a combination of these “primary” colors, 
which produces the “secondary” colors when cells fire in combination. Because of this 
structure, the human eye cannot distinguish between a single-wavelength light source that 
produces a reaction in both medium and short cone cells, and two dimmer, proximate 
light sources activating those same cones. This is why an LCD screen is capable of 
relating very convincing simulacra of the world; it is also the basis for the iconic 
sandwich bag commercials.
11
 Third, sight is processed by the human brain; its structures 
and processes also contribute to what we see. Optical illusions take advantage of these 
structures and processes to produce surprising effects. Finally, how a culture groups these 
stimuli affects how people describe them, relate them, and engage with them. Kövecses 
summarizes the interrelated color system in this way: 
[C]olor categories are determined by four distinct factors. First, they are 
determined by the external physical world. This is how wavelength plays a role in 
color perception. Second, human biology (the structure of the nervous system) is 
crucially involved in how we see basic primary colors, such as black, red, and 
blue. Third, the human mind has the capability to combine primary basic colors 
into nonprimary basic colors, such as purple and pink. Fourth, culture is again a 
crucial factor in that it determines which color categories there are in a particular 
language and it also determines the boundaries of the use of color terms.
12
 
It is clear why the color example is so wide-spread in texts engaging the findings of 
cognitive linguistics. It is quickly graspable. It usefully holds together several important 
factors, making clear the interrelationship between culture, ocular and neural biology, and 
exterior stimulus. It does this in a way that can attend to a real engagement with the 
                                                 
11
 That is, “yellow and blue make green.” 
12
 Ibid., 33.  
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exterior world, name its limitations, and describe the role culture plays in structuring a 
reality that comes to us in a fundamentally unstructured way.
13
 
If experience comes in mediated ways to human beings, the next question must 
be: “how can we talk about the forms of this mediation, specifically relating to the human 
production of meaning?” In contradistinction to the conventional view, one cannot 
conceive of literality as the “base-position of language” which is occasionally violated for 
the sake of poetic or transcendental speech. Instead, even language that we would usually 
describe as expressing basic meaning makes use of various kinds of “mappings”14 that 
cross categories of language and meaning and are therefore metaphorical. Even literal 
understandings are linguistically and culturally constructed, and in turn shape the ways in 
which we receive and understand the world.  
One can consider the two statements, “the temperature is rising” and “the mercury 
is rising.” The first is the more basic of the two statements in our habitual use, but only 
the second could be called “literal” because the first relies on a metaphor (that is, a cross-
domain mapping), MORE IS UP.
15
 To highlight the extent to which such metaphoric 
understandings permeate our consideration of the world, we could consider how 
                                                 
13
 The fact that the spectrum of visible light is a true spectrum, (i.e. a continuous and dense range), 
and that human engagement with the spectrum is always based in categories, lends further support to the 
explanation. 
14
 A mapping is a match created between two spaces or frames, that allows a blend to arise. 
Mappings can be dynamic and short-lived, or stable and persistent. The latter are more important to this 
chapter, and are also called “cross-domain mappings.” They can be visualized in visual networks, which 
will be described below. Mappings can take different forms, depending on how many inputs there are, and 
what relationship those inputs have to each other. See Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 47. 
Evans, Glossary, 130. 
15
 Masson, Without Metaphor, 52. Small caps are conventionally used to designate a schema, a 
frame, or a metaphor. Strictly speaking, “metaphor” is reserved to describe the concept which makes the 
cross-domain mapping sensible (i.e. MORE IS UP), while a metaphoric expression is an instance of its 
employment, in this case, “the temperature is rising.” The expression also assumes HEAT IS A QUANTITY, 
which further points to the complexity of this seemingly “literal” metaphoric expression, although the 
authors do not generally point out this further complexity. 
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foundational the metaphor CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS is for our understanding of the 
world as Masson, Kövecses, and Fauconnier and Turner do. This metaphor is ubiquitous 
throughout the speech and thought of many if not most cultures. Attending to it allows us 
to see how the metaphor encourages us to think of categories as having hard edges and 
sharply-defined feature lists.  
Objective and Subjective Aspects 
One of the real advantages of this account, which should become clear in light of 
the disagreements about the nature of theological language narrated in the second 
chapter, is that it is capable of giving a nuanced and investigable answer to the question 
of objectivity and subjectivity. If the world is mediated to us not only through the 
particular biological realities of the human body, but through the culturally constructed 
metaphors through which we receive sense data about the outside world, then attention to 
the forms these metaphors take and the ways in which they structure our experience and 
our commitments is helpful, especially in situations where differing schemata of cultural-
linguistic metaphor might be at work. I will return momentarily to investigating how the 
insights of cognitive linguistic specialists can be helpful in the larger project at stake. 
First, I will provide the reader with a very basic introduction to the basic types of 
cognitive network by which cross-domain mappings (metaphors) produce meaning. 
Some Basic Vocabulary: Mental Spaces, Networks, and Blends  
While frames are fairly basic units of meaning, we habitually combine them into 
more useful groupings, called “mental spaces.” These are produced “dynamically in 
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working memory, but they can also become entrenched in long-term memory.”16 As an 
example of the latter, Fauconnier and Turner point to “Jesus on the Cross,” which brings 
to mind (or activates) a variety of other mental spaces, including those of “Roman 
crucifixion, of Jesus the baby, of Jesus the son of God, of Mary and the Holy women at 
the foot of the cross, of styles of painting the crucifixion, of moments of the liturgy that 
refer to it, and to many more,” all of which influence the meaning that the network 
produces.
 17
 This means that many of our habitual understandings are built up out of 
meanings from a variety of such mental spaces, related in different ways, but all of which 
are engaged when the network is evoked.
18
 Explaining this more clearly requires some 
technical vocabulary.  
Mental spaces are habitual mental simulations that characterize an understanding 
in the human mind. These can be real or purely imaginative, but are formed by the 
activation of a variety of elements, and the simultaneous engagement of these elements 
builds connections that are mutually reinforcing. These spaces can be described by a 
“gestalt node” that “activates all of the elements of the mental space” or by providing 
sufficient numbers of common elements to engage the network.
19
 We often hold several 
of these mental spaces in mind at once in a process that is referred to as “blending” or 
“conceptual integration.” There are various types of blends which will be described 
                                                 
16
 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 103. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 The language of engagement is intended to operate also on the level of brain function, as 
repeating patterns of brain engagement reinforces those patterns and makes them more likely in the future. 
The habits of thought by which such connections are made become, in a sense, hardwired, producing 
patterns of thought in which one by necessity evokes the other. See Masson, Without Metaphor, 80.  
19
 George Lakoff, “The Neural Theory of Metaphor, 17–38 in The Cambridge Handbook of 
Metaphor and Thought, 30. As an example, the mental space “restaurant” can be activated by a gestalt node 
“restaurant” or “menu,” or it can be activated by a sufficient number of simpler elements in proximity, as in 
the example “the ham sandwich is asking for his check.” 
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below. A blend does not necessarily imply a metaphor, although metaphors are types of 
blend.  
To illustrate the concept of blending, Lakoff uses a riddle. Imagine a monk who 
ascends a mountain one morning to pray. He arrives at the top and spends the night. The 
next morning, he descends the mountain. Is there a point on his path that he inhabited at 
the same time on each day? To solve the riddle, one pictures two monks walking the 
same path, one ascending, the other descending. Their paths will cross and so there must 
be such a point. Each instance of the monk walking forms a mental space. They are 
blended into one space (in a non-metaphoric manner) to solve the riddle. Referring to the 
“riddle of the monk” activates both spaces, and is therefore a gestalt node.20 This example 
is a blend because it is a neural binding (between mental spaces). It is not a metaphor, 
which he defines as “a cross-domain mapping.” To describe the distinction, he reminds 
us of the sentence, the temperature went up. In this sentence, the active metaphor is 
MORE IS UP. But there is no blending. In seeing a vertically-mounted mercury 
thermometer, both the metaphor (MORE IS UP) and the blending are present. The blending 
is the neural binding between the source and the target elements of the metaphor that 
makes the thermometer a useful tool.
21
  
In discussing blends, one can construct a network in which the input spaces are 
depicted along with blended and general spaces in such a way as to make various types of 
blend explicit. Examples of these are below. Some authors also make use of the 
terminology “network” to describe mental blends; this emphasizes the neurological basis 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., 31. 
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of cognitive blending.
22
 Thus, a network can also be described as an intra-cognitive 
relation held between primitive domains.
23
  
While a much more extensive description of the concepts of frames and mental 
spaces would be helpful, this has been done well and repeatedly by others.
24
 The 
usefulness of cognitive linguistics to theology is the ability to engage and dissect more 
complex engagements with meaning. I will, therefore, press on to describe the various 
descriptions of more complex blends that are built with the basic concept, trusting that 
any remaining difficulties will become understandable via demonstration.  
Frames and Domain Mappings – Metonyms 
Language that maps meaning within a single frame, but which uses one item to 
stand for another can be called metonymy. In a sense, these are the simplest of cognitive 
processes to describe. Kövecses proposes several examples of metonymy, all of which 
presuppose an (implied) frame to be sensible. We habitually supply the frame, even when 
it is not supplied for us. Consider the following sentence: the ham sandwich is asking for 
his tab. A reader can quickly supply a frame in which it becomes a sensible metonymy, 
i.e. RESTAURANT. The sentence within this frame, “provides mental access to the 
conceptual element “person eating the ham sandwich” (target) through the use of another 
                                                 
22
 In describing thought processes in terms of underlying brain structures, one names “nodes” of 
neuronal activation which interrelate in a variety of means, including mutual activation or inhibition, or 
binding, in which we simultaneously activate several nodes but hold them together as a single object. One 
of the most important insights of this neurological investigation is the importance of habituation. This is 
usually expressed in terms of the motto, “neurons that fire together wire together. (Lakoff, “Neural 
Theory,” 19), meaning that “[d]uring learning, spreading activation strengthens synapses along the way. 
When the activation spreading from A meets the activation spreading from B, a link is formed, and the link 
gets stronger the more A and B fire together.” (Ibid., 19–20).  
23
 Kövecses, 277–287. 
24
 See Masson, Without Metaphor, 27–55; Kövecses, 39–95, Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We 
Think, 75–170. 
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conceptual element “ham sandwich” (vehicle) that belongs to the same frame.”25 Other 
examples of such intra-domain intelligibility would include sentences like The Vatican 
issued an encyclical, or the Department moved the professor and his family from Boston. 
Metonymy can be divided into a variety of configurations, each of which presupposes a 
frame for sensibility.
26
 These expressions use language from within a frame to provide 
access to other aspects of that frame. It extends beyond language to behavior, including 
for example, the painting of portraits or the production of ID photos (the THING-AND-
PART ICM or “Idealized Cognitive Model”). It also is inherent in ritual behavior, such as 
reverencing icons, or of the cross on Good Friday.  
Cross-Domain Mappings – Metaphors 
Describing more complex mappings require understanding how the mind relates 
items to each other across frames, often “on the basis of some kind of perceived 
similarity.”27 As Fauconnier and Turner go to great lengths to make clear, such 
“blending” of input spaces does significant work in human cognition, often by means of 
what they call “compression” and “decompression.” A successful cross-domain mapping 
does not call to mind every aspect of both domains, but compresses insignificant aspects 
                                                 
25
 Kövecses, 99.  
26
A list of several kinds of examples will make the point. All of these are drawn from Kövecses, 
100–106. The Vatican example is a case of “Whole and its Parts” Configuration, which can be further 
divided into THING-AND-PART ICM (idealized cognitive model), the SCALE ICM, (How old are you?) in 
which an end of a scale stands in for the whole scale; the CONSTITUTION ICM (there was cat all over the 
road) where object stands in for material; the COMPLEX EVENT ICM (she’s in the hospital), in which a 
location stands in for a whole complex event; the CATEGORY-AND-PROPERTY ICM (boys will be boys); and 
the category-and-member ICM (Do you have an aspirin?) in which a member of a category can invoke the 
entire category. A second category, the “Part and Part” Configuration, would include the ACTION ICM 
(shampoo one’s hair) relating action to element within a frame; the CAUSATION ICM (She’s my joy/pride); 
and the CONTROL ICM (Nixon bombed Hanoi). Finally, a category of indeterminate relationships serves to 
hold other examples, including the one with which we started, The Ham Sandwich….  
27
 Kövecses, 115. 
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so as to hold the significant aspects in focus.
28
 They divide cross-domain mappings into 
four different types of blend of varying complexity, and chart the salient features of 
particular blends (or conceptual integration networks), by means of diagrams that have 
four “spaces.” Generally, two input spaces are located on a horizontal axis. Input Spaces 
contribute images, concepts, and understandings from other more basic blends and data 
from particular frames. Important aspects of these are listed in the input spaces. A 
Generic Space is located above them. If the inputs share a frame, this may be listed here. 
Cross-frame mappings will call forth an abstract “generic space” in which aspects of the 
two inputs are understood as having common traits. These traits can be listed in the upper 
space. The lower space is the Blend itself. Here, the particular aspects of the blend are 
noted. In particular, aspects of the blend that are particular or unique are highlighted. 
Lines may be used to map particular connections between aspects of the inputs and the 
generic and blended spaces. Each type of network uses the same type of figure, but 
relates the inputs in different ways (Fig. III-1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 They provide a number of examples, including the process of imagining a rug in a showroom in 
your living room, which compresses unimportant aspects of both spaces and the distance between them. In 
the “riddle of the monk,” we are compressing time within one frame, and the unimportant differences in 
age between the monk travelling up and the monk travelling down. See Fauconnier and Turner, The Way 
we Think, 113–35 and 312–28. 
Figure III-1 
Basic Network Diagram 
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Simplex Network 
A simplex network is usually an application of a particular frame to a particular 
set of points, so as to relate them within the extant frame. Fauconnier and Turner suggest 
the sentence, Paul is the Father of Sally, which applies terms (father, daughter) within the 
frame, HUMAN FAMILY, to specify the relation of two persons. They draw the simplex 
network in the following manner (Fig. III-2):
29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simplex networks contain no clashes between the inputs because the input with 
values (in this case, Paul and Sally), has no organizing frame of its own. The organizing 
frame is provided by the second input (Father-ego), which is provided a particular data 
set by the first. In this, it can be imagined as being like a mail-merge in computer 
software, whereby the structure (a letter with addresses, greetings, etc.) is provided by 
one program in a suite and the data to be structured (names, street addresses, states, ZIP 
                                                 
29
 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 121. 
 Figure III-2 
Simplex Network: 
 Paul is the father of Sally 
Paul is the 
Father of Sally 
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codes) by another. Running the merge (or “running the blend”) produces a useful set of 
documents that are structured in a particular way using the data from the second program. 
Mirror Networks 
Mirror networks are slightly more complex, in that all the spaces (i.e. inputs, 
generic space, and blended space) have an organizing frame. They are still relatively 
simple, because all inputs share a common frame that can be differentiated in some way 
(such as time). As an example, consider the following infographic (Fig. III-3).
30
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The image asks the reader to imagine the world-record holders in the Men’s 100m dash 
of the last century as if they were running the same race in order to compare their 
finishing times. All of the input spaces are the same (MEN’S 100M DASH), but there are 
differences at sub-frame levels (1912, 1920 … 2009). This is a complex blend, insofar as 
it asks the viewer to deal with 58 inputs, but because they all share the same organizing 
frame, the viewer is easily able to compare the various inputs, compressing the less 
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 Infographic by Ryan Flynn, 2012. Data source, IAAF. Used under Creative Commons License. 
Available at http://www.parseerror.com/i/mg/100m/100m-1600.png , April 8, 2014.  
Figure III-3  
Men’s 100m Dash World Records 
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important data to take in the infographic’s intended point regarding the ever-shifting 
horizon of this particular sports event. Because all of the inputs map the same, we can 
simplify it to two inputs as a representative way of describing the blend. It can be drawn 
as follows (Fig. III-4): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we see the blend of the records held by D. Lippencott (1912), and that of U. Bolt 
(2009). In the blend, we imagine them running the same race, with U. Bolt winning by 
1.02 seconds, despite nearly a century having elapsed between their world-record 
attempts. The races constitute a single organizing frame, in which the two records are 
mutually intelligible. 
Single-Scope Networks 
Single-scope networks differ from mirror networks in that one of the inputs 
provides the organizing frame, and is therefore the source of inferences relating to the 
other. Single-scope networks thus describe what theologians routinely describe as 
Figure III-4  
Mirror Network: 
100m dash records 
  150 
metaphor, following Thomas Aquinas,
31
 but are called “analogical thinking” in Gerhart 
and Russell’s work.32 A classic example would be Achilles is a lion. That proposed by 
Fauconnier and Turner is Murdoch knocks Iacocca out. In both of these cases, the 
relations in one input (lions/boxing) determine what can be inferred about the inputs from 
the other input space (Achilles/Murdoch & Iacocca). We cannot make inferences in the 
other direction, such as Boxers run companies, or Lions descend from the Gods (Fig. III-
5):
33
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Double-Scope Networks 
Finally, and most importantly for the present project, we can describe double-
scope networks, in which the two inputs each bring their own organizing frames, and 
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 Metaphorice, see ST I.Q13.A3. 
32
 Gerhart and Russell, Metaphoric Process, 109–119. For these authors, analogy is the broader 
category, which properly describes what we are describing as single-scope blends. When the “field of 
meanings” requires distortion, what is produced is a metaphor. This will usually be something more like 
what we will describe below as a double-scope blend.  
33
 Figure from Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 128.  
Figure III-5 
Single-Scope Network: 
Boxing CEOs 
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these do not obviously mesh. Holding them in tension allows the possibility of what 
Fauconnier and Turner call, “rich clashes,” that is, a productive tension out of which new 
imaginative possibilities arise.
34
 In such a blend, neither input can properly be termed 
“source” or “target” because they are mutually re-defining. This means that the 
differences between the organizing frames allow for implications that cannot be drawn in 
a single-scope blend. Kövecses uses the phrase God, was he ever mad. I could see smoke 
coming out of his ears—I thought his hat would catch fire! as an example of a double-
scope blend. In this case, the inputs are the metaphor ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER, and the angry person. In the blended space, we imagine the person with 
steam escaping his ears. We can draw an implication from the first input and it’s 
submapping ANGER IS HEAT, to imagine the man’s hat (which usually sits on a head, 
above the ears), catching fire. Kövecses depicts the blend in this manner (Fig. III-6):
35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., 131. There is a parallel which can be drawn to the metaphoric theory of Gerhart and 
Russell. See n. 1 above. Masson argues convincingly that they are describing the same cognitive action. 
See Masson, Without Metaphor, 77–94. As Fauconnier and Turner point out, double scope networks can be 
non-clashing, if the two inputs are mutually interpretive, but do not contain contradictory aspects. In this 
case, they would “both contribute to a blend that incorporates both of them. For example, if in a particular 
corporate community traveling business partners are typically lovers, we can develop the traveling business 
partners/lovers frame, with emergent structure, which can become familiar and used routinely in the 
culture.” Idem., The Way We Think, 135.  
35
 Kövecses, 284. 
Figure III-6:  
Double-Scope Blend 
Anger leading to a fiery hat 
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Here we see several things. First, Kövecses has chosen to demonstrate the blend 
graphically. Images are indeed closer to the basic form of this blend, which is visual in its 
structure.
36
 As can be seen from the example, both inputs contribute to the blend, such 
that the outcome (“running the blend”) produces a memorable re-imagination of the 
situation and the basic metaphor that contributed to it. A flaming hat has little to do with 
ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, but is an immediately understandable implication 
of the blend as it is presented.  
Masson’s Application to Theological Language 
Theology is human, embodied, and rooted in language, although it describes what 
is divine, transcendent, and ineffable. This is not a new insight of the contemporary era. 
The Thomistic adage, “that which is received is received according to the mode of the 
receiver” (quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur), implies it.37 However, one 
might initially be put off from applying the insights of cognitive linguists within theology 
because it is clear that for many cognitive linguists, the embodied character of human 
knowing is understood reductively. If language is a human phenomenon, it is difficult to 
understand how it could describe what is traditionally called God.
38
 This reduction is not, 
                                                 
36
 For an engagement with the relationship of visual and conceptual metaphors, see Elena Semino 
and Gerard Steen, “Metaphor in Literature,” 323–46 in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and 
Thought, 238–39. 
37
 A form of the adage is found at ST 1a, q. 75, a. 5, resp. There it is phrased in this way: “For it is 
clear that everything received into something is received in it according to the mode of the recipient.” 
Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. 
38
 As an example, see George Lakoff’s 2001 Gifford Lectures, “The Embodied Mind and How to 
Live with One,” 49–108 in Anthony Sanford, ed. The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding: the 
2001 Gifford Lectures at the University of Glasgow, (New York: T&T Clark, 2003), especially 102–105. 
He suggests that there are three possible metaphoric understandings of God: GOD AS PARENT; GOD AS THE 
INFINITE; and GOD AS IMMANENT/GOD AS WHAT EXISTS. His reasons for rejecting both the first and the 
second seem to assume that people who believe such things accept all the implications of the blend, as if it 
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however, a necessary implication of their work, a point that Masson is at pains to argue 
clearly, and a task at which he succeeds. When the cognitive linguists discussed so far, 
and in particular George Lakoff, engage theological topics, they often do so in 
insufficient manners, perhaps because of their use of “folk understandings” of terms such 
as religion, faith, soul, and God.
39
 The analysis of human knowing can be used to 
describe the quite complex language by which Christians seek to express insights 
garnered about that which is beyond direct human knowing. Again, this is not a new 
problem. Understanding God to be transcendent requires some explanation of how 
limited human speech and reason can properly know God.  
Double-scope blends in particular have been important in the history of 
theological consideration, partly because of the need to speak about that which is 
transcendent, but also because humans are embodied creatures. Our language, our very 
thought, is constructed of metaphoric blends that rest at their deepest levels on the mental 
structures governing bodily motion.
40
 Children begin to develop metaphoric thought 
early, before the age of three. To describe the process of development, we can consider 
the metaphor SEEING IS KNOWING. First the basic embodied action is mastered and 
                                                                                                                                                 
were a simplex network. He is able to possibly accept the third, because “what exists exists,” in other 
words, because it is not logically problematic and he wants to hold the world as sacred. The theological 
understanding of a God that is neither a thing in the world, nor the collection of all things in the world, nor 
nothing is not available to him, and this lack causes him to judge the suitability of the available metaphors 
poorly.  
39
 That is, an understanding which, while common, is not that of experts in the field. Cognitive 
linguists often describe how folk understandings of concepts such as categories cause people to understand 
what they are doing when they categorize as different from what they are actually doing. A similar thing 
may very well be happening because Lakoff, for example, is considering God as either the largest of all 
possible beings or as something outside of human knowing. See previous note. Masson makes exactly this 
point, see Without Metaphor, 19–22. 
40
 George Lakoff, “How the Body Shapes Thought: Thinking with an All-Too-Human Brain,” 50–
74 in The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding: The 2001 Gifford Lectures at the University of 
Glasgow, Anthony Sanford, ed., (New York: T&T Clark), 2003), 71–73.  
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described (“see daddy”). Then what are called conflations occur in which “the domains of 
seeing and knowing are co-active.” (“see Daddy come in. See what I spilled.”). Finally, 
metaphorical cases are added, as in “see what I mean.” These patterns of thought are 
almost always grounded in neural patterns for body motion or sense data, a complexity 
made possible because the brain is capable of engaging the mapping for body movement 
without engaging the motor neurons or the visual neurons. This is why seeing someone 
perform an action uses the same neural clusters as performing the action oneself. This is 
referred to as “mirroring.”  
A classical theological example of a double-scope blend, that is, a blend in which 
neither input is entirely determinative of the outcome, would be the definition of the 
Council of Chalcedon. Jesus is fully human and fully divine and this must be understood 
in such as a way that the divine and human natures are not changed, confused, divided, or 
separated.
41
 In Jesus, implications are drawn that are proper only within the blend (the 
concept of the communicatio idiomatum), such that we predicate of Jesus descriptions 
proper to God but not to humanity and vice versa. Masson would say that this definition 
prompts for a “tectonic shift,” that is, a new organization of the data that is not possible 
without the double-scope blend, but in light of which we are able to make sense of the 
data of experience and revelation regarding Jesus.
42
  
Masson’s preferred example of a double-scope blend is “Jesus is the Messiah.” 
This has inputs consisting of the historical life of Jesus mediated by scripture, and the 
expectations of the messiah; these must be held together despite the clear tension between 
                                                 
41
 See Council of Chalcedon. Tanner, I:86, ll.16–45. 
42
 This is a direct parallel to Gerhart and Russell’s concept of how particular metaphorical 
language “warps the world” of meaning, allowing new things to be said. See New Maps for Old: 
Explorations in Science and Religion, (New York: Continuum, 2001), 32–37. 
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them. Doing so produces a very fecund blend that leads to Christian thought in general. 
Masson begins to draw the network in this way (Fig. III-7):
43
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, the two inputs are held in tension, such that both are reinterpreted. As Masson 
notes, the input “‘Messianic Expectation,’ is itself a complex blend of overlapping and 
also conflicting Apocalyptic, Messianic and Prophetic images.” Jesus’ life, as mediated 
through the scriptures, is interpreted in terms of this complex blend, “messianic 
expectation,” and that blend is also reshaped in terms of the particulars of Jesus’ life. In 
this way, the Son of Man and the Suffering Servant traditions are selectively re-imagined 
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 Masson, Without Metaphor, 107. 
Figure III-7:  
Double-Scope Blend 
Jesus is the Messiah 
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and molded to the church’s telling of Jesus’ story. They open up new possibilities for 
narrating that story and its importance for the world.  
 Of course, religion in general and Christian theology in particular is a rich field of 
double-scope blends. When forced to choose between seemingly contradictory positions 
(Jesus is God/Monotheism, or Jesus is divine/Jesus is human), Christian theologians have 
routinely chosen “both,” forcing tectonic shifts in thinking to make sense of seemingly 
irreconcilable data. In this, they follow Jesus’ own example in the Gospels, where he is 
often presented with a seeming dilemma by his interlocutors and his answer prompts for a 
tectonic reconfiguration in which new possibilities are available.
44
 In the process, the 
shift prompts Christians to re-imagine how the “data” of scripture and tradition can be re-
interpreted to allow for the reconciliation of the seeming dilemma.  
 It may be that double-scope blends are a fundamental and necessary aspect of not 
only Christianity, but of monotheistic religion in general. George Lakoff’s critique of 
religion in his Gifford Lectures can help clarify why this might be the case. He 
(unknowingly?) accepts Feuerbach’s premise, that either God is not God (because he is a 
thing in the world), or God is unknowable to humans. Unlike Feuerbach, Lakoff can 
imagine a third possibility, a kind of pantheist, “all that is.”45 In part, as mentioned above, 
this may be due to his employment of a “folk understanding” of what monotheists might 
                                                 
44
 So, for example, the question regarding taxes (Mk 12:13–17), the story of the woman caught in 
adultery (Jn 8:1–11), or the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–37).  
45
 George Lakoff, “How to Live with an Embodied Mind: When Causation, Mathematics, 
Morality, the Soul, and God are Essentially Metaphorical Ideas,” 75–108 in The Nature and Limits of 
Human Understanding: The 2001Gifford Lectures at the University of Glasgow, Anthony Sanford, ed., 
(New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 102–105. 
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mean when they refer to God.
46
 The idea that God might be truly transcendent and 
nevertheless have revealed himself to humans is not considered in Lakoff’s lectures. 
But how Christians believe precisely this to be true is important for the present 
project. The fundamental problem of describing a transcendent God in a situation of 
immanence leads to various metaphorical strategies for saying something useful without 
saying either too much or too little. Roman Catholics have a rich tradition of reflection on 
and by analogy. Some Protestants seek to solve the problem through a dialectical 
theology that holds transcendence and immanence at an unresolved distance.
47
 The 
mystics have honed the art of saying something important by giving up on trying to say 
anything. In each of these cases, God can only be spoken about metaphorically, because 
that is how human language is constructed. Attention to how the logic of that language is 
used will require being attentive not only to the kinds of speech which are required and 
which are forbidden in a particular theological speech, but a kind of openness to the shift 
in thinking which the theological metaphors prompt. The monotheistic religions have 
consistently insisted not only that God is one, but that God is not a thing in the world. 
Metaphorical analysis will have to keep in mind, then, how those metaphors are used.  
It is helpful to note that one of the very basic metaphors which Lakoff and others 
have described, CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS, is exactly at issue in this question.
48
 If 
God is not a thing in the world, then God cannot be properly “contained” within any 
category. But if we can only speak categorically because of how we are in the world, then 
                                                 
46
 See n. 39 above. 
47
 For an engagement with this process and its similarities and differences to analogy in Catholic 
thought, specifically related to the question of blending, see Robert Masson, Without Metaphor, 147–64. 
48
 See p. 138, above. 
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something like analogy, like dialectic, or like the way of unknowing will always be 
necessary in speaking in categorical terms about the ineffable.  
Applying Network Analysis to Ecumenical Consensus 
One of the perpetual difficulties of ecumenical dialogue, described at length in 
chapter two, is the question of how different and divided Christian confessions might 
come to consensus, and how they would recognize that they had arrived there. As we 
have seen, one cannot merely picture ecumenical dialogue as a simple exercise in which 
one party proposes a truth statement to which the other either assents or asks for further 
clarification.
49
 The usual metaphoric frames are CONSENSUS IS QUANTITY, (“more 
consensus has been reached”) CONSENSUS IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY, (“the churches are 
coming closer together”) or CONSENSUS IS A BUILDING (“we are slowly building mutual 
understanding”). These form our imagination of the dialogue results; none is entirely 
adequate to expressing the differentiated consensuses that have arisen over time in 
bilateral dialogue between separated churches.
50
 In these models, consensus (in the 
specific terminology of the previous chapter, Übereinkunft) is something that is 
approached, or that grows (the frames referenced above). In both cases, unlike a 
                                                 
49
 This model is presupposed by Beinert in his description of Übereinkunft. See the discussion 
above at page 84.  
50
 The shift noted in chapter two (see p. 103) from speaking of a “consensus in the basics” 
(amount) to a “basic consensus” (building) is a very important shift in the dialogues’ self-description. It 
attempts to clarify how agreement relates to consensus and to church union. The first points to a limited 
consensus about small things and envisions a future union requiring complete Übereinkunft. The second 
instead might have more in common with St. Paul’s image of the one foundation which cannot be 
supplanted and on which each must build (1 Cor 3:10–15). In this model, the consensus in the basics 
already provides a kind of unity, and one can discuss which of the remaining differences are barriers to full, 
visible unity. 
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differentiated consensus, the end point is uniformity, either understood in terms of 
“inhabiting the same space” or “being 100% in agreement.”  
Differentiated consensus arises from the encounter between representatives of two 
confessional traditions, each of which makes use of a habitual logic, terminology, and 
discourse, forming an assumedly coherent system. Consensus need not require actual 
theological change on either side of the discussion. What is necessary is a change of 
interpretation regarding the other’s native logic and a willingness to see the potential 
consensus in its own terms. Describing the consensus that has crystallized in a dialogue 
to those who have not been trained to see the inner logic of the other theology is a 
difficult task.  
At this point, it is important to repeat something from the introduction of this 
chapter regarding the goal of the present project. It is not intended to propose a new 
method for conducting dialogue, nor a method to synthesize Lutheran and Catholic 
theologies into something greater (what we have called the transconfessional project). I 
am arguing that an understanding of metaphor and the associated forms of network 
analysis proposed by cognitive linguists are capable of making the real achievements of 
the bilateral dialogues more available to those who have not spent decades developing the 
ability to speak the language and inhabit the world of the ecumenical other.  
In other words, the complex relationship between Lutherans and Catholics 
contains common elements and areas of divergence. Some of the latter are mutually 
contradictory, while others are not. In the decades-long process of ecumenical dialogue, 
representatives of both churches have recognized the other’s position on justification to 
be divergent from, but not mutually-contradictory to their own position, despite the 
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inherited wisdom to the contrary. The JDDJ represents the public acceptance of this 
insight on the authority of the churches themselves. In the next two chapters, I will be 
applying the insights described above regarding the construction of human thought to 
make clearer why the differentiated consensus described in the JDDJ represents a real 
consensus despite what seems to be contradiction. Doing so does not develop the 
consensus that the JDDJ reaches, but it may make that consensus more broadly receivable 
in the churches, a need that chapter one demonstrates. In order to do this, I will first 
connect what has been said here about the metaphoric nature of human thought to 
Lindbeck’s proposal for explaining ecumenical “reconciliation without capitulation.” I 
will then proceed to the question of whether a “differentiated consensus” is merely a 
willful equivocation, or whether it can demonstrate a real agreement between different 
systems of thought. 
Cognitive Linguistics and the Cultural-Linguistic Proposal  
Of course, one is immediately struck by the linguistic commonality between these 
two descriptions of human meaning. This is not surprising. As noted above, the twentieth 
century has witnessed increased attention to the role of culture and language in 
determining meaning, leading to critiques of totalizing narratives and to accounts of truth 
that presume a simple connection between the world-as-it-is and our knowledge. 
Language and the culture that it represents are an important aspect of the mediation of the 
world, leading to Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic terminology. The structure of our bodies, 
particularly our neurological systems, adds another layer of mediation. Its description 
leads to the insights and terminology of the field of cognitive linguistics.  
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Of course, just because these two inquiries share a common name, one should not 
presume that they are dealing with the same aspect of the same thing. However, one of 
the characteristics of Lindbeck’s proposal that made it unconvincing to some was its 
inability to provide a reason beyond Lindbeck’s own ecumenical experience for why it 
might be true. In this section, I will briefly argue that the insights of cognitive linguistics 
provides precisely such an explanatory model, supporting the assertion that in some 
matters of ecumenical disagreement, reconciliation without capitulation —or even 
compromise— might be possible, and that doctrines can be understood to function as 
rules for speaking the truth within a particular tradition.  
Why would such a thing be possible? Because the parties involved are reasoning 
about the same question by means of different metaphors producing different blends. As 
such, they are coming to conclusions that seem to be contradictory but are, in fact, merely 
different. Masson makes a similar claim, arguing that the analysis of conceptual 
integration networks provides a possibility for providing  
a more generalized (non-Thomist) account of such conceptual moves, of their 
logic, and of their propriety … This is particularly important for progress in 
ecumenical conversations, and in today’s pluralistic theological and philosophical 
contexts, where different metaphoric mappings and conceptual blends are always 
operative but usually in very subtle and unconscious ways.
51
  
He brings this insight to bear in engaging Eberhard Jüngel’s claim that Catholic analogy 
claims to know not too much about God, but too little. Importantly, he finds in (Roman 
Catholic) analogy and (Jüngel’s Protestant) dialectic not differing accounts of the same 
thing. They may share structures of thought that are inherited from underlying human 
commonality; “both Catholic analogical thinking and Protestant dialectical thinking entail 
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 Masson, Without Metaphor, 146. 
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complex integrations and tectonic equivalences.”52 Nevertheless, Masson recognizes that 
Jüngel “understands his position to be in opposition to the Catholic position.” Masson 
himself has similar reservations about Jüngel’s theology.53 They are not merely different 
names for the same thing.  
Both forms of thinking are making use of the same basic human cognitive 
process, and neither can be understood apart from that process. Because it entails certain 
“prompts” for tectonic logic, by which Masson means an invitation to re-arrange the 
available data in a new way, like JESUS IS THE MESSIAH does, it is possible to understand 
all the data of a particular position without understanding the position itself. That this is 
true is demonstrated by many students in catechism classes or Introduction to Theology 
classes who can recite back the Creed or the Definition of Chalcedon without having 
made the shifts required to hold the pieces together in an authentically Christian manner. 
This is often demonstrated by their failure to properly translate the positions they have 
memorized into different frames in discussion or in essays. Mastery is demonstrated by 
an ability to use the language properly in a new situation.  
It is also a standing problem for ecumenical dialogue, especially in the task of 
reception. As Masson concludes, “for a genuine dialogue between Catholics and 
                                                 
52
 Ibid. In engaging the question of dialectic theology, it is important to note that for all the 
importance that this has in contemporary Protestant systematics, there is some question about the 
appropriateness of applying this to Luther’s thought, particularly as it relates to the sinful and justified 
Christian. See Wolf-Dieter Hauschild “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der 
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Gerecht und Sünder 
zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen, ed. Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz, (Freiburg im Breisgau: 
Herder, 2001), 30349. Otto Hermann Pesch agrees, “The focus of his [Luther’s] understanding even 
without the formula is even stronger than the lifelong struggle against sin. This definitively excludes a 
coequal sinner- and saint-being and also a pure “dialectic.” Because the of the lifelong experience of 
inadequacy of this struggle creates a worry about assurance [Gewissensängste], the problem of assurance is 
(for the first time!) pressing and solved through the idea of promise, such that it is to be kept before the 
eyes in times of doubt.” Idem, “Simul iustus et peccator: Sinn und Stellenwert einer Formel Martin Luthers, 
Thesen und Kurzkommentare, in Schneider and Wenz, 154. See also chapter five.  
53
 Ibid., 159.  
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Protestants to advance, the logic of the conceptual integrations and tectonic equivalences 
involved in the respective positions needs to be taken into account.”54 Within the contexts 
of the dialogues themselves, this happens in a somewhat hidden manner through the long 
process of learning to articulate the other’s position so that they can recognize it as their 
own. This extended process of developing mutual understanding is not broadly available 
in the process of reception, however, and so the implicit must be made explicit for the 
benefit of those in the broader churches. 
Engaging Lindbeck’s proposal more directly, there is some slippage between the 
analysis he provides of the metaphor DOCTRINES ARE RULES, and the engagement with 
difference, objectivity, and culture that the results of the cognitive-linguistic proposal 
would predict. In part, these can be attributed to an incomplete application of Lindbeck’s 
own insight to his analysis, but there may be real disagreement about how things can be 
known. The chief difference has to do with the possibility of achieving a more universal 
viewpoint from which to engage both perspectives. This works itself out in different ways 
in his three test cases. In the first example, the Nicene Creed, Lindbeck treats the creed as 
not itself a necessary rule for the Christian faith, but as something from which more basic 
rules can be derived. This seems to be the result of both an incomplete application of his 
insight and perhaps a misinterpretation of Lonergan’s engagement with the development 
of the creed.
55
 In these examples, Lindbeck —perhaps inadvertently— makes use of an 
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 Ibid.  
55
 There is some question about whether Lindbeck’s understanding of the development of the 
creeds, which states that it relies on Lonergan, is sufficient. This is a much larger topic than can be engaged 
here. See Jane Barter Moulaison, “Missteps on The Way to Nicea: A Critical Reading of Lonergan’s theory 
of the Development of Nicene Doctrine,” Studies in Religion 38 no. 1 (2009): 51–69; Jeremy D. Wilkins, 
“(Mis)reading Lonergan’s Way to Nicea: A ‘More Generous Interpretation,’ in Conversation with Jane 
Barter Moulaison,” Studies in Religion 42 no.4 (2013): 429–47; Jane Barter Moulaison, “A Response to 
Jeremy Wilkins,” Studies in Religion 42 no. 4 (2013):448-51; Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Gratitude and 
Clarifications: A Note,” Studies in Religion 42 no.4 (2013):452–53. 
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understanding of his own rule theory that represents the kind of surpassing of 
confessional difference that Harding Meyer associates with multi-lateral dialogues of the 
previous era,
56
 and not the real reconciliation without capitulation that he describes as his 
goal.
57
 In his second example, the Marian doctrines, Lindbeck comes closest to achieving 
his objective, but is still operating under a transconfessional ecumenical model. In his 
third example, papal infallibility, he is aided by the inherently regulatory nature of his 
subject matter. Here, his regulative theory is applied in a fairly strong manner that both 
takes into account the native blends of each of the traditions he examines, although still 
relativizing each in the process. His analysis holds up reasonably well in the divided 
situation that the contemporary church inhabits. Lindbeck’s image of a reunified church, 
however, implicitly assumes a future communion in absolute consensus (i.e. 
Übereinkunft) that would have to disallow the kinds of difference that his cognitive-
linguistic model is intended to explain. In this, he never fully reaches his goal of 
describing the possibility of reconciliation without capitulation. 
Example 1: Nicaea and Chalcedon 
Lindbeck’s engagement with the Christological doctrines of the councils of 325 
and 451 rests on a strong application of a form/content distinction. He argues that such a 
distinction “seems to be required in Christianity” in part because of the necessity of 
holding together the breadth of the New Testament canon.
58
 He argues that only a 
propositionalist or a regulative account of truth (the latter is the account he has developed 
                                                 
56
 See above, p. 99. 
57
 See discussion above on page 103. Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 16–17. 
58
 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 92. 
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out of the cultural-linguistic proposal) can adequately make this form/content distinction; 
an experiential-expressivist position must hold that changing a form or context will 
change the substance of the non-discursive symbol.
59
 This is the step at which he seems 
to inadequately apply his cultural-linguistic insight. Because he makes a sharp distinction 
between “discursive” and “non-discursive” symbols, he ends up making culturally-
embedded, linguistic symbols like the Niceanum into rules that can be replaced by other, 
more basic expressions of their content.
60
 In doing so, he seems to make the form/content 
distinction in such a way as to provide a kind of extra-cultural access to the content, that 
is, an access that in some way is not embodied. Therefore, while describing the creed as a 
rule of faith, he can distill it into three rules behind the rules. These are: 
[f]irst…the monotheistic principle: there is only one God, the God of Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus. Second, there is the principle of historical specificity: the 
stories of Jesus refer to a genuine human being who was born, lived, and died in a 
particular time and place. Third, there is the principle of what may infelicitously 
be called Christological maximalism: every possible importance is to be ascribed 
to Jesus that is not inconsistent with the first rules.
61
 
These are not bad Christological rules, but they do not exhaust the intended “content” of 
the Niceno-Constinopolitan Creed. Specifically, one could point to the regulatory 
function of excluding an Arian use of the “begotten” passages of scripture, and the 
resulting creation of a new possibility of thought, “eternal begetting.” Furthermore, this 
way of engaging the creed makes it not the kind of doctrinal rule that Lindbeck has 
suggested that it could be, but instead merely the bearer of more basic rules that are 
themselves binding apart from it. He states this most clearly at the end of his engagement,  
                                                 
59
 Ibid., 93. 
60
 Lindbeck’s text would lead to an understanding that what they can be replaced by is their 
content, although at times he does seem to admit that any expression of the their content is precisely that.  
61
 Ibid., 94. 
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though these ancient formulations may have continuing value, they do not on the 
basis of rule theory have doctrinal authority. That authority belongs rather to the 
rules they instantiate. If these rules, as was earlier suggested, are such regulative 
principles as monotheism, historical specificity, and Christological maximalism, it 
is at least plausible to claim that Nicaea and Chalcedon represent historically 
conditioned formulations of doctrines that are unconditionally and permanently 
necessary to mainstream Christian identity. Rule theory, in short, allows (though 
it does not require) giving these creeds the status that the major Christian 
traditions have attributed to them, but with the understanding that they are 
permanently authoritative paradigms, not formulas to be slavishly repeated.
62
 
This example makes clear why many of Lindbeck’s critics see in his rule theory a retreat 
from the actual historical doctrines of the church. This parallels the attempts of the early 
multi-lateral dialogues described by Meyer, to transcend their difference by “leaving 
behind their historical confessional forms and identities in order to meld into one church 
with a new identity and a new name.”63 While Lindbeck seems to want to see the union 
of the church happen in a situation in which its positive differences remains intact, his 
account of the kind of consensus on which such a union is built would allow for a kind of 
undifferentiated Christianity built on the ahistorical distillates of the creeds, rather than 
on the creeds themselves that must be interpreted in light of their situatedness.  
 Nevertheless, Lindbeck’s engagement with creeds as (containers for) rules can 
usefully be extended via network analysis. As an example, we can consider the creedal 
response to Arius’ contention that the nature of God is to be unbegotten. Because Jesus is 
called “only-begotten of the Father” in the scriptures, he cannot be properly-speaking 
divine.
64
 In responding, the creed calls Jesus not only consubstantial with the Father, but 
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 Ibid., 96.  
63
 Meyer, “Ökumenischer Konsens als ‘differenzierter Konsens,’” 43. “…die sich vereinenden 
Kirchen liessen ihre bisherige konfessionelle Gestalt und Identität züruck, um zu einer Kirche mit neuer 
Identität und Neuem Namen zu ‘verschmelzen.’” 
64
 I recognize that the theology of Arius is terrain in which the systematic theologian ought to 
beware. For the sake of the current example, I am attempting to keep the focus tight enough to make the 
cognitive point understandable. For a more subtle engagement with Arius’ thought, particularly on the 
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begotten “before all the ages” by a begetting which does not imply “being made.”65 In 
this way, the creed maintains the biblical language, but removes the problem of Jesus’ 
extreme distinction from the Father by describing a new, analogous kind of begetting that 
is both eternal and not a creation. It provides a new grammatical rule to which 
Christology must adhere if is to be recognizably Christian.   
Example 2: Marian Dogmas 
Lindbeck’s engagement with the Protestant/Roman Catholic disagreement on the 
infallible pronouncement of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception demonstrates a 
more complete application of the implications of his rule theory.
66
 He frames the question 
as “whether a regulative approach leaves the theological options open and is therefore 
capable of accommodating irreversibility as well as reversibility (not to mention the usual 
Protestant view, which the rule theory also allows, that these doctrines are simply 
illegitimate).”67 This is a strong description of the difference with which the regulative 
                                                                                                                                                 
question of why he believed that the Word must be differentiated from the Father in the way that he does, 
see Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy & Tradition, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). Williams 
argues that each of Arius’ rejected conclusions rests on an uncontroversial term problematized by “an 
implicit critique of conservative ‘Platonic consensus’ doctrines, and a far stricter differentiation, even 
opposition between monad and dyad. … [Williams] proposes that he became the center of a controversy 
because of his fusion of these conservative themes with a very un-conservative ontology, which isolated 
him not only from Alexander and Athanasius but also from his Lucanist allies and their successors.” Ibid., 
232.  
65
 Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, Tanner I:24, ll.5–11. The creed of Nicaea itself includes 
“consubstantial” and “begotten not made” but has not yet explicitly made this tectonic shift clear by 
declaring the begetting of Christ to be eternal. 
66
 While the section is entitled “Marian dogmas,” Lindbeck does not engage the question of the 
Assumption of the BVM, perhaps because the Immaculate Conception is the more ecumenically fraught 
question, and yet some of the questions of an irreformable or excluded doctrine are the same.  
67
 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 96. 
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theory must grapple if it is to allow for doctrinal reconciliation that is truly without 
capitulation.
68
  
Lindbeck’s engagement with the question is quite brief, showing how the doctrine 
of the Immaculate Conception is “a valid application in particular circumstances of 
permanently essential rules.”69 Here we have another example of how, for the sake of 
unity, Lindbeck moves the rules themselves behind the doctrines. He does acknowledge 
that here expressing these rules outside of the doctrine itself is difficult.
70
  
His analysis would be strengthened if it attended particularly to the cultural-
linguistic structures in which Protestants and Catholics have reached their seemingly 
contradictory doctrines, and especially to the role that difference and broken koinonia 
played in this development. A study of the blends in which the Immaculate Conception of 
Mary is (non-)sensible would have to, on the Catholic side, attend to the blend by which 
Original Sin is understood, along with the implied blend for human freedom and its 
dependence on divine grace.
71
 On the Protestant side, a differing understanding of human 
                                                 
68
 One can rightly ask what is meant by “irreversible” and “illegitimate” in this charge – clearly 
Protestants cannot mean “illegitimate for Catholics” and Catholics cannot mean that the irreversible papal 
declaration must apply in the same way for Protestant theologies of Mary. In this, it would be much like 
Avery Cardinal Dulles’ caveat regarding the JDDJ’s use of “acceptable differences,” stipulating that this 
cannot mean that Lutheran theologies can be preached from Catholic pulpits and vice versa. See Idem., 
“Justification and the Unity of the Church,” in Gospel and Justification in Christ, ed. Wayne C. Stumme 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 127. 
69
 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 97. 
70
 Ibid., “One can say, for example, that it is only in the context of a questionable Western 
theology and sense of sin that it is necessary to exempt the Mother of our Lord from all natal stain in order 
to maintain her God-given and God-dependent freedom in saying ‘yes’ to the angel’s terrifying 
announcement. This is not a denial of the doctrine. As in the case of our earlier and simpler example of the 
immortality of the soul, one could view the Immaculate Conception as a valid application in particular 
circumstances of permanently essential rules. The difference is here, as we have noted, it is much more 
difficult to specify what the underlying rules might be. One might have to content oneself with saying that 
they have to do with the uncodifiable aspects of the interaction of divine and human freedom.” 
71
 Lindbeck briefly makes this case, “it is incompatible with Mary’s freedom in becoming 
Theotokos, and, more crucially, with God’s humility and condescension in waiting on a creaturely ‘yes’ 
(which, to be sure, he himself graciously provided). Thus Christians discovered that the grammar of their 
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sin would have to be articulated, to explain why no human —save Jesus— can be 
excluded from having participated in this category, even by God’s gift.72 One would also 
have to take stock of the differing understandings of revelation and its relationship to the 
Church.
73
 Analyzing these blends is a much more extensive project than can be 
accomplished here, but I mention the possibilities as a way of showing how Lindbeck’s 
argument could be made stronger by attending more-fully to the blends that create the 
conditions in which Catholics find themselves required to affirm Mary’s preservation 
from sin from the first moment of her conception by God’s grace, while many Protestants 
find themselves barred from saying the same.  
Example 3: Infallibility 
Of the issues he engages as test cases, infallibility is the one with which Lindbeck 
himself had been most fully engaged as an ecumenical issue. The US Lutheran–Roman 
Catholic dialogue had only recently begun its consideration of Mary when Nature of 
Doctrine was published, but had completed its engagement with infallibility, published in 
1980.
74
 Here Lindbeck makes the most direct link between the “regulative” and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
faith required them to speak of the Mother of our Lord as sinless in a way concealed from the first 
generations.” Ibid.  
72
 The differing habitual blends regarding sin, namely SIN IS OPPOSITION TO GOD’S WILL and SIN 
IS A CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM GOD, will receive more explicit examination later.  
73
 This might include the THE BIBLE IS REVELATION and THE SPIRIT LEADS THE CHURCH INTO 
DEEPENED TRUTH. 
74
 The eighth round of the dialogue on Mary and the Saints ran from 1983–1990, and was 
published as H. George Anderson, J. Francis Stafford, Joseph A. Burgess, eds., The One Mediator, the 
Saints, and Mary: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VIII, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992). The 
sixth round, regarding infallibility had run from 1973–1978, while Lindbeck had been preparing the Nature 
of Doctrine. It was published as Paul C. Empie, T. Austin Murphy, and Joseph A. Burgess, eds., Teaching 
Authority and Infallibility in the Church: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VI, (Minneapolis, 
Augsburg, 1978). Lindbeck himself published several works on infallibility in this period, including one 
paper in the proceedings of the dialogue, “The Reformation and the Infallibility Debate,” 101–19 in Empie, 
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“linguistic” frames of his proposal. Following his reading of Karl Rahner, he describes 
infallibility as properly describing the decision, while the doctrine is properly termed 
“irreformable.”75 This allows him to make a connection between how a linguist would 
define a point of grammar as “correct” and how a theologian might judge a theological 
logion. Both would ask a version of the question, “How do competent speakers speak?” 
Of course, as Lindbeck points out, the variety of ecumenical difference, and the fact that 
“most Christians throughout most of Christian history have spoken their own official 
tongue very poorly,” means that judging authentic Christianity first requires judging who 
is a truly competent speaker.
76
 He describes three general patterns for doing this, one of 
which is infallibility. The other two are Protestant exclusivist sola scriptura doctrines and 
the Orthodox attempt to continue the pre-schism pattern of judging according to the 
whole.
77
 Because he sees each of these as a second-order rule for judging which speakers 
of “Christian” are expert speakers, they are rules that do not necessarily conflict in the 
situation of a future reunification of the churches. However, he also assumes that such 
rules will fall away (except perhaps that of the Orthodox) under such a reunification. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
Murphy, and Burgess. He also gave the 1972 Père Marquette Lecture at Marquette University on the topic, 
published as Idem, Infallibility, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1972).  
75
 See Lindbeck, Infallibility, 42–43. Lindbeck does not point to particular writings by Rahner, 
instead, pointing to Rahner’s “many writings on ‘anonymous Christianity,’ ‘transcendental’ and 
‘categorical’ revelation, and the development of dogma.” Ibid., n. 51. He more exactly cites Gregory Baum 
and Richard McBrien’s articles in J. Kirvan, ed. The Infallibility Debate, (New York: Paulist Press, 1971). 
The same book is also cited to make the same point in Nature of Doctrine, 99. 
76
 Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 100. 
77
 Lindbeck finds the Orthodox use to be severely limited by the situation of a divided church. Of 
course, some Orthodox would respond that the church is not divided, and so Lindbeck’s objection does not 
hold. (As an example, see the letter to Pope Francis from Bishops Andrew of Dryinoupolis, Pogoniani and 
Konitsa and Seraphim of Piraeus and Faliro, available at goo.gl/jqVBIr. (Accessed, May 6, 2014.) Of 
course, this letter does not bear the authority of the entire Orthodox church, but does represent one method 
of dealing with the scandal of division.) Whether his judgment stands that the Orthodox position has led to 
a “traditionalistic immobility … not unrelated to the lack of a theory of final authority appropriate to a 
broken Christendom”, is well outside the purview of this argument. Ibid., 103. 
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this, he is not adequately describing the Roman Catholic position, at least as articulated 
by Karl Rahner, with which he began.
78
  
Rahner would describe the decree regarding papal infallibility as a definitive 
decree that is not logically necessary, and so therefore could have not been made, but 
that, having been made, is irreformable.
79
 While Lindbeck’s engagement with divided 
Christianity implicitly assumes that any future reconciliation will erase confessional 
differences (in the manner described in the section above on the Creed), Rahner would 
have to say that while the doctrines might be reinterpreted, they remain. Thus, a future 
reunification would have to allow the inheritors of the Roman Rite a proper law in which 
the past exercises of papal infallibility are maintained along with the possibility of its 
future use. In a Lutheran rite, such a legal institution might not exist. Other Lutheran 
structures for determining doctrine would be in its place. What would have to exist would 
be structures by which papal pronouncements and Lutheran decisions were coordinated 
                                                 
78
 Certainly it is not an adequate expression of what Vatican I is intending to proclaim (Pastor 
aeternus ch. 4, DH 3065–75), although Lindbeck seems convinced that should a situation of Christian unity 
be established, such questions would be once again up for discussion. This is further evidence that he has 
inadequately implemented his insight regarding reconciliation without capitulation, and understands 
Christian unity as entailing a kind of transcending of confessional identity.  
79
 So, for example, “for a Catholic understanding of faith (which is characterised by the possibility 
of an evolution of irreformable ‘new’ dogmas), theology is ultimately not merely the non-binding human 
reflection – of an always reformable kind – on an unchangeable phenomenon without a history (e.g. a 
sacred scripture understood in this way); rather, it is the way in which an absolute history of faith takes 
place, a history which is irreversible and opens only into the future.” K. Rahner, “Scripture and Theology,” 
89–97 in Theological Investigations VI: Concerning Vatican Council II, Karl. H. Kruger and Boniface. 
Kruger, trans. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 91. See also, Idem, “Considerations on the Development of 
Dogma,” 3–35 in Theological Investigations IV: More Recent Writings, Kevin Smyth, trans., (Baltimore: 
Helicon, 1966); Idem, “The Teaching Office of the Church in the Present-Day Crisis of Authority,” 3–30 in 
Theological Investigations XII: Confrontations, David Bourke, trans., (New York, Crossroads, 1975); 
Idem, “Basic Observations on the Subject of Changeable and Unchangeable Factors in the Church,” 3–23 
in Theological Investigations XIV: Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church, the Church in the World, David 
Bourke, trans., (New York: Seabury Press, 1976); Idem, “On the Concept of Infallibility in Catholic 
Theology,” 66–84 in TI XIV.; Idem, “Magisterium and Theology,” 54–73 in Theological Investigations 
XVIII: God and Revelation, Edward Quinn, trans., (New York: Crossroad, 1983).  
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in such a way as to maintain communion in the truth, but the shape of what this would 
look like is still beyond imagining in the present, divided church.  
Looking at Lindbeck’s third test case with the insights of cognitive-linguistic 
analysis, we see a similar point. Consider the extrincicist understandings of truth he 
demonstrates, despite pointing to culturally- and incarnationally-mediated forms. 
Lindbeck rightly argues that the regulative, grammatical nature of doctrines like sola 
scriptura and papal infallibility means that they need not be finally contradictory. But his 
analysis of what we learn from this difference about a possible unity is deficient. The 
analysis of words describing color, referenced above, showed both that cultural 
difference is not unimportant to our perceptions of color, and that a strong Whorfian 
hypothesis is not a possible option.
80
 Christians can come to understand the inner logic of 
another tradition by examining the assumptions implicit in their own and the other’s way 
of speech. This does not mean that the difference will be erased, or that a new pidgin will 
be created. Communion need not erase diversity, nor will it necessarily require 
abandoning difference. Moreover, and analogously to the structures of the eye, there can 
be aspects of the Christian gospel that will determine how that difference expresses itself, 
without there being any single extra-confessional way of describing it.  
Lindbeck’s regulative description of doctrine falls within a cultural-linguistic 
model that he fails to fully implement. His implicit assumption that a future ecclesial 
reconciliation will require abandoning ecclesial structures or doctrines developed in the 
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 Benjamin Lee Whorf was a 20c. linguist who proposed that language shapes the ways in which 
humans are able to conceptualize their world. Linguists distinguish between a “strong Whorfian 
hypothesis” that is, that language determines how humans are able to engage the world, and a “weak 
Whorfian hypothesis,” that is, that language effects how humans are able to engage the world. See 
Kövecses, Language, Mind and Culture, 3–16. 
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situation of schism need not follow from his own proposal. On the contrary, assuming 
that outcome weakens both the test cases he proposes and their explanatory power.  
Network Analysis, Blending, and Differentiated Consensus 
Differentiated consensus, the product of ongoing bilateral dialogue, requires a 
method of description and analysis to make it available to those who are not steeped in 
the decades-long exercise of engagement represented by the dialogues themselves. As 
alluded to above, there is good reason to believe that the network analysis developed for 
the investigation of cognitive metaphor and metonymy by cognitive linguists bears a 
strong potential for filling this need. In particular, it can make clear the underlying 
structures of thought that make an implication proper or improper within a system. I will 
briefly develop Masson’s claim that “[t]ectonic figurative conceptualization and 
inference provide a crucial key to the resolution of significant theological controversies at 
popular, academic, ecclesiastical, and ecumenical levels,” specifically paying attention to 
ecumenical concerns.
81
 I will then relate this to the descriptions of “differentiated 
consensus” provided by Meyer and “consensus with difference” from Hietamäki. Finally, 
to make a transition from pure theory to the particular case in the JDDJ that will be 
spelled out in the following chapters, I will briefly introduce the particular blends that 
will be central in my analysis of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic claims regarding the 
anthropology of the justified Christian, and are held in differentiated consensus in JDDJ 
4.4 and Annex 2A and B. 
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 Masson, Without Metaphor, “Thesis 7,” 8. 
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Tectonic Figurative Conceptualization in Ecumenical Theology 
In describing the necessity of metaphoric thought process for theological 
description, Masson is careful to note that showing any particular statement to be tectonic 
is not a proof of its truth any more than calling a statement analogical in Thomas means 
that it is necessarily true.
82
 If a Thomist were to argue that “God is evil,” he would, by 
necessity be making an analogical statement: God’s evil would not be as human evil. His 
statement would nonetheless be ruled out of bounds by Christian theology. But attending 
to how a particular tectonic statement is constructed, and on what metaphors it rests, the 
“blend,” can be a helpful tool in uncovering why one Christian tradition would want to 
affirm the blend while another would have to rule it out of bounds.  
Moreover, this can help the reader who is not fluent in both modes of discourse to 
remember that her own mode is also using language in ways that push beyond what we 
think of as the “plain sense.” While a particular theological expression may be entirely 
proper and even necessary within a particular tradition, it can be built-up of blends that 
may not be shared with the dialogue partner. Those who are engaged in dialogue may 
come to be fluent in the other’s way of speaking, and so are able to code switch in such a 
way as to make the agreed consensus quite clear.
83
 However, as has been expressed 
several times, reception is necessary to the effectiveness of the dialogues’ work. 
Describing the other’s theology to those not engaged in the dialogue may be aided by 
making the blends by which they are expressed more transparent. Of course, sketching 
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 See discussion above at pg. 150. 
83
 “Code-switching” is a linguistic term referring to a bilingual or bidialectical individual’s ability 
to express themselves in two different modes of speech, usually without confusing them.  
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out the blends explicitly can also make clear that one's own language is not as plain as 
one would assume it to be, because it makes use of customary metaphoric blends.
84
  
As an example we can look to one of the early US Lutheran–Roman Catholic 
Dialogues, The Eucharist as Sacrifice (ES), and its engagement with the seemingly 
contradictory claims, “The Eucharist is a [Propitiatory] Sacrifice” (Roman Catholic) and 
“The Eucharist is not a [Propitiatory] Sacrifice” (Lutheran).85 In engaging the question, 
the dialogue attended both to particular doctrinal engagements with the question, along 
with concerns that each side sought to protect in its claim. Among other concerns, the 
understanding of “Propitiatory Sacrifice” was, understandably, central. While not directly 
describing a differentiated consensus on the topic, the dialogue sought to clarify what 
Catholics and Lutherans intended by this language as it is applied to Calvary and the 
Mass. There were two concerns buried in the discussion, first, that saying “Calvary was a 
Propitiatory Sacrifice” might require a particular Anselmian understanding of Christ’s 
saving work; secondly, that to apply the language of “sacrifice” to the Mass could be 
taken to imply that it “adds to Calvary, is a ‘re-doing’ of Calvary and … [thus] that the 
one sacrifice of Christ is defective and incomplete.”86 We will attend to the second 
question alone as our example.  
Both Lutherans and Catholics wish to deny that the Mass is a re-sacrificing of 
Christ or that the liturgical action completes something that is incomplete in Christ’s 
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 As an example, remember “the Temperature is rising,” (see p. 143 above) which seems on first 
examination to be a purely “literal” and unmetaphoric expression. It, however, requires at least the 
metaphor MORE IS UP, and likely also HEAT IS A QUANTITY. 
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 U.S.A National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation and the Bishops’ Committee for 
Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue III: The Eucharist as Sacrifice, 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1967). Hereafter ES. 
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 ES, §III.3 
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work. They have, however, historically reached opposite conclusions about the 
appropriate use of language because of this claim.
87
 If we consider the blend, “The Mass 
is a Sacrifice” from a Roman Catholic perspective (or that of the sense in which the 
dialogue accepts the Roman Catholic position), we might picture the most salient aspects 
of the blend in the following way (Fig. III-8):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example we see the sacramental action making present the one sacrifice of Christ. 
It is the action of the church made possible because of its union with Christ, that is, as his 
body. In this action, the totus Christus repeatedly asks the Father’s mercy on account of 
the once-and-for-all action of the Son. The example is felicitous because it demonstrates 
a fairly simple agreement that describes why a seemingly clear historical contradiction is 
instead a possible location of agreement between the two churches. Lutherans remain 
wary of the potential difficulties raised by the Roman Catholic language, but are able to 
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 In the document itself, “Catholics agree that some of the language used in the 16th century by 
Catholics could be so interpreted,” but flatly states that this is not now and was not the position of the 
Catholic Church. Ibid. 
Figure III-8: 
Double-Scope Blend: 
The Eucharist as Sacrifice 
   177 
acknowledge that these are not its intended outcomes. Roman Catholics can recognize the 
Lutheran hesitancy to use their language not as a denial of the intended meaning, but as a 
wariness against historical abuses. 
The blend is a double-scope blend, meaning that the common space partakes of 
both inputs. “The Eucharist/Mass as Sacrifice” describes a repeatable event but in a way 
that maintains the unicity and once-for-all character of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary. It 
makes the church’s action necessary, but in such a way that it remains properly the action 
of Christ, not a Pelagian action demanding grace apart from God’s work. Importantly, 
this blend rests on another habitual tectonic blend that Lutherans and Catholics hold in 
common, that is, the very complex blend SACRAMENTAL REAL PRESENCE, which allows 
for both unity and distinction, unicity and multiplicity, and is shared by churches that 
affirm the real presence of Christ in the eucharist. Engaging the question of sacrifice in a 
dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and one of the traditions that are wary of 
sacramental language would require a different common agreement, if one could indeed 
be reached.
88
 
“Differentiated Consensus” and Tectonic Figuration 
When Meyer describes the process by which differentiated consensus arises, it is 
important to notice that he is describing a protracted process of dialogue, of learning to 
speak the language of the other as they would speak it. In the process, it can happen that 
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 As an example of such a dialogue, see Willard Roth and Gerald W. Schlabach, eds. Called 
Together to be Peacemakers: Report of the International Dialogue between the Catholic Church and 
Mennonite World Conference, 1998–2003, (Kitchener, ON: Pandora Press, 2005), §II.B. Also available 
online at http://goo.gl/iM2yQf (Accessed April 21, 2014). The difficulty of the task may explain why the 
dialogues between the Roman Catholic Church and the churches without a strong sacramental theology 
have tended to focus on the authority of the Scriptures and on the mission of the churches. 
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what arises is an understanding that the other’s language is authentically Christian. That 
is, it expresses an aspect of the same Christian Gospel. This can occur, as it has in the 
context of the conversation regarding justification, as a new, tectonic understanding of a 
seeming contradiction.  
In carefully attending to any differentiated consensus having arisen out of an 
interconfessional bilateral dialogue, we can see it providing direct attention to the blends 
habitually made by each dialogue partner and to their mutual interaction. This is already 
present in the documents of the dialogues, albeit in a somewhat hidden form. Such 
phrases as “when Lutherans say,” “According to Lutheran teaching,” or “Catholics 
emphasize that” provide clues to this reality; they are found throughout the JDDJ and are 
common throughout the documents of the bilateral dialogues.
89
  
This process of comparison and understanding is more complicated, in part 
because these systems of thought and expression are genetically related.
90
 It leads to the 
possibility of quite different and potentially incompatible use of related concepts. From 
the evolutionary frame, we might consider the commonality found in the limbs of land 
animals and their aquatic descendants. Practically all of these animals display a “1 bone-2 
bones-lots of blobs-digits” pattern extending from the shoulder joint, whether that pattern 
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 Just a partial list will make this clear: “When Catholics/Lutherans say that” JDDJ §§20, 29, 33; 
“According to Lutheran/Catholic teaching/understanding” JDDJ §§21, 26; “When Catholics/Lutherans 
emphasize,” JDDJ §§23–24, etc. Other phrases to make the same point are also found throughout the 
document.  
90
 The use of this frame (HISTORICAL DERIVATION OR RELATION IS GENETIC) is considered. Its use 
in both evolutionary and linguistic analysis provides more-than-adequate room for engaging the similarity 
and differences which occur in Lutheran and Roman Catholic accounts of the anthropology of the justified 
sinner, while keeping the reader in the frame of a historical analysis of relationship and difference in a 
cultural-linguistic system. 
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is expressed as a wing, an arm, a leg, or a fin.
91
 We can point to the abstract structural 
connection as evidence of a common heritage. In the realm of use, however, a fin and a 
wing are quite different and neither would be effective as a leg. Lutherans and Catholics 
similarly use much of the same inherited technical terminology, but not always in ways 
that are recognizable to the other as appropriate. Returning to the linguistic side of the 
analogy, we could say that there are many false friends (or faux amis) shared between the 
two theological traditions.
92
 
 Nevertheless, both are attempting to express the common gospel of salvation in 
Christ Jesus; they are also preaching to a common humanity, even if in different cultural 
contexts.
93
 They have to deal with many of the same theological tasks (avoidance of 
particular defined heresies, human tendencies that require ecclesial response, etc.) 
Particularly regarding the anthropology of the justified Christian, these structural 
constraints would include the avoidance of pelagianism and of antinomianism, the 
                                                 
91
 This pithy description of the pattern is from Neil Shubin, Your Inner Fish: A Journey into the 
3.5-Billion-Year History of the Human Body, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2008), 32. The pattern itself 
was first described by Sir Richard Owen in 1849, a decade before Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 
1859. Owen, On the Nature of Limbs: A Discourse Delivered on Friday February 9, at an Evening Meeting 
of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, (London: John van Voorst, 1849).  
92
 Linguists separate “false cognates” from “false friends.” The former are similar in form, but 
derive from separate roots. This would be like the convergent evolution of analogous structures in the 
biological frame. As an example consider the separately evolved, but similar wing structures on modern 
bats and ancient pteranodons. “False friends” share a common root, but have diverged in meaning. In this 
they are like divergent but homologous structures in the biological frame. An example would be human 
limbs and dolphin fins.  
93
 These two commonalities lead to two different kinds of relationships analogous to the 
distinctions of the previous footnote. Expressing the common gospel of salvation would be analogous to 
false friends, or divergent evolution. The shared history, terminology, and proclamation has sometimes 
developed in different directions, and both the commonalities and the differences must be made clear.  
The common human condition, to which the churches are speaking, on the other hand, acts 
analogously to convergent evolution, in which common conditions are responsible for multiple unrelated 
developments towards a common point. For example, the reality of sin in the baptized requires 
engagement, no matter the terms, cognitive frames, or methodologies by which it is approached, because it 
is so clearly the case; in the words of the Council of Trent, describing concupiscence, “But this holy 
council perceives and confesses (fatetur et sentit) that in the one baptized there remains concupiscence or 
an inclination to sin.” (Session Five, (June 17, 1546), can. 5, DH 1515).  
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received Western theological tradition about original sin and sacramental action, and the 
need to “arrange all things such that the strong have a something to aspire to and the 
weak are not discouraged.”94  
As has been emphasized several times, while analysis of tectonic figuration may 
be helpful in the work of the bilateral dialogues, it’s real utility will come to bear in 
explaining the differentiated consensuses that arise out of those dialogues to those who 
are stakeholders in the dialogues’ work, but are neither ecumenical specialists nor 
especially versed in the theology of the dialogue partner. It can also be helpful in pushing 
past the facile engagements with ecumenical difference (seen in some of the examples of 
the previous chapter) that amount to saying, “Lutherans and Catholics are different, and 
therefore they cannot agree.”95  
 The JDDJ’s Anthropology: Describing the Operative Blends 
It may be expeditious at this time to say something more in depth about this final 
point that relates to the nature of ecumenical statements of differentiated consensus. In a 
sense, the explanation of a differentiated consensus attempts to describe not only the 
habitual blends of each of the partner churches, but to produce its own double-scope 
blend in which the similarities between them are highlighted and the differences are 
shown to be compatible with the consensus. This means that reading such a consensus 
demands a double (or even triple) action of the reader. He must simultaneously seek to 
                                                 
94
 RB 64:19: “sic omnia temperet ut sit et fortes quod cupiant et infirmi non refugiant.” 
95
 These engagements mistake the kind of blend which differentiated consensus represents. Instead 
of a double-scope blend (in which the inputs have different frames, each of which contributes to the blend), 
Hampson and others instead treat the consensus as a mirror blend (like the race example above, page 146). 
In such a blend, the two inputs share a common frame. In such a setting, Hampson’s claim that the two 
theologies have different logics and therefore cannot agree would be sensible. As it is, it is a mistake.  
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understand the ecumenical meta-blend while attending to the possibility of its integration 
with the normal theology of his own church, and if he is fluent in the habitual theology of 
the other church, to that as well.
96
  
 Making this complex task easier for the reader can be aided by explicitly 
engaging the different mappings by which each theology is constructed along with the 
meta-mapping that the JDDJ provides. I will proceed as follows: in what remains of this 
chapter, I will briefly introduce the blends that are at stake in describing the anthropology 
of the justified Christian. Each of the next two chapters will then trace through the 
theological claims of one of the two churches as represented in the JDDJ in light of those 
blends. Each chapter will also have to attend to how those commitments are held together 
with the consensus statement. The conclusion will investigate how these blends are held 
together in the text of the JDDJ. 
 SIN  
One of the areas that will require particular care is the blend that defines “sin.” It 
should not surprise us that the understanding of this term is important to defining what 
the Christian person is, nor that the blend by which it is conceived might change with far-
reaching implications. As a parallel case, we might consider the argument made by Gary 
                                                 
96
 As was averred to in chapter one, there is further difficulty if the theology of one of the churches 
is contested. This enters into engagements with the JDDJ in particular regarding the somewhat different 
accounts of justification offered by different Lutheran thinkers and schools such as that of the 
Lutherrenaissance, the contemporary Finnish school, the LC–MS, and Gerhard Forde, or historically, 
between the Lutheran Orthodox and Lutheran Pietists. As stated in chapter one, I cannot adjudicate 
between Lutheran theologies in this dissertation, and will therefore only engage with the question of 
whether the Lutheranism which is displayed in the JDDJ is brought into a successful differentiated 
consensus with Roman Catholic thought as displayed in the JDDJ. I can and will also try to show that that 
Lutheranism is grounded in Lutheran sources, and is therefore a possible Lutheranism, not merely a 
capitulation to the Roman Catholics, as some of the critics have argued. See above, beginning at p. 25.  
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A. Anderson.
97
 Making use of the work of Lakoff and Johnson, Anderson argues that a 
change in understanding from SIN IS BURDEN to SIN IS DEBT lies at the root of shifts in 
theological understanding present in the Hebrew Bible. The shift also makes possible 
much of later Christian theology. Anderson’s argument has been generally well-received. 
While it is a related project, the historical distance of this shift within the Hebrew 
Scripture from both Lutheran and Catholic theologies makes it not directly germane to 
the contemporary ecumenical discussion between Lutherans and Catholics. It does, 
however, emphasize the extensive theological implications that a conception of sin can 
have. 
As will become clear in the succeeding chapters, there are different operative 
blends active in the Lutheran and Catholic engagements with the anthropology of the 
justified sinner. I will be engaging several closely-connected commitments on each side, 
but they are given shape by the blends SIN IS CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM GOD (Roman 
Catholic) and SIN IS SOMETHING OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE LAW (Lutheran).
98
 Each of these 
structures what can and cannot be said about post-baptismal sinfulness. If sin is a state, 
then it is in relationship of mutual contradiction with the justification and divine favor. If, 
however, it is a descriptor of things that fail to live up to the entire divine desire for the 
human person, than one can speak of sin and justification as mutually existing in the 
justified Christian.
99
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 Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
98
 These blends will be nuanced and provided depth in chapters four and five. It is also important 
to note that while they are illuminative, they are not exhaustive of either communion’s anthropological 
teaching. 
99
 As we engage this question on the Lutheran side of the discussion, we will have to engage the 
intra-Lutheran disagreement regarding whether the simul iustus et peccator is to be understood in a partim-
partim or totus-totus manner. The distinction has to do with the question of whether the iustus and peccator 
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Framing 
Another difference to which we will have to attend is the way in which the 
operative blend for sin is framed in each theology. The Roman Catholic understanding of 
sin is sacramentally framed, specifically in terms of the sacrament of baptism. That the 
Roman Catholic teaching priveleges the logic of the baptismal rite is clear in the 
documents.
100
 Baptism is a non-repeatable sacrament in which people are “cleansed from 
sin and rise to a new birth of innocence by water and the Holy Spirit.”101 Catholics affirm 
that “the sanctifying action of the Holy Spirit removes the guilt of sin (reatus culpae) and 
renders the justified pleasing in God’s sight.”102 This is the position and central concern 
of Trent, which rules in its fifth session that the church “has never understood that 
[concupiscence] is called sin because it would be sin in the true and proper sense in those 
who have been reborn, but in the sense that it comes from sin and inclines to sin.”103 This 
declaration protects the efficacy of the sacraments, particularly baptism, and necessitates 
an account of the Christian as sacramentally renewed by the indwelling of God. At stake 
is the divine action in the sacrament which changes the state of the baptizand. If sin, 
properly-speaking, remains after baptism then the sacrament does not accomplish its 
goal. 
                                                                                                                                                 
are to be understood as entire realities held in tension or parts of a greater whole, or both. See chapter five, 
beginning on p. 270. 
100
 See, for example JF §95–96.  
101
 Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults, §571. The logic of baptism is shared between both 
Catholics and Lutherans. Similar descriptions of baptism are present through Luther and Lutheran works, 
but are not explicitly engaged to provide the frame within which sin in the Christian is understood.  
102
 JF, §102. 
103
 Council of Trent, Decree on Justification (17 June, 1546), canon V. DH 1515, 
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On the other hand, the Lutheran understanding of sin is framed not primarily 
sacramentally, but in terms of the distinction between law and gospel that structures 
much of Lutheran theology. Luther himself defines the distinction, and Lutheran 
theologians have prized it since the sixteenth century. Here, law and gospel have a proper 
theological sense which denotes the two “words” that God speaks to the believer: the 
word of condemnation (law), and the word of grace (gospel). “The law reproves unbelief 
by reproving those who do not believe God’s Word. … [E]verything that provides 
comfort—everything that offers the favor and grace of God to those who have 
transgressed the law—is and is called the gospel in the strict sense.”104 It is important to 
note that both law and gospel are found in all parts of the Bible.
 105
 Discerning to which 
realm any theological or biblical proposition belongs is held up as the central task of all 
theology. In a useful anecdote, Luther is portrayed as describing the entire task of the 
theologian in terms of the distinction. Even the mastery of Scripture is subordinated to 
the purpose of distinguishing between law and gospel:  
Anybody who wishes to be a theologian must have a fair mastery of the Scriptures, 
so that he may have an explanation for whatever can be alleged against any 
passage. That is to say, he must distinguish between law and gospel. If I were able 
to do this perfectly I would never again be sad. Whoever apprehends this has 
won.
106
  
The character of the human, then, is described in terms of that which is required of him 
but he is incapable of fulfilling (law), and that which is freely given him in Christ 
                                                 
104
 FC, SD 5:19–21.  
105
 Thus, in Bondage of the Will, Luther can disparage Erasmus’ exegesis of Isaiah in terms of its 
failure to distinguish law and gospel: “In these passages our Diatribe makes no distinction whatever 
between expressions of the law and of the gospel; for she is so blind and ignorant that she does not know 
what law and gospel are. For out of the whole of Isaiah, apart from that one verse, “If you are willing,” she 
quotes not a single word of the law, all the rest being Gospel passages, in which the brokenhearted and 
afflicted are called to take comfort from a word of proffered grace. But Diatribe turns them into words of 
law.” LW 33:132.  
106
 Table Talk, LW 54: 111.  
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(gospel). This sensibility mirrors the logic of the confessional, requiring both real 
repentance of one’s sins and trust in God that they will be forgiven. 
Only in light of this central, structuring distinction, can we make sense of simul 
iustus et peccator within Lutheran theology. From the standpoint of the law, the Christian 
is fully sinner, for she is incapable of living as the law requires, while from the standpoint 
of the Gospel, the Christian is totally righteous because Christ’s righteousness is God’s 
gift to her. This does not mean that the Christian is worthy of damnation, because 
“despite their sin, [Christians] are not separated from God.”107 Just as the Roman 
Catholic understanding of sin is framed by an insistence on the efficacy of baptism, the 
Lutheran understanding that sin is anything contrary to God’s law finds its proper 
explication only within the frame of the law and the gospel. 
Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have applied the insights of cognitive linguists to understanding 
the questions relating to consensus developed in the previous chapter. Describing the 
blends by which particular theological positions and the differentiated consensus 
recognized between them are achieved can make clearer the reasons why particular 
                                                 
107
 JDDJ. §30. So also Guido Bausenhart, “Simul Iustus et Peccator: Zum römischen Einspruch 
gengen die ‘Gemeinsame Erklärung zwischen der katholischen Kirche und dem Lutherischen Weldbund 
über die Rechfertigungslehre.” Catholica 1999(2), 131–2. Iustus and peccator are both total descriptors of 
the believer, of the justified person. That means that while that he is a sinner is not everything which can be 
said about the person, although everything said about him which doesn’t take the reality of sin into account 
is false, and the same is true of justice. This is also clear from its converse, from which Luther regularly 
distances himself: iustus like peccator does not mean some part of humans; that is the human 
understanding of justice (iustitia humana).  
“‘Iustus’ und ‘peccator’ sind beides Totalbestimmungen des gläubigen, des gerechtfertigten 
Menschen. Damit, daß er Sünder ist, ist zwar noch nicht alles gesagt über den Menschen, aber alles, was 
über ihn gesagt wird, ist falsch, wenn nicht diese Realität der Sünde mit ausgesagt ist - und das gleiche gilt 
für die Gerechtigkeit. Deutlich wird das auch vom Gegenkonzept her, von dem sich Luther regelmäßig 
distanziert: ‘iustus’ wie ‘peccator’ meint nicht etwas am Menschen; das sei die menschliche Vorstellung 
von Gerechtigkeit (‘iustitia humana’).  
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theological commitments are required or impossible within a particular tradition and how 
that position can be related to the dialogue partner. In this, double-scope blends are 
particularly important, as these hold two different frames in tension in such a way that 
neither is in complete control of the blended space. They can allow what Masson has 
called, “tectonic blends,” that is, new perspectives only possible because of the insistence 
that two, seemingly incompatible, commitments be held together.  
In seeking to understand the theological anthropology of the Joint Declaration on 
the Doctrine of Justification, attention to the different blends for SIN and its framing will 
help make clear not only why the JDDJ represents authentic agreement, but why it seems 
to be an equivocation to those who have approached its consensus as a mirror blend 
rather than a double-scope blend. In the former, the two sides share the same frame, and 
thus can be compared exactly. In the latter, the difference of frames means that a certain 
amount of tension is present, requiring some work to reconcile them. 
In each of the next two chapters, this will be made clear, first from the Roman 
Catholic perspective (chapter four) and then from the Lutheran perspective (chapter five). 
Chapter four will proceed in the following manner. I will begin by attending to the 
history of the development of the Catholic position, and its sixteenth-century opposition 
to the Lutherans. I will then clarify its position by attending to the primary narratives by 
which the various inputs are held together in tension within Catholic tradition. Then this 
narrative will be described in the terms of the cognitive linguistic analysis outlined in the 
previous chapter. Finally, the reasons why the Lutheran blend may appear to be anti-
gospel from within the Catholic framing will be elucidated along with an engagement 
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with how the apparent difficulty is resolved in the JDDJ. The same procedure will be 
followed in engaging the Lutheran position in chapter five.  
Attention to theological blending is much more than merely playing word games. 
Theology is built of language and liturgy; by these means we produce and reinforce 
habitual theological, metaphoric linkages in human cognition. Our embodied nature, a 
central commitment of both Catholic and Lutheran understandings of the divine 
engagement in human history, requires an attention to not only God’s incarnation but to 
ours. Christians have insisted that the resurrection must be a resurrection of the body to 
be an authentically human resurrection; Christian theology is on its strongest ground 
when engaging questions of truth through the categories of embodiment. Attending to the 
linguistic, cultural, and liturgical forms by which our theological thinking is shaped can 
only make us more attentive to the truth, receptive to the other, and able to seek a true 
unity that does not undercut legitimate human diversity. 
  
  
     
CHAPTER FOUR: 
 CONCUPISCENCE IN AN ESCHATOLOGIACL LENS 
Chapter Introduction 
Having laid considerable groundwork arguing for the possibility of a truly 
differentiated consensus, I will now apply that theory to the document serving as focus of 
our attention. Two related historical claims will provide us purchase for engaging the 
consensus of the JDDJ: Trent’s insistence that concupiscence is not, properly speaking, 
“sin,” and the Lutheran aphorism, simul iustus et peccator.1 These are related loci classici 
of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic debate. Both questions received extensive public 
engagement in the final stages of the JDDJ process.
2
  
Each of these controversial convictions relates to the anthropology of the baptized 
Christian. Each seeks to balance the proclaimed reality of Christ’s justification of the 
sinner with the experience of continuing to be affected by what Paul calls “the flesh.”3 
Understanding the ecumenical difficulty regarding the one will require developing an 
understanding of the other. For the sake of explanation, however, they will be examined 
separately and in the context of their native traditions.  
In effect, each anthropology logically subsequent to justification describes an 
eschatological reality; it proposes a description of the Christian existing in the “already/ 
not yet” of the kingdom. In this, it describes the human being in a manner analogous to 
                                                 
1
 While the claims are related, they are not merely parallel and require ongoing translation in 
relation to one another. This chapter will approach their relationship from the perspective of the Tridentine 
declaration. The next will do so from the Lutheran perspective. 
2
 See chapter one beginning at p. 20. 
3
 As in Rom 7–8.  
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classical sacramental theology, proposing both a unity and a differentiation between res 
and sacramentum (reality and sign).
4
 In another manner of speaking, one could say that 
each doctrine seeks to balance language about the state of the justified (a non-scalar 
reality based entirely on God’s action)5 with the assurance that the faithful are not yet 
what God desires them to be. This transformation implies a trajectory, requiring scalar 
language and admitting of, or even requiring, human response to the divine action.
6
  
Despite inheriting seemingly incompatible and potentially irreformable 
theological language, in the JDDJ the Catholic Church and the LWF describe a real 
consensus on the eschatological anthropology of the baptized. The Lutheran and Catholic 
descriptions of the Christian begin from different starting points, use different lenses to 
judge their fittingness to the Gospel, and make use of different points of reference.
7
 They 
therefore entail different anthropological accounts of the Christian in his eschatological 
                                                 
4
 The res tantum (thing alone) is the religious or final effect of the sacrament. For baptism, as an 
example, this is rebirth as a child of God. The sacramentum tantum (sign alone) is the sacramental sign by 
which it is enacted (water and the proclamation of baptism in the triune name). These two have an effect in 
the church’s life as res et sacramentum, or the ecclesial effect of the sacrament. For baptism, this is 
membership in the church and freedom from original sin. The ecclesial effect, while efficacious and truly 
present, remains to be perfected in the world to come. In this example, ecclesial membership and freedom 
from original sin are finally perfected in the in full unity with the Father through Christ in the Spirit with 
the restoration of original justice such that the Christian is, to borrow a distinction from Augustine, non 
posse peccare. 
5
 For the way I am using these terms, see chapter three. Briefly, “non-scalar” denotes a term which 
either is, or is not, present, true, or apt. “Scalar” describes something which admits of various levels of 
presence. There are hybrid cases, which I have called “threshold” and “growth” categories, following the 
suggestion of Michael Root. See p. 91, n. 45. 
6
 While this language of a trajectory, or even a “growth in justification” is clear in the Roman 
documents, most especially, the Council of Trent, (Session VI, Ch. 10), it is also present in the Lutheran 
tradition, despite the language of “mere passivity.” See David S. Yeago, “Interpreting the Roman Response 
to the Joint Declaration on Justification” Pro Ecclesia 8 no. 4 (1998), 406–10. 
7
 In the language of chapter three, each produces a different “blend” in which the seemingly 
contradictory statements about divine accomplishment of salvation and human growth towards holiness are 
held in tension to produce a new field of meaning in which justification can be more adequately described. 
These blends seem mutually contradictory, but the JDDJ seeks to demonstrate that the points of supposed 
contradiction can be shown to be merely apparent. In doing this, it produces a third “blend” which accounts 
for Lutheran and Catholic anathemas and touchstones.  
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and fleshly aspects. Both are attempting to reconcile those two realities, the already and 
the not yet.  
Each doctrinal commitment will be examined in its own chapter: concupiscence 
in this, and the “simul” in the next. Although each chapter will have to give an historical 
introduction to the area of dispute, the final emphasis will be on understanding the 
metaphoric framing by which this position is made necessary. This will allow a 
demonstration of how each position is compatible with the agreement in §4.4 of the JDDJ 
(“The Justified as Sinner”). It will also allow a demonstration that the others’ seemingly 
contradictory position can be accepted, thus comprising a true differentiated consensus.  
Each theological description must account for both the new life in Christ and the 
continued struggle against sin. Insisting that the different descriptions be read as 
instances of the initiated eschatological reality of the Christian in Christ, that is, as a kind 
of eschatological double-vision, allows each to be understood on its own terms without 
thereby requiring the repudiation of the other. The cognitive-linguistic explanation of 
ecumenical consensus detailed in the previous chapter can provide an account of truth in 
which the dialogue members’ experience of recognizing a consensus in difference can be 
explained; it should also provide a means for clarifying that insight to others. As noted at 
the end of the previous chapter, I will be arguing that different metaphorical blends for 
SIN
8
 and different controlling frames make different theological commitments necessary 
in each tradition. This causes each to take a different position on concupiscence and the 
sensibility of the Lutheran “simul.” The fact that they take these positions within their 
                                                 
8
 The reader will remember that to differentiate the consideration of blends and frames from 
normal usage, I am following the usage standard in cognitive linguistics and placing these terms and 
phrases in small caps.  
   192 
own theological visions, however, need not mean that they are in a true contradiction, 
once the positions are understood in terms of the antecedent metaphorical blends. This 
type of consensus need not supplant or reject the inherited theological commitments of 
either party.
9
  
This chapter will apply the method developed thus far to clarify how the shared 
sense of eschatological tension leads Roman Catholics to insist that concupiscence cannot 
properly be called sin. After an historical introduction, it will then attend to the primary 
narratives by which the eschatological reality is held together under tension by Catholics. 
The necessity of this position within Catholic theology will then be described in the terms 
of the cognitive linguistic analysis outlined in the previous chapter, specifically in terms 
of the blends by which SIN is understood and the controlling sacramental frame, 
BAPTISM. Finally, I will examine the reasons why the Lutheran position appears to 
contradict Catholic doctrine, and why this apparent difficulty is resolved in the JDDJ. I 
will end with brief engagements with the major Catholic critics of the JDDJ as they apply 
to the question of concupiscence to show how this analysis can be helpful in answering 
Roman Catholic concerns and aiding reception. The final chapter will follow the same 
procedure to attend to the Lutheran insistence on the anthropological descriptor, simul 
iustus et peccator as this is presented in the Joint Declaration.  
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 Thus, it is not an example of the transconfessionalism described in chapter two, p. 99. Instead, it 
is precisely that product of bilateral ecumenical dialogue that Harding Meyer calls “differentiated 
consensus,” described in chapter two.  
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Concupiscence in the Context of the Reformation 
The question of whether concupiscence is sinful or not rests on two prior 
determinations: what concupiscence is, and what constitutes “sin,” properly-speaking. A 
brief historical introduction to the terminology is found in chapter one, so here I will limit 
myself to an introduction to the sixteenth-century setting of the terms of dispute leading 
to the Tridentine definition. It has been said that the Reformation was a clash amongst 
Augustinianisms, trying to outdo each other in fidelity to their theological master.
10
 This 
is particularly important to keep in mind in any consideration of concupiscence, which 
derives both its terminology and its theological elaboration from Augustine’s own 
works.
11
 
On the path to the Tridentine determination that concupiscence is not “sin in the 
sense of being truly and properly such in those who have been regenerated,”12 the papal 
bull condemning Luther in 1520, Exsurge Domine, provides an appropriate starting point. 
The ongoing discussion can be traced through the documents related to the Diet of 
Augsburg (1530) and the Diet of Regensburg (1540–41). Trent itself dealt with the 
question in Session V (June 17, 1546). As this chapter is primarily interested in the 
Roman Catholic position, the canons of Trent serve as an appropriate sixteenth-century 
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 The argument is most notably made by Jaroslav Pelikan The Christian Tradition: A History of 
the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700), (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 12–22. This recognition is also explicitly present in the predecessor 
documents to the JDDJ, see LK Rechtfertigung.II.4; 47–48. 
11
 See chapter one above, pages 48–52. 
12
 Council of Trent, Session V (June 17, 1546), canon 5. DH 1515; Tanner II:667.19–20. 
“ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse, peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum 
sit.” 
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terminus, providing as they do the definitive definition with which the contemporary 
dialogue has had to wrestle.  
Antecedents to the Tridentine Decree 
Exsurge Domine (1520)  
 Leo X’s bull, Exsurge Domine is a difficult document to engage theologically for 
several reasons.
13
 First, it seems to be based on knowledge of only a small subset of 
Luther’s early writings, and so one can ask if it is a reasonable engagement with even his 
early thought. Of its forty-one condemned propositions, at least twelve “did not 
accurately quote Luther or cannot be taken to express his sentiment.”14 Furthermore, the 
bull is incredibly vague as to the severity of its judgments of particular propositions: 
All and each of the above-mentioned article or errors, as set before you, We 
condemn, disapprove, and entirely reject as respectively heretical or scandalous or 
false or offensive to pious ears or seductive of simple minds and in opposition to 
the Catholic truth.
15
 
Clearly, Leo X intends the faithful to reject these propositions; there is, however, a great 
difference between a heretical proposition and one judged to be seductive of simple 
minds. Heretical propositions have been judged to be necessarily destructive of the 
Gospel in themselves, while something “seductive of simple minds” might be orthodox in 
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 Leo X, Bull Exsurge Domine, (June 15, 1520), DH 1451–1492. Hereafter, ED. 
14
 See Hans J. Hillenbrand, “Martin Luther and the Bull Exsurge Domine,” Theological Studies, 30 
no.1 (1969): 111. Another, perhaps less difficult, concern is that ED is a rejection of propositions held to be 
Martin Luther’s personally, and not a rejection of what would become the Lutheran position in time.  
15
ED Censure, DH 1492. “Praefatos omnes et singulos articulos seu errors tamquam, ut 
praemittitur, respective haereticos, aut scandalosos, aut falsos, aut piarum aurium offensivos, vel 
simplicium mentium seductivos, et veritate catholicae obviantes, damnamus, reprobamus, atque omnino 
reicimus.”  
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itself, but easily lead to theological aberrations among the unlearned.
16
 Leaving the 
specific charges against the listed statements undifferentiated in this manner greatly 
obfuscates attempts to interpret the document. Nevertheless, Exsurge Domine sets the 
direction in which the discussion would develop. The second and third (rejected) 
propositions invoke concupiscence: 
2. To deny that sin remains in a child after baptism is to disregard both Paul and 
Christ alike.  
3. The tinder of sin hinders a soul departing from the body from entering into 
heaven, even though there is no actual sin.
17
 
Proposition two is traced to the Disputatio et excusatio F. Martini Luther adversus 
criminationes D. Johannis Eccii of 1519,
18
 by H. Roos.
19
 It is abbreviated from a longer 
thesis, but the sense is unchanged.
20
 Roos traces proposition three
21
 to the support of 
Thesis 24 in Luther’s Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute of 1518.22 
The rejected article is a restatement of Luther’s argument rather than a citation, but it is a 
fair paraphrase. Luther writes:  
They say all these things as if there were no sins except actual sins, and as if the 
tinder [of original sin] which is left is not an impurity, not a hindrance, not a 
means which would delay entrance to the kingdom of heaven. Unless this 
                                                 
16
 To illustrate the point, one might consider the difference between Pelagianism on the one hand, 
and theologies of Mary as coredemptrix on the other. While the second is not heresy, it can quickly lead 
theologically-untrained Christians or careless theologians into murky theological territory. 
17
 DH 1452–53. “2. In puero post baptismum negare remanens peccatum, est Paulum et Christum 
simul conculcare. 3. Fomes peccati, etiamsi nullum adsit actuale peccatum, moratur exeuntem a corpore 
animam ab ingressu caeli.”  
18
 WA 2:160.33–35. 
19
 H. Roos, “Die Quellen der Bulle Exsurge Domine,” 909–26 in Theologie in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, edited by J. Auer and H. Volk, (Munich: K. Zink, 1957), 919. 
20
 The original reads: “In bono peccare hominem et peccatum veniale non natura sua sed Dei 
misericordia solum esse tale aut in puero post baptismum peccatum remanens negare, hoc est Paulum et 
Christum semel conculcare.”  
21
 Roos, “Quellen”, 919. 
22
 WA 1:572.10-14. 
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[original sin] is healed, it is impossible to enter the kingdom of heaven, even if 
there is no actual sin present, ‘For nothing unclean shall enter it’ [Rev 21:27].23  
We should note that Luther’s argument and the proposition rejected by Leo hinge on 
different blends for SIN. Perhaps because of this, they give different weight to the word 
“hinders” [moretur/moratur]. The citation from Revelation shows Luther to be asserting 
that concupiscence will be purged before the beatific vision. This would seem to be a 
rather uncontroversial assertion.
24
 On the other hand, Exsurge Domine seems to be 
rejecting the proposition that the presence of concupiscence at death would finally 
prevent the soul from attaining that vision.
25
 
Although the propositions in Exsurge Domine are specifically condemned as the 
personal opinions of Martin Luther and not the Lutheran movement as a whole, they 
become central, recurring questions throughout the sixteenth century. The concern that 
baptism must be understood to truly remove sin (ED 2) remains a central theme in 
Roman Catholic thought on concupiscence, as will be seen in what follows. Similarly, the 
worry that salvation is imperiled (ED 3) if baptism does not truly remove sin provides an 
enduring motivation to the Roman Catholic engagement with the question. 
 Here we have the first aspect of the Roman Catholic blend: concupiscence cannot 
be understood to separate from God in such a way that it interferes with salvation. This 
has two implications: first, that “sin properly-speaking” names the cause of precisely 
such a separation. Second, the sacraments, to be effective, must overcome the inherited 
                                                 
23
 LW 31:153.  
24
 As Karlfried Froelich notes in his background paper for LK, “Augustine, who took his clue from 
Paul’s medical language, had already pointed in this direction: the more God’s grace takes control, the 
more the remaining concupiscence must diminish.” “Justification Language in the Middle Ages,” 143–161 
in Justification by Faith, 146. 
25
 This interpretation is somewhat less clear than that of the Luther passage, in part because there 
is no explanation of what is rejected about each proposition, or under what level of authority as noted 
above. 
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division from God that is termed original sin. Thus, we can initially call the Catholic 
blend SIN IS CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM GOD.
26
 On the other hand, Luther’s position is 
based on a blend that is better described as SIN IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH 
GOD’S LAW. 27 Thus, the Christian hope in heaven is, for Luther, evidence that God’s 
final purgation of all sin is possible.
28
 Everyday experience proves that Christians are not 
yet what the scriptures say that they will be, so the sacraments must not entirely purge 
Christians of sin now; although they stand as sure evidence of God’s mercy and final 
power over sin.
29
 These blends will be more explicitly developed in this chapter and in 
the next, but keeping the end-point in mind will be helpful in following the argument.  
Documents Related to the Diet of Augsburg (1530) 
In 1530, Charles V called the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire to a Diet at 
Augsburg, which would deal primarily with the defense of the empire against Turkish 
invasion.
30
 In order to serve this defense, he desired an end to the struggles over reform 
                                                 
26
 This will be made more specific later in the chapter in light of the metaphoric use of Trent, to 
produce the blend SIN IS AN IMPURITY WARRANTING DISINHERITANCE. See below, p. 211. 
27
 This phrasing is from Luther, Against Latomus, “id quod non est secundum legem dei.” WA 
8:83.29.  
28
 As will be developed below, this different blend for SIN will also cause the differing positions 
taken on the question of mortal and venial sin, and how Christians should describe these realities in their 
lives. See p. 291.  
29
 Direct engagement with the Lutheran position belongs in chapter five. However, for examples 
of this kind of argument, see AAC II.42–45; JF §102–103; even the statement in the JDDJ that 
concupiscence “does not correspond to God’s original design for humanity,” (§30); see discussion in Annex 
§2B.  
30
 Kolb/Wengert, 27. The AC begins with an introduction describing the calling of the council, as 
“first, to deliberate concerning aid against the Turk.” Preface, 2–3. Latin. The German text makes it clear 
that this is a citation from the Emperor’s summons to the Diet. See also, Herbert Immenkötter, Die 
Confutatio der Confessio Augustana vom 3. August 1530, (Munich: Aschendorffsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1979), 8–10. See also, Henrich Lutz, “Kaiser, Reich und Christenheit: Zur 
weltgeschichtlichen Würdigung des Augsburger Reichstages 1530,” in Confessio Augustana und 
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that had plagued the Holy Roman Empire and so asked the princes and estates to prepare 
an explanation of their theological positions and the reforms they had instituted.
31
 The 
document answering this charge, called the Augsburg Confession (AC), was prepared by 
Philip Melanchthon and received Martin Luther’s approval before its presentation to the 
emperor.
32
 It received an official response, called the Confutation of the Augsburg 
Confession (CAC). Charles demanded that the evangelical party accept the CAC and 
pledge to make no public response as a condition of providing them a copy, this condition 
they refused. They instead had several people act as stenographers while the German text 
was read publically.
33
 Over the next several months, Melanchthon wrote an extended 
defense, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (AAC), on the basis of these notes. 
These documents are central to both Lutheran self-understanding and to the developing 
Catholic understanding of the Lutheran position, and require attention.  
A fairly simple declaration in the AC asserts that 
since the fall of Adam all human beings who are propagated according to nature 
are born with sin, that is, without fear of God, without trust in God, and with 
concupiscence. And … that this disease or original fault is truly sin, which even 
                                                                                                                                                 
Confutatio: Der Augsburger Reichstag 1530 und die Einheit der Kirche, Erwin Iserloh, ed., (Munich: 
Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1980), 735.  
31
 Charles V. “Des Kaisers Carl V. Ausschreiben zu dem Reichstage nach Augsburg an Kurfürst 
Johann von Sachsen,” in Urkundenbuch zu der Geschichte des Reichstages zu Augsburg im Joahre 1530, 
ed. Karl-Eduard Förstemann (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1833), I:29. 
32
 The AC replaces an earlier text more directly about the reforms, in order to combat the Four 
Hundred Four Propositions of Johannes Eck, that assembled citations from the Reformers with quotations 
from “Antitrinitarians and Anabaptists as well as Ulrich Zwingli … [to] give the impression that the Saxon 
theology affirmed most of the heresies known to the church.” Thus the AC provides not only the Second 
Part dedicated to the reform of abuses(Articles 23–28), but an even more substantial First Part dedicated to 
demonstrating their orthodoxy (Articles 1–22). The sections on original sin with which we will deal are 
found in this First Part (specifically, Article 2). Kolb/Wengert, “Editors’ Introduction to the AC,” 28. 
33
 Mark D. Tranvik, trans. “The Confutation of the Augsburg Confession,” 105–139 in Robert 
Kolb and James A. Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts of the Book of Concord, (Minneapolis, Fortress 
Press, 2001), 105. The Latin text is 73–212 in Herbert Immenkötter, ed. Die Confutatio der Confessio 
Augustana vom 3. August 1530, (Münster Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1979). Hereafter, CAC. 
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now damns and brings eternal death to those who are not born again through 
baptism and the Holy Spirit.
34
  
While generally approving the article, the authors of the Confutation offered some 
critique. Specifically, they reject a potential interpretation of the Augustana vis-à-vis 
concupiscence: 
Also rejected is their teaching that inherited or original sin is concupiscence, if 
they mean that concupiscence is a sin that remains in children after their Baptism. 
The apostolic see has already condemned two articles by Martin Luther where he 
taught that sin remains in infants after Baptism and the ‘fomes’ of sin hinders the 
soul’s entrance into heaven. But if they are speaking in the manner of St. 
Augustine’s teaching and call the inherited sin concupiscence in the sense that it 
ceases to be sin in Baptism, then this teaching can be accepted, for it is in accord 
with St. Paul, who said, “We are all born children of wrath” [Eph 2:3], and that 
“in Adam we have all sinned,” Romans 5[:12].35 
This would be a somewhat surprising response to the text of the AC, if it weren’t for the 
prior condemnations of Luther in Exsurge Domine. Concupiscence is traditionally tied to 
original sin, even if the two are not equated. Moreover, the Augsburg Confession 
explicitly ties the overcoming of original sin and its effects to baptism and the divine 
action of the Holy Spirit.
36
 However, concupiscence was primed to be a topic of debate 
by the Papal Bull of 1520. Here the confutators reiterate its concern that the efficacy of 
baptism not be undercut.  
It is not surprising that Melanchthon’s Apology dwells on the question of 
concupiscence (concupiscentia, bose Lust) at several points. The most significant portion 
                                                 
34
 AC II.1–2. Latin text. The reader should note that the concupiscence referred to here is pre-
baptismal. 
35
 CAC II. Latin: “Sed et ea reiicitur declaratio, qua vitium originis concupiscentiam dicunt, si ita 
concupiscentiam volunt esse peccatum, quod etiam post baptismum remaneat peccatum in puero. Iam 
pridem enim damnati sunt a sede apostolica duo articuli Martini Lutheri, secundus et tertius de peccato 
remanente in puero post baptismum et de fomite remorante animam ab ingressu caeli. Quod si iuxta divi 
Augustini sententiam vitium originis dicerent concupiscentiam, quae in baptismo peccatum esse desinat, 
acceptandum esset ; quandoquidem et iuxta beati Pauli sententiam omnes filii irae nascimur, Ephes. 2, et in 
Adam omnes peccavimus, Rom. 5.” Immenkötter, 81–83. 
36
 AC II.2. 
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of these occurs in Article II, Original Sin. There is also passing mention of the term in 
Article 18, Free Will,
37
 and 23, The Marriage of Priests.
38
 As expected, however, the 
major discussion is found in Article II, where concupiscence is considered primarily in its 
relationship to original sin. While any extensive engagement with Melanchthon’s 
anthropology of the baptized Christian belongs in the next chapter, a few brief points are 
helpful here. The question will continue to be raised between the Lutherans and Catholics 
in general, and between Melanchthon and various opponents in particular, over the 
following decades. The emerging dispute that begins to be visible here can be described 
as a difference between understanding concupiscence to not be sin because that would be 
to make baptism inoperative, and saying that “the remnants of original sin in the human 
being are not in their essence neutral, but need both the grace of Christ, so that they might 
not be held [against us], and also the Holy Spirit, so that they might be put to death.”39  
                                                 
37
 Here Melanchthon speaks of the difficulty in resisting concupiscence, “such that people more 
often obey their evil impulses than sound judgment.” This use seems compatible with the intention of 
Trent. AAC 18:5  
38
 Here, the author’s clear intent is to distinguish between the natural affection leading to marriage 
and the lusts of the flesh. Melanchthon is making a distinction between natural affection (“illo appetitu, 
quem vocant στοργὴν φυσικήν, quem concupiscentia nonsustulit ex natura”; “die natürliche Neigung, die 
zwischen Mann und Weib auch gewesen wäre, so die Natur rein blieben wäre”) and “that concupiscence 
which is sin” (“concupiscentia, quae peccatum est”; “der unordentlichen Brunst die da sundlich ist”). It is 
not directly germane to our topic, except in that the word concupiscence is present. Melanchthon does 
stipulate that this natural desire is “inflamed” by concupiscence (accendit; noch stärker gemacht), thus 
requiring an antidote (Latin text only, remedio). The relationship between concupiscence properly-speaking 
and sexual desire is certainly drawn closely in this text, which is a somewhat different question from that 
under consideration at present. AAC 23:13.  
39
 AAC II.25. In the 1540 Worms disputation with Eck, he will further strengthen this point: “One 
point now remains in controversy: whether the remaining sickness in the saints be true punishment or an 
indifferent thing, whether truly it be something worthy of eternal death by its nature if it is not done away 
with. For this evil is not merely concupiscent appetite in the senses, nor merely a tinder or a quality of the 
body, but it is of that remaining gloom, not yet banished from the mind, which the saints have especially 
experienced. By which they have known doubts about of God and doubted. Nor has their will been turned 
toward God in complete fire of love, for even the saints have experienced pride in and love of self. 
Therefore an infirmity still remains in the mind and in the will and in the senses, which the saints have 
often lamented.” “Nunc manet hoc in controversia: an morbus reliquus in sancis sit poena tantum seu 
adiaphoron, an vero sit res digna aeterna morte sua natura, si non condonaretur. Porro hic morbus non 
tantum est concupiscentia in appetitu sensitivo, nec tantum fomes seu qualitas corporis, sed reliqua est in 
mente nondum prorsus dispulsa caligo, ut maxime experiuntur sancti, qui agnoscunt dubitationes de Deo, 
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Of course, one cannot simultaneously say that concupiscence in the baptized “is 
sin” and “is not sin” in the same sense. The reformers and their opponents certainly felt 
themselves to be in at least partial disagreement on this point.
40
 Both would say that the 
baptized are to trust that God forgives their sin on account of their baptism and that it is 
salvation for them. In the second article of the Apology, Melanchthon returns repeatedly 
to insist that people, by their natural powers, are unable to conquer their inborn 
concupiscence and that even after baptism, what remains in people is no neutral matter.
41
 
Indeed, he finds these anti-God tendencies even in the saints, citing the Psalms and the 
prophets.
42
 He sees the scholastic engagement as minimizing the effects of original sin, 
although he himself does not carefully distinguish between the situation of the baptized 
and the unbaptized.
43
  
This dialogue on original sin would continue over the following decades, and 
receive its next major expression in the Diet of Regensburg, where the same positions 
                                                                                                                                                 
diffidentiam. Nec ita voluntas conversa est ad Deum, ut tota ardeat dilectione; sed sancti etiam ruunt in 
admirationem et amorem sui. Manet igitur et in mente et in voluntate et in appetitu sensitivo infirmitas, 
quam toties deplorant sancti.” CR IV:2131 col. 40  
40
 Both the AAC and the CAC, for example, will acknowledge that there is much agreement on the 
doctrine of original sin, but then go on to worry about the implications of the other’s manner of describing 
concupiscence in the baptized. The same pattern is evident in the engagements leading up to Regensburg. 
41
 He lists the following as examples: “doubting the wrath of God, the grace of God, and the Word 
of God; being angry with the judgment of God; being indignant that God does not rescue us immediately 
from afflictions; grumbling that the ungodly experience more good fortune than the upright; being stirred 
up by rage, lust, desire for glory, wealth, and the like.” AAC II.42–43. Notice however that for 
Melanchthon, the question is whether concupiscence is a “neutral matter” [adiaphoron] rather than whether 
its presence in itself is enough to prevent the salvation of the Christian. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 So, for example, immediately after the passage cited at the end of the previous paragraph, in 
which he is clearly talking about the “remnants of original sin” in the baptized, he shifts to speaking of the 
full, unruled power of sin in the world after the fall. He does then speak of Christ’s role as bearer of sins 
and penalties, and as “destroy[er of] the reign of the devil, sin, and death” (AAC II.50). Melanchthon seems 
unconcerned at this point, however, with the role of baptism in our salvation by Christ, focusing more on 
the necessity of helping people to understand the depths of sin from which they were saved so as to 
recognize “the benefits of Christ” which presumably are applied to the baptized by God’s grace (Ibid.). 
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would continue to be examined. The Catholic insistence that baptism not be undone 
continued to meet the Lutheran concern to not minimize the remaining power of sin. 
The Diet of Regensburg (1541) 
The Diet of Regensburg was understood, even at the time, as a last chance to 
overcome the developing rift between Catholics and Lutherans.
44
 It occurred at a 
particularly interesting historical moment in 1541. At this point, there was still some hope 
for (re)union, but the parties were much further apart than they had been at Augsburg in 
1530.
45
 At Augsburg the Lutherans had argued that their reform left them within the 
bounds of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church with their opponents.
46
 At 
                                                 
44
 Cornelis Augustijn calls the Diet a “turning-point” during which it became clear that while both 
parties were seeking “reformatio,” the reformatio that they envisioned was quite different. He sees the 
Catholic position as being very much what the Council of Trent would shortly undertake, while the 
Lutherans were looking for at first, permission to continue the reforms they had undertaken, and then as a 
last hope during the unpromising discussions at Regensburg, “a return to the early church, the common 
basis of all Christians.” “The Quest of Reformatio: The Diet of Regensburg 1541 as a Turning-Point,” 64–
80 in Archive for Reformation History— Special Volume: The Reformation in Germany and Europe: 
Interpretations and Issues, Hans R. Gugisberg and Gottfried G. Krodel, eds., (Heidelberg: Verein für 
Reformationsgeschichte, 1993), 79. See also Jedin, History of the Council of Trent, II: 198; and Phillip E. 
Pederson “The Religious Colloquy of Regensburg (Ratisbon) 1540,” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 
1978; 341. 
45
 Pederson, 37. As he points out, conditions were both volatile and seemingly ripe for some kind 
of settlement. There were really three parties to disagreement in the empire, Papal, Imperial, and Protestant, 
each with political and theological issues. These questions are too complex for the current investigation, so 
the question will be carefully policed to relate to concupiscence in the Regensburg Book. The failure of the 
diet to produce an agreement made it unlikely that they would find peaceful settlement, and the Emperor 
ceased trying. Ibid., 341–42. 
46
 See the language of the Preface of the AC in particular, but also the Conclusion of Part One: 
“As can be seen, there is nothing here that departs from the Scriptures or the catholic church, or from the 
Roman church, insofar as we can tell from its writers. Because this is so, those who claim that our people 
are to be regarded as heretics judge too harshly. The entire dissension concerns a few specific abuses, 
which have crept into the churches without any proper authority. Even if there were some difference in 
these matters, the bishops should have been so lenient as to bear with us on account of the confession we 
have now recounted. For even the canons are not so severe as to demand that rites should be the same 
everywhere, nor have the rites of all churches ever been the same. Nevertheless, the ancient rites are, for 
the most part, diligently observed among us. For the accusation is false that all ceremonies and ancient 
ordinances are abolished in our churches. Truth is, there has been a public outcry that certain abuses have 
become fused to the common rites. Because such abuses could not be approved with a good conscience, 
they have been corrected to some extent.” Latin text.  
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Regensburg, the text to be discussed was drawn up specifically as a compromise 
document to be discussed by a small group of Protestant and Catholic theologians.
47
 This 
structure makes it a tempting example of failed “consensus ecumenism,” especially for 
authors already convinced of the failure of the JDDJ.
48
 This judgment, while it underlines 
the importance of the Regensburg process, collapses the historical distance between 1540 
and 1999 and fails to attend to the differences of genre, political situation, and 
ecclesiological presuppositions between the two. 
There are several historical aspects of the Regensburg Diet which it will be 
helpful to clarify. The Diet was the culmination of a series meetings that had taken place 
at Hagenau and Worms over the preceding year.
49
 At Regensburg, the emperor appointed 
six collocutors, three Roman Catholics and three Lutherans.
50
 They were assigned to 
discuss the so-called “Regensburg Book” (LR), a document originally drafted by Gropper 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., 71. 
48
 Examples include Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions, 175–79; Suzanne Schulz 
Hequet, The 1541 Colloquy at Regensburg: In Pursuit of Church Unity, (Saarbrucken: Verlag Dr. Müller, 
2009), 1–5, 74–77; and Irene Dingel, “The Debate Over Justification in Ecumenical Dialogue,” Lutheran 
Quarterly 15 no.3 (2001): 310.  
The Diet of Regensburg did not achieve the Emperor’s goal of a reunited Christianity within his 
borders. That this is the case, however, cannot be merely blamed on theological disagreement, although 
such certainly existed. The Diet was first and foremost a political event, secondly, an ecclesiological one 
struggling with a new reality of separate, parallel magisteria, and also a forum of theological discussion. 
That it failed to reach a consensus is unfortunate, but we should be quite careful of drawing the historical or 
theological parallels too closely. To do so collapses the difference between the quite different social 
locations of the Roman and Protestant Christians of 1540 and 1999. While Matheson’s final comment on 
the Diet, “the dialogue between Protestantism and Catholicism at the Diet of Regensburg in 1541 did not 
fail. It never took place” is an overstatement, it is not entirely wrong, especially when his distinction 
between Lutheran theology and the emerging Protestantism, i.e. the system of the Schmalkald League, is 
kept in mind. Peter Matheson, Cardinal Contarini at Regensburg, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 181.  
49
 Three meetings had originally been planned, one of Catholics only, one of Catholics and 
Protestants, and one Imperial to accept the solutions proposed. This pattern was somewhat disrupted by 
papal distrust of the emperor and the German estates and the late arrivals of delegates due to disease and 
inter-Catholic distrust. Pederson 41, 52–58. 
50
 Johannes Eck, Johannas Gropper, and Julius Pflug (the bishop elect of Naumburg) on the 
Catholic side; Philip Melanchthon, Martin Bucer and Johann Pistorius on the Protestant. Cardinal Contorini 
was not named as a collocutor, a fact that Charles V’s chancellor waved off as a scribal error, although 
Matheson notes that it may have been a ploy to keep the Protestant party pacified. Matheson, 93. 
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as a compromise document and emended at several points by the papal legate, Cardinal 
Contarini.
51
 The Protestants, especially Melanchthon, had hoped that the Augsburg 
Confession, or Melanchthon’s recently revised version, might be the basis of discussion, 
but the Emperor’s perception that the Protestants were determined not to deviate on any 
point of the Augsburg Confession, made any text based on it a poor choice for dialogue.
52
 
Finally, after the colloquy was closed, the emended articles of the Regensburg Book 
along with nine Protestant counter articles were submitted to the Estates.
53
 The Diet of 
Regensburg continued for about two more months.
54
  
More important to the present discussion than the compromise text, however, is 
the response that it received at Catholic hands. This is of two parts: first, the Catholic 
engagement in the Diet itself. Second, that of the Council of Trent, which was aware of 
the Regensburg colloquies and whose discussion was shaped partly in response to them.
55
 
Therefore, in this section, I will give a short description of the Regensburg Book’s 
engagement with concupiscence, before examining its reception by the Catholic 
collocutors and then transitioning to the teaching of the Council of Trent. 
                                                 
51
 Strangely, the book’s authorship was hidden at the Diet. It was presented as having been 
authored by several Dutch theologians (Matheson,101). Pederson attributes the fiction to Granvelle. (71). 
52
 See Augustijn, 71; Matheson, 101–102. The Emperor seems to have been well informed, as the 
Elector of Saxony, in an instruction dated 15. March, 1541 had admonished the collocutors to not give up 
on even small points of the Confession, lest the opponents, having found them “weak on one or two small 
points, come to believe that we can be weakened on the other points as well.” “wo man in einem oder 
zweien Punkten weich funden, daß sie es darnach dafür halten würden, wir könnten in den andern auch 
wohl entweichen.” Corpus Reformatorum, Carolus Gottlieb Bretschneider, ed, (New York: Johnson 
Reprint Corporation, 1963), IV: 2162. Hereafter, CR. 
53
 The one section of the LK with which we will be most concerned below, Article 4, “On Original 
Sin” did not receive a counter-article, although there are counter articles related to the following Article 5, 
“On Justification.” 
54
 Hequet, 72.  
55
 Jedin, History of the Council of Trent, II: 168 n. Regensburg had its largest impact on Trent 
through the theory of double justice, which was ultimately rejected. The influence of LR Article 4 on 
Original Sin, however, is noticeable.  
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Like at Augsburg, concupiscence appears in Regensburg Book chiefly in 
relationship to original sin, here Article 4. It is defined at length, mostly in terms of the 
teaching of St. Augustine, although with attention to the usual texts from St. Paul.
56
 The 
Book emphasizes baptism and its effects, but it also admits that there are senses in which 
concupiscence should be called sin, in part based on a distinction between pardoning and 
erasing sins. 
Baptism, [Augustine] says, gives pardon for all sins and removes offenses, it does 
not erase them. … Due to this, one must carefully teach with Augustine that the 
law of sin and concupiscence that remains in the saints, if it bears no bad fruit, is 
not sin that still holds them by means of guilt. For all their guilt is destroyed by 
Christ. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged and taught —with like 
authority to Augustine’s— that the apostle called this evil “sin,” for it is not only 
brought forth by sin, but it also inclines toward sin, and it is involved in 
disobedience to the rule of reason.
57
  
The next section of the article marshals texts in which Augustine calls concupiscence 
“sin,” albeit in this limited way.58 It emphasizes that concupiscence is a fruitful vine, 
always ready “to become actual sin in us.” Therefore even the saints pray the Lord’s 
Prayer daily, including the petition for forgiveness.
59
 The article ends with a reminder 
that the concupiscence of the baptized differs from that found in the unbaptized, and 
suggests how the faithful ought to be taught to trust in the promises of Christ without 
                                                 
56
 That is, Rom. 7, 14, 17, 20; Gal. 3. 
57
 “…inquit, omnem dat indulgentiam peccatorum et aufert crimina, non radit. Et in hanc 
sententiam alia plurima sanctus ille episcopus scripsit. 
 Itaque docendum est cum Augustino diligenter legem illam peccati et relictam in sanctis concupiscentiam, 
si ex se nullum fructum malum edit, non esse peccatum, quod adhuc eos reatu aliquo teneat. Omnis enim 
reatus eius per Christum sublatus est. Ceterum eodem Augustino auctore agnoscendum quoque et dtum 
nequest, quod apostoleccato invectum sit, sed et neque id solum quia peccato invectum sit, sed etiam quia 
ad peccatum inclinat et ei inest inoboedientia contra dominatum mentis. ” “Das Regensburger Buch aus 
1540/1541,” 21–88 in Acta Reformationis Catholicae Ecclesiam Germaniae Concernentia Saeculi XVI, Vol 
6: 1538–1548 Part IIIb, Georg Pfeilschifter, ed. (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1974), 28.26–29.2. 
Translation mine, hereafter, LR.  
58
 Specifically, Contra Julianum, Migne, PL 44: 696, 787. 
59
 LR 29.12–21. It also points to 1Jn 1:8 as evidence of our ongoing need for forgiveness. 
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discounting how “great the infirmity that remains” is.60 Taken as a whole, the article 
holds together trust that Christ has renewed the Christian in baptism —what we have 
called attention to the “state of justification”— and the admission that throughout our 
earthly lives we are not yet fully healed and thus remain on a trajectory that has not yet 
reached its goal. 
 Several things should be noted about this article before we turn to its reception. 
First, it makes a very close connection between concupiscence and original sin in the 
unbaptized, although it distinguishes them carefully in the baptized. The first several 
paragraphs of the article describe original sin as a lack of original justice joined to 
concupiscence.
61
 It seems likely that the authors saw the work of baptism as forgiving 
guilt and restoring the state of being able to resist the pull of concupiscence. Second, 
Jesus’ intensification of the law to forbid internal attitudes, especially anger and lust 
(concupiscentia in the Vulgate), makes the careful balancing of baptismal regeneration 
and the accusation of a believer’s conscience difficult.62 The Regensburg Book’s list of 
“deeds” which are the fruit of concupiscence includes therefore, “thought, speech, 
external act, or act of service which though due we omit.”63 Distinguishing between a 
concupiscent desire and a guilty thought requires a subtle engagement, albeit one that had 
received significant attention in the penitential literature.
64
  
                                                 
60
 “tanta infirmitate, quae superest,” LR 30.5. 
61
 LR 26.25–28.  
62
 Mt. 5:21–30. 
63
 “sive id fiat cogitatione, sive locutione, sive externo opera, sive actus operisve debiti omissione” 
LR 27.4–5. 
64
 The distinction that a thought was not sinful unless it received assent is common. In the Middle 
Ages, however, the explanations for this developed in a variety of directions. As an example, Gerson 
distinguishes between two wills, one of the rational and one of the sensible soul. The human being is held 
responsible for the working of the first, not the second if the first does not accede. See Sven Grosse, 
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Speaking of “the Catholic response at Regensburg,” requires care. The Catholic 
parties were not in agreement with each other, demonstrating a wide variety of opinions 
among themselves. Some of the Catholic Estates have been called “openly Protestant” in 
both the contemporary literature and at the time.
65
 In addition, the papal legate Cardinal 
Contarini, who had been willing to dialogue in good faith, received new instructions from 
Rome in the middle of the Diet. These were to make no concessions that deviated from 
the substance or even the terminology of the Catholic position.
66
 
On the simplest of levels, it would be proper to say that the Catholic response to 
the Diet of Regensburg and its book was a simple rejection. Contarini was unable to 
accede to the Emperor’s policy of toleration towards the Protestants until a council, 
because to do so would make the doctrinal matters seem undecided. He therefore rejected 
the diet’s proposals, including the Book in its entirety.67 On the other hand, we can offer 
a more nuanced appraisal, especially regarding the doctrine of original sin as outlined in 
the Regensburg Book. In order to do this, however, we will have to examine sources 
pertaining to the discussion leading up it.
68
 In particular, we can consider the exchange 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heilungewißheit und Scrupulositas im späten Mittelalter: Studien zu Johannes Gerson und Gattungen der 
Frömmigkeitstheologie seiner Zeit, (Tübingen: J.C.V. Mohr, 1994), 4748.  
65
 Matheson, Contarini at Regensburg, 22. Pederson, 88–96. 
66
 Matheson, 152.  
67
 Ibid., 162. Contarini’s opinion of July 12, 1541, states that as the Protestants have abandoned a 
number of articles of the common consensus of the Catholic Church, the only remaining option is to remit 
the matter to the holy see to call a general council. CR IV: 2303. The growing opinion calling for a national 
council among the Diet required a second intervention from the legate. In this, dated 26 July, he tells the 
emperor “For, as is quite clear, in a national council, no agreement is possible to determine controversies of 
the faith, for these concern the position of the universal church. And whatever would be determined there 
would be nothing, invalid, and empty.” “Nam perspicuum est, in nationali concilio nullo pacto posse 
determinari controversias fidei, cum hoc concernat statum universalem ecclesiae. Et quicquid ibi 
determinaretur esset nullum., irritum, et inane.” CR IV: 2340. Therefore an ecumenical council would be 
necessary, and this could only be called by the pope.  
68
 The Diet itself, depending as it did on larger questions of church and imperial politics, did not 
provide substantial feedback to Article 4 of the LR from the Catholic side. There is significantly more 
response to individual articles from the Protestant side, see for example, CR IV:2300–2302. 
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between the more intractable of the collocutors, Eck and Melanchthon.
69
 Finally, 
however, for a unified Catholic response to the theological positions of Regensburg, we 
have to look to Trent. 
It should be remembered that Eck’s interventions in the colloquy remain his 
personal positions. They were, however, important to the negotiations, even if he did 
wholly repudiate the book when it was finished.
70
 Eck chose original sin as the first point 
of discussion, finding the Augsburg Confession’s definition to require further 
clarification. He turned specifically to the question of post-baptismal concupiscence, 
which he understands the Augustana and the Apology to consider “to be true, in itself, 
and simply, sin.”71 The problem he poses, of course, is the efficacy of the sacrament and 
God’s promise to the believer, for baptismal regeneration is impossible “if the sin of 
concupiscence even still [i.e. after baptism] endures in the descendants of the first-made 
Adam, as is clear.”72 Athina Lexutt understands Eck to be making explicit a common 
position among his peers:  
Baptism removes not only the accusation of formal original sin, but also its 
material existence. That must then, naturally, have consequences for one’s 
understanding of justification, for the purified human, except for the disposition 
towards actual sin, is capable of applying his own powers towards his salvation.
73
  
                                                 
69
 In this colloquy, particularly regarding justification, but also throughout the discussion, 
Melanchthon and Eck played the role of hard-liners, rejecting attempts at negotiation through compromise. 
The other collocutors, several of whom had possibly played a role in producing the original LR, were more 
conciliatory. Pederson, 161–67. 
70
 CR IV: 2291. He writes, “It neither pleased, nor does it please, nor will it please, that stupid 
book of yours, in which so many errors and faults can be discerned; therefore I judge, and I will always 
judge, that it should not be received by the Catholics, that derelict, so to speak, of the church and Fr. 
Melanchthon.” Translation mine.  
71
 CR IV: 2132, column 35. “esse vere, per se et simpliciter peccatum.” 
72
 CR IV: 2132, column 36. “Quod non fieret [the regeneration of the soul in baptism],si 
permaneret peccatum adhuc a protoplasto Adam descendens, concupiscentiae scilicet.” 
73
 Athina Lexutt, Rechtfertigung im Gespräch: das Rechtfertigungsverständnis in den 
Religionsgesprächen von Hagenau, Worms, und Regensburg 1540–41, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
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While it is possible that this is Eck’s intention in this document, it is not the necessary 
implication that Lexutt makes it out to be, for reasons important to the present project. 
The blend SIN is particularly central; Lexutt’s understanding of Eck rests on the blend SIN 
IS ANYTHING CONTRARY TO GOD’S LAW, rather than SIN IS CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM 
GOD. Eck’s logic, however, clearly implies the latter, because he makes the point to 
safeguard the possibility that baptism actually unites the Christian with God. Lexutt 
collapses the (potential) eschatological tension in Eck’s concern, leaving precisely the 
Pelagian situation the reformers feared. This is demonstrated by her quick dismissal of 
the “disposition toward actual sin,” which Catholics, including Eck, would understand to 
mean the concupiscence of the baptized. This disposition is not to be lightly dismissed 
even if it does not of itself merit God’s damnation, for it can be a powerful and constant 
temptation to the actual sin that does separate from God. Because the power of God’s 
grace given in baptism is the source of renewed human life, that grace is also the 
condition of possibility for any human striving.
74
 For Eck, the avoidance of real sin does 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ruprecht, 1996), 220. “Die Taufe hebt nicht nur die Anklage der formalin Erbünde auf, sondern auch ihre 
material Existenz. Das muß dann natürlich Folgen haben für das Rechtfertigungsverständis, denn ein bis 
auf die Neigung zur Tatsünde gereingter Mensch vermag seine Kräfte für sein Heil einzusetzen.” 
74
 See Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the Joint Declaration on 
the Doctrine of Justification,” Modern Theology 20 no. 1 (2004), 6–22. As Root argues, the Catholic 
position rests on the possibility of a “double agency” in which “an action can be ascribed both to the human 
agent and to God acting within the human action. This double agency is not a cooperation where two agents 
each do part; rather, God is at work moving human action. God (and God alone) can move the human 
person in this way without violating that person’s freedom, for as Creator and Preserver God’s relation to 
the person is, so to speak, an internal one” (12). 
A further issue, which because it is not as central to our consideration, I will limit to this footnote, 
is Lexutt’s use of the words “formal” and “material.” Her point seems to rest on an understanding of 
material that is more like the contemporary “stuff,” or what we would mean by “actual” than the 
Aristotelian materia. A materia without form is not a thing, but only a potentiality. Thus concupiscence, 
the materia of sin, can remain without being truly sin. Lexutt is suggesting that for Eck it must be removed 
“in its material existence,” to rid the human of damnable sin. It is possible that it is not her intent to invoke 
Aristotelian categories, but in that case opposing “form” and “matter” is an unfortunate choice, although 
they are present in the debate itself. See also Vinzenz Pfnür, “Simul iustus et peccator – Gerecht und 
Sünder zugleich: Hintergrund bei Luther und in der katholischen Kontroverstheologie Abklärung der 
Kontroverse im amicum colloquium zwischen Eck und Melanchthon Augsburg 1530 und Worms 1541,” 
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not earn salvation; rather, refusing God’s gift and committing actual sin loses it. As the 
final text of the Regensburg Book makes clear, this cannot mean that the Christian is to 
boast of herself, for in the body she must continually fight, and “must persevere in 
continual repentance and prayer for pardon.”75 Nor, however, should the Christian 
despair of her salvation, for the grace of baptism is greater than sin, and God sent the Son 
so that she might be made wholly, finally just in “the full victory [of] the future age.”76 
The Tridentine Decree on Original Sin 
Concupiscence is most definitively dealt with in the Tridentine session devoted to 
original sin, (Session V, June 17, 1546). Three questions were proposed by the legates to 
guide the council’s deliberations. These were intended to make the council’s teaching 
“accessible to bishops,” to prevent the conciliar debate from merely rehashing the 
scholastic controversies on the definition of original sin, and to clarify the difference 
between the Roman and Protestant doctrines of original sin.
77
 This structure produced a 
text descriptive of original sin’s effects instead of providing a definition. It also focused 
                                                                                                                                                 
227251 in in Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen, eds., Theodor Schneider and 
Gunther Wenz, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2001), 237. 
75
 “in iugi poenitantia et precatione veniae perseverant” LR 30:7–8. 
76
 “ad plenam victoriam in futuro saeculo” LR 30:15.  
77
 Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent, Ernest Graf, OSB, trans., (New York: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1961), II: 134. The three questions proposed follow (Ibid.).  
(1) To what testimonies of the Scriptures and the apostolic traditions do the Fathers, the Councils and the 
Apostolic See appeal against those who deny original sin? From what principle do they derive this 
doctrine? Who are they who contract this sin, and in what way? 
(2) In accordance with the precedent established by the ancient Councils, the nature of original sin, unlike 
other sins, must be determined not by definition but by a description of its effects. 
(3) How is man freed from original sin? Is the effect of salvation complete or do certain traces (vestigia) 
remain? And if so, what is their effect? 
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discussion on rooting out the difference between the council’s doctrine and that of the 
Reformers rather than on seeking conciliation. 
 The conciliar decree was strongly tested by interventions from Girolamo 
Seripando, the reforming Prior General of the Augustinian Hermits.
78
 While 
understanding himself to disagree with Luther, Seripando argued strongly for allowing 
preachers to call concupiscence in the baptized “sin” because it is displeasing to God.79 
He understood his teaching to be distinguished from Luther because of his firm defense 
of the proposition that concupiscence in the baptized did not render them liable to 
damnation.
80
 Interestingly, along with several others, he argued that baptism is made 
effective in faith, a position not far distant from Luther’s emphasis that fides sacramenti 
(faith in the sacrament) is more central to justification than the sacramentum fidei (the 
sacrament of faith, i.e. baptism) itself.
81
 Seripando did finally render a placet to the 
decree as it was passed.
82
  
In its final form, the conciliar decree holds that original sin is from Adam and 
inherited; that it is present in all humans except Jesus and Mary from birth;
83
 and that its 
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 Hieronymus Seripandus, “De concupiscentia” (May 24, 1546), XII:549–553 in Concilii 
Tridentini Tractatum, Pars Prior, Vincentius Schweitzer, ed., (Freiburg: Herder, 1966).  
79
 Ibid., 553.5-7. As Peter Walter points out, Seripando did argue that God still hates this 
remaining concupiscence in the baptized, because it is the reason for actual sins that God hates. Idem., “Die 
Bleibende Sündigkeit der Getauften beim Trienter Konzil,” 268–302 in Schneider and Wenz, 278.  
80
 He makes the point repeatedly, although in this votum, he does not mention Luther directly. This 
is also the concern of the third rejected proposition in ED.  
81
 Seripando, “De peccato originali,” (May 24, 1546), 542–549 in Concilii Tridentini Tractatum, 
Pars Prior, Vincentius Schweitzer, ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1966), XII:547–48. 
82
 Jedin, II:161–62. 
83
 Trent is deliberately cagey on the mechanism of this exception, in an attempt to sidestep the 
ongoing debate over the Immaculate Conception. Instead, it declares only its intention to not speak of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary in its decree, and reaffirms the “constitutions of Pope Sixtus IV” (that is, Cum 
praeexcelsa, (Feb 27. 1477), DH 1400; and Grave nimis, (Sept. 4, 1483), DH 1425). These careful 
documents assert that the church must invite the faithful to praise of God for the “wonderful conception of 
the immaculate Virgin” (de ipsius immaculatae Virginis mira conceptione, DH 1400), and anathematize 
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guilt and penalty are removed by baptism, leaving behind physical death and an 
inclination to sin called “concupiscence.”84 This concupiscence cannot be properly called 
sin because of its effects on the baptized:
85
 
But this holy council perceives and confesses (fatetur et sentit) that in the one 
baptized there remains concupiscence or an inclination to sin, which, since it is 
left for us to wrestle with, cannot injure those who do not acquiesce but resist 
manfully by the grace of Jesus Christ.…This concupiscence, which the apostle 
sometimes calls sin, the holy council declares the Catholic Church has never 
understood to be called sin in the sense that it is truly and properly sin in those 
born again, but in the sense that it is of sin and inclines to sin.
86
 
Here, concupiscence is a description of the remaining anti-divine powers at work within 
the Christian. This remaining concupiscence is not, properly-speaking, sin because it does 
not of itself deserve God’s judgment.87 Unlike in the Augsburg Confession, this 
concupiscence is clearly distinguished from that in the unbaptized, and is so 
differentiated from original sin. It is this understanding of concupiscence which is taken 
up in the Catholic sections of the JDDJ, as made clear by the direct quotation of this 
canon in §30.  
                                                                                                                                                 
anyone who preaches either that the Immaculate Conception itself is a heresy or that its denial is a heresy, 
“since the matter has not yet been decided by the Roman Church and the Apostolic See” (cum nondum sit a 
Romana Ecclesia et Apostolica Sede decisum, DH 1425).  
84
 Ibid., II:135. 
85
 Notice that the emphasis on the effects of original sin is a direct response to the second of the 
charges to the council in drafting this decree. See n. 77 above. 
86
 Council of Trent Session V. June 17, 1546. Canon 5. DH 1515. “Manere autem in baptizatis 
concupiscentiam vel fomitem, haec sancta Synodus fatetur et sentit; quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere 
no consentientibus et viriliter per Christi Iesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet. Quin immo ‘qui legitime 
certaverit, coronabitur’ [2 Tim 2:5]. Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus ‘peccatum’ [cf. Rm 
6:12–15; 7:7, 14–20] appellat, sancta Synodus declarant, Ecclesiam catholicam numquam intellexisse, 
peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccator est et ad peccatum 
inclinat.” English translation above from Tanner, II:667. 
87
 That this definition emphasizes the efficacy of baptism, perhaps to the detriment of a real 
attention to “human fragility” is a standing critique that need not undercut the council’s teaching. It may 
however benefit from adding attention to this fragility, which engagement with the Lutheran position can 
provide. See Walter, “Die Bleibende Sündigkeit,” 302.  
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The Catholic Eschatological Vision: Outlining the Blends 
It is now possible to clarify the metaphoric blends upon which the Roman 
Catholic position is dependent. As has been highlighted above, two important and related 
commitments were continually emphasized in the Papal Bull Exsurge Domine, by Roman 
Catholic theologians at that time, and at the Council of Trent. The first of these is, that 
baptism truly cleanses the Christian of sin for 
God hates nothing in the reborn because there is no condemnation for those who 
are truly buried with Christ by baptism into death, who do not walk according to 
the flesh but, putting off the old person and putting on the new person created 
according to God, heirs indeed of God and fellow heirs with Christ, so that 
nothing at all impedes their entrance into heaven.
88
  
The second, an implication of the first, is that post-baptismal concupiscence, which, 
while “the tinder of sin” and is called sin by the apostle “because it comes from sin and 
inclines to sin” cannot be called sin “in the true and proper sense in those who have been 
reborn.”89  
 These positions, in turn, depend on a habitual blend for “sin” which has so far 
been called SIN IS CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM GOD and can now be made more 
specific: SIN IS AN IMPURITY WARRANTING DISINHERITANCE. This in turn depends on the 
logic of baptismal regeneration as a controlling frame. In this section, I will describe and 
depict the blend, connecting it to the Catholic vision that has been described, and 
showing how it continues to be operative in the documents of the contemporary dialogue 
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 Council of Trent Session V. June 17, 1546. Canon 5. DH 1515. “In renatis enim nihil odit Deus, 
quia ‘nihil est damnationis iis’ [Rm 8 :1], qui vere ‘consepulti sunt cum Christo per baptisma in mortem’ 
[Rm 6:4], qui ‘non secundum carnem ambulant’ [Rm 8:1], sed veterem hominem exuentes et novum, qui 
secundum Deum creatus est, induentes [cf. Eph 4:22–24; Col 3:9s], innocentes, immaculati, puri, innoxii ac 
Deo dilecti filii effecti sunt, ‘heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi’ [Rm 8:17], ita ut nihil prorsus 
eos ab ingressu caeli remoretur.” Translation Tanner II:667. Emphasis original. 
89
 Ibid. 
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before the JDDJ. In the following section, I will show how these habitual metaphoric 
understandings require the Catholic position as articulated in section §4.4 and how they 
predict the places where Catholic readers asked if the correlative Lutheran position might 
be contradictory. I will then show how the JDDJ’s final agreement, including the Annex, 
demonstrates a real consensus that is compatible with the Catholic vision.  
SIN IS AN IMPURITY WARRANTING DISINHERITANCE 
The overwhelming concern evidenced by the sixteenth-century Catholic sources 
examined here is that if post-baptismal concupiscence is called “sin,” this would mean 
that the Christian would remain separated from God, and would not be saved. How then, 
is sin understood in the Roman Catholic engagements with post-baptismal 
concupiscence? To begin, sin is something deserving separation from God. This also 
means the loss of heaven, as heaven is the state of union with God. To clarify what this 
means, we can attend to several other aspects of the blend, SIN, before returning to map 
the original expression. 
For Roman Catholic authors, actual sin is a more central example of the category 
SIN than is original sin.
90
 Categories do not operate as entirely equal collections of the 
items fulfilling a set of necessary requirements, as we often assume. Instead, we construct 
categories in terms of central examples and include items based on their similarity to the 
collection of examples assembled. Thus, for example, apples and oranges regularly test as 
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 Small caps, as will be remembered, denote a metaphor or a blend.  
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more central examples of the category “fruit” than do bananas or kiwis.91 Tomatoes 
represent a borderline case which we include in some settings and not in others. 
Attending to the relative centrality of examples can help us to understand what it is that 
we intuitively attend to in constructing the category and still allow the inclusion of less-
central examples.
92
 To say that actual sin is more central allows us to explain why Roman 
Catholic authors can put such an emphasis on the role of the will in sin without ruling 
that original sin is not truly sin.  
In particular, Adam’s (and Eve’s) sin is the central and defining example of the 
category. In the Gen 3 narrative, they know what they do to be wrong. Nevertheless, 
desiring to be like God and tempted by the goodness of the fruit, they make their choice 
and sin. This primordial sin generates original sin as both the lack of original justice and 
the burden of unruled concupiscence.
93
 The category of sin is ordered by the story of the 
fall not only theologically, but scripturally and liturgically; we rarely speak of sin, or of 
Christ’s redemption, without somehow mentioning the central sin requiring redemption 
that gives order to the story, the felix culpa of Adam and Eve. This is especially clear in 
the canons of Trent with which we have been concerned, for they are entirely ordered by 
the story of Adam as it proceeds to Christ, then to the post-baptismal lives of Christians. 
The only canon that does not fit this pattern is the sixth, which merely exempts Mary 
from the considerations of the council.  
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 At least in the United States. Often such categorical centrality is tested by seeing how long it 
takes subjects to sort particular objects into the proper category. A longer time is evidence of more complex 
processing, and therefore a more peripheral example. See Kövesces, Language, Mind, and Culture, 25–26. 
92
 See Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 17–57. 
93
 See Trent V can 2, DH 1512. Note how these are directly related to each other. Original justice 
is precisely the faculty that rules and orders the various desires of the human, and its removal allows them 
to be “disordered” or “unruled” desires or concupiscences. 
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Because of the importance of Adam’s sin and the centrality of actual sin which 
derives from it, the blend SIN is closely linked to action. I am convinced by Gary 
Anderson’s work on sin, which traces the shift within the biblical text from the blend SIN 
IS A BURDEN to SIN IS A DEBT, and then follows the further trajectory of that metaphor 
into Syriac, Greek, and Latin Christianity.
94
 If we were to begin with a mapping of this 
metaphor, we would have something like this (Fig IV-1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because it is a single-scope blend, the frame of one input —in this case, the legal frame 
that comes with indebtedness— determines the frame of the blend. Humanity owes a debt 
to God or Satan, which is either repaid (to God) by Christ who has no debt of his own, or 
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 Gary Anderson, Sin: A History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009)111–132; 189–202. 
Figure IV- 1  
Single-Scope Network  
 SIN IS DEBT 
 
  217 
it is cancelled because the devil’s overreach means he loses the legal right to collect.95 
This basic pattern is shared across Christian engagement with sin. It does little, therefore, 
to shed light on the differences regarding post-baptismal concupiscence that are at the 
center of the present investigation. In order to do this, the particular blends at stake in the 
documents under discussion must be described.  
The group of descriptors found in that canon of the Council of Trent which has 
recurred in this investigation, i.e. canon five of the fifth session, will allow us to make 
this general Christian understanding of sin more specific, and thus, more helpful. 
Describing the state of the newly baptized, the council writes that they “become innocent, 
stainless, pure, blameless and beloved children of God, heirs indeed of God and fellow 
heirs with Christ, so that nothing at all impedes their entrance into heaven.”96 There are 
two classical Christian metaphors used here leading to one major implication. Each of 
these will be engaged in turn and then connected to our complex blend, SIN. The first set 
of descriptors are based on the metaphor SIN IS A STAIN/IMPURITY,
97
 the second on 
CHRISTIANS ARE CHILDREN/HEIRS OF GOD, together, these imply SIN IS CAUSE FOR 
DISINHERITANCE. The theological implication drawn from this metaphoric complex is 
that in baptism God makes Christians clean and [worthy] heirs of God, so that they may 
enter heaven.  
                                                 
95
 After correctly noting that theories of the atonement did not receive the careful theological 
definition that the councils thought necessary in the areas of the Trinity and Christology, Anderson traces 
out two Syriac Christian explanations, as found in homilies of Narsai, a theologian of the Church of the 
East (d.503), and Jacob of Serug, from the Syrian Orthodox Church of the West. The first could be called a 
central example of a the Christus Victor theories, the second such an example of Christ as wealthy 
benefactor repaying for another. Sin, 121–130. 
96
 DH 1515, trans. Turner, II:667. 
97
 It is possible that the Council’s extensive effort aimed at avoiding the question of the 
Immaculate Conception itself reinforced the tendency towards the metaphoric frame of stain (macula). 
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Stated negatively, there are two related metaphors at work: SIN Is IMPURITY and 
DAMNATION IS DISINHERITANCE. Each of these is a single-scope blend much like SIN IS 
DEBT. In each case, the controlling frames CLEANLINESS and FAMILY INHERITANCE 
control what can be said about the other term without itself being reinterpreted. The 
resulting complex network makes sin to be an inhering imperfection which is, in any 
amount, just cause for damnation.
98
 It might look as follows (Fig. IV-2): 
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 As Susan K. Wood notes, Catholics emphasize transformative language for justification, 
meaning that “this is an instance where Lutherans tend to use both/and language and Catholics either/or 
language.” This difference, as she points out, leads to an equivocation on the word sin, which is precisely 
what the present project is attempting to clarify. “Observations on Official Catholic Response to Joint 
Declaration,” Pro Ecclesia 7, no. 4 (1998), 422. 
Figure IV- 2 
Complex Blending Network 
SIN IS CAUSE FOR DISINHERITANCE 
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Because sin is cause for disinheritance, mortal sin is the most proper (or most central 
example of) sin. This is something quite different from what the Lutherans mean by sin, 
as will become clear.
99
 Moreover, the image of a spot sets up particularly Roman modes 
of thought, including a tendency towards cyclical patterns of cleansing and sin and 
towards conceiving of sin as truly separate from oneself.  
BAPTISM as Controlling Sacramental Frame 
At this point, it will be helpful to make explicit something related to the blend SIN. 
In addition to the frame provided by the story of Adam’s fall, and sin as spot, it should be 
made explicit that baptism provides the primary sacramental frame for understanding this 
blend. It should not be surprising to find the Christian ritual bath figuring so prominently 
in a blend based on the frame of CLEANLINESS.
100
 Other aspects of the frame, however, 
are worth pointing out, as they will determine many things which can be said about the 
removal of sin in the Christian. To begin, baptism is a non-repeatable sacrament. The 
Christian churches have, from very early on, not baptized people again if they fell back 
                                                 
99
 “In the most proper sense sin is the first, mortal or deadly sin, which in itself alienates a person 
from God so as to result in damnation. This is where Catholics speak of being in a ‘state of sin’ which is 
incompatible with justification.” Ibid. Venial sins, therefore, are also not central examples of the category 
sin, because they neither separate from God nor require the same kind of sacramental response that mortal 
sins do. As Stephen J. Duffy notes, even the distinction between mortal and venial sins presupposes that in 
a state of grace “integral personal development is a fragile business.” Divine grace leads to healing, but this 
healing is gradual, and “the work of elevation is in principle complete, but healing takes a lifetime.” This is 
not entirely dissimilar from Luther’s description of healing and justification, as will be clear in the next 
chapter. The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology, (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 1993), 154. David Yeago makes a similar point, in more traditionally Lutheran language, 
“Interpreting the Roman Response,” 407.  
100
 Lehrverurteilungen–Kirchentrennend? makes the point that the logic of baptism is central in 
Roman Catholic thought, while that of the confessional is more apt to the Lutheran. LK - Rechtfertigung 
II.1; 45–46.  
   220 
into mortal sin. The classic text on this topic is, of course, the final article of the Nicene 
creed, with its confession of “one baptism for the forgiveness of sins.”101  
Several implications derive from this character of the sacrament. It makes it likely 
that more weight will be given to justification as a state, for all the emphasis on character 
imparted by the sacrament implies a state of being justified.
102
 It also emphasizes divine 
action and therefore describes human action relating to salvation as being in a merely 
conservatory role.
103
 Moreover, baptism is historically called the sacramentum fidei, 
language that we have seen is tied to justification as a state. As we have repeatedly seen, 
attending primarily to the validity and real action of this sacrament has been closely 
associated with the Catholic insistence that concupiscence cannot be sin properly-
speaking, because if it were, the state of being made just would never exist in human 
experience.  
Finally, this blend for SIN and its controlling frame BAPTISM leads to a further 
differentiation regarding concupiscence as it is reflexively understood by Catholics and 
Lutherans. Because sin is conceptualized by Catholics in terms of a stain or an impurity, 
both actual sins and concupiscence in the baptized are imaged in terms of SOME-THING IN 
the Christian. This has consequences for the understanding of the Christian’s 
anthropology, for if sins are something in oneself that is somehow separate from ones’ 
own being, they can be more easily categorized as being blameworthy or not, that is, as 
                                                 
101
 Even with the rise of tariff penance, baptism remains the central metaphor, as it is described as 
a return to baptism, or even the return to the baptismal state. See, for a modern example, CCC 1425–26. 
102
 See Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium, (Nov 21, 1964), §11; Tanner II:857. 
103
 Consider the following as examples, taken from the explanatory rites of baptism. “You have 
become a new creation and have clothed yourself in Christ. Receive this baptismal garment and bring it 
unstained to the judgment seat of our Lord Jesus Christ, so that you may have everlasting life.” (RCIA 
§229) “You have been enlightened by Christ. Walk always as a child of the light and keep the flame of faith 
alive in your heart.” (RCIA §361) 
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something deserving disinheritance or not. The traditional question of whether the person 
has consented to the thought or deliberately encouraged it demonstrates this separation 
between the person and their inner experience.
104
 If we were to map this implication of 
the Catholic blend, it might look something like this (Fig. IV-3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As will become clear in the next chapter, this is differentiated from a Lutheran tendency 
to interpret this internal experience as a reality properly belonging to the inner life of the 
person, something which will not be present in their final redeemed state, and is thus a 
part of their sinful, or in Paul’s language, fleshly, reality.105 
                                                 
104
 Of course, this language is exactly that of Trent. DH 1515; Tanner II:667.14–15.  
105
 See LK Rechtfertigung II; 44–45. 
Figure IV- 3 
Complex Blending Network 
CONCUPISCENCE “IN” THE CHRISTIAN 
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An Eschatological Double-Vision: STATE and TRAJECTORY  
Given this complex blend for sin, the Christian life can be imagined as a kind of mirror 
network in which the human is “in Adam” or “in Christ.”106 Baptism makes one “in 
Christ,” but the state can be lost through actual sin. This could be a recipe for a cyclical 
works-righteousness, as the Lutherans feared. It could also lose sight of the church’s call 
to “embrace sinners in its bosom.”107 It is saved from both of these tendencies by two 
things. First, the entirety of salvation is rooted in and remains dependent on God’s 
grace.
108
 Even this could become, as Robert Jenson has worried, a mere “anti-Pelagian 
codicil” by which theologians attempt to save a Pelagian mode of thought by insisting 
that such is not their intended outcome.
109
 It is prevented from this fate by a second 
aspect of the Tridentine teaching, what I have been calling its “double-vision.” The 
Tridentine decree does not merely say that concupiscence is not sin and that humans must 
remain in the state of grace until death. It holds this static understanding together in a 
kind of double-scope blend, what Robert Masson calls a tectonic blend, with an 
understanding of the as-yet-unfulfilled, eschatological aspects of justification. In this 
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 Because these are found within the same frame and constitute exclusive options to each other, 
they could be said to constitute a mirror network.  
107
 Lumen gentium, §8. DH 4121. “Ecclesia in proprio sinu peccatores complectens…” 
108
 Justification by Faith §109; JDDJ §15, §§19–20; Annex §2E. 
109
 Eric W. Gritch and Robert W. Jenson, Lutheranism: The Theological Movement and its 
Confessional Writings, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1976), 39. The idea has gained a significant place in 
Lutheran worries about Catholic thought. Examples include Gerhard O. Forde, A More Radical Gospel: 
Essays on Eschatology, Authority, Atonement, and Ecumenism, Mark C. Mattes and Steven D. Paulson, 
eds., (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 125, 130; Steven D. Paulson, “The Augustinian Imperfection: Faith, 
Christ, and Imputation and Its Role in the Ecumenical Discussion of Justification,” 104–24 in The Gospel 
of Justification in Christ: Where does the Church Stand Today, Wayne Stumme, ed., (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2006), 111. Interestingly, Joseph Burgess and Jeffrey Gros diagnose a parallel worry among 
some Catholics about an “anti-Manichaean or Anti-Antinomian codicil in certain formulations of Lutheran 
Orthodoxy” Building Unity Ecumenical Dialogues with Roman Catholic Participation in the United States, 
(New York: Paulist, 1989), 190. 
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second manner of thought, justification is a trajectory that has not yet reached its 
completion.
110
 Concupiscence is prime evidence that this is the case, which is why the 
council “perceives and confesses” that this concupiscence, no longer a bar to salvation, is 
still present in the believer now in a way which it will not be in God’s final victory.  
In addition to the council’s engagement with concupiscence, there are other 
reasons to believe that it understood justification as a state and also as a trajectory. 
Among these, we might consider chapter ten of the sixth session, in which justification, 
or more properly justice, somewhat unusually, is said to increase. 
So those justified in this way and made friends and members of the household of 
God, going from strength to strength, are (as the Apostle says) renewed from day 
to day by putting to death what is earthly in themselves and yielding themselves 
as instruments of righteousness for sanctification by observance of the 
commandments of God and of the church. They grow and increase in that very 
justness they have received through the grace of Christ, by faith united to good 
works, as it is written: Let him who is holy become more holy; and again, Do not 
wait until death to be justified; again, you see that a person is justified by works 
and not by faith alone. Indeed, holy church asks for this increase in justice when it 
prays, Lord, give us an increase in faith, hope, and charity.
111
 
The Christian in this life is herself an eschatological reality. When viewed as a person in 
time, her relationship to God can change, as do all relationships, because she remains 
capable of bowing to concupiscence, to acquiring debt or stain, and to losing her 
inheritance. But viewed in terms of the already-present kingdom of which baptism makes 
her an heir, her justification is God’s doing, and she already participates in its final reality 
                                                 
110
 In this, it may be considered a “growth” category, in Root’s schema (see chapter two, p. 91), 
but I am arguing for something more than this. It is not merely that the human is just in God’s eyes and 
becoming more just, (thus deepening in an non-scalar reality). Instead, the human being is at the same time 
participating in God’s final justice (as the formal cause of his justification), but experiencing his own life as 
not fully embodying that end. A person is thus himself or herself an eschatological reality which requires a 
double-vision (of the world as it is and as it will be) to adequately describe.  
111
 DH 1535; trans. Tanner, II: 675. While the chapter itself speaks of an increase in justice, the 
title describes an increase in justification, “De acceptae iustificationis incremento.” The relevant canon also 
speaks of an increase in justice. DH 1574; Translation Tanner II:680.35–37. Emphasis original. 
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which will grow until she finally bears the form which God desires for her. Trent 
describes this in terms of the formal cause of justification, which it describes as  
the justness of God: not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he 
makes us just and endowed with which we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, 
and are not merely considered to be just but we are truly named and are just, each 
one of us receiving individually his own justness according to the measure which 
the holy Spirit apportions to each one as he wills, and in view of each one’s 
dispositions and co-operation.
112
  
Because this is a formal cause, it is the end-point of the transformation God works in 
human beings, that is, their own justice that God desires for them. It is an eschatological 
endpoint, already present in the believer as the formal cause of that which they will 
become but are not yet.  
These two understandings of justification cannot be held together simply, for they 
make some contradictory claims. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the 
integration of terms in tension is an important aspect of human cognition, which we can 
describe via double-scope blends, or what Masson has called tectonic integration. If we 
were to depict the double-scope blend by which JUSTIFICATION IS A STATE and 
JUSTIFICATION IS A TRAJECTORY were held in tension, it might look something like this, 
although this is only a beginning of the implications of the blend (Fig. IV-4): 
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 Trent Session 6, Chapter 7, which 1529, Tanner II:673. This section will be important again 
below in considering the critique of the JDDJ offered by Christopher Malloy. 
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Concupiscence in the JDDJ 
Having made more explicit the complex understanding of sin which underlies the 
Catholic insistence that post-baptismal concupiscence can only be called sin improperly, I 
will now examine how concupiscence is dealt with in the JDDJ, how the Catholic and 
Lutheran positions are held in a productive tension, and whether the consensus is 
adequate to the Catholic vision. The word “concupiscence” appears in the JDDJ six 
times.
113
 It appeared briefly in JDDJ I (§26),
114
 received minor development in JDDJ II 
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One occurance in JDDJ §30, five in the Appendix, Resources for 4.4. In the German, it occurs 
five times as Konkupiszenz: one in §30, four in Anhang, Quellen zu 4.4. The other use appears in the 
German as Begierde. This term also appears in §12 of the JDDJ, and is translated “desires” in the English 
version (i.e. “the justified are assailed from within and without by powers and desires”). “Desire” in the 
sense of concupiscence (that is, “the selfish desires of the old Adam”) also appears in §28. In the German, 
this is rendered “des selbstsüchtigen Begehrens des alten Menschen.” Begehren appears in the document 
only this once.  
114
 JDDJ I §26 (Geneva, 1995), obtained from the ELAC Archives, Elk Grove, IL. “In terms of 
content, there is agreement with Lutherans when Catholics say that ‘concupiscence,’ which remains after 
baptism [as an inclination to be contrary to God, affects the whole human being,] is in contradiction to God 
and is the object of a lifelong struggle. And yet concupiscence no longer separates the justified from God. 
Properly speaking, it therefore is not [in that sense] sin.” The German is available in GER-DER, A.3. The 
additions in brackets are present in a text of the document labeled “revised 21.9.94” and found in the ELAC 
Figure IV- 4 
Double Scope Network 
Justification as Proleptic Reality 
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(§30)
115
 and a much more substantial paragraph in (the final) JDDJ III (§30). The 
pertinent final text reads as follows: 
Catholics hold that the grace of Jesus Christ imparted in baptism takes away all 
that is sin “in the proper sense” and that is “worthy of damnation” (Rom 8:1). 
There does, however, remain in the person an inclination (concupiscence) which 
comes from sin and presses toward sin. Since, according to Catholic conviction, 
human sins always involve a personal element and since this element is lacking in 
this inclination, Catholics do not see this inclination as sin in an authentic sense. 
They do not thereby deny that this inclination does not correspond to God's 
original design for humanity and that it is objectively in contradiction to God and 
remains one's enemy in lifelong struggle. Grateful for deliverance by Christ, they 
underscore that this inclination in contradiction to God does not merit the 
punishment of eternal death and does not separate the justified person from God. 
But when individuals voluntarily separate themselves from God, it is not enough 
to return to observing the commandments, for they must receive pardon and peace 
in the Sacrament of Reconciliation through the word of forgiveness imparted to 
them in virtue of God's reconciling work in Christ. (§30)
116
  
The positions here expressed should, at this point, be quite familiar to the reader, 
for they are the concerns of Trent, the histories of which have been traced out in detail. 
Concupiscence is not properly sin because it is not “worthy of damnation” in itself. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
archives of the Lutheran/Roman Catholic Coordinating Committee. The first bracketed text seems to have 
been removed on the advice of Harding Meyer, noted in a German edition labelled “von Meyer redaktionell 
überarbeitete Fassung. 8. Okt. 1994,” available in the same archival collection.  
115
 JDDJ II §30 (Geneva, 1996), ELCA Archives. “Catholics hold that concupiscence remaining 
after baptism is contrary to God’s original plan for humankind. This inclination, which comes from sin and 
presses toward sin, is however not ‘sin’ in the proper sense, for it is not a morally wrong, free decision, nor 
is it a condition or inclination that merits the punishment of eternal death. They say that concupiscence is in 
contradiction to God and is the object of a lifelong struggle. It does not separate the justified from God.” 
The German is available in GER-DER, B.1. 
116
 JDDJ (§30), in German: “Die Katholiken sind der Auffassung, daß die Gnade Jesu Christi, die 
in der Taufe verliehen wird, alles was “wirklich” Sünde, was “verdammenswürdig” ist, tilgt (Röm 8,1), daß 
jedoch eine aus der Sünde kommende und zur Sünde drängende Neigung (Konkupiszenz) im Menschen 
verbleibt. Insofern nach katholischer Überzeugung zum Zustandekommen menschlicher Sünden ein 
personales Element gehört, sehen sie bei dessen Fehlen die gottwidrige Neigung nicht als Sünde im 
eigentlichen Sinne an. Damit wollen sie nicht leugnen, daß diese Neigung nicht dem ursprünglichen Plan 
Gottes vom Menschen entspricht, noch, daß sie objektiv Gottwidrigkeit und Gegenstand lebenslangen 
Kampfes ist; in Dankbarkeit für die Erlösung durch Christus wollen sie herausstellen, daß die gottwidrige 
Neigung nicht die Strafe des ewigen Todes verdient und den Gerechtfertigten nicht von Gott trennt. Wenn 
der Gerechtfertigte sich aber willentlich von Gott trennt, genügt nicht eine erneute Beobachtung der 
Gebote, sondern er muß im Sakrament der Versöhnung Verzeihung und Frieden empfangen durch das Wort 
der Vergebung, das ihm Kraft des Versöhnungswerkes Gottes in Christus gewährt wird [vgl. Quellen zu 
Kap. 4.4.].” (GER-DER, C.1).  
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an inclination that does not comport with God’s original or final desire for humans, and 
that will be overcome at the end of all things. Christians are called to struggle against this 
concupiscence, and when they have fallen to its call, to seek “pardon and peace in the 
Sacrament of Reconciliation.”  
The next question to ask is if this classically Catholic position really achieves 
consensus with the Lutherans, as the Joint Declaration claims. In order to examine this 
question, it will be broken into two. First, does the consensus statement on this topic in 
the JDDJ (§28) sufficiently represent the Catholic position and its concerns? Second, 
given the long history of understanding the Catholic position on concupiscence to be in 
direct conflict with Lutheran teaching, can the JDDJ’s solution allow Catholics to accept 
the Lutheran position, which has even recently raised concern?  
The Consensus Statement in the JDDJ 
This short statement approaches the topic from neither the direction of 
concupiscence nor that of the simul, which will be the subject of the next chapter. Instead, 
it asks in what sense the justified person is a sinner, seeking to describe the difficulty in 
terms that are mutually agreeable, before then explaining why each group’s traditional 
language is reconcilable with this common statement. What results is a statement that 
quite directly approaches the eschatological double-vision which is shared in common 
between Lutherans and Catholics. Christians are already one with Christ, for “in baptism 
the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and truly renews the person.”117 But that 
reality, while truly present, is not present in its finality yet, because  
                                                 
117
 JDDJ §28. 
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the justified must all through life constantly look to God's unconditional justifying 
grace. They also are continuously exposed to the power of sin still pressing its 
attacks (cf. Rom 6:12-14) and are not exempt from a lifelong struggle against the 
contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the old Adam.
118
 
Moreover, the real effects in the life of the believer are that they are to live in a state of 
confident striving, for the object of their hope is already present, even if those things that 
contradict it are also present for now. God’s forgiveness, made theirs in their baptism, 
remains real in their lives, even though they fall into sin. “The justified also must ask God 
daily for forgiveness as in the Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:12; 1 Jn 1:9), are ever again called to 
conversion and penance, and are ever again granted forgiveness.”119  
This describes neither the pure form of JUSTIFICATION IS A STATE, or IS A 
TRAJECTORY, but is the blended form, for God’s justification is already present fully, 
although not finally because the justified human must still struggle with sin daily. In a 
sense, this short-circuits the old imputed/imparted disagreement, because what is given is 
truly given, but in a way that does not do away with the Christian’s ongoing need for 
God’s mercy, righteousness, and help.120 The gift of grace does not make the Christian 
independent of God. The righteousness that the Christian possesses is both complete, in 
the sense that in baptism there really is nothing left that God hates,
121
 and incomplete, in 
the sense that the human is not yet fully remade in the form of his final justice as desired 
by God. This double-vision of the Christian as already that which God desires them to be 
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 Ibid. 
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 JF §99, §159.9; Wood, “Observations,” 423; Yeago, “Interpreting,” 406. In a sense, the 
remaining difficulty is caused by those who would insist that the disagreement be settled in those terms, 
rather than in terms of a different model as JF and the JDDJ do. Another way of describing this is the idea 
of “double agency,” suggested as a solution to this problem by Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and 
Reformation Theology after the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” Modern Theology, 20 
no.1 (2004). The idea will be more directly applied below at n. 168.  
121
 i.e. that would lead to damnation. 
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and not yet fully reformed, is from a Catholic standpoint, perhaps best described in the 
Council of Trent’s terms of the formal cause.122  
What is key to understanding this definition is remembering what kind of cause 
this is. It is a formal cause, that is, “‘the form’, ‘the account of what-it-is-to-be’, e.g., the 
shape of a statue.”123 If the formal cause of our justification is “our own justness 
according to the measure which the holy Spirit apportions to each one, …” this is not a 
tool by which God makes us just, for that would be instrumental causation.
124
 Instead, it 
is the final form of our redemption already present in us, albeit in a hidden manner. This 
is precisely the language of an eschatological or sacramental vision of the redeemed 
Christian. The final form of our redemption is already present in us, but not as something 
onto which we can grasp on our own. It is God’s doing, not ours, and God gives us the 
ongoing freedom to reject his gift. The Roman Catholic insistence that concupiscence not 
be called sin properly is fully compatible with this vision, for what remains does not 
endanger God’s final salvation made truly present in baptism, but also leaves room to 
“recognize and confess” with the fathers of Trent that disordered desires remain in us, but 
that these are neither God’s final will for us nor present a final bar to our salvation. 
Perceived Conflicts with the Lutheran Position 
Roman Catholics have often expressed concern that the Lutheran motto simul 
iustus et peccator, that is, that the Christian is at the same time justified and a sinner, is at 
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 See above at p. 224. 
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 Falcon, Andrea, "Aristotle on Causality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/aristotle-causality, 
§2. Citing Aristotle, Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2. 
124
 So Christopher Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration, (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2005). I provide a more adequate response to his argument below, p. 236.  
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best contradictory and at worst a denial of the actual redemption promised in baptism. As 
one recent example, we can examine the first clarification of the JDDJ requested by the 
Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity (PCPCU) and the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) in June of 1998.
125
 It is important to note that these 
offices understand, “[t]he major difficulties preventing an affirmation of total consensus 
… [to] arise in paragraph 4.4 The Justified as Sinner (nn.28-30).”126 Specifically, the 
Response finds the simul to be “a cause of perplexity” and not acceptable, precisely 
because of the Tridentine decree.
127
  
Why this is the case should be clear to the reader at this point. The habitual 
Roman Catholic blend SIN in the context of concupiscence and baptism does not allow 
the newly baptized Christian to be called a sinner, for to do so would make baptism 
ineffective and God incapable of saving. As the Annex makes clear, this insistence is 
right and proper, for the justified are not sinners in the sense that they are enslaved to 
sin’s power, lacking new life in Christ, or disinherited by God.128 On the other hand, we 
cannot say that they remain without sin in the sense that they make no mistakes, are not 
guilty of “unwitting sins” or “secret faults,” or do not need to ask God’s forgiveness 
continually as they do in the liturgy.
129
 Moreover there remains a “persisting danger that 
comes from the power of sin and its action in Christians.”130 In this way, Catholics can 
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 PCPCU with the CDF, “Response of the Catholic Church to the Joint Declaration of the 
Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation on the Doctrine of Justification.” June 25, 1998. 
http://bit.ly/1iIZm4b. German, GER-DER, C.55.  
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 Ibid., Clarification 1. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Annex §2A. 
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 Ibid., citing Ps. 19:12. 
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 Ibid. 
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understand the Lutheran motto as neither violating the consensus found in §4.4 of the 
JDDJ nor being finally incompatible with the typical Catholic understanding of sin and 
concupiscence. The nature of Christian life, from the Catholic perspective, is best seen in 
relationship to its eternal goal in Christ. This life is intelligible only in light of Christ, and 
in relationship to the new reality first given in baptism. That even Christians are tempted 
and commit sins must be perceived and confessed with Trent, but this is not God’s final 
word about us. In this, the Roman position must be open to the very Lutheran formula 
which it at first seems to contradict, for as Hermann Otto Pesch has remarked, “there is a 
great difference between a sinner who is only a sinner and a sinner who is at the same 
time just … the simul is an interior structure of the new creation, not something that calls 
it into question.”131  
In response to the historical Lutheran claims that the Roman Catholic position is a 
kind of Pelagianism, Catholics have pointed to their repeated assertion that everything 
that is meritorious in Christians is itself God’s gift in Christ.132 This in turn rests on a 
description of sin as division from and justification as re-incorporation into God through 
Christ. For this reason, Roman Catholics have often used the category of gratia increata 
in the dialogues to describe the justificatory effects of the sacraments on the believer.
133
 
If uncreated grace is the indwelling of God himself, and this is effected in the sacraments, 
then accounts of the Christian life are accounts of the continual struggle to master the 
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 Otto H. Pesch, Hinführung zu Luther, (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1982), 191–192. 
“Zwischen dem Sünder, der nichts als Sünder ist, und dem Sünder, der zugleich gerecht ist, liegt ein 
Abgrund … Das ‘simul’ ist eine inwendige Struktur dieser Neuschöpfung, nicht etwa deren 
Infragestellung.” 
132
 So, JF §157–58. 
133
 JF §103; So also Avery Dulles, "Justification in Contemporary Catholic Theology," 258-60. 
See also the discussion in LK, Rechtfertigung, III.4; 54–55. 
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temptations to sin which divide us from God in light of the continual offer of forgiveness 
and reunification with God by grace.
134
 This account of the human is inherently 
communal, for grace is both communicated communally (through the church) and has 
communal effects (union with the communion of those in Christ). The effects of God’s 
self-gift are to bring the baptized person into communion with the Trinity and the 
church.
135
 The Catholic insistence that concupiscence is not sin properly-speaking is 
therefore itself an insistence that the Christian is someone who, while capable of sinning 
and often tempted to do so, is also a participant in Christ’s life by virtue of baptism: it is 
an eschatological description of the double character of Christian life as experienced, if 
not as intended.  
It is unsurprising that it is precisely here that Catholic voices raised concerns in 
the final stages of the JDDJ, for the habitual structures of Catholic thought as they have 
been presented in this chapter require the judgment that calling the Christian a “sinner” 
endangers the very salvation which God promises. The Joint Declaration’s solution is not 
to create a new language which both Lutherans and Catholics will speak, nor is it to settle 
the sixteenth-century dispute in favor of one party or the other. It instead demonstrates 
how, by reconceptualizing the questions of debate, a real consensus can be shown to exist 
that nevertheless leaves the parties speaking their own native languages. These languages 
will continue to seem to contradict one another, and so will require theologians on both 
sides to continually demonstrate that the other is truly orthodox, even if speaking an 
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 Christopher Malloy makes a major point of the distinction between created and uncreated 
grace, suggesting that created grace is ignored by much of contemporary Catholic theology and specifically 
the dialogues. However, if created grace is a quality of the soul inclining us to the movement of 
relationship with God, then this too has a primarily relational character. The Christian is related toward 
God, and the gift of created grace is fundamentally related to this motion, it is not something which we 
possess as a thing within ourselves unrelated to our relationship to God. See ST Ia.IIa.Q110.A2. 
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 Ibid., 260-61. 
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incompatible language. The historical condemnations will also continue to stand as 
warnings against the temptations present in each tradition.
136
 
There is still a continued difference between Lutherans and Roman Catholics 
regarding the possibility for Christians, other than Mary, to live a life so fully in God’s 
grace as to remain without sin.
137
 Nevertheless, the affirmation that the new creation is 
present in the Christian and in the church by God’s continued gift is itself the reality 
which both these confessional propositions are seeking to guard while they 
simultaneously admit that the fullness of that new creation is often not present. 
Catholic Critiques of the JDDJ  
At this time, it is necessary to consider several Catholic critics of the Joint 
Declaration as they relate to the question of concupiscence and sin in the justified. The 
goal in doing so is to test the thesis that has been developed in this chapter, and to 
determine more critically whether the consensus proclaimed by the Lutheran World 
Federation and the Catholic Church is indeed receivable from the Catholic side.  
                                                 
136
 This call has repeatedly been made my Michael Root. As one example, see “Continuing the 
Conversation: Deeper Agreement on Justification as Criterion and on the Christian as simul iustus et 
peccator,” 42–61 in The Gospel of Justification in Christ: Where does the Church Stand Today, William C. 
Stumme, ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 44. For an example of what this could very practically mean 
for Lutheran and Catholic positions, see Robert Jenson, “On the Roman Response,” 402–403.  
137
 Although even this may require some nuance as Catholics will mean by this, “without mortal 
sin” and Lutherans do not make this particular distinction. 
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Avery Cardinal Dulles 
Cardinal Dulles has been perceived as a Catholic critic, or at least a reluctant 
recipient, of the JDDJ.
138
 In part, this is correct. As a member of the Lutheran–Roman 
Catholic Coordinating Committee in the U.S., he was one of three Catholic members who 
wanted the document enlarged to explain how Lutheran and Catholic teaching on 
“preparation for justification, the faith of unrepentant sinners, and satisfaction (Trent 
canons 4, 28, and 30) are not incompatible.”139 Dulles expressed concern that some of 
these remaining differences might prove to be contradictory.
140
 Patrick Carey, in his 
magisterial theological biography of Dulles, sees these concerns as being particularly 
illuminated by the differing role played by Mary in Lutheran and Catholic theologies. 
These “help to explain [Dulles’] criticisms of the declaration.”141 There is certainly a 
parallel between the Lutheran discomfort with the Catholic emphasis on Mary as the 
prime example of Christ’s work and the parallel case of attending to human cooperation 
in the work of justification, but I do not find this to be insuperable as Dulles seems to at 
times. Instead, I see in his critiques, particularly as they developed, an application of the 
central insight of the JDDJ, that consensus need not eliminate difference.
142
  
                                                 
138
 Dulles’ language about the JDDJ was indeed harsher in 1999 than it was later. See “Two 
Languages of Salvation: The Lutheran-Catholic Joint Declaration,” First Things 98 (Dec 1999), 25–30. 
139
 “Response by the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Coordinating Committee in the USA to the 
Proposed ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification Between the Lutheran World Federation and 
the Roman Catholic Church,” 4, cited in Patrick W. Carey, Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ: A Model 
Theologian, (New York: Paulist, 2010), 371.  
140
 It should be noted for the present study that none of these relate to the anthropology of the 
baptized.  
141
 Carey, 373. 
142Dulles also entertains Christopher Malloy’s contention that the JDDJ has little juridical 
authority. He first questions the LWF’s authority to make a binding decision on behalf of the member 
churches. This is a complex issue. The LWF cannot formally force its churches to assent, and so it has 
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Dulles wanted to define the agreement reached as not changing the internal 
structures of thought of either church. As noted in the first chapter, he specifically “would 
not want to expel from the Catholic Church anyone who held the Lutheran positions on 
justification as described in the JD[DJ]. But if [he] were in a position to do so, [he] would 
prohibit these Lutheran positions from being preached in Catholic pulpits or taught in 
Catholic seminaries and catechisms.”143 This position, while it may seem contrary to the 
spirit of the JDDJ, is in fact a necessary implication of its differentiated consensus. If the 
consensus were not differentiated, then Lutheran positions would be perfectly acceptable 
                                                                                                                                                 
historically reported on consensus, but the process of the JDDJ speaks to something new. Following 
historical precedent, the LWF Council established that there was a consensus among the vast majority of 
member churches. Then by a vote of the LWF Council (in light of the report of the member churches) the 
LWF spoke in its own name. Robert Jenson, at least, sees in this action, the creation of “something 
remarkably resembling a general Lutheran magisterium … for the purpose,” of declaring the 
condemnations inactive on behalf of the whole LWF. See Jenson, “Vatican’s ‘Official Response,’” 401. 
This may be a bit of an overreach, but the opinion is not a complete outlier. What Jenson describes as a fact 
is raised as a question in the semi-official history of the LWF published several years earlier:  
The LWF has been able to make common decisions, even about doctrinal matters, by a slow process of 
consensus formation sealed by an assembly action which recognizes the formed consensus. This form 
of decision making ... remains untested. Similar procedures are being adopted in relation to the 
possible declaration of nonapplicability of the Reformation condemnations of the Roman Catholic 
Church in relation to justification. Can world Lutheranism together make an authoritative statement 
about the meaning of some aspect of the confessions in the contemporary ecumenical situation? (Jens 
Holger Schjørring, Prasanna Kumari, Norman A. Hjelm, eds. From Federation to Communion: The 
History of the Lutheran World Federation, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 244.) 
What we can positively say is that as the LWF council recognized a consensus as existing among the 
churches of the LWF; the JDDJ was therefore signed by the LWF in its own name and not just in the names 
of the assenting churches. See “Response of the Lutheran World Federation,” LWI (June 24, 1998) §e. 
GER-DER, C.54. See also Our Continuing Journey, 147. On the Lutheran side, it therefore seems that 
while Jenson might be overstating the import of the LWF’s decision, Dulles is certainly understating it.  
On the Roman Catholic side, Dulles raises the question of what it means that it was signed by the 
PCPCU, and worries that it merely summarizes the decades of dialogue. Finally, he wonders how the 
Catholic Church could teach Lutheran positions authoritatively, and vice versa. [Avery Cardinal Dulles, 
“Justification and the Unity of the Church,” 126–28.] I have already responded to the first critique in 
chapter one. As to the second critique, this moment of recollection is precisely what the LWF and the 
Catholic Church sought to do in a way that would receive the dialogues’ work so that they could be more 
bindingly taught in common. To make this a reason for doubting the JDDJ’s authority is to make the 
exercise pointless from its beginning. Finally, his worry about teaching for the other church is merely an 
artifact of the genre. What is taught in common are the consensus paragraphs, and most importantly, that 
the condemnations do not apply to the other (Official Common Statement (OCS) §1). Of course, the 
document is not taught infallibly, but it is taught with the church’s authority, deserving a kind of obsequium 
religiosum. 
143
 Dulles, “Justification and the Unity of the Church,” 127. 
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in Roman pulpits and vice versa. As it is, however, to import Lutheran language and 
expression into Catholic use runs the risk of a true equivocation leading to false teaching 
because these statements would be repositioned within a different system of interrelated 
ideas, definitions, and habitual use. 
It is important to keep in mind that Dulles’ critiques presuppose the existence of a 
successful agreement on justification:  
I think this is a very broad consensus, a consensus not only on justification but 
one which puts justification in the framework of the christological and trinitarian 
confessions of the undivided Church of the first centuries, a consensus on the 
center and focus of the Gospel.
144
 
This does not mean that all questions are answered, or even that further clarification of 
issues such as the simul might not be helpful.
145
 Dulles’ ongoing critique of the JDDJ is 
rooted in his agreement that there is a broad consensus, but one that still should spur the 
churches to further dialogue.
146
 Moreover, this agreement is found in allowing the 
confessions to retain their habitual language described as being mutually compatible, but 
allowing the historical condemnations to stand as guards against the remaining danger 
that either side tip over into the excesses anathematized in the sixteenth century. Dulles 
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 Ibid., 17. It should be noted that this is a more full support of the JDDJ than he evidenced in 
2002, when he wrote that it “tried to accomplish too much,” perhaps in part because he was then 
interpreting the JDDJ as “cling[ing] to the conceptuality and language of the sixteenth-century 
formulations.” Here also he is worried that the notion of “acceptable” may mean that Lutheran language 
may find its ways into Catholic pulpits and vice versa. Idem. “Justification: The Joint Declaration,” 
Josephinum Journal of Theology 9 no.1 (2002): 119. Available at http://www.pcj.edu/journal/essays/ 
dulles9-1.htm. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
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 Dulles, “Justification and Unity,” 19.  
146
 Ibid., 20. 
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consistently pointed out that the JDDJ did not overcome all barriers, but that is merely 
reiterating its own claim against those who misinterpret it.
147
 
Christopher J. Malloy 
Christopher Malloy has been an outspoken opponent of the JDDJ in his 2008 
book Engrafted into Christ
148
 and in other published works including a 2007 piece 
evaluating the Joint Declaration in light of a theology of Marian coredemption.
149
 There 
is more to critique in his treatment of the JDDJ than can be adequately addressed here, so 
I will confine myself to engaging his argument as it relates to the anthropology of the 
justified.  
In engaging Malloy, I am making the following two basic critiques of his work: 
first, that his account rests on an understanding of consensus as so strong an Übereinkunft 
that it does not allow for the differences of language, culture, and expression which 
condition human speech.
150
 Thus, he expects the JDDJ to show that Lutherans and 
Catholics say identical things about the same things in the same way, and he is unable to 
see the agreement that exists despite remaining difference. Second, his central critique of 
                                                 
147
 See Dulles, “Roman Catholic Perspective,” 20–21. There have been voices who expected that 
the JDDJ should have brought about full communion, and see the continued break in communion as a fault 
of the JDDJ. See Hequet, 1–5. 
148
 Christopher J. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration, (New York: 
P. Lang, 2005). 
149
 Christopher J. Malloy, “The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in the Joint Declaration,” 
The Thomist 65 (2001): 93–120; and Idem. “Marian Coredemption and the Joint Declaration on the 
Doctrine of Justification,” 351–409 in Mary at the Foot of the Cross, VIII: Coredemption as Key to a 
Correct Understanding of Redemption, and Recent Attempts to Redefine Redemption Contrary to the Belief 
of the Church, (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2008).  
150
 See chapter two, beginning at p. 84. As Pieter de Witte comments, “It is clear for [Malloy and 
Scheffczyk that] the only desirable outcome of the ecumenical dialogue would be that Lutherans accept the 
teaching of Trent in its entirety and abjure their own heresy. In this sense their approach is clearly 
apologetic.” Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic Difference, 227.  
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the document is based on his judgment that it pays insufficient attention to the formal 
cause of justification as defined by Trent, which he calls “a grace given by God that 
inheres in the justified person.
151
 It is my contention that he both misreads Trent, making 
the formal cause of justification into a secondary instrumental cause, and that this 
misreading forces him to misjudge the JDDJ.
152
 As a final note, Malloy regularly gathers 
Lutheran voices unhappy with the JDDJ and uses them as evidence that it is not a truly 
Lutheran document.
153
 These critiques cannot be answered in this chapter, as it has not 
yet examined the Lutheran accounts of justification and their conformity with the account 
in the JDDJ.
154
  
Concupiscence and Consensus 
Malloy’s chief engagements with concupiscence rest on an understanding of 
“remnant sin” developed in conversation with Wolfhart Pannenberg and the Finnish 
School. This idea, rooted in Luther’s Against Latomus, Malloy portrays as a stronger 
understanding of what is “not yet” in the Christian: “The Finns, however, view the ‘not 
yet’ character of transformation not merely as concupiscence, not merely as the 
persistence of venial sin, not merely as the incomplete character of adoptive sonship in 
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 Malloy, Engrafted, 20.  
152
 It also seems that his emphasis on the formal cause of justification leads to a disassociation of 
that teaching from the other causes that the council defines, namely the efficient and meritorious causes. 
See de Witte, 228–29. 
153
 See, for example, 275–79, but the tendency is found throughout the book. 
154
 Even in chapter five, Malloy’s use of Lutherans will go unanswered, but several of the voices 
he cites will be engaged. As I wrote in the first chapter, I am not, as a Roman Catholic theologian, in a 
position to argue that a particular position is the proper Lutheran understanding. However, given the unique 
ecclesial act that the signing of the JDDJ represents in the modern Lutheran world, I can explicate what its 
teaching is and relate this to historical Lutheran sources and contemporary dialogue.  
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this life, but primarily as remnant infidelity worthy of damnation.”155 In Pannenberg, he 
finds this idea even more broadly interpreted, for here it is specifically a remnant of 
original sin, unpurged by baptism.
156
 In tracking this idea in the JDDJ, Malloy insists that 
the diametric positions of the sixteenth century be settled in the terms of the original 
debate, forcing a choice between either the Catholic or the Lutheran position as expressed 
then. Thus, there must be not only room for, but the explicit mention of inhering grace in 
any consensus which he would recognize.
157
 Malloy not only requires that the Lutheran 
position be reconcilable with the Catholic position, but also that all the implications of 
the Catholic position be explicitly present in the Lutheran.
158
 In dealing with what the 
Lutherans call “remnant sin” he is unable to ask whether they are using terms in ways 
that force the dichotomy he sees. For example, when the Finns speak of a “remnant 
infidelity worthy of damnation,” they are clearly not speaking of something that actually 
prevents the Christian from being saved. It must be much more like Melanchthon’s 
insistence that the remaining tendency is no indifferent thing,
159
 or Luther’s confidence 
that this remaining disease would be purged.
160
 Instead of insisting that Lutherans accept 
the distinction of mortal and venial sin and say that the latter do not “deserve” damnation, 
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 Malloy, Engrafted, 155. 
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 Malloy, Engrafted, 181.  
157
 This is more explicitly connected to my second point, and so will be taken up again in the next 
sub-section. 
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 See, for example, his engagement with “cycles” of mortal sins on p. 291–92. It is noteworthy 
here that his engagement with Catholic moral theology likely narrows the field of allowable Catholic 
positions more than the church itself does, although because he does not provide particular examples or 
further descriptions of the theologians he is ruling out of bounds, this is difficult to judge.  
159
 See above, n. 35. 
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 See above, p. 181.  
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the JDDJ instead asks if Lutherans believe that Christians are separated from God by this 
sin, to which it can answer a firm “no.”161  
The requirement of verbal agreement in all details is even clearer in his article 
evaluating the JDDJ in light of co-redemption. Indeed, like the Kinki Japanese Lutherans, 
he asks repeatedly on which “side of the contradiction” the JDDJ’s statements fall.162 
Asking the question in this way presumes that a contradiction exists and therefore only 
allows a solution to ecumenical difference by surrender. This tendency repeatedly leads 
him to ask the wrong kind of question of Lutheran engagements. In querying the simul, 
for example, he separately holds up each of the affirmations “entirely righteous” and 
“entirely a sinner” to Tridentine teaching on its own, and finds each lacking.163 As will be 
shown in the next chapter, these descriptors are not intended to operate singly. They are a 
matched pair that makes a very particular point about the baptized Christian. As paired 
terms they cannot properly be split.  
One category which would greatly improve Malloy’s ability to engage the 
difference between Lutheran and Catholic understandings of concupiscence is the 
difference between considering concupiscence as an alien something in us, and 
concupiscence as the movements of our own will.
164
 Clearly, these are not mere 
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 JDDJ §29. 
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 Malloy, “Coredemption,” 369. 
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 Malloy, “Coredemption,” 383–84. More surprisingly, he here quotes a longer section of §29, 
and still fails to notice the different logic spelled out in that paragraph by the traditional Lutheran image of 
the Christian as he sees himself in God’s proclamation (coram deo), and as he looks at himself on his own 
(coram hominibus).  
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 This distinction is present in LK already, see Rechtfertigung III.2.a; 50–51. See also Friedrich 
Beisser, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Tridentinums und seine Interpretation,” 34–48 in Bekenntnis 
Fuldaer Heft 31 Reinhard Rittner, ed. (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1990), 4142. Beisser does 
not accept LK’s description of Trent on grace, specifically because Trent does not describe grace as a 
habitus but as something in the person.  
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contradictions, but different foundational metaphors, each of which makes different 
expressions possible or likely.
165
 Insofar as concupiscence is something different from us 
and which is “in” us, Malloy’s engagements with the Lutheran’s positions are more 
reasonable, for how could that foreign thing be both “damnable” and yet not “damned” if 
God is just?
166
 On the other hand, if concupiscence is conceived as the remaining 
movement of our own will which opposes God’s will for us, then we find in ourselves 
something which is both truly ours and which is experienced as opposing God. This thing 
we know will have to be healed before our final union with God. In Malloy, exclusive 
attention to the prevailing metaphor of things “in” us, whether grace or sin, neglects the 
personal aspect of both our justification and our ongoing struggle with concupiscence. It 
therefore runs the risk of not only misunderstanding Lutheran language, but of forgetting 
a central Catholic claim: grace is never a thing. Created grace is a quality of the soul, not 
a thing added into the human being that has its own existence.
167
 The justice “by which” 
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 Cf. this with de Witte’s contention that dialogue presupposes a kind of learning process, and 
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reify grace by converting quality to quantity so that grace became a magic elixir poured into the soul.” 
Duffy, Dynamics of Grace, 157–58. 
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God makes us just is a final cause, not an instrumental one.
168
 This brings us directly to 
the second critique.  
Concupiscence and the Formal Cause of Justification 
As noted above, the problems with Malloy’s critique extend well beyond his 
inability to properly interpret across different dialects of Christian language. He sees an 
original divide, what we might call a Grunddifferenz, existing between Lutherans and 
Catholics. This difference he locates in their opposing verdicts on Trent’s formal cause of 
justification. Malloy’s engagement with this formal cause, however, falls into an easy 
trap. Because he consistently imagines created grace as a “thing” which God puts inside 
the person and by which they become just, he fails to preserve this cause as a formal 
cause. Instead, he lets it slip easily into the mold suggested by his controlling metaphor. It 
becomes a secondary instrumental cause of justification. This failure permeates his 
thinking about Lutheran-Catholic difference, and prevents him from doing justice to 
either the Tridentine teaching or the Lutheran.  
Malloy’s central insight seems to be that the JDDJ does not attend to Trent’s 
formal cause of justification directly. While he admits that the “phrase itself is 
expendable,” he finds this to be a central, unresolved difficulty in the JDDJ.169 He 
describes the Catholic position in this way: “Catholics confess that justifying grace 
formally causes justification because it is an infused grace that expels all damnable sins 
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 DH 1515. A better expression of the action of this grace (so as to prevent the tendency to slide 
into the problematic metaphoric frame described) would be that that the Christian is “formed into the image 
of this justice.” 
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 Malloy, “The Nature of Justifying Grace,” The Thomist 65 (2001), 93–94.  
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by inhering in a man.”170 He explains this more fully in the book after quoting the draft 
text of chapter seven of the sixth session of Trent.  
This draft made it absolutely clear that there is only one formal cause of 
justification: this is not the justice of God himself but rather the justice imparted 
to the sinner, making him to be truly just. In other words, the formal cause was 
defined as inhering grace, freely and divinely infused through the merits of Christ, 
provided the human person freely accepts God’s mercy with the help of 
prevenient grace.
171
  
The problem arises as he tries to compare this teaching with the Lutheran position, and it 
seems to have two roots. The first is that his insistence on the historical language of 
inhering grace (gratia inhaerens) or justice (iustitia inhaerens) tempts him, as we have 
said, to think of that grace or that justice as an object placed inside the human being by 
means of which God produces an effect in the justified.
172
 The second is that his 
interpretation of the Lutheran position always loses the eschatological framework in 
which it must be interpreted.  
 Malloy’s tendency to view grace as a thing inside people has its parallel in his 
similar tendency to view concupiscence and actual sins in the same manner.
173
 Thus 
justice, for Malloy, seems to be a tallying of the objects contained within the human 
being. He describes the Catholic position (rejected by Lutherans) as being that “infused 
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 Malloy, Engrafted, 75. He says something quite similar in his first article on the subject, “First, 
the Catholic Church teaches that justification's singular formal cause is the grace which, infused by God on 
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 This “by means of which X produces effect Y” is the very definition of an instrumental cause. 
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 Malloy, “Coredemption,” 384. 
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gifts (charity, and even faith itself) expel all damnable sins.”174 While the description is 
not in itself problematic, it does force a particular frame of metaphoric use, and 
encourages the user to conceptualize sins and grace as MUTUALLY-EXCLUSIVE OBJECTS.
175
 
Thus, for Malloy, concupiscence cannot be sin not merely because that would make 
baptism universally ineffectual, but because inhering grace and sin cannot occupy the 
same internal space. Venial sins are in this image, “small enough” to squeeze into the 
person along with iustitia inhaerens, and in his opinion, this adequately describes the 
justified Christian this side of the eschaton. We are saved by God, and as long as the only 
sins we acquire are venial, or we expel mortal sins by return to the sacrament of 
reconciliation, our tally will come out positive and we are among the saved. But this 
collapses the eschatological tension of the Tridentine vision. It makes of the double-scope 
network (in which the frames of both the “already” and the “not yet” are held in 
productive tension) into a mirror network in which human life is framed entirely in the 
present.
176
  
Instead, the Tridentine formal cause must be maintained as a formal cause, as it is 
that justice which gives shape to the Christian’s renewed life. It is, as it were, God’s 
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 Malloy, “Justifying Grace”, 96. Otto Hermann Pesch has described this difference between 
Lutherans and Catholics as a difference between an understanding in which sin (and therefore also 
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internal one.” Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology”, 12. 
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 This has an opposite tendency among some Lutheranisms, which want to see the human’s 
justification to be framed entirely by the future. See chapter five, p. 300. 
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vision for what a particular Christian person is to become. It remains a formal cause even 
while they have not yet been conformed to it fully, just as the form of Aphrodite remains 
the formal cause of the Venus de Milo despite the imperfect equivalence caused by her 
lack of arms. Thus, the formal cause of Trent, especially when paired with Trent’s 
realistic appraisal of the human capacity for imperfection, requires an eschatological 
double-vision of the sort we have been describing. It cannot be merely the this-worldly 
tabulation of sins venial and mortal vs. the grace given that drives them out. It must keep 
hold of both the already and the not-yet and by holding these in tension, create space to 
say something new. God’s gift of justice, precisely as created grace, can only be a formal 
cause and a quality of the soul, not an added instrumental cause by which God brings 
about effects.
177
 By collapsing the eschatological space represented by the formal cause, 
Malloy cannot understand the Lutheran position and presents a drastic cheapening of the 
Tridentine vision. His single-minded focus on the deeply traditional language of inhering 
justice has led him to mistake the analogy and slide into an improper conception of its 
use, and thus, a thoroughgoing misinterpretation of the council.  
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the Roman Catholic position on concupiscence as it 
developed through its definitive teaching at the Council of Trent. It has applied the tools 
developed in the previous chapter to make clearer the network of metaphoric 
conceptualization in which these engagements are sensible and even necessary. In 
particular, the conceptual blend SIN IS AN IMPURITY WARRANTING DISINHERITANCE was 
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found to be particularly central to the Council of Trent and the contemporary Roman 
Catholic sources. A controlling sacramental frame dependent on baptism was also seen 
throughout.  
The position was also shown to be best interpreted as an eschatological double-
vision in which the human being as he is and as he will be are held in unity. The present 
person is not to be sundered from the form of his final regeneration, nor is the distance 
between the present reality and that fullness of justice to be collapsed.  
The Council’s position on concupiscence was then shown to be both clearly taken 
up in the JDDJ’s paragraphs explaining the Catholic position and to be compatible with 
the common statement of section 4.4 as clarified by the Annex. Finally, several Catholic 
critics of the JDDJ were engaged to ask whether the judgment that true consensus had 
been reached is warranted. In particular, the work of Christopher Malloy was found to be 
based on an insufficiently careful interpretation of the Council of Trent, collapsing its 
eschatological tension and leading to an insufficiently Catholic interpretation that also 
produced an inability to understand the Lutheran position. Keeping the controlling 
metaphors in mind allows both positions to be understood properly. Keeping hold of the 
eschatological tension also prevents ether from collapsing into the un-tectonic positions 
condemned in the sixteenth century.  
The final chapter will follow the same procedure for engaging the Lutheran motto 
simul iustus et peccator. It will be shown to be operating on a different metaphoric 
framework, but similarly holding together an eschatological vision of the justified person 
who recognizes and confesses the ongoing effects of sin in his life. Both of these 
positions are describing the Christian after baptism. Her life cannot be adequately 
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described without referencing both Christ’s unshakable gift of salvation, and the 
remaining fleshly aspects which have yet to be rooted out of her. The Joint Declaration 
finds its consensus not be litigating the questions as they were asked in the sixteenth 
century, but by discovering the common pattern of Christian experience, and relating 
both Lutheran and Roman Catholic claims to this.  
  
     
CHAPTER FIVE: 
 SIMUL IUSTUS IN AN ESCHATOLOGICAL LENS 
 
Chapter Introduction  
The Lutheran aphorism simul iustus et peccator, expressing that the Christian is at 
the same time justified and a sinner, has both a more complex history of development and 
a less definitive interpretation than does the Tridentine definition on concupiscence 
treated in the previous chapter. It will, therefore, require a somewhat more expansive 
history, attending not only to the sixteenth-century development of the phrase in Luther 
and the Confessions, but also to the rediscovery and reinterpretation which the phrase 
received in the nineteenth and twentieth century, particularly related to systematizations 
of Luther’s thought.  
Several systematic concerns will also require development before proceeding to 
chart the cognitive blends related to this topic and operative in the JDDJ. These have to 
do with whether the phrase is to be interpreted in a totus-totus (i.e. the Christian is 
completely justified and completely a sinner) or a partim-partim manner (the Christian is 
partly justified and partly a sinner). Of course, holding to both in different situations or 
according to different manners of speaking is possible; it appears that the JDDJ does 
precisely this. This distinction will have important parallels with what we have 
previously termed understanding justification as a state and as a trajectory.
1
 Two intra-
                                                 
1
 Purely totus-totus interpretations will emphasize justification as a state; interpretations allowing a 
partim-partim interpretation will allow some language of trajectory. As will become clear, the traditional 
Lutheran distinction between justification and sanctification often serves to keep these two considerations 
quite separate. 
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Lutheran concerns, namely how justification relates to the Christian in history, and 
whether the fides (faith) that justifies is only fiducia (fiduciary trust), are also important 
to this interpretation because both questions relate to which interpretations of the simul 
are allowable.  
After these issues are clarified, it will be possible to describe the Lutheran 
cognitive blend for sin. As the previous chapters noted, it can be described as SIN IS THAT 
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW,2 and it is framed by the Lutheran distinction 
between law and gospel. This framing introduces a second way of speaking about sin, 
that is, as “ruled sin” producing the metaphoric blend SIN IS A SICKNESS TO BE HEALED 
OR AN IMPRISONED ROBBER.
3
 In light of this understanding of sin, the simul provides an 
eschatological double-vision of the Christian as justified and sinner, although the precise 
vision will be changed by the interpretation that the phrase receives.  
Finally, having laid this groundwork, it will be possible to examine the Lutheran 
blends as operative in the JDDJ’s section 4.4, “The Justified as Sinner” and in Annex 
§2A–B, and to examine two representative critiques of the JDDJ. The first is levied by 
Daphne Hampson. Her negative reaction to the JDDJ in part demonstrates her inadequate 
understanding of the Catholic position, but also rests on an acceptance of a strong 
dialectic as the defining characteristic of Lutheran thought. The second, representing a 
“Confessional Lutheran” viewpoint, is offered by the faculty of Concordia Seminary, 
Fort Wayne, Indiana. They offer a number of critiques structured by an insistence on a 
purely forensic account of justification entirely separated from sanctification.  
                                                 
2
 This phrasing is from Luther, Against Latomus, “id quod non est secundum legem dei.” WA 
8:83.29.  
3
 These will be described more fully below, beginning on p. 281. 
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The JDDJ represents a real consensus between Lutheran and Catholic positions, 
but not all Lutherans will accept its account of Lutheran thought. In this chapter, I will 
attempt to show that its depiction is a reasonable account of Luther’s thought and that of 
the Confessions. What I cannot do is to normatively argue that this is the only, or even 
the best, development of Lutheranism in the contemporary era.
4
 That determination must 
be left to Lutherans. Demonstrating that the JDDJ develops a differentiated consensus 
despite differences is a plausible goal. The analysis of metaphoric blending found in this 
project can make the positions of each party to the JDDJ clearer and show how they can 
be held together. The analysis, however, cannot adjudicate the ongoing conversation 
between signatory and non-signatory Lutherans regarding the definition of a properly 
Lutheran theology of justification.  
Sixteenth-Century Development 
In any engagement with Lutheran theology, the question must be raised of how to 
relatively value the theology of Martin Luther, that of the Confessions, and the 
interpretations of the contemporary era. In what follows, my engagements with the 
sixteenth- and twentieth-century sources are intended not to judge the Lutheran position 
as developed in the JDDJ, but to contextualize it and to make clear the various Lutheran 
influences on its final form. Nevertheless, the confessional documents, and to a lesser 
                                                 
4
 A recurring concern throughout this chapter is the historical role played by explicitly anti-
medieval and/or anti-Catholic hermeneutics for interpreting Luther in the twentieth century. If Luther 
indeed failed to fully implement his “reformation insight,” leaving a number of medieval remnants that 
contemporary theologians must purge, then the mark of a real Lutheranism will be its distance from the 
historic Catholic commitments. If this is the case, then Daphne Hampson may be right that there is an 
unbridgeable contradiction between the two traditions, although it is not the contradiction that she posits. 
The Roman Catholic insistence that the decisions of the historical church are part of a developing tradition 
would then be in conflict with those who measure growth by its purgation of that tradition. 
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extent Luther’s writings, do wield authority over contemporary Lutheran theology, and 
they cannot merely be brushed aside.
5
  
Luther 
It is clearly impossible to give a sufficiently thorough description of Luther’s use 
of simul iustus et peccator in one section of one chapter of this project. What follows, 
therefore, represents an overview providing references to other studies in order to give 
the reader a sense of Luther’s use of the term and its later effects in Lutheran theology. I 
will focus on its appearance in three documents: its first expression in the Lectures on 
Romans (1515–16), its development in Against Latomus (1521), and its employment in 
terms of law and gospel in the Lectures on Galatians (1530). 
Beginnings: Lectures on Romans (1515–16) 
The concept of simul iustus et peccator developed in Luther’s thought in the 
second decade of the sixteenth century. The noted phrase makes its first appearance in the 
                                                 
5
 The different values given to these documents by different Lutherans is part of the difficulty with 
which the JDDJ had to wrestle in engaging world Lutheranism. The LWF constitution describes the 
authority of Confessions in this way: “The Lutheran World Federation confesses the Holy Scriptures of the 
Old and New Testaments to be the only source and norm of its doctrine, life, and service. It sees in the 
three Ecumenical Creeds and in the Confessions of the Lutheran Church, especially in the unaltered 
Augsburg Confession and the Small Catechism of Martin Luther, a pure exposition of the Word of God.” 
(LWF Constitution, §2. Available at http://goo.gl/Id4CFG. Accessed September 7, 2014). Different 
member churches have different descriptions of how these documents are authoritative within their own 
church. It should be remembered that part of the conversation about the JDDJ on the Lutheran side was 
whether its affirmation would set the JDDJ up as a new confession, a position which the LWF did not see 
to be a necessary outcome of its signing, particularly because it expresses differentiated Lutheran and 
Catholic positions within the text, and is therefore of a different genre than “Confession.” See chapter one, 
p. 35. 
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Römervorlesungen of 1515–166 in his consideration of concupiscence, (Rom 7:77), and of 
Paul’s surprise that he does not do what he knows to be right (Rom 7:158). It returns as a 
major theme in the scholion on chapter four, particularly its second conclusion and the 
following corollary.
9
 Here the theme of the opposition is clear: saints “are always sinners 
in their own sight,” while sinners “are always righteous in their own sight.”10 Our own 
consideration of ourselves and God’s consideration of us are opposed in experience, and 
possibly by necessity. This idea is strengthened in the second conclusion by the addition 
of the idea of contemporaneity (simul) and because the saints are both righteous and 
unrighteous within one point of view: “‘God is wonderful in His saints,’ [Ps. 68:35]. To 
Him they are at the same time both righteous and unrighteous.”11 The saints are “just by 
[means of] the consideration of God’s mercy.”12 In the following corollary, Luther is 
wrestling with the role of post-baptismal concupiscence: 
                                                 
6
 Martin Luther, Die Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, (D. Martin Luthers Werke Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 56, Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1938)70.9–10. “simul sum peccator et 
iustus;” 269.21–22 as “‘Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis’, Cui simul sunt Iusti et Iniusti;” 272.17 as “simul 
peccator et Iustus.” For a fuller treatment of the development of this phrase in Luther, see Otto Hermann 
Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator: Sinn und Stellenwert einer Formel Martin Luthers Thesen und 
Kurzkommentare,” in Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen, ed. Theodor Schneider and 
Gunther Wenz, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2001), 146–67. Hereafter, volumes of the Weimar Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe will be cited as WA. When the English of the American Edition of Luther’s Works is cited, 
it will be as LW. 
7
 “What then can we say? That the law is sin? Of course not! Yet I did not know sin except 
through the law, and I did not know what it is to covet except that the law said, ‘You shall not covet.’[Vul: 
Non concupisces]” NAB 
8
 “What I do, I do not understand. For I do not do what I want, but I do what I hate.”  
9
 WA 56.269–273 = LW 25.254–259.  
10
 WA 56.269.21–30: “‘Mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis’, Cui simul sunt Iusti et Iniusti. Et Mirabilis 
in hipocritis Deus, Cui simul sunt Iniusti et Iusti. Quia dum sancti peccatum suum semper in conspectus 
habent et Iustitiam a Deo secundum misericordiam ipsius implorant, eoipso semper quoque Iusti a Deo 
reputantur. Ergo sibiipsis et in veritate Iniusti sunt, Deo autem propter hanc confessionem peccati eos 
reputant Iusti; Re vera peccatores, Sed reputatione miserentis Dei Iusti; Ignoranter Iusti et ScienterinIusti; 
peccatores in re, Iusti autem in spe.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid., 269.29. “Sed reputatione miserentis Dei Iusti” 
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Therefore, actual sin (as it is called by theologians) is more truly sin, i.e. the work 
and fruit of sin, but sin itself is the passion, tinder [fomes] and desires 
[concupiscentia] or the inclination towards evil and the obstinacy towards good as 
below “I would not have known coveting to be sin.” If however, “they work,” and 
they are therefore not themselves works, but workings that bear fruit; therefore 
they are not fruit. Therefore to the contrary, just as our justice that is from God is 
that turning toward goodness and away from evil, given interiorly through grace, 
and our works themselves are the better fruits of justice, so sin is this turning 
away from good and inclination to evil. … And now this is evil, since it is truly 
sin, which God remits by his non-imputation from his mercy to all who discern 
and confess and hate it and pray to be healed of it. From this it is such that “if we 
say we have no sin, we are lying.” And it is false that this evil is able to be healed 
by works, for experience testifies that in whichever good work we do there 
remains desire [concupiscentia] for evil remains and no one is clean of it, not 
even a one-day-old child. But God’s mercy is that while this remains it is not 
thought of as sin for them, who call on him and lament for his liberation. Now 
such ones easily avoid works for they always seek eagerly to be made just. Such 
therefore in ourselves we are sinners and yet just persons by faith in God’s sight. 
For we believe the one promising to free us provided that for now we persevere, 
such that sin not rule [us] but we hold it back until he remove it.
13
 
Luther then proceeds to talk about a sick person under the care of a doctor, who hopes in 
his future health because of the doctor’s care. Here, the simul is clearly a promise of a 
future healing which is held in hope because of the trustworthiness of the one promising. 
In fact, the rhetorical version of the simul that Luther had deployed just before this 
                                                 
13
Ibid. 271.6–272.2. “Ergo Actuale (sicut a theologis vocatur) verius est peccatum i. e. opus et 
fructus peccati, peccatum autem ipsa passio fomes et concupiscentia siue pronitas ad malum et difficultas 
ad bonum, sicut infra: ‘Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum.’ Si enim ‘operantur’, ergo non sunt 
ipsa opera, Sed operantes, Vt fructificet; ergo non sunt fructus. Igitur a Contrario: Sicut Iustitia nostra ex 
Deo Est ipsa ipsa Inclinatio ad bonum et declinatio a malo interius per gratiam data, opera autem sunt 
potius fructus Iustitie, Ita peccatum est ipsa declinatio a bono et inclinatio ad malum. … Hoc enim malum, 
cum sit re vera peccatum, Quod Deus remittit per suam non-Imputationem ex misericordia omnibus, qui 
ipsum agnoscunt et confitentur et odiunt et ab eo sanari petunt. Hinc fit, Vt ‘si dixerimus nos peccatum non 
habere, mendaces simus’. Et error est, Quod hoc malum possit per opera sanari, Cum Experientia testetur, 
quod in quantumlibet bene operemur, relinquitur concupiscentia ista ad malum et nemo mundus ab illa, nec 
Infans vnius diei. Sed misericordia Dei est, Quod hoc manet et non pro peccato reputatur iis, qui Inuocant 
eum et gemunt pro liberatione sua. Tales enim facile et opera cauent, quia querunt Iustificari omni studio. 
Sic ergo in nobis sumus peccatores Et tamen reputante Deo Iusti per fidem. Quia credimus promittenti, 
quod nos liberet, dummodo interim perseueremus, ne peccatum regnet, sed Sustineamus ipsum, donec 
auferat ipsum.”  
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section makes this explicit: God is wonderful in his saints, who know themselves to be 
sinners, and are thus “sinners in fact, but saints in hope.”14  
Otto Hermann Pesch summarizes the sense and use of the formula here. Luther 
employs it “in order to break pride in any self-justice and to make clear the ongoing 
struggle in which the Christian is found: bridged by God’s total effective non-imputation 
and aligned on the hoped-for-good of the final overcoming of sin through the 
eschatological gift of justice.”15 In the section of the Römervorlesungen cited above, this 
pattern is clear. The Christian is one who in looking at his own life sees the remaining, 
defanged power of sin and who struggles against it daily while waiting for God to finally 
remove it. Luther calls this remaining sin “ruled” because Christ prevents it from harming 
the Christian. It is not evidence that we will not be saved (as Pope Leo X understood 
Luther to be saying)
16
 but is a sparring partner while we await our final salvation.
17
 In 
this context, then, the simul is a statement of hope from Christians who see all too clearly 
the situation of struggle in which they remain, but trust that God’s promises made in the 
sacraments are good.  
As Jared Wicks notes, Luther’s skepticism regarding the “Scholastic thesis that 
justification was instantaneous change by an infusion of grace and concomitant expulsion 
of sin” led in the Lectures on Romans to a distinction between “God’s forgiveness as the 
                                                 
14
 WA 56:269.30 “peccatores in re, Iusti autem in spe.” 
15
 Otto Hermann Pesch, “Simul Iustus et Peccator,” 153. “Der Sinn der Formel, zusammengefasst, 
ist also hier: den Stolz auf jede eigene Gerechtigkeit zu brechen und die unabgeschlossene Kampfsituation 
des Christseins herauszustellen: überbrückt durch Gottes total geltende Nicht-Anrechnung und ausgerichtet 
auf das Hoffnungsgut der endgültigen Überwindung der S:unde durch die eschatoloogische Gabe der 
Gerechtigkeit.”  
16
 See chapter four, p. 192. 
17
 WA 56.331.24. “Sed seruit, quando ei resistitur, quia perficit odium iniquitatis et amorem 
Iustitie.” 
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nonimputation of our sin and the temporally extended and purifying expulsion of sin.”18 
Commenting on the progress of the Christian, “whose life is not inactive, but in motion 
towards the better, just as a sick person [is moving] from sickness into health,”19 Luther 
systematizes the process of expelling sin according to what he takes to be Aristotle’s 
account of change.
20
 In this setting, Luther describes justification as a stage in the 
spiritual life, albeit a stage that one does not completely pass through until heaven:  
The human is always in nonbeing, on the way, in being; always in privation, in 
potency, in act; always in sin, in justification, in justice, i.e. always a sinner, 
always a penitent, always a saint. Indeed the fact that someone repents, this makes 
a saint of the unjust. Therefore, penitence is the path between injustice and justice. 
Our terminus a quo stretches as far as sin and our terminus ad quem stretches to 
justice. If therefore, we always repent, we are always sinners, and yet for that 
reason we are saints and made righteous, partly sinners, partly saints [partim 
peccatores, partim Iusti], i.e. nothing except penitents. And just the opposite for 
the impious, who fall away from justice hold a middle place between sin and 
justice moving opposite [to us]. Hence, this life is a road between heaven and hell. 
No one is so good that she is not made better, no one so bad that he is not made 
worse, until we come all the way to our final form [formam].
21
 
The Christian is thus a creature always in flux, always tending towards his final goal by 
means of repentance. Sin here names both the particular actions of which the Christian 
                                                 
18
 Jared Wicks, “Luther and this Damned, Conceited, Rascally Heathen Aristotle: An Encounter 
More Complicated than Many Think,” review of Der junge Luther und Aristoteles. Eine historisch-
systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie, by Theodor Dieter, Pro 
Ecclesia 16, no. 1 (2007):98 
19
 WA 56.441.15–16.“Quorum vita non est in quiescere, sed in moueri de bono in melius velut 
egrotus de egritudine in sanitatem.” 
20
 Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung 
zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), 302–308. The five stages 
Luther describes are nonbeing (a person in her sins), becoming (justification), being (righteousness), action 
(doing and living justice), and being acted upon (to be made perfect). See WA 56.442.1–5.  
21
 WA 56.442.15–25. “Semper homo Est in Non Esse, In fieri, In esse, Semper in priuatione, in 
potentia, in actu, Semper in peccato, in Iustificatione, In Iustitia, i. e. Semper peccator, semper penitens, 
semper Iustus. Quod enim penitet, hoc fit de non Iusto Iustus. Ergo penitentia Est medium inter Iniustitiam 
et Iustitiam. Et sic est in peccato quoad terminum a quo et in Iustitia quoad terminum ad quem. Si ergo 
semper penitemus, semper peccatores sumus, et tamen eoipso et Iusti sumus ac Iustificamur, partim 
peccatores, partim Iusti i. e. nihil nisi penitentes. Sicut econtra Impii, Qui recedunt a Iustitia, medium 
tenent inter peccatum et Iustitiam contrario motu. Quare hec Vita Est via ad cȩlum et infernum. Nemo ita 
bonus, vt non fiat melior, nemo ita malus, vt non fiat peior, vsque dum ad extremam formam 
perueniamus.”  
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repents and the state from which God draws him ever farther away, through the gift of 
repentance. For this reason, Wicks rightly summarizes, “Luther called the ever-recurring 
starting point, the prior instant, ‘sin,’ from which you always have to be moving on, 
while the contrary, righteousness, is always ahead and toward it you have to keep setting 
out ever anew.”22 Of course, to try and do this of one’s own power will always result in 
ruin; it must always be the result of Christ’s gift. Penitence in Christ is truly the path to 
justice.
23
 
Development: Against Latomus (1521) 
Luther’s Against Latomus comes at the end of several years of back-and-forth 
argumentation between Luther and the Louvain theologians.
24
 It responds directly to a 
book written against Luther by Jacques Masson (Jacobus Latomus).
25
 Luther’s expansive 
statement: “Every good work in the [earthly] pilgrimage of saints is sin” is the chief point 
of contention in the work.
26
 Luther defends his position through an interpretation of 
Isaiah 64:5a, “We have all become like something unclean, all our just deeds are like 
polluted rags.” Regarding this verse, Luther and Latomus disagree on several points: to 
whom the verse properly applies, whether “all” can be read as poetic overstatement or 
                                                 
22
 Wicks, “Luther and Aristotle,” 98– 99. 
23
 There are strong monastic echoes here. See RB 7. Luther also cites St. Bernard just before the 
above WA 56.441.21 to reinforce his point of needing to desire to be better. 
24
 Martin Luther, Rationis Latomianae confutatio, WA 8:36–128. 
25
 For the present task, Latomus’ actual positions matter little, as the work is being read to flesh 
out Luther’s understanding of the Christian after baptism, specifically as saint and sinner. For that reason, I 
will restrict myself to directly engaging the Antilatomus. For a history of the interaction, see Jos E. 
Vercruysse, “Jacobus Latomus und Martin Luther: Einführendes zu einer Kontroverse,” Gregorianum 64, 
no. 3 (1981): 515–38.  
26
 Luther refers to the thesis both as the last thesis and as the first. “Ultimus: Omne opus bonum in 
sanctis viatoribus esse peccatum” WA 8:58.7–8; “Primus articulus a Latomo petitus est iste: Omne opus 
bonum est peccatum.” Ibid 59.12. I will treat these as one in what follows.  
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synecdoche, and whether it is logically consistent. This last is the most interesting for the 
present engagement. Luther once again asserts on the basis of scripture that no person can 
stand upright before God’s judgment except by God’s mercy.27  
It could seem that the dispute is about whether there are any truly sinless persons, 
but both men would reject this position.
28
 Instead, Luther is arguing that there is no single 
work in any saint which they would dare hold up as not “in need of God’s forgiving 
mercy” and in which they “can glory before [God].”29 Because the person never entirely 
escapes the clinging motivations of the old man in this life, all human works are 
accomplished in a situation of incompletion and under the cloud of the present age.  
By rejecting the possibility of a sinless work, even by God’s grace, Luther is 
focusing on a dispute familiar in these pages, the question of what sin is. He clearly 
defines “sin,” limiting it to a single meaning: “Sin is truly nothing other than that which 
is not according to God’s law.”30 Luther’s insistence on this definition of sin is, in a 
sense, made possible because he is not committed to the axiom that if God’s mercy did 
not truly remove sin now, God’s justice would of necessity condemn sinners eternally. 
Instead, God does and will truly remove sin, but for now, the human remains a creature 
subject to the effects of sin, if not its rule, by God’s mercy. This definition is clearly 
                                                 
27
 He cites Ps 143:2, Rom 2:6, Job 9:22, Ps 44:17–18; and Jeremiah 49:12 and other texts here. 
28
 With the usual exception for the Blessed Virgin and her Son. 
29
 Ibid 79.21–25. “nec indigent tua misericordia ignoscente, … In hoc gloriari coram te possum.” 
30
 Ibid. 83.26–29. “In primis, peccatum non multis, sed uno simplicissimoque modo in scripturis 
accipi non dubites, nec sinas per Sophistas multioloquos hoc tibi extorqueri. Peccatum vero aliud nihil est, 
quam id quod non est secundum legem dei.” 
This Luther directly opposes to Latomus’ fourfold interpretation of “sin” in scripture: “First, the 
cause of sin, Second, its effect or punishment, Third, as sacrifice for sin, and fourth for the fault itself by 
which the soul is made guilty.” Ibid 82.21–23. “Primo pro causa peccati, Secundo pro effectu seu poena, 
Tertio oblationem pro peccator, Quarto pro ipsa culpa quo anima rea fit.” 
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central to the dispute, for each man wrote that the other understood nothing about the 
relationship of sin and grace.
31
 
Luther’s engagement with Latomus on this point would be easy enough to reduce 
to a difference between a forensic and a transformational understanding of justification. 
But to do so would be to severely truncate Luther’s own writing. In the Antilatomus, 
Luther writes that there are “two sides of justification: the forensic and the effective.”32 
The human is both named just by God and is to progress towards that holiness that will 
always remain a gift. In Luther’s memorable image from this text, sin is a robber, 
imprisoned by God and therefore unable to terrify the countryside.
33
 After baptism, “it is 
truly sin in us by its nature, but in substance, not in quantity, nor quality, nor action, for it 
is truly entirely passive.”34 Like the robber in his cell, it can merely cajole the guards to 
conspire with him, for it is restrained from doing its own evil. This is not a static 
situation; Luther is too careful a reader of Paul for that. This sin must be removed daily 
until it is eradicated.
35
 Failure to progress in holiness is the same as capitulation to sin.
36
 
The (caged) robber still has the power of its voice, and therefore the Christian finds in 
                                                 
31
 Vercruysse, 532. 
32
 Anna, Vind,“Ein Streit um Worte: Luther versus Latomus,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische 
Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 46, no.4 (2004): 450. 
33
 WA 8:91.18–40. He extends the metaphor by asking how Christ secures this robber, interpreting 
Is 11:5 (“Justice shall be the band around his waist, and faithfulness a belt upon his hips”) to suggest that it 
is precisely faith (fides) and justice (iustitia) that form the chains by which Christ constrains sin in the 
Christian.  
34
 Ibid 91.35–38: “Ita peccatum in nobis post baptismum vere peccatum est naturaliter, sed in 
substantia, nec in quantitate, nec qualitate, nec actione, in passion vero totum.” As Pesch comments, Luther 
admits freely in the text that he and Latomus agree that “after baptism sin no longer harms the baptized, so 
long as he ‘doesn’t consent’ (Latomus), or ‘never ceases to fight against it’ (Luther). … The Question and 
the point of dissention is only whether sin after baptism does not divide from God because of its nature or 
for other reasons.” This is what Luther seems to be arguing with his use of substance language, i.e. that the 
remaining sin is still sin although God does not account it as such and it is restrained from harming the 
baptized. Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator,” 156. 
35
 Ibid. 93.3–7.  
36
 See above, p. 254. 
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herself something that is contrary to God’s law, which is not as it will be in the final 
remaking of all things. And this, Luther calls “sin” though of itself it does not separate 
from God’s mercy.37  
Before moving on from this text, its role in one contemporary inter-Lutheran 
discussion deserves mention. This ongoing conversation between the Finnish and 
German schools of interpretation asks how Christ effects justification in the sinner. The 
Finns have been arguing that the human being is truly made just by faith because “if 
through faith we really participate in Christ, we participate in the whole Christ, who in 
his divine person communicates the righteousness of God.”38 Against Latomus has been 
important to this interpretation because of how Luther develops his explanation of 
cleansing from sin.
39
 He distinguishes between gift [donum] and grace [favor]: 
The just and faithful person certainly has grace [favor] and gift [donum]: grace, 
which makes him entirely acceptable, such that his person be entirely pleasing 
and there be no room remaining for wrath in him; [it is] the gift, however, that 
heals him from sin and from all corruption of body and soul. It is most impious, 
therefore, to say that the baptized remains in sin or is not forgiven fully of all sins. 
… All is forgiven through grace, but not all is yet healed by the gift.40  
                                                 
37
 He recognizes that there is some equivocation at stake, but argues that the terms as used by 
Latomus, while they may follow the usage of the Fathers, do not comport with Paul’s terminology and are 
more likely to lead the Christian to trust in herself, and not take the distructive power of those whispers 
seriously. Like Tolkein’s Saruman trapped in his tower, the power of its voice means that it is still 
dangerous. If it is released, it will return to its robbery and entrap the Christian once again.  
38
 Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, “Preface: The Finnish Breakthrough in Luther 
Research,” in Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert 
W. Jenson, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), viii.  
39
 So, Tuomo Mannermaa, Christ Present in Faith: Luther’s View of Justification, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2005), 19f. 
40
 WA 8:107.13–22. “Iustus et fidelis absque dubio habet gratiam et donum: gratiam, quae eum 
totum gratificet, ut persona prorsus accepta sit, et nullus irae locus in eo sit amplius, donum vero, quod eum 
sanet a peccato et tota corruptione sua animi et corporis. Impiissimum ergo est dicere, baptisatum esse 
adhuc in peccatis , aut non esse omnia peccata plenissime remissa. … Remissa sunt omnia per gratiam, sed 
nondum omnia sanata per donum.” 
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Nor can the two be separated, precisely because Luther considers sin in the baptized to be 
truly sin. While “grace certainly considers no sin [to be] there,” the gift, which is Christ 
himself, “does find sin, which it purges and conquers, for a person neither pleases nor has 
grace, except for the sake of the gift that works in this way to purge sin.”41 The Christian 
has a part in this work, for “God does not save imaginary sinners, but real ones, and 
teaches us to mortify real sins.”42 Later we will engage the question of whether the simul 
is best understood as two overlapping totalities (totus iustus-totus peccator) or as also 
describing a dividing line within one person (partim iustus-partim peccator). Here 
Luther’s emphasis on Christ’s work, in which we must cooperate, means that the latter 
option cannot be entirely dismissed as having no part in Luther’s theology.43  
Law and Gospel: Lectures on Galatians (1531) 
To engage Luther’s mature theology of justification, I will now turn to his 
Lectures on Galatians (1531). Other choices would be possible, especially his Lectures 
on Genesis.
44
 I am choosing the earlier Lectures on Galatians because these are not only 
                                                 
41
 Ibid., 107.32–35. Emphasis added. 
42
 Ibid., 107.35–36. Emphasis added. 
43
 The question of what role the Christian must play in working out his own salvation is important, 
but must be bracketed here for the sake of brevity. See Vink, 458-62. On the topic, the JDDJ points to the 
LK Rechtfertigung.III.3; JF §156; PCPCU Gutachten, 22; and the position paper of the VELKD on LK 
84.3–8. 
44
 These lectures, which Luther gave over the last decade of his life, had received little scholarly 
attention until recently, in part because influential studies by Erich Seeberg and Peter Meinhold in the 
1930s argued that the published lectures had only a poor connection to the actual lectures of the Reformer. 
Erich Seeberg, Studien zu Luthers Genesisvorlesung (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1932); and Peter 
Meinhold, Die Genesisvorlesung Luthers und ihre Herausgeber (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1936). 
Recently, however, several scholars have profitably reengaged the lectures and found in them a rich source 
of the older Luther’s thought. See particularly John A. Maxfield, Luther’s Lectures on Genesis and the 
Formation of Evangelical Identity, (Kirksville: Truman State University Press, 2008); Mickey L. Mattox, 
Defender of the Most Holy Matriarchs: Martin Luther’s Interpretation of the Women of Genesis in the 
Enarrationes in Genesin, 1535-45, (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Jonathan D. Trigg, Baptism in the Theology of 
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helpful in understanding Luther’s thought, but unlike the Genesis lectures, they remained 
influential in Lutheran engagement with justification and post-baptismal sin.
45
 They are 
famously cited in the Formula of Concord as providing an exposition of the Lutheran 
understanding of sin in the Christian.
46
 In the contemporary debate they are also central: 
Mannermaa’s foundational work, sometimes read as condemning the Formula of 
Concord,
47
 understands itself to be building on these lectures.
48
  
Luther’s preface to the Lectures on Galatians offers a short, unified insight into 
his description of the justification of the sinner and the state of Christian life after 
baptism. It also provides the classic exposition of Luther’s differentiation between the 
law and the gospel and relates this to sin in the baptized. This law/gospel dynamic is 
difficult to engage well, and disputes about it are current in intra-Lutheran discussions.
49
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Martin Luther, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). Trigg’s book in particular is relevant to the present study in its 
engagement with the renewal of the Christian in baptism.  
45
 Martin Luther, In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius ex praelectione D. Martini 
Lutheri collectus, WA 40, 2 vols. 
46
 FC SD.III.28. It should be remembered that the Formula of Concord itself, while an important 
Lutheran confessional document and authoritative for many Lutheran churches, is not understood to be 
authoritative by all LWF member churches. 
47
 See Javier A. Garcia, “A Critique of Mannermaa on Luther and Galatians,” Lutheran Quarterly, 
27 (2013): 34. Others making similar critiques include Timo Laato, “Justification: The Stumbling Block of 
the Finnish Luther School,” Concordia Theological Quarterly, 72, no. 4 (2008): 329–7–46; Carl R. 
Trueman, “Is the Finnish Line a New Beginning? A Critical Assessment of the Reading of Luther Offered 
by the Helsinki Circle,” Westminster Theological Journal 62 (2003): 242-3. 
48
 Mannermaa, Christ Present, 3–6. Mannermaa does critique the FC on the matter of inhabitatio 
Dei, although he understands its own citation of the Galatians lectures as pointing to how it can be more 
fully interpreted. At stake in the argument are a number of issues, not least of which is the question of the 
kind of authority which the confessions bear. Some Lutherans assert that because the Book of Concord is a 
proper explanation of the Gospel, it is to be treated as authoritative, while others say that while these 
documents do bear authority as interpretations of the Gospel, they are not wholly infallible and may need 
ongoing critique and correction to comport more fully with the Gospel of Christ. Notice above (n.3) that 
LWF’s constitution lists the scriptures as finally normative and the AC and the Small Catechism as pure 
explanations of the word of God, but does not explain what implications are to be drawn from this. Nor 
does it list the FC bearing this authority, although some LWF churches do so list it in their own governing 
documents. Cf. ELCA Constitution §2.02–07 Available at http://goo.gl/yOcXYf. Accessed September 10, 
2014.  
49
 For example, Javier A. Garcia, in critiquing Mannermaa’s interpretation of Luther, faults him 
for so emphasizing participation in Christ that he both deemphasizes the salvific effects of the cross (in 
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In this work, Luther states that both law and gospel remain binding for humans as 
long as they are in the flesh, although in different ways and to different purposes.
50
 Each 
has its own proper righteousness: the righteousness of the law consists in obeying the 
commandments; by it humans are unable to merit salvation. Nevertheless, in a Christian, 
the law should “have dominion over the flesh that is subjected to it and remains under 
it.”51 Christian righteousness, however, transcends this former righteousness and has 
dominion over the Christian’s conscience. Through baptism, the Christian can say to the 
law: “I am baptized and called by the Gospel to a communion of justice and eternal life, 
to the Reign of Christ, in whom my conscience reposes, where there is no law, but pure 
forgiveness of sins, peace, quiet, joy, health and eternal life.”52 The Christian participates 
in both because he has a share in both the old man (through the flesh) and the new man, 
i.e. Christ, through baptism.
53
 In setting up the law/gospel distinction, Luther asks how 
the Christian is “not under the law? According to the new man to whom the law does not 
apply. It had its own limits until Christ as Paul says later: ‘The law up to the time of 
Christ.’”54  
                                                                                                                                                 
favor of the incarnation) and neglects “the main project of Luther’s preface [to the Galatian’s lectures]… to 
introduce the distinction between law and gospel, a theme that dominates the rest of the commentary.” 
Garcia, “A Critique of Mannermaa,” 36. 
50
 WA 40i:48.21. “Ita utrumque manet dum hic vivimus.” 
51
 Ibid. 50.26–27. “sed tantum habere dominium in carnem quae et ei subiecta sit et sub ea 
maneat.” 
52
 Ibid. 51.14–17. “Sum enim Baptisatus et per Evangelium vocatus ad communionem iustitiae et 
vitae aeternae , ad Regnum Christi, in quo cquiescit concientia mea, ubi nulla lex est, sed mera remissio 
peccatorum, pax, quies, laetitia, salus et vita aeterna.” 
53
 This description may be challenged by some Lutheran readers. It seems at times that Forde 
reads Luther’s engagement with the old man to properly mean the death of the person themselves, rather 
than their non-participation in Adam and the old order. See below, p. 297. 
54
 Ibid. 45.20–22. “Quomodo non sub lege? Secundum novum hominem ad quem lex nihil 
pertinent. Habetenim suos limites usque ad Christum, ut Paulus infra dicit: ‘Lex usque ad Christum.’” 
Here is a potential answer to both of Garcia’s critiques (see n.47, p. 260): the Christian is made 
one with the new man, Christ, in whom the law ends because of Christ’s death and resurrection. The 
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The double jurisdiction over the Christian with which Luther began the preface 
sets up the double vision of the law/gospel distinction. The Christian is considered from 
two different points of view: before God because of Christ, and in herself. From the first 
perspective, she is righteousness because of God’s grace in seeing Christ’s obedience as 
hers. Having died with Christ, she is free from the law. From the second perspective, she 
is a sinner worthy of God’s damnation, and the law retains its hold on her so long as she 
is in the flesh. The law condemns her sin and calls her to do better. This, however, is not 
the forum in which her justification is judged. She is likewise called —and is able— to 
do great works because of her participation in Christ. These will never be the cause of her 
salvation. Luther ends the preface with a depiction of the justified Christian: 
When I have this [justice] within me, I descend from heaven just like the rains 
fructifying the earth, that is: I go forth into another kingdom and do whatever 
good works come to mind. If I am a minister of the word, I preach, console the 
faint of heart, and administer the sacraments; If I am a head of household, I rule 
the household and family, I educate the children in piety and honesty; if a 
magistrate, I perform the office committed to me by divine commission; if a 
servant, I attend faithfully to my master’s affairs; In sum, whoever knows surely 
that Christ is his justice not only labors at his calling in joy and with spirit, but for 
the sake of love he submits himself in everything to the magistrate, even to their 
impious laws, and [submits] to every piece of this present life, even —should it be 
required— to burden and danger. For he knows that God desires this and that such 
obedience pleases him.
55
  
                                                                                                                                                 
incarnation and the crucifixion are therefore not to be opposed to each other. If Mannermaa argues that the 
incarnation allows humans to have union with Christ, it is for the sake of the salvation which is offered to 
the world through the whole of the Christ event. Nor is this a new theological development. The kenosis 
hymn of Philippians 2, as but one scriptural example, narrates Christ’s saving obedience as an obedience 
that leads to his “taking the form of a slave and coming in human likeness” and to “becoming obedient to 
death, even death on a cross” (Phil 2:27–8). That this kenotic obedience finds a parallel in Luther’s 
description of the redeemed Christian at the end of the Preface of the Galatians Lectures is not to be 
overlooked. 
55
 WA 40i.51.2131. “Hanc cum intus, descendo de coelo tanquam pluvial foecundans terram, hoc 
est: prodeo foras in aliud Regnum et facio bona opera quaecunque mihi occurrunt. Si sum minister verbi, 
praedico, consolor pusillanimes, administro sacramenta; Si paterfamilias, rego domum, familiam, educo 
liberos ad pietatem et honestatem; Si Magistratus, officium divinitus mihi mandatum facio; Si servus, 
fideliter rem domini curo; Summa, quicunque certo novit Christum esse iustitiam suam, is non solum ex 
animo et cum gaudio bene operator in vocatione sua, sed subiicit se quoque per charitatem magistratibus, 
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In short, the Christian who is united with Christ is not merely named just in such a way as 
to leave her life unchanged. Nor is that change a secondary and separate thing. Precisely 
because she is united with Christ and has his justice “within her,” she becomes as Christ, 
obedient to the Father in all things, even potentially to death on a cross.  
 Although the Christian will never in this life be free of sin and deserve salvation 
apart from Christ, she is nevertheless promised it. The law will continue to judge her 
efforts as insufficient; the Gospel will continue to speak God’s promise to her. But 
because of Christ’s indwelling, because of the justification offered to her apart from her 
works, she is also being healed.
56
 The sinner is, in a sense, simul totus iustus (by God’s 
consideration through Christ) et totus peccator (considered from the perspective of the 
flesh) et partim peccator partim iustusque (because by Christ’s action sin’s hold is 
lessened over time as it is uprooted). The dividing line between the sinful and redeemed 
self ought to move as Christ puts the remaining, “ruled” sin to death in the Christian, a 
work that will not be completed in this life. How this might be conceptualized will be 
described below as it is at work in the JDDJ.  
Confessional Statements 
The phrase simul iustus et peccator and its variants (such as peccator in re, iustus 
in spe)
57
 do not occur in the Book of Concord.
58
 Nevertheless, as has been shown, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
etiam impiis legibus eorum, et omnibus praesentis vitae, si res ita postulet, oneribus atque periculis, Qui 
scit Deum hoc velle et ei placer hanc obedientiam.”  
56
 Mannermaa argues that this is precisely because it is Christ who is both favor and donum, and 
Christ cannot be divided. Therefore, the imputation which the favor provides is itself the beginning, cause, 
and ongoing power of the renewal of the Christian by which the old Adam is put to death and the Christian 
is more closely unified with Christ. See Mannermaa, Christ Present in Faith, 57. 
57
 This version is found in Luther, especially in the Romans Lectures, WA 56:269.30.  
   266 
idea is present that the Christian, although justified in baptism, still has remaining sin. 
Two short engagements with the Book of Concord will suffice: first, with the description 
of baptism and penance in the Small Catechism; second, with the first article of the 
Formula of Concord.  
The Small Catechism 
Luther’s Small Catechism, written in 1528–29, is, along with the Augsburg 
Confession, one of the two works to which the LWF constitution requires subscription for 
membership.
59
 It has served as a catechetical tool, often through memorization, since its 
publication. While simple, it is central to Lutheran thought. It follows the pattern of many 
late-medieval catechisms, and includes sections on the 10 Commandments, the Apostle’s 
Creed, the Lord’s Prayer, and the Sacraments of baptism and eucharist. As a catechetical 
and liturgical work, it does not delve into controversies with Roman Catholics or other 
groups, but does provide a look into what the Christian life is supposed to be.  
Commenting on baptism, after describing the action of the sacrament, Luther asks 
what the sacrament’s significance is, and answers 
It signifies that the old creature [der alte Adam / vetus Adam] in us with all sins 
and evil desires [bösen Lüsten / concupiscentiis] is to be drowned and die through 
daily contrition and repentance [Reu und Buße / mortificationem ac 
poenitentiam], and on the other hand that daily a new person is to come forth and 
                                                                                                                                                 
58
 James A. Nestingen makes a case that Luther’s allocution regarding the third article of the creed 
in the Small Catechism “I believe that by my own understanding or strength I cannot believe in Jesus Christ 
my LORD or come to him, …” (Martin Luther, Small Catechism, Creed, 6. Kolb/Wengert translation.) 
represents another instance of Luther’s logic in the simul. This contention does not seem to influence the 
present discussion. “The Catechism’s Simul,” Word & World 3, no. 4 (1983): 364–72.  
59
 See n. 5, p. 250 above. 
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rise up [auferstehen / resurgere] to live before God in righteousness and purity 
forever.
60
 
The Christian is inaugurated by baptism into a life of struggle against sin in which a 
frequent return to Christ in repentance is necessary.
 61
 The Christian is a creature in via, 
for in baptism the old Adam “is to be drowned and die through daily contrition and 
repentance” that is, it is an ongoing work that remains to be completed.62  
 It is no accident that, after pointing the reader to the Letter to the Romans for 
confirmation, Luther next asks “how simple people are to be taught to confess” and 
provides a form for confession. The ongoing struggle against sin means that the Christian 
will be aware of particular sins for which they should repent. After the confession, Luther 
has the confessor say to the penitent: 
“God be gracious and strengthen your faith. Amen. …  
Do you believe that my forgiveness is God’s forgiveness?” 
[Answer:] “Yes, dear sir.” 
Thereupon he may say: “Let it be done for you according to your faith.” And I by 
the command of our Lord Jesus Christ forgive you your sin in the name of the 
Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Go in peace.”63 
The penitent is told that the confession is of two parts, first, confession, and second, 
receiving absolution, which is to be firmly believed.
64
 In this, the Christian, on the path of 
justification by God’s grace in Christ, is both recognized as a sinner in need of 
confession, but also described as one who is on the path of justification. Confession 
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 Martin Luther, Small Catechism. Baptism.12. Kolb/Wengert translation. 
61
 As Jonathan Trigg comments, “Progress in the Christian life can never be progress away from 
the beginning of baptism, but a repeated return to it. Thus Luther interprets the sacrament of the keys, not 
as a new stage in the Christian pilgrimage, or as a dispensation of new grace, but as a continual return to 
baptism.” Trigg, Baptism in the Theology of Martin Luther, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 96. 
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 Both the Latin and the German word this in terms of an “ought.” The old Adam “soll ersäuft 
warden und sterben…” or “debet subinde per mortificationem…” It remains a work to be accomplished by 
Christ in the Christian’s life. 
63
 Luther, Small Catechism, Baptism.26–28. 
64
 Ibid., 16. 
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fulfills a necessary aspect of that path: daily contrition and repentance. By daily 
contrition, the Christian returns to Christ whose justice he receives as the gospel and 
Christian righteousness, and by whose indwelling he is able to begin to fulfill the 
demands of the law. 
The Formula of Concord 
The Formula of Concord (FC), drafted progressively throughout the 1570s and 
signed in 1580, was intended as a solution to intra-Lutheran disputes that had arisen in 
the decades since Luther’s death in 1545. The formula was accepted “by about two-thirds 
of the Evangelical churches of Germany and was then incorporated as the concluding 
document of the Book of Concord.”65 It is divided into two parts, the Solid Declaration 
and an abbreviated version called the “Epitome.”  
In the first Article, “On Original Sin,” the Solid Declaration seems to exemplify 
the difference with which this chapter and the previous have to wrestle. Unlike the 
Catholic insistence that only the material and tinder of sin is left in the baptized, the 
Formula does not distinguish between original sin in the unbaptized and in the baptized. 
Indeed,  
Christians [should] regard and recognize as sin the actual violation of God’s 
commandments in their deeds, but they should also perceive and recognize that 
the horrible, dreadful, inherited disease corrupting their entire nature is above all 
actual sin and indeed is the ‘chief sin.’ It is the root and fountainhead of actual 
sins. Luther calls this a ‘nature-sin’ or a ‘person-sin,’ in order to indicate that even 
if a human being thinks, says, or does nothing evil (which is, of course, after the 
fall of our first parents, impossible for human nature in this life), nevertheless our 
entire nature and person is sinful, that is, totally and thoroughly corrupted in 
God’s sight and contaminated by original sin as with a spiritual leprosy. Because 
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 Kolb/Wengert, “Introduction to the Formula of Concord,” 484. 
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of this corruption and on account of the fall of the first human beings, God’s law 
accuses and condemns human nature and the human person. Therefore, Luther 
concludes, we are ‘by nature children of wrath,’ of death, and of damnation, if we 
are not redeemed from them through Christ’s merit.66  
If it weren’t for the first sentence, the Catholic reader would be tempted to read this as a 
description of the unredeemed, those who have not yet been baptized into Christ’s 
paschal mystery. To predicate this kind of sin of Christians would seem to unmake their 
salvation. Continuing, however, the reader will notice that the Christian is not to conclude 
that he is separated from God, but only that his renewal is not yet complete, he has not 
yet, to borrow Trent’s language, been made into the final form of his justice. Far from 
being a counsel of despair, this description of sin is intended to ever again orient him to 
Christ. 
This inherited defect is so huge and abominable that it can be covered and 
forgiven in God’s sight in those who are baptized and believe only for the sake of 
our Lord Christ. Only the new birth and renewal of the Holy Spirit can and must 
heal this deranged, corrupted human nature. This renewal only begins in this life; 
it is finally completed in the life to come.
67
  
Here we see a description of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator. He is heir to a 
spiritual disease that not only makes him commit actual sins himself, but is itself worthy 
of damnation. Even the Christian is to recognize this disease in himself, although not in 
its untreated state. Although baptism and renewal heal its corruption, and in a sense can 
be said to have already done so, its healing never comes to completion in this life.  
 This teaching must be read in light of the third article of the Formula, “On 
Righteousness.” The Formula maintains a strict separation between justification and 
regeneration understood as making a person righteous. It therefore describes a fairly pure 
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 FC.SD.I.5–6. 
67
 Ibid., 14. 
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form of a forensic justification of imputed righteousness. Although this forensic 
justification does result in a real transformation, the Formula insists that the two must be 
sharply distinguished so as to avoid confusing law and gospel. The authors of the 
Formula worry that such confusion will lead Christians to trust in their own deeds for 
salvation.
68
 The teaching of the Solid Declaration, then, provides a kind of pure totus-
totus understanding of the simul regarding justification. It does not rule out progress in 
sanctification, and thus the Christian might be said to become more holy. Luther himself 
clearly says this in the Galatians commentary, which Article III recommends as a 
“wonderful, magnificent exposition” of the Evangelical doctrine.69 Standard readings of 
the Formula, however, understand it to require a strict separation between justification 
and sanctification. Its status as a confessional document gives this interpretation real 
weight. 
The Formula has provided a locus of debate among Lutherans, precisely because 
of its strictly forensic definition of justification. Recently, Tuomo Mannermaa has argued 
that its reference to Luther’s Galatians Commentary leaves room for reinterpreting the 
teaching of the Formula in light of what he sees as Luther’s uniting of grace and gift in 
the person of Christ.
70
 More traditional exegetes of the German school have strongly 
doubted that his interpretation can be squared with the Formula itself and repeat its worry 
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 So, FC.SD.III.38–39: “That the only function or characteristic of faith remains that it alone and 
absolutely nothing else is the means or instrument by and through which God’s grace and the merit of 
Christ promised in the gospel are received, laid hold of, accepted, applied to us, and appropriated. …  
That neither renewal, sanctification, virtues, nor good works are to be viewed or presented tanquam forma 
aut pars aut causa iustificationis. They are also not to be mixed into the article of justification under any 
other pretense, pretext, or terminology. Instead, the righteousness of faith consists alone in the forgiveness 
of sins by sheer grace, because of Christ’s merit alone.” 
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 Ibid., 67. 
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 Tuomo Mannermaa, Christ Present in Faith, 4–6. 
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about mingling law and gospel.
71
 These questions, and therefore the relationship between 
the Formula and Luther’s lectures on Galatians, cannot be answered in this brief 
overview, although the tensions and their contributions to the JDDJ will be examined 
below.  
Contemporary Systematic Questions 
Contemporary Lutheran theology is developing along two major trajectories, both 
of which exerted influence on the Joint Declaration.
72
 These schools posit different 
understandings of the mechanism by which God justifies Christians. Their different 
understandings produce different emphases related to the simul iustus et peccator, a 
phrase both groups share. In this section, I will highlight several of the issues at stake, 
specifically how justification is understood to relate to the Christian in history and how 
justifying faith is to be understood, before I show how these affect the interpretation of 
the simul. The German school will be shown to emphasize an understanding of the simul 
as totus iustus-totus peccator, while the Finnish school will add to this an understanding 
of the Christian as partim iustus-partim peccator. These emphases parallel the schools’ 
engagements with the relationship between justification and sanctification rooted in their 
different theories about God’s work in the Christian. 
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 See discussion below, p. 285. 
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 Admittedly, a phenomenon as complex as contemporary Lutheranism has more than two major 
schools of thought that are currently developing. In the US, for example, we can speak of “Evangelical 
Catholic Lutherans,” “Radical Lutherans,” and “Confessional Lutherans,” as three major theological 
schools. One overarching distinction across contemporary Lutheranism, however, is the question of how 
justification and sanctification are said to relate to one another, and it is this question that the present 
distinction names. The German school keeps them separate, while the Finnish are more willing to speak of 
their interrelation.  
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Justification as State and as Trajectory  
Despite its widespread presence in Luther’s writings, the simul can be said to be 
“a discovery of the twentieth century,” as Wolf-Dieter Hauschild has argued, because it is 
not until the twentieth century that the phrase came to be used as a systematic tool for 
ordering Luther’s theology in light of his theory of justification.73 This history is 
interesting not only because it demonstrates that this widely-assumed understanding of 
Luther is a recent development, but also because it illumines particular assumptions about 
the simul. Specifically, attending to this history helps to understand the totus-totus and 
partim-partim readings in their proper history and therefore to help the theologian judge 
what Luther may have meant by the expression. This is particularly important for 
understanding the JDDJ because, as Pieter de Witte argues, the JDDJ’s engagement with 
the simul is strongly marked by the Finnish insistence that both interpretations are 
necessary to understand Luther’s teaching on justification.74  
The rediscovery of the simul went through three stages. First, it was used by 
Catholic polemicists as an example of Luther’s incoherence.75 This can be set aside for 
the current project because these authors neither affect Lutheran interpretation of the 
simul nor correctly situate it within Luther’s theology. Second, the phrase was picked up 
in the German Lutherrennaissance, and was given its major exposition in terms of a totus 
iustus-totus peccator model that draws heavily on dialectical theology. Its emphasis on a 
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 Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ als Element der 
reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre – eine Entdeckung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Schneider and Wenz, 
Gerecht und Sünder zugliech?: 303–49. 
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 Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 198–200. 
75
 Specifically, H. Denifle and H. Grisar. See Hauschild, “Die Formel,” 316–18. 
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purely forensic justification separates growth in holiness strictly from the justification of 
the sinner. This is often paired with an insistence that the “faith” by which the Christian 
is saved can only be described as trust [fiducia]. The Christian truly remains unaltered by 
her justification by God, passively trusting that the promised salvation will come in the 
future. The Christian in this model is properly made holy after history rather than within 
it.  
More recently, a Finnish school of Luther interpretation has developed a different 
interpretation of the Reformer. It attempts to demonstrate that the standard German 
interpretation is overly-influenced by neo-Kantianism and therefore misinterprets Luther 
himself. They interpret Luther’s theology of justification in terms of a union with Christ, 
as a kind of theosis. The simul maintains a forensic totus-totus aspect, because the 
completion of justification remains a promise whose endpoint is in the future. The 
Christian is, therefore, peccator in re, iustus in spe, for she awaits her final justice.
76
 But 
the Finns insist that the simul must also describe the Christian as growing in holiness 
because the grace by which the Christian is justified and the gift by which she is 
sanctified are one: the Lord Jesus to whom she is joined. This requires understanding the 
Christian also as partim iustus and partim peccator. These two schools of Luther 
interpretation are both highly active in contemporary Lutheranism. The dialogue between 
them both illuminates the solution of the JDDJ and explains many of the criticisms levied 
against it. 
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 WA 56:269.30. 
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Faith: Assensus, Fiducia, Donum Christi 
It will be helpful to first clarify the question of how to understand the faith 
through which Christians are justified. Given the centrality of faith in Luther’s account of 
justification, this is no small question. It is also central to the Joint Declaration.
77
 Ted 
Peters delimits three different possible Lutheran interpretations of justifying faith: “(1) 
faith as belief; (2) faith as trust; and (3) faith as the indwelling presence of Christ.”78 Of 
course, no theological definition need choose one of these at the expense of the others. 
Faith can be defined to include all of these, even if theological weight is given to one or 
the other. But some theologies, specifically when considering justifying faith, do 
emphasize one or the other option to the exclusion of the others. In particular, theologians 
who insist on a purely forensic account of justification tend to limit justifying faith to 
fiducia, Peters’ second sense. These theologians do not see “human powerlessness … in 
relation to justification” as a problem to be overcome by God’s grace. 79 Instead, for them 
it is the solution to the problem of assurance. Because humans are powerless, they can 
only trust in God, and are thus freed from having to strive to earn God’s favor in any 
way. This version of Lutheran theology emphasizes trust in Christ to the extent that it 
drives out any possibility of human cooperation or even “any ‘transcendental’ view on 
grace, which emphasizes the non-exclusivity of grace and human action.”80 Any 
expectation that justification should produce a renewal in humans could be understood as 
                                                 
77
 The very purpose of the JDDJ includes articulating “a common understanding of our 
justification by God’s grace through faith in Christ” §5. 
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 Ted Peters, “The Heart of the Reformation Faith,” Dialog 44, no. 1 (2005): 6. 
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 JDDJ 4.1 Title. 
80
 Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 192. 
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an attempt to wrest control from God and thus as a repetition of the sin of Adam and 
Eve.
81
 
Such an interpretation may require rejecting the JDDJ. It would likely cause 
dissatisfaction with the description of §§31–33 and Annex §2 C–E with good cause. Also, 
as de Witte notes, if a theologian holds “that the human being is saved by fiducia alone, 
canon 20 [of session VI of the Council of Trent] indeed applies to them.”82 Wilfried 
Härle argues that this fiduciary understanding of faith, which he holds to be the Lutheran 
position, is also condemned by canons nine and twelve of the same session.
83
  
One of the ways of reading the difference between the Germans and the Finns is 
as precisely the difference between a merely fiduciary and a fiduciary-transformational 
account of justification. The JDDJ’s final version, while it draws from both Finnish and 
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 A similar claim is made by Jorg Baur and Notger Slenczka, “Lutherische Rechtfertigungslehre 
ohne das ‘Simul iustus et peccator’?”epd-Dokumentation no 43/99, (1999), 3–4. 
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 Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 204. That canon reads: “If anyone says that a 
justified man, however perfect he may be, is not bound to observe the commandments of God and of the 
Church but is bound only to believe, as if the Gospel were merely an absolute promise of eternal life 
without the condition that the commandments be observed, a.s.” DH 1570. 
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 Wilfried Härle, “Lutherische Formeln – tridentinisch interpretiert,” epd-Dokumentation no. 
43/99(1999):5. Available at http://goo.gl/a1xlEX. Accessed September 19, 2014. Härle points to Annex 
§2C as supporting canon 9, and to what he sees as a remaining unclarity in the JDDJ about the meaning of 
faith [glaube], that leaves the Tridentine condemnation of sola fiducia in place. This seems to be a 
reasonable reading of both the JDDJ and the council. The pertinent canons read as follows:  
Can. 9: “If anyone says that the sinner is justified by faith alone in the sense that nothing else is 
required by way of cooperation in order to obtain the grace of justification and that it is not at all 
necessary that he should be prepared and disposed by the movement of his will, a.s.” DH 1559 
Can. 12: If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than confidence [fiduciam] in the divine 
mercy that remits sins on account of Christ or that it is this confidence alone that justifies us, a.s.” DH 
1562. 
Another question that remains is that of what has changed since the sixteenth century. Have 
Lutherans recently reclaimed a more medieval interpretation of Luther instead of one which sought to root 
out any possible remaining Catholic tendencies? Or have Catholics grown to appreciate existential thinking 
in addition to (or in replacement of) their prior ontological thinking. O. H. Pesch clearly thinks some of the 
latter has happened, although not in a way that negates Trent. Pesch, “Simul iustus et peccator,” 165. Pieter 
de Witte questions the strength of categories that Pesch leans so heavily on in articulating the difference 
between Catholics and Lutherans. De Witte argues that the “existential” is always assumed by the 
“sapiential,” and thus in twentieth century ecumenical discussions, most of the movement towards 
consensus has been on the Lutheran side. Doctrine, Dynamic, Difference, 229–31. His assessment seems 
mostly reasonable, as long as the genuine movement of Catholic theology away from its former polemical 
positions is also acknowledged. 
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German suggestions for improvement, emphasizes trust in God while also insisting that 
the justification of the Christian has real effects in their life in history.  
German Model (totus-totus) 
As noted above, the discovery of the simul as a systematic principle for ordering 
Luther’s theory of justification dates to the early twentieth century, particularly among 
theologians who can be described as Lutherrenaissance or dialectical theologians.
84
 In its 
purest form, the picture that emerges is of the Christian as one who has received an 
entirely alien righteousness by imputation alone. Here, trust in Christ allows the Christian 
to exist in hope of a future sanctification on the basis of a past promise constituting his 
justification. The Christian is truly totus peccator (in re), and totus iustus (in spe). There 
are, however, at least two positions that can lead to this same allocution, one attempting 
to keep the Christian from trusting himself instead of Christ, and the second insisting that 
the remaining presence of sin in the Christian means that his life is not renewed this side 
of heaven. The first makes THE CHRISTIAN IS A SINNER a double-scope blend, the second 
a single-scope blend with the field of meanings determined by SINNER. In other words, in 
the first, the Christian’s life is interpreted in terms of the frames provided by both 
Christian justice and inadequacy under the law. In the second, sin determines the field of 
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 An excellent book-length study of the question of how God’s work in the Christian through 
Christ is understood by these theologians is provided by Risto Saarinnen, Gottes Wirken auf uns: Die 
tranzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung. (Veroffentlichungen des 
Instituts für Europaische Geschichte, Mainz, vol. 137; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Wiesbaden, 1989). A 
specific engagement with the development of the simul in these theologians is found in Wolf-Dieter 
Hauschild, “Die Formel ‘Gerecht und Sunder zugleich.’”  
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meanings within this world; even Christian justice does not truly exist before the 
resurrection.
85
  
The milder of these two positions finds any description of justification that does 
not entirely separate justification and sanctification to be in danger of leading the 
baptized person to trust in his own efforts instead of the gift of Christ.
86
 It may be willing 
to speak of the necessary renovation of life that follows from justification, but will place 
a sharp dividing line between this and the justification of the Christian, at least in terms 
of a terminological distinction. Thus, for Jaroslav Pelikan, to read the simul as “iustus in 
spe, peccator in re” means precisely that justification and sanctification must be 
differentiated.
87 
He emphasizes that the Formula of Concord rules out both 
Melanchthon’s intellectualism that obscured “the relation between justification and 
sanctification,” and Osiander’s mysticism “in which the tension of simul justus et 
peccator was resolved by reference to a mystic union between Christ and the believer.”88 
Pelikan links the formulation iustus in spe to the teaching that the iustitia under 
discussion is the iustitia Christi and as such does not yet belong to the person as 
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 The same difference could be expressed as saying that the first represents a proleptic 
eschatology, while the second is properly futurist. 
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 Thus, FC.SD.II.32: “It is correct to say that in this life believers who have become righteous 
through faith in Christ have first of all the righteousness of faith that is reckoned to them and then thereafter 
the righteousness of a new obedience or good works that are begun in them. But these two kinds of 
righteousness dare not be mixed with each other or simultaneously introduced into the article on 
justification by faith before God. For because this righteousness that is begun in us—this renewal—is 
imperfect and impure in this life because of our flesh, a person cannot use it in any way to stand before 
God’s judgment throne. Instead, only the righteousness of the obedience, suffering, and death of Christ, 
which is reckoned to faith, can stand before God’s tribunal. Even following their renewal, when they 
already are producing many good works and living the best kind of life, human beings please God, are 
acceptable to him, and receive adoption as children and heirs of eternal life only because of Christ’s 
obedience.” 
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 Jaroslav Pelikan, "Doctrine of Man in Lutheran Confessions," Lutheran Quarterly 2, no.1 
(1950): 42. 
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 Ibid., 43. 
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something proper to themselves. While Lutherans do sometimes speak as if the human is 
sinner now and justified later, Pelikan interprets this language as explicitly undercut by 
the synchroneity implied by the simul. The hope at stake here, then, must be that faith 
which the believer has in Christ which looks forward to its eventual freedom from all 
sinfulness. Thus, while justification and sanctification are separated terminologically, 
they must be related, for as Wenzel Lohff writes, “the peccator in re is iustus in spe, that 
is, in transcending hope …[which] grants a new beginning of lived-out salvation.”89  
For these theologians, then, there is no actual division between justification as 
promise and the renovation of life that it grants by God’s grace in Christ through the 
Spirit. Because “sin is that which is not in accord with God’s law,” anything that is not in 
accord with that law makes the Christian a sinner and worthy of damnation, including the 
bound presence of concupiscence and any actual sins. The call to grow in holiness has as 
its endpoint the promise of complete sinlessness, but that endpoint remains on the other 
side of the resurrection.
90
 For this position, there are still sins that can separate the 
Christian from Christ in this life: in particular, these are sins against faith, in which the 
Christian begins to trust in himself, ceases to ask forgiveness, and thus repeats the sin of 
Adam. One can recognize the resulting “feigned, dead faith” specifically because it has 
not resulted “in all kinds of good works and fruits of the Spirit.”91 
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 Wenzel Lohff, “Justification and Anthropology,” Currents in Theology and Mission, 44 (1), 34. 
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 Again, here the endpoint is Augustine’s description of final justice as non posse peccare 
([being] unable to sin). Luther’s insistence that baptism does not make the Christian truly posse non 
peccare (able not to sin), does not undercut the shared sense that the Christian life begun in baptism is a life 
of fighting against sin with its endpoint in the final justice of heaven. What differentiates Luther is his rigor 
in naming as sin not only that which of itself separates from God, but everything that does not live up to 
God’s desire for the renewed Christian. 
91
 FC SD III.42, summarizing the teaching of AAC IV. 
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The second position sets up an extreme dialectic which not only differentiates 
between justification and sanctification, but also insists that there can be no relationship 
between them; any attention to sanctification can only endanger the Christian’s ability to 
trust in Christ alone. As any remaining sin makes the Christian a sinner, sanctification is 
an entirely future hope that takes place in heaven. This takes Luther’s unwillingness to 
differentiate between kinds or grades of sin very seriously but does not attend to the 
implications he draws from the difference between “ruled” and “unruled” sin, that is, 
between sin in the Christian and in the unbaptized. Nevertheless, there are Lutheran 
theologians for whom any language of progress or gradation is entirely out of bounds and 
likely to encourage Christians to trust in their own progress for their salvation.
92
  
One question that needs to be asked is the extent to which this latter 
understanding develops from a problematic methodological heritage of the 
Lutherrenaissance. Insofar as Luther’s own work is interpreted as incompletely reformed, 
as containing remaining traditionalisms in need of purgation, the historical Catholic 
position can only be the foil against which a truly reformed theology is defined.
93
 There 
will, therefore, be an unbridgeable methodological impasse between a theology that 
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 One example, who will become important in what follows, is Gerhard Forde, an American 
Lutheran theologian who taught at Luther Seminary, St. Paul. The reason that such language is out of 
bounds is the nature of justification in Forde’s view. Because justification is entirely God’s work, Forde 
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See Saarinnen, Gottes Wirken, 113–18. 
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insists on any reverence for the Tridentine canons and a theology which sees itself as 
Christian to the extent that it has overcome them.
94
 Moreover, if Luther’s reformation 
insight is incompletely developed in his own theology or in the Reformation theology of 
his time, then there is little basis on which to judge between contemporary Lutheran 
theologies, except in how far they have transcended the dead theologies of the past.  
The Finnish Luther School (totus-totus and partim-partim) 
The Finnish school’s insistence that in Luther’s thought “grace” and “gift” can be 
distinguished but not separated also means that the same is true of justification and 
sanctification. The Christian is still totus iustus-totus peccator, insofar as she is 
considered from the standpoint of justification, for she is saved entirely on account of 
Christ and her own being is never sufficient for salvation. But she is also partim iustus-
partim peccator when considered in terms of the process of healing resulting from her 
union with Christ. This requires a differentiated understanding of sin that more closely 
approximates Luther’s as described above. For Mannermaa, because the sin remaining in 
Christians is a ruled sin, they will feel desire, but need not “fulfill” it.95 Even in cases 
where they do, he finds a distinction in Luther between such sin when it occurs “out of 
weakness” and “deliberately.” The first is forgiven by God, but the second is not because 
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 Elements of this impasse can be seen in the discussion regarding fiducia and the Tridentine 
canons, especially insofar as LK can be interpreted as suggesting that the Roman position has come to 
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Dynamic, Difference, 193. 
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response to the JDDJ. “Report” (March 31, 1998), Hauschild C.10.c.381. It references the Large 
Catechism, Creed 55, Lord’s Prayer 107; and the Augsburg Confession II.38–40. 
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they no longer “regard sin as sin.”96 The latter truly deprives the Christian of the justice 
he had formerly had in Christ, because he has ceased calling to Christ for mercy.
97
  
The Lutheran Eschatological Visions: Outlining the Blends 
That the Lutheran teaching has an eschatological aspect is clear; the Christian is 
called simul iustus et peccator precisely because God’s promise in Christ makes present 
their final eschatological justice in a still incomplete way. The teaching would merely be 
a counsel of despair without its eschatological horizon.
98
 It is important to diagram the 
blends by which this eschatological vision of the Christian is defined so as to both clarify 
the Lutheran position for Catholics and to show Lutherans how their habitual forms of 
expression are part of the differentiated consensus in the JDDJ. This section will be 
somewhat more complex in its structure than the parallel section in the previous chapter 
because there is not a single Lutheran vision of how the baptized Christian is to be 
understood. Instead, there are several eschatological visions that have been incorporated 
into the JDDJ and will require disentangling.  
This section will proceed as follows: First, I will diagram the metaphoric blend 
SIN in the two different ways Luther engages its definition. Next, I will describe the 
implications of framing this blend for sin within Luther’s distinction between law and 
gospel. Finally, I will return to the Finnish and German schools of Luther interpretation 
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and describe the operative eschatological blends related to the simul. This will set up the 
following section, in which these positions will be traced through the Joint Declaration 
itself.  
The Complex Lutheran Blend SIN 
Luther’s definition of sin, extensively operative in the Lutheran tradition, names 
sin to be “that which is not in accord with God’s law.”99 Taken as an operative cognitive 
blend, this assertion not only explains why Lutherans describe concupiscence in the 
baptized as sin, but it clarifies the distinctively Lutheran simul iustus et peccator that 
underlies Lutheran eschatological descriptions of the baptized. The first thing the reader 
should notice is how much broader this metaphoric blend is than that generally assumed 
by Catholic theology when speaking of sin properly: SIN IS CAUSE FOR DISINHERITANCE. 
Luther’s disinclination to systematically differentiate between what Catholics term mortal 
and venial sin, or between actual sin and concupiscence in the baptized is reasonable in 
his operative blend.
100
 It would not be in the habitual Roman Catholic blend. In that 
context, it would imply that the Christian could not be saved and therefore that God’s 
promise is empty.  
Moreover, because ruled sin is experienced as being something that is part of the 
baptized, its very presence is evidence that the Christian is not yet what she is to become. 
Here, anything that is not fully redeemed and entirely purged of its fallen character is still 
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 Luther, Against Latomus, WA 8:83.29: “id quod non est secundum legem dei.”  
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 Luther, and Lutherans, as has been seen, have all of these distinctions (or at least functional 
parallels to them). What differs is that while venial sin and concupiscence in the baptized are merely 
analogously sin for Roman Catholics, they are proper members of the category in the Lutheran schema. See 
p. 211above. 
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properly sinful. This does not imperil the Christian’s hope of salvation, because the 
presence of sin is not the only word to be said about the Christian. It is not even the most 
important thing to be said. In what seems to be a paradoxical turn-about from the 
Catholic viewpoint, precisely because the Christian experiences himself to be a sinner, he 
can hope in Christ and trust in the gift of salvation. Trusting in the promise of Christ 
means that the Christian is freed from having to reach the impossible standard of 
sinlessness and freed for the battle to finally kill sin that continues after it is caged. 
This is precisely where the Lutheran differentiation between law and gospel 
comes into play. Remember that in the preface to the Lectures on Galatians, Luther 
distinguished between two kinds of righteousness: the “righteousness of the law,” and the 
“righteousness of faith,” or “Christian righteousness.”101 This distinction plays a central 
role not only in Luther’s description of how the Christian is made just before God, but 
also in speaking about sin. Because of this, the initial blend (SIN IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN 
ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW) will be considered in two stages. I will first develop a 
description of the blend SIN specifically as related to the righteousness of the law apart 
from Christ. This will carry over into the second consideration of sin in the Christian in 
light of the gospel. Finally, how these pieces are held together will be differentiated 
related to the two major schools of Luther interpretation with which this chapter has been 
dealing.  
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 WA 40i.40.15–30. “iustitia legalis seu decalogi” and “fidei seu Christiana Iustitia.” Luther 
actually distinguished between four kinds of righteousness in the Preface of Galatians. The remaining two, 
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SIN IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW 
The basic frame of Luther’s simple definition is that of law, specifically the 
Mosaic law. In Against Latomus, he defines sin: “sin is truly nothing other than that 
which is not in accord with God’s law.”102 In the Preface to the Lectures on Galatians, he 
describes a “righteousness of the law or of the Decalogue, which Moses teaches.”103 
Together, these produce a simplex network for the blend SIN of which an initial depiction 
might look like this (Fig. V-1):
104
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 WA 8:83.2829: “Peccatum vero aliud nihil est, quam id quod non est secundum legem dei.”  
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 WA 40.40.26, “iustitia legalis seu decalogi quam Moses docet.” 
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 As a reminder, “a simplex network involves two input spaces, one that contains a frame with 
roles and another that contains values. What makes this an integration network is that it gives rise to a 
blended space containing emergent structure that is neither of the input spaces taken individually.” Vyvyan 
Evans, Glossary, 197. In this case, the frame of divine law is combined to particular human actions, desires, 
deeds, etc., to produces an understanding of sin that is any deviation from the (high) standards of that law, 
thereby effectively ruling all human beings sinners. 
Figure V- 1 
Simplex Network 
SIN IS ANYTHING NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW 
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Sin is the condition of all who are not fully righteous, who do not constantly demonstrate 
perfect love of God and neighbor. The righteousness of the law is, frankly, impossible to 
attain as Luther frames it. It is, however, not the only righteousness that Christians 
preach.
105
 This second righteousness, “Christian Righteousness,” is a divine gift given on 
account of Christ’s obedience. It works a real change in the Christian, although not 
immediately or in such a way as to give the Christian a righteousness she could possess 
apart from Christ. The change that it works introduces a second metaphoric engagement 
(really a double-scope blending of two metaphors) with “ruled sin,” that is, the remaining 
sin in the Christian that is still a deviation from the divine law given through Moses, but 
which is no longer able to separate the Christian from Christ, or to terrify his conscience. 
“RULED SIN” IS SICKNESS BEING HEALED AND A CAGED ROBBER 
The addition of Christian righteousness fundamentally alters Luther’s description 
of sin. While the remaining tendencies to sin in Christians are still to be called “sin” 
because they are still not in accord with God’s law, they are unable to harm the Christian 
because of Christ’s work. Two metaphors arise. Each emphasizes both Christ’s work for 
the Christian and the ongoing danger of turning away from Christ. The first of these, 
from the Romans Lectures, is of the Christian as a sick person under a doctor’s care.106 
Sickness remains, but the patient can trust in the promised healing despite the remaining 
pain, difficulty, and symptoms. It should be remembered that it is in this context that 
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 As Luther argues in the Galatians Lectures, both active and passive righteousness are necessary 
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Luther describes the Christian as peccator in re, iustus in spe, that is, as experiencing her 
ongoing failure to be what God desires for her, but trusting in God’s healing. 
Sickness provides an apt comparison to sin. It is something somewhat mysterious 
in the person that causes them to act in a way that they do not wish. Convalescing can 
also be a long and mysterious process that requires trust on the part of the patient — 
especially in the late medieval era of Luther’s writing.107 Who the doctor is is incredibly 
important. Trusting the wrong doctor can be deadly. There is little way for the layperson 
to know how treatment is progressing before it is completed. Consider, for example, the 
tendency in our own day for patients to not complete courses of antibiotics because they 
start to feel better, leading to both personal relapses into illness and to the development of 
drug-resistant strains that can harm others. 
In the Anti-Latomus, Luther adds another metaphor, that of the caged robber.
108
 
Here the remaining sin is personalized and given an agency of its own, albeit a limited 
one. Here we encounter something resembling Augustine’s distinction between the 
unbaptized as “non posse non peccare,” and the baptized as “posse non peccare,”109 
although Luther would not draw the implication that a Christian who does not give in to 
the wheedling of the caged robber is sinless. Sin is still “in” the Christian, and imprisoned 
only by the power of Christ. The Christian remains unable to stand before God on his 
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own. He is thus is still a sinner, even if it is possible to withstand the cajoling of the 
robber caged by Christ’s power. These two images complement each other well. The 
personal aspect of the second augments the directionality of the first. Christ is removing 
sin from the Christian so that in the final remaking of all things she will be able to stand 
before God and will truly be non posse peccare, and therefore not be a sinner. But in the 
meantime, it “is prowling around like a roaring lion looking for [someone] to devour.”110 
Moreover, both give a primary role to Christ and a secondary role to the Christian, and 
both are rooted in faith. As the patient must trust the doctor, the deputy must trust the 
sheriff against the wheedling of the captured robber’s protestations of innocence.111  
Sketching out the blend, it might look like this (Fig. V-2):  
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Figure V- 2 
Complex Blending Network 
RULED SIN IN THE CHRISTIAN 
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Interpretive Frame: LAW AND GOSPEL 
This blend, however, must be interpreted within the frame of the two kinds of 
righteousness developed in the Lectures on Galatians. The Christian always remains a 
sinner in the first sense (SIN IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW) 
throughout the entirety of his or her earthly life. But Christ’s justice is the justice of the 
Christian, and so she is justified before God. Sin is being put to death in her. Luther’s 
insistence that sin remains in the Christian implies neither what Leo X’s thinks in 
Exsurge Domine, namely that the Christian is barred from salvation,
112
 nor the concern of 
Trent that Luther’s doctrine would lead to lawlessness or a disregard for the law of 
Christ.
113
 The Christian is justified in Christian righteousness and is required to follow 
the commands of God made both through Moses and Christ. But it is not by following 
this law that the Christian is made just, instead it is by God’s grace [favor] in Christ. The 
law retains its proper dominion only over the flesh.
114
  
God’s gift [donum] allows the remaining sinfulness to be put to death daily. Thus, 
even though a Christian must follow Christ’s commands, pursue the righteousness of the 
law and a ceremonial and legal righteousness, he will never reach a state of justice by 
these efforts which would suffice for his salvation. To begin to trust in one’s own justice 
is to go off one’s meds or to open the cage holding the robber. Even a weakened robber 
or a partially-healed sickness will still overwhelm the Christian. There is progression in 
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holiness, but not in such a way as to give the Christian a means of standing before God’s 
judgment apart from Christ. 
Two Eschatological Double Visions 
These blends for sin, framed in terms of law and gospel, can produce several 
eschatological visions of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator. In this section, I will 
chart those blends and relate this to the relationship between justification and 
sanctification and how the Christian is understood as simul totus iustus et totus peccator 
(and/or) simul partim iustus et partim peccator.  
Totus-Totus  
The totus-totus interpretation of the phrase is often understood in terms of 
Luther’s variant expression peccator in re, et iustus in spe, and that in a very particular 
sense.
115
 It heeds Luther’s warning to be careful to properly distinguish between 
justification and sanctification,
116
 particularly as that distinction is later interpreted in the 
Formula of Concord.
117
 Because the sin related to justification is understood through 
Luther’s first blend for SIN (SIN IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW), the 
Christian will always be a sinner in the sense that there will always be aspects of his life 
and person that are not in accord with God’s desire for his final justice. Even though God 
gives the Christian the gift (donum) such that they begin to heal, the presence of that 
which is not in accord with the divine law means that they will always be a sinner in this 
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life. The implication drawn from this is that justification can only be properly talked 
about in terms of Christian hope or a forensic imputation for the sake of Christ.  
To provide a depiction of this understanding requires two networks that do not 
interact with each other. The Christian is simul only in the sense that it is the same person 
considered in two different ways (Fig. V-3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This, of course, meshes well with a dialectical theology, for the historical, sinful 
existence of the Christian is held in an unresolved tension with her otherworldly, 
eschatological recovery. The Christian possesses Christ’s justice only by faith, and any 
attempt to be just apart from that faith runs the risk of repudiating faith and falling away 
from God’s imputation, thus becoming only a sinner.  
Partim-Partim  
The insistence that Christ is both God’s grace (favor) and gift (donum) leads to a 
more complex eschatological vision that holds sanctification and justification in a real 
Figure V- 3 
Two Single-Scope Blends 
Simul totus iustus et totus peccator 
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relationship.
118
 In this vision, it is possible to say that by God’s grace, the Christian is 
progressing in holiness, although whatever holiness they are able to achieve through that 
grace remains dependent on God’s ongoing action, not merely on his initial gift. Here, we 
can depict the Christian as partim iustus et partim peccator. This eschatological vision 
seeks to describe the Christian as on the trajectory of justification. It is not separable from 
the blend depicted immediately above just as Luther’s blend for RULED SIN (SICKNESS 
BEING HEALED AND A CAGED ROBBER), presupposes his basic blend for SIN. Sin remains 
sin during the process of its healing. Although it does not separate the Christian from 
God, sin does not become an indifferent thing. 
David Yeago has argued that for Luther, the totus-totus aspect of the simul 
actually finds its basis in the partim-partim aspect. Because remaining sin can be 
understood as a sickness, or even an injury, Christians are  
said to be righteous and sinners totaliter in more or less the way in which we say 
‘so-and-so has been injured’ when actually only ‘part’ of the person has been 
injured. Because sin is ‘partially’ present within them, therefore the faithful, so to 
speak as concrete human wholes, are rightly called ‘sinners altogether.’ Yet 
because they have been partly healed, the same human beings are at the same time 
equally truly said to be ‘totally righteous persons’ by divine imputation. 
Therefore, on the basis of the ‘partial’ simul, the same persons are said to be 
wholly righteous and wholly sinful at the same time – but diverso respectu, in 
diverse respects.
119
 
Here we see the complexity of Luther’s engagement with the Christian life, rooted in his 
eschatological understanding of the baptized person. The Christian participates in Christ, 
who is her justification and her healing. This healing continues throughout her life as a 
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trajectory towards her final redemption. It occurs as a result of her state of union with 
Christ that was effected once in baptism and which can be said therefore to be complete.  
This means that the eschatological double-vision by which the Christian is 
understood is no simple pair of single-scope blends that operate in different modes of 
thought. Instead, the Christian is both totus iustus et totus peccator as understood through 
the blends for SIN described above, along with being on the way to the final goal that is 
already made present by Christ’s merit. As Yeago argues, “neither of these forms of the 
simul can be rightly understood only by contrast with the other; they both presuppose a 
more basic state of affairs, the union of the believer with Jesus Christ by faith.
120
 
Forensic imputation does not leave the Christian unchanged, although the process 
of transformation will never be complete in this life. It is, therefore, not merely forensic 
imputation in the way that that term has been diametrically opposed to transformative 
models of justification. The Christian, inaugurated at baptism into the fight against sin, 
returns daily to Christ in contrition, asking forgiveness and for the ongoing healing that 
will eventually produce what we might equate with Trent’s formal cause of justification, 
i.e. God’s desire for the Christian’s final redeemed form. Drawing this complex blend 
rooted in Christ’s person might look something like this (Fig. V-4):  
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Here we see the Christian’s life as entirely caught up in God’s action in Christ. Apart 
from Christ, all that can be said is that she is entirely a sinner, for both grace and gift are 
lacking. With Christ, the Christian is both already named just and still in the process of 
being made just, a process that will find its completion in her resurrection. 
Conflicts with the Perceived Catholic Position 
The Lutheran blends for sin do not easily mesh with the habitual Catholic ways of 
speaking, as described in the previous chapter. While many of the same issues are at 
stake, such as how to account for both the Gospel promise of salvation in Jesus and the 
ongoing struggle with sin, the modes of discourse are significantly different. Lutherans 
historically see the Catholic insistence that baptism entirely purges the Christian of sin as 
not having enough respect for the power that sin retains in the lives of Christians. Others 
have worried that even the Christian use of the sacraments as means of grace could 
devolve into a cycle of works-righteousness by which Christians seek to earn their 
Figure V- 4 
Complex Blending Network 
Totus-Totus and Partim-Partim 
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salvation. The blends that we have been developing in these chapters can illuminate why 
this (apparent) division arises and help show how the JDDJ overcomes the differences. 
 The Roman Catholic insistence that the sacrament accomplishes something 
complete, as detailed in the previous chapter, leads to a blend SIN in which only that 
which separates from God can properly be called sin (Fig. IV-2). In the Tridentine use, 
sin is properly that which divides the Christian from Christ. Venial sins and remaining 
concupiscence, therefore, are sins only analogically. The Lutherans begin at a different 
place, and therefore end up with a different blend. Sin is most properly anything that is 
contradictory to the divine will. There are connections: Luther would agree, for example, 
that the sin in the Christian is just cause for disinheritance, but he does not assume that its 
presence in the Christian means her damnation, as Catholics tended to understand him to 
be saying.
121
 Also like Trent, Luther approaches the question of sin by examining the 
pattern of human redemption. Both look within themselves and recognize remaining 
disordered desires. The council fathers rule them to be not-properly sin because they 
cannot harm the Christian who does not consent; Luther instead finds in them evidence 
that he does not yet entirely love God. 
  This can also be described as a difference in the implications that they draw from 
the sacramental renewal affected by baptism. Trent protects this renewal by declaring that 
nothing remaining in the Christian is hateful to God, while acknowledging that the 
remaining concupiscence does not represent God’s final desire for the Christian.122 True 
sin is a stain that is removed by baptism. For Luther, on the other hand, true sin remains 
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in the Christian; it is a sickness needing healing and a crafty robber who, though 
imprisoned, is deadly.
123
 His complex manner of insisting that justification is relationship 
to Christ, can develop the blend described in Fig. V-4. Here, the remaining anti-divine 
tendencies [Gottwidrigkeiten] can be named sin (as in his first blend) while insisting that 
this sin is progressively being destroyed. The Christian becomes more and more just in 
this life moving towards a completion in the next. Luther’s blend, however, prevents any 
description of this process without direct and ongoing reference to Christ’s work. 
Lutherans’ discomfort with the Catholic manner of speaking can often be expressed as a 
worry that once baptism has occurred, the Christian is on her own to work out her own 
salvation in fear and trembling, apart from Christ.
124
 As baptism is incorporation into 
Christ’s body, this is also impossible in the Catholic blend. It is, however, not as 
explicitly present as it is in the Lutheran blend.  
The Simul in the JDDJ 
Most of the attention given to the simul is found in Section 4.4 of the JDDJ, 
(§§28–30, “The Justified as Sinner”), and in Annex §2A–B. These sections are carefully 
crafted and show an intriguing parallelism in their treatment of the Roman Catholic and 
Lutheran positions, noted by Pieter de Witte. In each section, there are  
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no less than three of what are almost verbal parallels: (1) The Christian is no 
longer separated from God, (2) what remains in the Christian that is in opposition 
to God does not deserve eternal punishment and (3) sins are forgiven in the daily 
return to baptism (Lutheran) and in the Sacrament of Penance (Roman Catholic, 
in the case of mortal sins).
125
 
This strong parallelism is the fruit of the careful work of decades of bilateral dialogues.
126
 
The distinguishing paragraphs, however, are themselves framed by a common statement 
in which justification and sanctification are held together as equal fruits of baptism, 
played out in the ongoing drama of Christian life: 
We confess together that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, 
justifies, and truly renews the person. But the justified must all through life 
constantly look to God’s unconditional justifying grace. They are also 
continuously exposed to the power of sin still pressing its attacks (cf. Rom 6:12–
14) and are not exempt from a lifelong struggle against the contradiction to God 
within the selfish desires of the old Adam (see Gal 5:16; Rom 7:7–10). The 
justified must ask God daily for forgiveness, as in the Lord’s prayer (Mt. 6:12; 1 
Jn 1:9), are ever again called to conversion and penance, and are ever again 
granted forgiveness.
127
  
In a sense, this paragraph is exemplary of the JDDJ’s tendencies, because it draws 
heavily on the prior dialogues while shifting the framing slightly. The framing sentence 
that holds justification and renewal together is not found in the first two drafts of the 
JDDJ. Both JDDJ I and JDDJ II begin with a version of what is now the second sentence, 
pointing to the necessity of God’s unconditional justifying grace.128 The final framing 
makes explicit the influence of the developing Lutheran willingness to speak of 
justification and sanctification as related, while still distinguishing them. This remains 
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controversial, however. This sentence provides an insight into both the reasons the JDDJ 
is possible and into the discomfort some Lutherans have with its conclusions. 
An Uneasy Intra-Lutheran Consensus 
Section 4.4 of the JDDJ underwent significant revision in response to the LWF 
member churches’ responses. The German and Finnish theological tendencies were well 
represented in these responses, pulling in somewhat different directions. The final form 
of the JDDJ section 4.4 makes explicit use of the totus-totus terminology, and explicitly 
stipulates that because the sin in the Christian is “‘ruled’ by Christ with whom the 
justified are bound in faith … Christians can in part lead a just life.”129 Here we have 
precisely the language of a partim-partim understanding.  
The latter sentence derives from a proposal of the German National Committee in 
response to JDDJ II. It, however, greatly changes the emphasis of that proposal. They had 
suggested the addition of the following:  
[The Christian] is just, because God forgives him his sin and promises him 
Christ’s righteousness. Regarding his own thoughts and deeds, however, he is a 
sinner, incessantly requiring the justifying grace of God, and, as long as he 
remains on Earth, he only begins to live a piecemeal life of justice.
130
 
While either is compatible with what we have charted above as a Lutheran understanding 
of the daily death of sin in the Christian, the original text is much less optimistic about 
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the Christian life, while the final form of the JDDJ may leave some room to expect real 
progress by Christ’s mercy.  
 The Finnish response makes these connections clear. It begins by describing sin in 
the baptized from the standpoint of the Confessions, demonstrating that there is a 
Lutheran tradition of differentiating between temptation as non-damning sin (because 
while these are not consented to, they remain opposed to God’s will) and actual sin 
requiring forgiveness.
131
 They then stipulate, on the basis of a report of the Finnish 
Bishops’ Conference, that for Lutherans the 
total nature of justification and sin ‘is to be understood correctly only if the partial 
perspective is also borne in mind: Christ’s indwelling of the believer also means 
that the righteousness of the believer is only incipient righteousness, but this 
incipient righteousness God counts as perfect righteousness for Christ’s sake.’132 
These two positions, while they differ in tone, do seem to agree that the Christian cannot 
be merely portrayed as totus iustus-totus peccator, unless that is also connected to the 
ongoing renovation of life that Christ begins with baptism and continues in the life of the 
Christian. It is no mistake that the JDDJ regularly approaches the questions of Catholic 
and Lutheran difference on these questions from the perspective of justification as 
“forgiveness of sins and making righteous.”133 
This means that there are some historically extant Lutheran positions that are not 
compatible with the agreement reached in the JDDJ. A theology that insists on justifying 
faith as only fiducia and links this to an understanding of the simul in which the Christian 
cannot be said to progress in righteousness by God’s grace in this life cannot accept the 
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JDDJ as it is written. Such a theology would place the entire renovation of the Christian 
life in the eschaton, because to speak of any human participation in this world would be 
to negate the gospel proclamation.
134
 It also accepts the historical distinction between 
Lutherans as proclaiming a merely forensic justification as opposed to a Roman Catholic 
transformational account. 
Nevertheless, the Lutheran position as articulated in the JDDJ has room for some 
breadth of interpretation, allowing not only the Mannermaa school’s strong account of 
justification as theosis, but also providing room for Lutheran theologies that place more 
emphasis on forensic imputation, as long as that imputation will have consequences in the 
Christian life. Luther’s own emphasis on seeking holiness and confessing sins makes this 
interpretation of forensic imputation fairly widespread.
135
  
Representative Lutheran Critics of the JDDJ 
This present project cannot respond to all the critics of the JDDJ; I will therefore 
respond to two voices that became important in the first and second chapters of this work. 
Daphne Hampson rejected the JDDJ’s solution because it failed to harmonize the 
“divergent structures” of Lutheran and Catholic belief. Her description of Lutheran 
theology is strongly influenced by Gerhard Forde, and absolutizes a totus-totus dialectical 
model of Lutheran thought. Second, the critique leveled by the faculty of Concordia 
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Seminary, Fort Wayne, Indiana, is representative of the responses of many self-identified 
Confessional Lutherans. 
Daphne Hampson  
Daphne Hampson’s critique of the Joint Declaration was first studied in terms of 
her expectations regarding consensus in ecumenical dialogue.
136
 This section will 
examine her direct engagement with, and rejection of, the differentiated consensus of the 
JDDJ. This rejection is based on her contention that Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism 
represent not merely two Christianities, but two opposing faiths structured in radically 
different ways. Lutheranism, she argues,  
is built around a dialectic. One way of speaking of that dialectic is captured by the 
phrase justification by faith. Justification by faith creates a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ (the 
dialectic). In saying that we are justified by trusting in Christ, we are saying that 
we are not justified by anything about the way we are. It is the dialectic itself 
which is important, structuring Lutheran faith. This dialectic is understood over 
against law, revelation over against reason, and faith over against works. Every 
theological idea finds its place in relation to this dialectic.
137
 
This is contrasted with a Catholicism she describes as “linear,” in which the human, 
transformed by grace, comes eventually “to be able to stand before God on account of his 
merits.”138 This difference leads to a difference between Lutherans and Catholics 
regarding sin(s). Catholics, according to Hampson, speak of sins in the plural, as moral 
infractions, the “obverse of justice,” and a lack of being. This last description means that 
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God can only love humans to the extent that they are sinless. Lutherans, she argues, only 
speak of sin in the singular as damning, for by this they mean a lack of faith. Sins, she 
argues, cannot separate the Christian from God in Lutheran theology. God therefore loves 
sinners as sinners, and this for Lutherans is the Gospel.
139
 
 There is a great deal to be clarified in this description. In order to engage it, it will 
be necessary to sort out two separate claims: first, that Lutheranism is “built around a 
dialectic” of the kind she proposes; second, that the distinction related to sin and being is 
actually present in the distinction between Lutherans and Catholics, and therefore its lack 
in the JDDJ constitutes a failure to properly engage the two traditions. 
The Lutheran Dialectic 
 In one sense, Hampson’s claim that Lutheranism is structured by a dialectic, 
sometimes known as “justification by faith” and variously described as law/gospel, 
faith/works, revelation/reason, is entirely uncontroversial. There are many Lutheran 
theologians who have systematized Lutheranism in precisely this way, particularly since 
the Lutherrenaissance of the early twentieth century.
140
 Hampson’s dialectician of choice 
is Gerhard Forde, and she describes his theology reasonably well, namely that the 
Christian proclamation creates a fundamental break between the world as it is and as it 
will be. Justification by faith means a new creation of the person in Christ, which for now 
we only possess in faith (and hope). Thus, Forde describes the relationship of 
sanctification and justification in this way: 
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The justification given is a total state, a complete, unconditional gift. From that 
point of view true sanctification is simply to ‘shut up and listen!’ For there can be 
no more sanctification than where every knee bends and every mouth is silent 
before God, the only Holy One. And God is revered as the Holy One only where 
the sinner, the real sinner, stands still at the place where God enters the scene and 
speaks. That is the place where the sinner must realize that his or her way is at an 
end. Only those who are so grasped that they stand still here and confess to sin 
and give God the glory, only they are ‘sanctified.’ And there cannot be more 
sanctification than that! Whoever knows this knows that there is an end to the old, 
there is a death involved, and that this being a Christian means ever and anew to 
be blasted by that divine lightning (for we always forget it) and to begin again.
141
 
Here we see a strongly eschatological vision of the Christian, within a very particular 
eschatology. History is not sublated in this eschatology, nor is it redeemed. It is ended so 
that a new creation can take its place. Thus, there can be no progress in the Christian life 
beyond the single moment of realizing God’s new beginning and returning to it. 
Hampson narrates this as a rejection of any continuity between the fallen world and the 
new creation, instead preferring to speak of continuity between Eden and the new 
world.
142
  
What is unclear in this structure is how the Christian is in any sense different from 
the catechumen. In other words, does God do something in baptism that goes beyond the 
promise that is offered broadly in the proclamation of the Cross? If not, there would be 
the danger that Jesus’ own command to baptize is merely a work of law, and therefore an 
unacceptable works-righteousness if it has any relationship to salvation.
143
 It is clear that 
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about history. While he is expressing his point in terms of the church, it is equally true in terms of the 
renewal of the person. “It is a measure of the depth of our dissensus that it takes off from the theological 
definition of the gospel itself: evangelical catholics deny to begin with that the gospel is properly 
understood as a limit in Professor Forde’s sense. That is to say, it is not the office of the gospel to put an 
end to history, but rather to initiate and sustain a new history. The gospel is thus not only spoken in history, 
but is itself historical, a socially embodied word which has a history, a word whose reality penetrates 
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for Luther, and for many contemporary Lutheran theologians, this is not the case —the 
Christian is told to return to baptism so as to be made holy.  
Here we find an important divide within contemporary Lutheranism, exemplified 
by the theologies of Forde and David S. Yeago. Where for Forde the eschaton provides a 
limit for Christian life, ending any attempts at progress in holiness, for Yeago it provides 
a renewal.
144
 This distinction creates a further difference as to what holiness is. For 
Forde, it is an internal recognition that only God is God. For Yeago, it must also have 
implications for the way the Christian acts. Justification is the beginning of a new life 
that, while it will not immediately make the Christian finally holy or somehow 
independent of Christ, will result in her progress in holiness. The old man is to be daily 
put to death and the sickness of sin is to be healed by Christ with the Christian’s 
cooperation.
145
  
                                                                                                                                                 
earthly-historical space and extends through earthly-historical time. For evangelical catholics, then, the 
eschatological reality, the gospel together with the faith it engenders, is not the termination of history, but 
historical existence made new, the kingdom of God taking form, however provisionally, in earthly space 
and time and assimilating to itself human life in all its social and historical density.” Yeago, “Theological 
Impasse,” 40. 
144
 Ibid. See also the discussion of Yeago’s position in the section on partim-partim 
understandings of the simul, above at p. 289.  
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 Those positing a radical break from history can read these texts about putting the old man to 
death, but they must read them as a call to put to death their own striving. Similarly, the Christian can be 
told to return to baptism as a place of realizing God’s gift. These, then, represent an entirely internal 
transformation, which explains the Finn’s contention that such Lutheranisms are overly determined by the 
neo-Kantian insistence that we cannot know things in themselves, but only their effects upon us. 
Justification by faith understood purely as a new understanding of God’s new relationship to us stands in 
contrast with what they see as the actual union of the believer with Christ, which has the necessary effect 
also of the sanctification of the believer in this world. Notice that for Forde, (n. 150 above), sanctification 
itself is an internal attitude of reverence for God. 
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Sin and God’s Love 
Hampson’s understanding of Lutheranism, Catholicism, and their difference 
results in her particular understanding of sin and justification, that is, of what she thinks 
Luther means by simul iustus et peccator. Engaging the Joint Declaration 4.4 directly she 
argues:  
the problem is that, structurally, Lutherans are saying that God accepts us simply 
as we are, qua sinners: they are speaking relationally. Whereas within 
Catholicism it must be said that the person is in some way like God, that is to say 
not a sinner, for it is axiomatic that if one is in relationship to God (that is to say 
‘not separated from God’) it could not be that one is a sinner.146 
There are serious problems throughout this paragraph. First of all, the Lutheran 
understanding, or at least Luther’s understanding, is not that God approves of sinners qua 
sinners. Indeed sinners are justified by a new relationship to God, but it is a relationship 
grounded in and inseparable from the person of Christ to whom Christians are joined by 
baptism and faith.
147
 It is Christ’s goodness that the Father loves, Christ’s obedience that 
is reckoned to sinners, and Christ’s sonship that constitutes their relationship to God. 
Within Luther’s understanding of sin, to say that God accepts sinners qua sinners, would 
be to say that the doctor accepts the patient’s disease or the sheriff accepts the bandit’s 
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 Hampson, 209. 
147
 In fact, if Luther does not intend to say this, then precisely his insistence that concupiscence in 
Christians is real sin that is being purged by Christ is nonsensical. Luther makes the point numerous times 
in the Lectures on Romans and Galatians, but perhaps this is clearest, (lecturing on Gal 4:6): “We ought 
therefore believe with certainty that not only our office please God, but also our person: whatever each one 
says, does, or thinks to himself is pleasing to God, not because of ourselves, but on account of Christ, 
whom we believe was made subject to the law for us. But we are certain that Christ is pleasing to God and 
is holy, etc. To the extent therefore that Christ is pleasing and we cling to him, so far also do we please God 
and are holy.”  
“Ideo statuere certo debemus non solum officium nostrum placer Deo, sed etiam personam 
nostrum: quicquid ea privitim etiam dixerit, gesserit, cogitaverit, placet Deo, Non quidem propter nos, sed 
propter Christum, quem credimus pro nobis factum esse sub legem. Sumus autem certissimi Christum 
placere Deo, eum sanctum esse etc. Quatenus igitur placet Christos et nos in eo haeremus, eatenus et nos 
Deo placemus ac sancti sumus.” WA 40i.576.27–33. 
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terrorizing of the countryside. Even more problematically for Luther, it would be to say 
that God accepts the transgression of the law. Hampson’s understanding of a dialectic 
that keeps history and eternity separate cannot describe Luther’s account of God’s love 
for the sinner because of Christ.  
 This relates directly to her misunderstanding of Catholicism. The basis of God’s 
love for Christians is their baptism, that is, their unification with the Son in the Spirit.
148
 
God loves Christians for Christ’s sake, and in doing so, he indeed makes them like God, 
restoring the image of God erased by sin.
149
 But this is no direct path to God made 
possible by the infusing of some otherworldly power. It is instead the constitution of a 
new relationship with God made possible solely by God’s work; that work includes a 
renovation of the fallen creature.
150
 As David Yeago remarks, the interior renovation of 
the believer  
would in Forde's view rob the "imputed, unconditional gift" of justification of any 
point at all. This is because Forde regards it as obvious that such growth would 
necessarily be a movement away from dependence on God's grace. The more 
progress the believer made, the less he or she would need unmerited favor; a 
person who was perfected in holiness would presumably be morally self-
sufficient, beyond the need for divine mercy.
151
 
Here, precisely, is where the misunderstanding lies. Christian progress by God’s grace 
does not make the Christian less dependent on God, as if the divine and human action 
                                                 
148
 It is important note that Trent equates the justification of the Christian with her “grafting onto” 
or “insertion into” Christ. Trent, Session VI, ch. 7, DH 1530.  
149
 Gen 1:27. It is precisely in the putting off of the old man, and the putting on of the new that this 
form is restored, or in the words of Trent, that they are “created in accordance with God.” Trent, Session V, 
can 5, DH 1515. 
150
 In Thomas’s discussion of grace, for example, it is clear that the justification of the sinner is 
purely an act of God, but because it creates a new relationship with a created being, it requires that God 
both give the creature the capacity for the new relationship and continue to be operating in the creature in a 
way that does not remove her freedom because to do so would not befit her nature as a rational creature. 
See Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology, after the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine 
of Justification,” Modern Theology, 20, no. 1 (2004), 11–12. 
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 David S. Yeago, “Martin Luther on Renewal and Sanctification,” 656.  
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were opposed. This would require that there could be human actions that were not 
somehow dependent on God’s prior gifts of creation, sustenance, and grace. 
In the terms of the present project, while it is true that Catholic theology 
conceptualizes sin as CAUSE FOR SEPARATION FROM GOD and draws conclusions from this 
for the life of Christians after baptism, it does so in the context of a complex 
understanding of causality in which God (as efficient cause) produces the justification of 
the sinner such that she is remade into the image of God’s desire for her own just self 
(formal cause), and she is unified with God (that is, as final cause). He accomplishes this 
by baptism and faith (instrumental cause) on account of Christ’s saving work 
(meritorious cause).
152
 In all of this, there is a transformation in the Christian wrought by 
God that remains non-final in this life. It remains God’s doing, although the Christian is 
fully involved in it.
153
 This is not the mere infusion of auxiliary power to help the 
Christian climb a difficult hill that Hampson suggests. Nor is it as different from Luther’s 
position as she imagines. 
The Faculty of Concordia Seminary, Fort Wayne, Indiana 
This evaluation, prepared as part of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod’s 
response to the Joint Declaration, makes seven chief critiques of the JDDJ, of which four 
are directly applicable to the present project.
154
 The salient critiques are first, that the 
document fails to admit a “glaring conflict between Augsburg and Trent,” that is whether 
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 JDDJ §21 and Sources for 4.1 
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 Department of Systematic Theology Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne, Indiana, 
“A Response to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, in The Joint Declaration on the 
Doctrine of Justification in Confessional Lutheran Perspective, (St. Louis: Commission on Theology and 
Church Relations of the LC–MS, 1999), 13–38.  
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justification is forensic or transformational. The second is the JDDJ’s definition of grace 
and the third its understanding of original sin. Finally, they reject both the JDDJ’s and the 
Luther Seminary Faculty’s description of law and gospel as it relates to faith.155 
The first of these sets the stage for the others. The Concordia faculty outlines the 
general distinction between justification as “essentially forensic” and as “an internal 
transformation of the believer.”156 While they stipulate that there is a Lutheran method of 
rightly saying that justification is both forgiveness of sins and making righteous, they 
reject with the Formula of Concord “that justifying righteousness ‘consists of two pieces 
or parts, namely, the gracious forgiveness of sins and, as a second element, renewal or 
sanctification.’”157 They expressly reject that transformation can have any part in an 
authentically Lutheran account of justification; this includes an explicit rejection of 
Mannermaa’s interpretation.158 
On this basis, in the following section, the faculty members draw a sharp 
distinction between grace as favor Dei and as “infused grace, a spiritual power poured 
into the soul by which we love God and merit salvation.”159 The concern with forensic 
models as starkly opposed to transformative models is also played out in the section on 
original sin. There the JDDJ asserts that remaining concupiscence is “objectively in 
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 The seven subsections of problems in order are titled: (1) Justification: Forensic or 
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contradiction to God [but] does not merit the punishment of eternal death and does not 
separate the justified person from God.”160 The faculty calls this description mere 
“excuses for sin [that] are substituted for forgiveness and justification.”161 Finally, they 
diagnose a failure to relate faith and justification to the atonement of Christ on the cross. 
In place of what they see as a kind of human cooperation in justification by the act of 
faith, they insist that justification is appropriated by faith, but only as “pure receptivity— 
the empty hand filled by the Person and Work of the God-Man.”162 The central concern 
throughout this critique is the mutual opposition of forensic and transformational 
accounts of justification, particularly as informed by an account of faith as fiducia. 
Clearly, this argument represents a not-incidental stream within the collection of 
historical Lutheranisms. It seeks to buttress the faith against what it understands to be an 
ever-present danger in Roman Catholicism, i.e. the human tendency to want to be God 
and to merit salvation. It therefore insists on a sharp distinction between justification and 
sanctification so that humans do not believe themselves to be meriting justification in any 
manner. Indeed, Luther’s distinction between law and gospel, between the iustitia 
Christiana and the iustitia legalis, can seem to support or even require such a distinction.  
Luther’s own theological practice, however, demonstrates that these two moments 
in the Christian story are also to be interrelated. Luther speaks of Christ’s gift of imputed 
justification and then immediately inquires as the effects that that justification has in the 
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 Ibid., 27. Interestingly, they cite Hans Küng’s book on justification positively here, in part to 
show that even a Catholic theologian is capable of seeing the work of Christ as related to both universal and 
personal justification. They do not point to Trent’s insistence that the saving death of Christ is the 
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life of the believer.
163
 The logical separation that keeps the believer from believing in 
himself is precisely a logical separation for the sake of preaching. It is not a necessary 
separation in the life of the believer, for Christ’s action does something within her: Sin is 
imprisoned; the sickness of sin begins to be cured.
164
 Of course, this gives the believer no 
rights against God, and in this sense she can be said to remain a sinner. But, in another 
sense, Luther’s own first blend SIN gives us a way of speaking of the Christian as no 
longer a sinner on account of Christ: If sin is anything not in accord with the law of God, 
then the Christian, precisely because she is united with Christ and is named just by God, 
can be said to no longer be a sinner, for the lawgiver himself has named her just. Having 
been named just, Christ’s action in her to kill death and sin names a transformative aspect 
of God’s action that cannot be wholly separated from her justification, except for the sake 
of preaching.
165
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sake of preaching, for forming consciences, and for responding to the existential crisis of Anfechtungen. 
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The question that must be asked, then, is whether the Joint Declaration muddies 
the distinction between justification and sanctification in Lutheran theology in such a way 
as to encourage the Christian to trust in her own actions for salvation, or whether it points 
her consistently to Christ as the author, means, and end of that justification. This question 
is not unrelated to the central task of the present work as a whole, for the anthropology of 
the baptized Christian is exactly what is at stake in critiques of Pelagianizing tendencies. 
If the Tridentine insistence that concupiscence in the baptized is not, properly speaking, 
sin means that baptism places the Christian in a state in which by her own powers she 
must act so as to be saved, then this is a problem. But this is not the teaching of the JDDJ: 
“We confess together that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and 
truly renews the person. But the justified must all through life constantly look to God's 
unconditional justifying grace.”166 Grace never makes the Christian independent of God. 
The different starting points for defining sin deeply affect the description of Christ’s 
action in the believer, but need not prevent each from recognizing in the other a working-
out of the implications of the one Gospel of Christ in the lives of believers.  
Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the Lutheran motto simul iustus et peccator has been discussed in 
terms of the complex Lutheran blends for SIN that begin with SIN IS ANYTHING NOT IN 
                                                                                                                                                 
existential concerns, and therefore that there is an asymmetry built into a consideration of Lutheran and 
Catholic theologies under this rubric, is not unwarranted. But, insofar as we are speaking of the fruitfulness 
of different descriptions of the Christian life, asking in which mode they are acting is helpful. See O.H. 
Pesch, “Existential and Sapiential Theology – The theological Confrontation between Luther and Thomas 
Aquinas,” In Jared Wicks, ed., Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 
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ACCORD WITH GOD’S LAW, and then are made more complex in describing the remaining 
sin in the Christian in terms of Christ’s “ruling” of that sin such that it becomes A 
SICKNESS BEING HEALED or A CAGED ROBBER. The Christian life is thus structured by a 
continual return to baptism through penance, so as to return to Christ in faith, and be 
healed of sickness or freed from the terrors of the robber. 
Different contemporary systematizations of Luther’s thought have been shown to 
draw different implications for how this is to be understood in the lives of believers, 
depending on the division or relationship that is posited as existing between Christian 
righteousness and the righteousness of the law, between justification and sanctification. 
In the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, these two are both considered as 
flowing from one divine action, that is, the union with Christ that is given in baptism and 
grasped in faith. Understood in this way, the Lutheran position is capable of a 
differentiated consensus with the Catholic position, although there remain Lutheran 
theologies that cannot accept the agreement.  
The Lutheran blends for sin and their sacramental framing make clear that what is 
at stake in Lutheran thought, at least as portrayed in the JDDJ, in the works of Luther, 
and in the Confessions engaged here, is capable of a differentiated consensus with the 
Roman Catholic positions described in the JDDJ. As a Roman Catholic theologian, I can 
properly judge how different Lutheran theologies work as historical interpretations of 
Luther and as they relate to each other. I cannot claim that one of these theologies is the 
theology to which all Lutherans must adhere. Therefore, while I can claim that the JDDJ 
makes a reasonable case for having achieved a differentiated consensus between the 
theologies that are operative in it, I cannot finally declare that the Lutherans who reject it 
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on the basis of affirming that faith is only fiducia or because they posit an impenetrable 
dialectic between law and gospel are bad Lutherans, although they are probably 
describing positions that are foreign to the Reformer himself.  
 
 
 
 
     
CONCLUSION:  
DIFFERENTIATED CONSENSUS IN THE JDDJ 
 
After two chapters of close engagement with the particular concerns of Lutherans 
and Roman Catholics, the reader, especially one quite familiar with the Lutheran-
Catholic dialogue, might be asking whether the mode of inquiry paid the promised 
dividends. In this conclusion, I will both point to the specific contributions of the 
application of cognitive linguistic insights to the present project and demonstrate how it 
can help an ecumenical non-expert to become a better reader of the JDDJ. First, I will 
return to the question of how cognitive blending functions in each church and in the 
dialogues. I will then return to the Joint Declaration itself to examine how the Lutheran 
and Catholic cognitive blends for SIN and their different framings are both present and 
reconciled in that document.  
Zooming Out Again: Why Cognitive Linguistics?  
Bilateral dialogue has been found to be a potent ecumenical method.
1
 Over years 
and decades, theological experts become proficient in the details of the disputed 
questions. They develop facility with the language and thought-forms of the dialogue 
partner. Roman Catholic theologians must learn to express the Lutheran position so that 
Lutheran experts recognize it as their own and vice versa. This familiarity with the 
other’s forms of thought allows a new ecumenical horizon to emerge in which it becomes 
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possible to discover if apparently contradictory teachings are in fact such, and if they are 
not, to name where the commonality lies. 
The weakness of the method is that ecumenical dialogues are always done on 
behalf of the wider church. Those who receive their findings have not developed the 
proficiency in the other church’s language that the dialogue’s findings presuppose or the 
merged horizon that is their most proper context. The process of reception requires each 
reader of the dialogue reports to test those findings against his own understanding of 
Christian teaching. If that understanding of Christian teaching requires exact repetition of 
cherished formulations or is systematically structured by the division from the other, 
reception of the dialogues will be difficult, if not impossible. It is in this situation that an 
examination of the cognitive-linguistic understanding of human meaning is most helpful. 
Examining the structures underlying human cognition and meaning expressed by 
languages and cultures leads to several important conclusions. First, the world does not 
come to people in a pre-structured manner such that literality is the univocal base-
position of language.
2
 Instead, humans experience the world in a fundamentally mediated 
manner. Every experience, every narration, contains a complex interplay of objective and 
subjective aspects. In the third chapter, color provided an example of how these different 
inputs are seamlessly blended in our experience, such that the outside world, human 
ocular and neural structure, and cultural formation all play a role in the simplest 
experience of color vision.
3
 
More complex ideas are made possible by the process of network formation. 
Basic mental spaces are linked to produce “blends” that can be metonymic or 
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 This description has been called the “idealized conventional view.” See chapter three, p. 133.  
3
 See chapter three, p. 139. 
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metaphoric.
4
 In everyday usage, we do not examine the formation or structure of these 
blends. Doing so would prevent us from achieving the facility of meaning and expression 
that they allow. But in some cases examining how these blends are structured is 
necessary to clarify why we say what we do. Ecumenical dialogue is one of these 
situations. Understanding the means by which habitual metaphors are constructed allows 
testing the implications of the blend to discover which are necessary because of the 
structure of the local language and which are universally necessary. Here again the 
comparison to color categories is helpful. By investigating the ways that native speakers 
of different languages use color words, we can tease out which particularities are due to 
the underlying structures of the eye and the brain and which are local cultural 
achievements. Making the translation to theological language, we would have to discover 
which rules are necessary requirements of the gospel, which are authentic local 
developments, and what aspects might be local malformations. 
The dialogues pay careful attention to the structures of Lutheran and Catholic 
thought. In doing so, members of the dialogues have come to the realization that some of 
these structures can be incompatible without being contradictory.
5
 As participants 
develop facility in the other’s language, practice, and ways of expressing the Christian 
gospel, they are more likely to see such commonalities. This experience has received 
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 The first is a blend that does not require a cross-domain mapping, the second does. As an 
example of metonym, we used the “riddle of the monk” which is solved by imagining the monk ascending 
and descending on the same day (p.141). Likewise, a metaphoric mapping holds together two different 
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the Church,” 127. See discussion in chapter one, p. 47.  
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notable expression by George Lindbeck and prompted his own consideration of meaning 
in The Nature of Doctrine. He describes the situation in this way.  
The dialogue members … say they have been compelled by the evidence, 
sometimes against their earlier inclinations, to conclude that positions that 
were once really opposed are now readily reconcilable, even though these 
positions remain in a significant sense identical to what they were before. 
… [T]he problem is not with the reality but with the comprehensibility of 
this strange combination of constancy and change, unity and diversity. The 
proper response in that case is not to deny the reality on the grounds that it 
seems impossible, but rather to seek to explain its possibility.
6
 
If all theologies as instantiations of human meaning are constructed through neural blends 
of various sorts, this experience becomes explainable.  
Different Christianities form different cultural-linguistic groups, and each speaks 
a different dialect of Christian. These dialects are shaped by theological concerns, 
liturgical practices, and historical accidents. In day-to-day use, there is no need to 
consider how these habitual blends were formed or how they force particular 
formulations and rule out others. Fluency requires neither an understanding of etymology 
nor of comparative philology. These become necessary only when comparing dialects or 
related languages. Lutherans writing a hymnal select and reject particular hymns because 
they fit or do not fit within the Lutheran liturgy; Catholics would choose a different, 
although overlapping, set of hymns. In both cases, the hymns that are chosen will form 
those who sing them, forming them as Catholics or as Lutherans by strengthening certain 
associations and networks at the expense of others.  
But in the dialogues, something unusual happens. Not only are experts in different 
Christianities seeking to understand the structure of the other, but “thoughts and formulas 
of ‘differentiated consensus’ crystallize over time in the process of working for consensus 
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 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 15. 
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in the bilateral interconfessional dialogues.”7 Here, we have a kind of higher-level 
blending, in which those who have developed facility in both forms of thought begin to 
see connections and consensus. They then have the task of describing these meta-blends 
in a way that is receivable by the broader church. For the dialogue to be truly effective, 
others must be able to see the particular metaphoric understandings of their own tradition 
in the consensus. They also need to overcome the inherited understandings of the 
difference that describe it in terms of insurmountable dichotomies. Without this, the 
dialogues’ experience of “doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation” cannot be shared 
with the wider church.
8
  
Blending in the JDDJ: Its Eschatological Double-Vision 
In our engagement with the JDDJ, we have seen how the habitual Roman Catholic 
blend SIN IS JUST CAUSE FOR DISINHERITANCE, framed by BAPTISM, produces significant 
apparent contradictions with the Lutheran SIN IS ANYTHING THAT IS AGAINST GOD’S 
LAW, framed by THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL. Historically, the clash of these blends has 
produced an understanding that the churches are divided because one has a 
transformational and the other a forensic account of justification.  
What we have seen in the Joint Declaration, however, is a recognition that this 
clash is only an apparent contradiction. In dialogues over the last five decades, Roman 
Catholic and Lutheran theologians had come to recognize that a consensus existed 
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 Harding Meyer, “Ökumenischer Konsens,” 41. “Gedanke und Formel zum ‘differenzierten 
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between their positions. This consensus required its own reframing: the Christian after 
baptism has already been made just and is in a state of justification. At the same time, she 
is not yet the version of her own self that God desires her to be. Justification therefore 
also implies a trajectory towards that final form of her justice in God. Lutherans and 
Catholics hold together this double vision differently. They have different habitual ways 
of relating the two sides to each other, but each is describing an eschatological double 
vision of the Christian as already just and as not yet fully just.  
In the JDDJ, then, there is a new blending that is proper to the dialogue. It should 
be appropriable by both Lutherans and Catholics. Two assertions, held together, re-frame 
the question and allow the JDDJ to achieve its goal.
 
These are JUSTIFICATION IS 
ABSOLUTELY GRATUITOUS, and JUSTIFICATION IS FORGIVENESS OF SINS AND MAKING 
RIGHTEOUS.
9
 The new framing allows the questions of historical disagreement to be 
understood differently. The two confessions need not be divided over the question of 
justification because each recognizes in the other a theology that is not what was 
condemned by the parties of the sixteenth century. This new blend is not intended to 
supplant the theology of either church, although it will likely be appropriated more and 
more as the churches continue to work and pray together. Should the churches come into 
communion with each other in the future, it would be on the basis of these agreements. It 
would not collapse the theology of either church into a single transconfessional 
                                                 
9
 That this is the context in which the consensus lies should surprise no one. Not only are these 
both central claims of the sixteenth century, but the seed of this agreement is already present in one of the 
first statements of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Joint Commission, “All Under One Christ:” “it is solely 
by grace and by faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit in us that we are accepted by 
God and receive the Holy Spirit who renews our hearts and equips us for and calls us to good works.” (UC 
§14).  
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consensus.
10
 However, the differentiated consensus that exists does set borders on the 
possible interpretations of Lutheranism and Catholicism. A Lutheranism that denies 
Christian progress in holiness is ruled out, as is a Catholicism that collapses the 
eschatological space, as if baptism made the Christian’s final form fully present in a 
more-than-sacramental manner. Speaking of the Christian as being “in a state of grace” or 
being “named just in Christ” can never exclude either the growth in justification that 
results in the Christian’s final form of justice,11 nor the progressive healing wrought by 
Christ who over time puts the old Adam in the Christian to death.
12
 
Interpreting a document like the JDDJ requires attending to what it is trying to do. 
It is not trying to adjudicate the sixteenth-century disputes in favor of one party or 
another. Nor is it trying to articulate an undifferentiated consensus on all the particulars 
in order to transcend the difference between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. Instead, it 
is describing a differentiated consensus that leaves Lutheran and Catholic manners of 
theologizing in place while showing that they need not be understood as contradictory to 
each other. This can be explained by appealing to our understanding of how language 
works and to Christian respect for for the incarnate nature of human existence. When 
ecumenists speak of “concerns,” or of historical anathemas as not indicting a 
contemporary dialogue partner, they are not ruling the past to be unimportant. Nor are 
they merely equivocating on important terms to find an ecumenical consensus that is not 
                                                 
10
 This model of ecumenism is thus more appropriable than that assumed by Lindbeck in his 
examples, in which the future church is monolithic, overcoming the histories of the divided churches. See 
p. 99 in chapter two. 
11
 See discussion of Trent, chapter four, p. 224. See also the critique of Malloy, p. 245. 
12
 See discussion of Luther, chapter five, beginning on p. 254, and the interpretation of the partim-
partim aspect of the simul, p. 292. See also the critique of Hampson, p. 302 
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a consensus in the truth.
13
 Instead, as chapters two and three demonstrated, any consensus 
in the truth between divided Christian groups will require something that resembles the 
differentiated consensus of the JDDJ. This kind of consensus neither ignores differences 
nor totalizes them. Instead, it seeks to translate between the metaphorically-constructed 
thought worlds to illuminate what consensus in the one Christian Gospel exists and to 
relate the differences that do exist to that consensus. 
Attending to the particular Lutheran and Roman Catholic blends that are involved 
in describing the justified Christian is important. Chapters four and five sought to tease 
out these blends and to show that the JDDJ was compatible with each. This conclusion 
will once more go through the sections of the JDDJ related to sin in the baptized to show 
how these blends are held together within the dialogues’ re-framing of the question. In 
place of the historic arguments between a (complete-) transformational and a (merely-) 
forensic account of justification, the JDDJ insists on a fuller blend that it finds to be truer 
to the visions of both churches. This blend is also capable of achieving the tricky balance 
necessary to describe the Christian as justified and still not yet what God desires for him. 
Again, it is JUSTIFICATION IS FORGIVENESS OF SINS AND MAKING RIGHTEOUS. It is no 
accident that this is the title of section 4.2 of the JDDJ.
14
  
It is important to note that this is a double-scope blend. Neither forgiveness nor 
making righteous has priority; both are held together in tension. This means that there is 
both unity and distinction between the two. Justification is not merely making righteous, 
                                                 
13
 This critique of the JDDJ is made specifically by Robert Preus in his Justification and Rome, 
(Saint Louis: Concordia Academic Press, 1997). I did not deal with his specific concerns both because they 
are not particularly original, and because the work was brought to a close by his death in 1995, and thus is 
not dealing with the final form of the JDDJ.  
14
 The title is actually “Justification as Forgiveness of Sins and Making Righteous.” The 
difference between the two formulations is merely the structural difference of a descriptive title and the 
operative blend it is defining.  
  321 
or the eschatological tension will be collapsed. But neither is it merely forgiveness. 
Arguments about transformational versus forensic accounts of justification tend to force 
their partisans to choose between equating justification with making righteous 
(accomplished transformational) and with forgiveness (merely forensic). The Joint 
Declaration, along with both Martin Luther and the Council of Trent, holds these inputs 
in tension. Each produces a complex double-scope blend in order to do so.  
When Roman Catholics merely equate justification with making righteous, this 
can encourage the Pelagianizing pattern of sacramental self-justification that Lutherans 
have historically condemned. As demonstrated in chapter four, however, this 
understanding itself runs afoul of Trent’s definitions. Because it collapses the 
eschatological tension and makes our final righteousness already present, it cannot 
describe the growth in justification that will eventually result in that form of justice that 
God desires for us and provides for us.
15
 It also runs counter to the liturgical practice of 
the church. As but one example, even though the celebration of the liturgy of the 
eucharist presumes that those taking part are free from the mortal sin that would separate 
them from God, the liturgy begins with the kyrie, asking God’s forgiveness; before 
receiving the eucharist, the people declare their unworthiness to receive it; many of the 
propers ask that God forgive his people and drive all remaining sin out of them.  
When Lutheran theology absolutely separates justification from sanctification, it 
can tend towards one of two equally problematic options diagnosed by David Yeago as a 
kind of antinomianism or a type of gnosticism.
16
 On the one hand, the separation of the 
                                                 
15
 Council of Trent, Session VI, ch. 7, 10; DH 1528, 1535. 
16
 These is, admittedly, an element of overstatement for the sake of clarity in this diagnosis, which 
is made by David S. Yeago, in “Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on 
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two can lead to a disregard for the law. Because God has already declared the Christian 
just, she has no need to strive to fulfil the dictates of the law. In this version of Lutheran 
thought, Daphne Hampson might be right, God would love the sinner as a sinner, without 
desiring her healing.
17
 On the other hand, there is the possibility of a kind of gnosticism 
in which justification has only to do with a proper inner attitude toward God. Here, 
because justification is an entirely inner reality exhausted by trust (fiducia) in God’s 
promise, it cannot have any exterior effects in the Christian’s life. Holiness itself is 
merely an inner attitude. Both of these positions are extant in contemporary Lutheranism. 
Neither does justice to Luther’s understanding of sin as framed by the law and the gospel. 
The Christian is freed by God’s word and declared just. He is also still called to war 
against the remaining sin in himself, and to live out the various laws to which he is 
properly subject in all things except his justification.
18
 Indeed, being justified by Christ is 
also the beginning of his being made righteous, a process that will continue throughout 
his life until he is fully conformed to God’s image in Jesus by the Holy Spirit. 
The JDDJ demonstrates that a double-scope blend holding together God’s already 
accomplished action of justification and the ongoing reformation of the Christian in 
holiness is common to both traditions. Chapter four argued that the Tridentine definition 
of the formal cause of justification maintains the eschatological space required to speak 
of the trajectory of justification. It does this within a theological tradition that emphasizes 
the state of justification in order to protect the efficacy of baptism. Chapter five described 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Cost of a Construal,” Pro Ecclesia 2, no. 1 (1993): 37–49. They are problematic consequences that can 
arise within Lutheran theology when forgiveness and making righteous are not properly balanced.  
17
 See p. 302. 
18
 That is, the righteousness of the law, ceremonial righteousness, and political righteousness. 
Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 40i.41.1–2. See p. 286 above. 
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the particular logic of Lutheran thought that is framed by the law and the gospel. Within 
this logic, the proclamation of divine forgiveness is fully present without exempting 
Christians from the daily struggle to overcome the old Adam. There is ongoing intra-
Lutheran disagreement about how to hold together the state of justification and the 
trajectory of being made righteous. The assenting Lutherans of both German- and 
Finnish-influenced theologies, however, affirmed that Christ’s work within Christians 
both declared them to be righteous and is carrying out the interior renovation that will 
lead to their final perfection in union with God. 
While it is differently described in each tradition, the common pattern allows 
recognizing an authentic Christianity in the other. Both groups recognize that when 
paired with the insistence of the absolute priority of grace (JDDJ 4.1, “Human 
Powerlessness and Sin in Relation to Justification”) the eschatological tension of 
Christian life can be described without either despairing for our salvation or trusting in 
our own works. Instead, the eschatological tension in the Christian mirrors the unity and 
distinction between earthly and heavenly realities found in many aspects of Christian life. 
The kingdom is present in the Church, but not in its final form. Christ’s body and blood 
are truly present in the eucharist, but in a sacramental manner. Likewise, baptism unites 
the Christian to Christ’s body, but not in the final form that that will take in the Kingdom. 
In doing so, God forgives his sin and inaugurates the struggle with sin by which he will 
be made righteous. 
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The Consensus of the JDDJ on Sin in the Baptized 
In order to test the case that has been made in the previous chapters, I will apply 
what has been demonstrated about the Lutheran and Catholic cognitive blends for SIN and 
its framing in terms of BAPTISM or LAW AND GOSPEL to the relevant sections of the Joint 
Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. In this section, instead of attending to 
whether the Catholic or the Lutheran positions are represented in the document, I will 
instead engage the question of whether they are represented in such a way as to make the 
case that the differentiated consensus recognized in the bilateral dialogues constitutes a 
real consensus between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. This occurs within the double-
scope blend JUSTIFICATION IS FORGIVENESS OF SINS AND MAKING RIGHTEOUS, within THE 
ABSOLUTE GRATUITY OF JUSTIFICATION.  
In order to do this, I will work backwards through the document, beginning with 
Sections 2A and 2B of the Annex, and then proceeding to the specifically Catholic (§30) 
and Lutheran (§29) paragraphs of Section 4.4. I will end by considering the common 
paragraph (§28). By beginning with the clarifications and working back through the 
paragraphs engaging difference, the consensus of the common paragraph will be made as 
clear as it can be, demonstrating that the Joint Declaration does indeed describe a 
consensus. This consensus is one in which the parties will continue to speak their own 
theological, ritual, and cultural languages. These would still seem to contradict each other 
if it were not for the insights provided by the process of dialogue and explained in the 
JDDJ.  
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Clarifications: Annex Sections 2A and 2B 
The Annex to the Joint Declaration has four major sections: A short paragraph of 
introduction (§1), a section of clarifications related to the priority of grace and Christian 
renewal (§2), a paragraph regarding the status of justification as “indispensable criterion” 
and touchstone of the faith (§3), and a final paragraph relating to the different modes of 
authority within the two churches (§4). Of these, section two is by far the longest, 
containing five sub-sections (A–E). Of these, A and B are most germane to the present 
investigation.  
Section two is briefly introduced with these words: 
Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ's saving work and not 
because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy 
Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works 
(JD[DJ] 15).
19
  
This paragraph reiterates the two central aspects of the blend we have been discussing 
that allow agreement in the JDDJ: JUSTIFICATION IS FORGIVENESS OF SINS AND MAKING 
RIGHTEOUS, as framed by THE ABSOLUTE GRATUITY OF JUSTIFICATION. In the language 
of the previous chapters, justification as divine gift is a fully-accomplished state, made 
present to the believer in baptism and faith. The ongoing reformation of the person that 
justification inaugurates and, in a sense, contains, is a trajectory implying growth into 
God’s desire for each person. Trent noted the remaining infidelities in the person,20 and 
spoke of the formal cause of their final justification,
21
 towards which they must grow so 
                                                 
19
 JDDJ Annex §2. 
20
 Council of Trent, Session V, can. 5, DH 1515. 
21
 Council of Trent, Session VI, ch. 7, DH 1529. 
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that justification can truly be said to increase.
22
 Luther spoke of the Christian life as a 
road on which we travel by contrition, progressing by Christ’s grace towards holiness,23 
all the while named just by God for Christ’s sake in Baptism.24 
Within this shared description of the Christian double reality finally determined 
by grace, the Annex reexamines a number of questions that had become controversial in 
the development of the JDDJ. Of these, I will primarily engage the first two, related to sin 
in the baptized (§2A) and the definition of concupiscence (§2B). 
Section 2A: Sin in the Baptized 
Section 2A consists of two paragraphs, both of which consist primarily of 
citations from the JDDJ and the bible, interspersed with connective phrases and 
commentary. The first paragraph describes the renewed life of the Christian, ending with 
the insistence that because God truly justifies Christians, they are —by definition— not 
sinners in the sense that they are separated from God: 
“We confess together that God forgives sin by grace and at the same time frees 
human beings from sin's enslaving power (...)” (JD[DJ] 22). Justification is 
forgiveness of sins and being made righteous, through which God “imparts the 
gift of new life in Christ” (JD[DJ] 22). “Since we are justified by faith we have 
peace with God” (Rom 5:1). We are “called children of God; and that is what we 
are” (1 Jn 3:1).We are truly and inwardly renewed by the action of the Holy 
Spirit, remaining always dependent on his work in us. “So if anyone is in Christ, 
there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has 
become new!”(2 Cor 5:17). The justified do not remain sinners in this sense.25  
                                                 
22
 Ibid., ch. 10, DH 1535.  
23
 Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans, WA 56.442. 
24
 Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians, WA 40i. 51.14–17, among others. 
25
 JDDJ Annex §2A1. 
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It is followed by a second paragraph that attends to the second half of the necessary 
double-vision: the remaining sin that Christians recognize as remaining within 
themselves. While the first paragraph focuses on the proclamation of forgiveness and 
new life that is made to the Christian by God in the gospel and the sacraments, this 
paragraph instead focuses on the response that Christians make to God when they 
carefully examine their own lives.  
Yet we would be wrong were we to say that we are without sin (1 Jn l:8-10, 
cf. JD[DJ] 28). “All of us make many mistakes” (Jas 3:2). “Who is aware of his 
unwitting sins? Cleanse me of many secret faults“ (Ps. 19:12). And when we pray, 
we can only say, like the tax collector, “God, be merciful to me, a sinner” 
(Lk 18:13). This is expressed in a variety of ways in our liturgies. Together we 
hear the exhortation “Therefore, do not let sin exercise dominion in your mortal 
bodies, to make you obey their passions” (Rom 6:12). This recalls to us the 
persisting danger which comes from the power of sin and its action in Christians. 
To this extent, Lutherans and Catholics can together understand the Christian 
as simul justus et peccator, despite their different approaches to this subject as 
expressed in JD[DJ] 29-30.
26
  
Notice what the paragraph accomplishes. Instead of asking whether the phrase is 
contradictory, as the Official Roman Response had, it situates the question of the simul 
iustus et peccator within its proper liturgical-experiential setting.
27
 From this perspective, 
an authentically Christian response to God’s gift of grace and justification must include a 
growing honesty about the ongoing necessity for God’s reformation of one’s life. 
Similar attempts were made in the sixteenth century. They include Melanchthon’s 
argument to Eck that the remaining concupiscence was no indifferent thing,
28
 and 
                                                 
26
 JDDJ Annex §2A1. 
27
 CDF and PCPCU, “Response of the Roman Catholic Church to the JDDJ,” Clarifications 1. 
28
 Corpus Reformatorum IV.2132:40: “Now this remains in controversy: whether the remaining 
sickness in the saints be the penalty itself, or an indifferent thing [adiaphoron], or whether it is truly by its 
nature deserves death, if it not be pardoned. Again, this sickness is not only a desire [concupiscencia] of the 
sensitive appetite, nor only the tinder [fomes] or a quality of the body, but it remains in the mind as a fog 
that has not yet been driven away, such that the saints are greatly tested, and acknowledge doubts and 
mistrust of God. Nor therefore is the will converted to God, so that it entirely blazes with love; but the 
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Luther’s rejection of any entirely pure act in the saints that would allow them to boast 
before God.
29
 Trent’s recognition that the remaining concupiscence in the Christian is to 
be turned away from also provides an example of this pattern, although their concern 
with defending the efficacy of baptism led them to much different language about the 
remaining tinder of sin in the baptized, as was shown above.
30
 The JDDJ’s recognition 
that the two aspects of justification must be held together in tension opens space for this 
experiential engagement with our justification without endangering the efficacy of its 
inauguration in baptism.  
Section 2B: Concupiscence 
In light of this agreement, the following paragraph on concupiscence requires 
little explanation. It states that Catholics and Lutherans use the term in related, although 
different, ways to describe the redeemed Christian still vulnerable to the attacks of sin.  
The concept of “concupiscence” is used in different senses on the Catholic and 
Lutheran sides. In the Lutheran Confessional writings “concupiscence” is 
understood as the self-seeking desire of the human being, which in light of the 
Law, spiritually understood, is regarded as sin. In the Catholic understanding 
concupiscence is an inclination, remaining in human beings even after baptism, 
which comes from sin and presses towards sin. Despite the differences involved 
here, it can be recognized from a Lutheran perspective that desire can become the 
opening through which sin attacks.
 31
 
The remaining vulnerability, however, must be described as something that will be 
removed in the final victory of Christ, for the eschatological tension that Christians 
                                                                                                                                                 
saints themselves rush on in admiration and love of self. This infirmity, which the saints have wept over so 
often, remains therefore in the mind and in the will and in the sensitive appetite.” My Translation. 
29
 Martin Luther, Against Latomus, WA 8.79.21–25. 
30
 Council of Trent, Session V, can. 5, DH 1515. 
31
 JDDJ Annex §2B1. 
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experience is not harmless. The flesh is capable of causing real damage to the person who 
consents to its anti-divine promptings. Moreover, the Christian life requires owning these 
remaining tendencies as one’s own insofar as we must repent of them and ask God to 
fully heal us. Examples of this pattern are found throughout scripture, in the liturgy, and 
in the writings of the saints, as was made clear by the citations found in §2A.  
Due to the power of sin the entire human being carries the tendency to oppose 
God. This tendency, according to both Lutheran and Catholic conception, “does 
not correspond to God’s original design for humanity” (JD[DJ] 30). Sin has a 
personal character and, as such, leads to separation from God. It is the selfish 
desire of the old person and the lack of trust and love toward God.  
The reality of salvation in baptism and the peril from the power of sin can be 
expressed in such a way that, on the one hand, the forgiveness of sins and renewal 
of humanity in Christ by baptism is emphasized and, on the other hand, it can be 
seen that the justified also ‘are continuously exposed to the power of sin still 
pressing its attacks (cf. Rom 6:12-14) and are not exempt from a lifelong struggle 
against the contradiction to God (...)“ (JD[DJ] 28).32 
Catholics will continue to insist that concupiscence is not truly sin, so long as it receives 
no consent, in the sense that it does not separate from God. It is, therefore, of itself not 
cause for our disinheritance. Lutherans agree that as long as this concupiscence remains 
ruled by Christ it is not damaging to the Christian, but call it sin precisely because it is 
contrary to God’s law and it will not be present in the final remaking of all things. Both 
recognize that it marks the distance that remains to be traveled in the journey towards 
God’s desire for us. 
These paragraphs of the Annex reiterate at greater length the agreement that the 
JDDJ described. They make clearer, based in the commonly-held texts of the tradition, 
that the double description that the Christian life requires is not only shared by Lutherans 
and Catholics, but is itself central to the proclamation of the Gospel. The fact that the two 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. §2B2. 
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inputs of the blend (that is: the final redemption of the kingdom and the experience of the 
present age) are described and balanced in different ways need not in itself be a cause of 
division, although it may require some real care in negotiating between Lutheran and 
Catholic manners of speech. The texts, liturgies, and hymns of one tradition may not be 
available for use by the other without significant translation. However, each tradition can 
recognize in the other an authentic proclamation of the Gospel and a call to live ever 
more as a subject of God’s kingdom.  
Particularity: Lutheran and Roman Catholic Paragraphs 
Moving backwards into the Joint Declaration itself, the Lutheran and Roman 
Catholic explanatory paragraphs provide the next level of explanation. These paragraphs 
have a two-fold task: to explain the particular teaching of the church in question and to 
note how that language is compatible with the consensus found in paragraph 28. I will 
deal with each paragraph in the same order as the chapters above. 
Roman Catholic (§30) 
The Roman Catholic clarification begins, appropriately, with the insistence that 
baptism is efficacious. It then moves directly to the recognition of the elements of the 
interior life that are not yet fully healed. 
Catholics hold that the grace of Jesus Christ imparted in baptism takes away all 
that is sin “in the proper sense” and that is “worthy of damnation” 
(Rom 8:1).There does, however, remain in the person an inclination 
(concupiscence) which comes from sin and presses toward sin. Since, according 
to Catholic conviction, human sins always involve a personal element and since 
this element is lacking in this inclination, Catholics do not see this inclination as 
sin in an authentic sense. They do not thereby deny that this inclination does not 
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correspond to God's original design for humanity and that it is objectively in 
contradiction to God and remains one's enemy in lifelong struggle. Grateful for 
deliverance by Christ, they underscore that this inclination in contradiction to God 
does not merit the punishment of eternal death and does not separate the justified 
person from God. But when individuals voluntarily separate themselves from 
God, it is not enough to return to observing the commandments, for they must 
receive pardon and peace in the Sacrament of Reconciliation through the word of 
forgiveness imparted to them in virtue of God's reconciling work in Christ.
33
  
The double aspect of justification in Christian life is present here. It is formed by the 
particularly Roman Catholic pattern of beginning by affirming God’s accomplished, 
effective work in the sacraments, and then balancing that affirmation by an attendant 
warning that in this life we can lose our justification by assenting to sin. Nevertheless, 
God remains gracious and willing to forgive those who repent. This mode of engagement 
describes the Christian by asking whether he has been disinherited after baptism, and how 
that can be overcome if it is so, not primarily by asking how closely he approaches his 
final form of justice. In this, it demonstrates the typically Tridentine SIN IS CAUSE FOR 
DISINHERITANCE, as framed by BAPTISM. But within this paragraph, that logic is 
expressed differently. Here it is held together with the ongoing concern for becoming 
what God desires us to be that marks the JDDJ’s own blend JUSTIFICATION IS 
FORGIVENESS OF SINS AND MAKING RIGHTEOUS. Nevertheless, that blend is described in 
in a particularly Roman Catholic modality. It is also careful to demonstrate that the 
Lutheran concerns with the Catholic language have been overcome. The paragraph uses 
the language of Trent to show both that the agreement is acceptable to Roman Catholics 
and that the Catholic language is acceptable to Lutherans within the agreement. 
 The Roman Catholic position has several important things to offer to Lutheran 
theology. First, it precludes any engagement with the Christian life that does not 
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continually ask about growth into God’s desire for us. Second, because the sacraments 
are central, it provides a description of the Christian life that is fundamentally rooted in 
the church as Christ’s body, disallowing the cultural tendencies towards individualism 
that the contemporary church must resist. 
Lutheran (§29) 
The Lutheran paragraph of section 4.4 similarly narrates the agreement in its own 
historical language. In this case, it is of course, simul iustus et peccator. As noted in 
chapter five, both the explicit language of totus-totus and a description of the partim-
partim aspect are present.
34
 The Christian is both already inhabiting an accomplished 
state of justification and is in the process of being made righteous by Christ’s work in 
her. 
Lutherans understand this condition of the Christian as a being “at the same time 
righteous and sinner.” Believers are totally righteous, in that God forgives their 
sins through Word and Sacrament and grants the righteousness of Christ which 
they appropriate in faith. In Christ, they are made just before God. Looking at 
themselves through the law, however, they recognize that they remain also totally 
sinners. Sin still lives in them (1 Jn 1:8; Rom 7:17,20), for they repeatedly turn to 
false gods and do not love God with that undivided love which God requires as 
their Creator (Deut 6:5; Mt 22:36-40 pr.). This contradiction to God is as such 
truly sin. Nevertheless, the enslaving power of sin is broken on the basis of the 
merit of Christ. It no longer is a sin that “rules” the Christian for it is itself “ruled” 
by Christ with whom the justified are bound in faith. In this life, then, Christians 
can in part lead a just life. Despite sin, the Christian is no longer separated from 
God, because in the daily return to baptism, the person who has been born anew 
by baptism and the Holy Spirit has this sin forgiven. Thus this sin no longer 
brings damnation and eternal death. Thus, when Lutherans say that justified 
persons are also sinners and that their opposition to God is truly sin, they do not 
deny that, despite this sin, they are not separated from God and that this sin is a 
                                                 
34
 See p. 293. 
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“ruled” sin. In these affirmations, they are in agreement with Roman Catholics, 
despite the difference in understanding sin in the justified.
35
 
The particular concerns of Catholics about the expression are also answered in this 
paragraph. The simul should not be taken to mean that the Christian is a sinner in the 
sense that she is separated from God, or in the sense that the sin within her is unruled.  
 There is still quite a bit of room within this paragraph for different understandings 
of how these two aspects of God’s salvation of sinners are related to each other. This is 
important given the breadth of contemporary Lutheran opinion on how to relate 
justification and sanctification to each other. It does preclude some positions. 
Lutheranisms that would totalize the description of the Christian as a sinner in this world, 
and push off any real renovation of the self until the resurrection are proscribed. 
Justification must have real effects in the world. This idea is clearly present in Luther and 
in the confessions, despite the wariness of the Formula of Concord about confusing 
justification and sanctification. In this, the JDDJ is in continuity with historical Lutheran 
commitments. 
 Perhaps the most important Lutheran contributions to the common understanding 
are: first, the refusal to underestimate the power of sin; second, the way in which the 
Lutheran blend keeps Christ’s action in the Christian always at the center of attention. 
These are real gifts that Catholics can receive through the dialogues. While a sense of the 
danger of sin is found in Catholic authors and they affirm Christ’s centrality to 
justification, the particular gift that the Lutheran model gives is its manner of binding 
these two together so closely. The saints can confess their sins in confidence, precisely 
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because their salvation is an undeserved gift and because it is Christ who is rooting sin 
out of the secret corners in which it hides.  
Consensus: Common Paragraph (§28) 
The consensus paragraph of section 4.4 consists of four sentences that begin with 
the confidence in God’s gift of salvation in baptism, followed by three sentences 
describing to the ongoing need for grace, the danger of sin, and the call to conversion and 
penance. 
We confess together that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, 
justifies, and truly renews the person. But the justified must all through life 
constantly look to God's unconditional justifying grace. They also are 
continuously exposed to the power of sin still pressing its attacks (cf. Rom 6:12-
14) and are not exempt from a lifelong struggle against the contradiction to God 
within the selfish desires of the old Adam (cf. Gal 5:16; Rom 7:7-10). The 
justified also must ask God daily for forgiveness as in the Lord's Prayer (Mt. 6:12; 
1 Jn1:9), are ever again called to conversion and penance, and are ever again 
granted forgiveness.
36
 
The first sentence contains the JDDJ’s new framing. Justification is union with Christ that 
is forgiveness of sins and making righteous (here, true renewal). This insistence is rooted 
in the previous sections detailing the human inability to merit justification (4.1), the 
connection of forgiveness and renovation of life (4.2), and justification by faith through 
grace (4.3). It is developed further in the following sections relating to the law and gospel 
(4.5), the assurance of salvation (4.6), and the good works of the justified (4.7). All of 
these work together to define the consensus recognized over years of bilateral dialogues.  
Section 4.4 has the particular work of describing what I have been calling the 
eschatological tension inherent in the anthropology of the justified Christian. The 
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addition of the first sentence to the paragraph in the final version makes this even 
clearer.
37
 Framing the paragraph in this way demonstrates that Christians cannot properly 
talk about the sin within themselves without also pointing to the already-present reality of 
their justification. The Christian already participates in her final justification, and in that 
justification she is able to head towards what God desires her to be in Christ, although it 
will not be accomplished before the fullness of the Kingdom is reached. Describing the 
double-vision built into the structure of Christian thought requires Christians to produce 
sophisticated double-scope blends. Within any particular Christian way of speaking, these 
blends describe the complexities of Christian life without having to be continually 
rebalancing one’s elocutions by referring in circles to languages of state and trajectory. 
They thus make the complexity of the blend implicit, allowing more elegant habitual 
speech. Within the contested space of the dialogue, however, it is important to make 
explicit what is implicit, and this is clearly done in this paragraph, especially as it is 
contextualized in the JDDJ.  
Summary and Prospects for Future Research 
The Lutheran–Roman Catholic agreement on justification in the Joint Declaration 
on the Doctrine of Justification is complex, balancing a large number of concerns in a 
few paragraphs. The critiques levied against it were of two major types, some relating to 
particular aspects of its content and others more generally to its representing a 
differentiated consensus, or “doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation.”38 The idea 
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that historically-opposed convictions could be discovered to constitute a greater 
agreement is difficult to imagine within a conventional view of how human language 
bears meaning. The experience of finding in the other a Christianity that is not opposed to 
one’s own despite one’s prior expectations can be explained within an understanding of 
theological language enriched by the insights of cognitive linguists. 
Theological language, like all language, is progressively developed through a 
process of relating different neural networks. These networks have their most basic roots 
in processes of the human body: bodily movement, sense data, and our experience of our 
own thought. From these basic building blocks, quite complex concepts are progressively 
built up by combining different networks in a variety of manners. These networks usually 
remain hidden to even exceedingly proficient speakers. Attention to them becomes 
helpful when different theological dialects are found to be in conflict. Sometimes these 
are discovered to be real conflicts. Sometimes, however, the conflicts are only apparent 
because different metaphorical structures within each tradition force or preclude 
particular patterns of speech. In these cases, careful attention to the metaphorical 
construction of that tradition’s habitual language can be helpful in clarifying the 
consensus that has been recognized in bilateral dialogue.  
In this project, I examined one important example within the Joint Declaration to 
do precisely this. The example in question was the complex description of the remaining 
anti-divine tendencies still present in the baptized. Because Christian justification is at 
once an already-achieved state and an ongoing trajectory, naming this reality requires 
subtlety. Lutheran and Roman Catholic methods of doing so seem to be in contradiction 
with one another, but this turns out to be an apparent contradiction related to the 
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particular cognitive blends for SIN that each habitually uses and the kind of framing that 
that blend is given.  
This type of research will continue to provide areas for investigation, both within 
the JDDJ and in its successor documents. One example would be the fraught question of 
the centrality of justification to theology. The JDDJ proclaimed: 
Therefore the doctrine of justification, which takes up this message and explicates 
it, is more than just one part of Christian doctrine. It stands in an essential relation 
to all truths of faith, which are to be seen as internally related to each other. It is 
an indispensable criterion which constantly serves to orient all the teaching and 
practice of our churches to Christ. When Lutherans emphasize the unique 
significance of this criterion, they do not deny the interrelation and significance of 
all truths of faith. When Catholics see themselves as bound by several criteria, 
they do not deny the special function of the message of justification. Lutherans 
and Catholics share the goal of confessing Christ in all things, who alone is to be 
trusted above all things as the one Mediator (1 Tim 2:5f) through whom God in 
the Holy Spirit gives himself and pours out his renewing gifts. [cf. Sources for 
section 3].
39
  
Many of the negative Lutheran responses to the JDDJ insist that this is not a strong 
enough description of the place of justification within Christian theology.
40
 Engaging the 
understanding of how justification operates as a criterion within historical Lutheran 
theologies could be helpful not only to the reception of the JDDJ, but to a variety of 
related questions in the ongoing dialogue. 
 The application of cognitive linguistic insight into meaning may also prove 
helpful to the dialogues themselves as they seek to tease apart the tangles of historical 
polemics. One area in which such an inquiry could be fruitful is the ongoing conversation 
regarding what constitutes a “church,” properly speaking. Some work on metaphoric 
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understandings of the church has already been done.
41
 The recurring difficulty that the 
ecumenical discussions experience related to ecclesiology, particularly as related to the 
sacrament of order, shows this to be an area in which new directions should be tried. 
Understandings of what makes the sacrament valid and how this relates to ecclesiality 
could benefit from careful investigation beginning with the cognitive blends for validity, 
sacramentality, and the church itself. 
I would venture to guess, however, that the primary use of investigations into 
cognitive blending will be in explaining the differentiated consensuses that arise out of 
bilateral ecumenical dialogues. There are many Christians who are not deeply familiar 
with either the theological language used by Christians of different traditions, or that of 
the dialogues. If attention to cognitive blending can make the differentiated consensuses 
that arise in bilateral dialogue more available to such Christians, it will foster reception of 
the dialogues’ conclusions among the churches. This will be a great service to the cause 
of unity. 
 
  
                                                 
41
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